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Hakwan Lau [11]Hakwan C. Lau [5]
  1. Hakwan Lau, Dissociating Response Selection and Conflict in the Medial Frontal Surface.
    aFunctional Imaging Laboratory, Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, University College London, 12 Queen Square, London WC1N 3BG, UK bDepartment of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, UK cOxford Centre for Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Brain, UK dDepartment of Psychiatry and Oxford Centre for Clinical Magnetic Resonance Research, University of Oxford, UK..
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  2. Hakwan Lau, Should Scientists Think?
    In my field of consciousness research, scientists frequently mock philosophers for their apparent uselessness. There are many issues about which philosophers have debated for centuries, and yet there are no satisfying resolutions. However, sometimes one thinks: what really is philosophy but careful thinking? Certainly that cannot be completely useless? It is therefore particularly refreshing to read Machado and Silva's article in this issue, which emphasizes the role of conceptual analysis in psychological research.
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  3. Hakwan Lau & Richard Brown (forthcoming). The Emperor's New Phenomenology? The Empirical Case for Conscious Experience Without First-Order Representations. In Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Themes from Block. MIT.
    We discuss cases where subjects seem to enjoy conscious experience when the relevant first-order perceptual representations are either missing or too weak to account for the experience. Though these cases are originally considered to be theoretical possibilities that may be problematical for the higher-order view of consciousness, careful considerations of actual empirical examples suggest that this strategy may backfire; these cases may cause more trouble for first-order theories instead. Specifically, these cases suggest that (I) recurrent feedback loops to V1 are (...)
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  4. Brian Maniscalco & Hakwan Lau (2012). A Signal Detection Theoretic Approach for Estimating Metacognitive Sensitivity From Confidence Ratings. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):422-430.
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  5. Hakwan Lau & David Rosenthal (2011). Empirical Support for Higher-Order Theories of Conscious Awareness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):365-373.
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  6. Hakwan Lau & David Rosenthal (2011). The Higher-Order View Does Not Require Consciously Self-Directed Introspection: Response to Malach. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (11):508-509.
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  7. Richard E. Passingham, Sara L. Bengtsson & Hakwan C. Lau (2010). Is It Fallacious to Talk of Self-Generated Action?: Response to Nachev and Husain. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (5):193-194.
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  8. Richard E. Passingham, Sara L. Bengtsson & Hakwan C. Lau (2010). Medial Frontal Cortex: From Self-Generated Action to Reflection on One's Own Performance. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):16-21.
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  9. Hakwan Lau (2009). Volition and the Function of Consciousness. Faith and Philosophy 26 (5):537-552.
    People have intuitively assumed that many acts of volition are not influenced by unconscious information. However, the available evidence suggests that under suitable conditions, unconscious information can influence behavior and the underlying neural mechanisms. One possibility is that stimuli that are consciously perceived tend to yield strong signals in the brain, and this makes us think that consciousness has the function of sending such strong signals. However, if we could create conditions where the stimuli could produce strong signals but not (...)
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  10. Hakwan Lau (2008). A Higher Order Bayesian Decision Theory of Consciousness. In Rahul Banerjee & B. K. Chakrabarti (eds.), Models of Brain and Mind: Physical, Computational, and Psychological Approaches. Elsevier.
    It is usually taken as given that consciousness involves superior or more elaborate forms of information processing. Contemporary models equate consciousness with global processing, system complexity, or depth or stability of computation. This is in stark contrast with the powerful philosophical intuition that being conscious is more than just having the ability to compute. I argue that it is also incompatible with current empirical findings. I present a model that is free from the strong assumption that consciousness predicts superior performance. (...)
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  11. Hakwan Lau (2008). Are We Studying Consciousness Yet? In Lawrence Weiskrantz & Martin Davies (eds.), Frontiers of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. 2008--245.
    It has been over a decade and half since Christof Koch and the late Francis Crick first advocated the now popular NCC project (Crick and Koch, 1990), in which one tries to find the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) for perceptual processes. In his chapter in this book Chris Frith provides a splendid review of how neuroimaging has contributed greatly to this project. For the sake of contrast, this chapter takes a more critical stance on what we have actually learned. (...)
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  12. Hakwan Lau & Navindra Persaud (2007). Broken Telephone in the Brain: The Need for Metacognitive Measures. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):513-514.
    The fact that early visual processing has a larger capacity than later visual processing can be explained without positing distinct systems for phenomenology and cognitive accessibility. While phenomenology may overflow forced-choice reports, the later can also overestimate the former, as in the case of blindsight. Metacognitive measures of awareness offer a way to address the of consciousness research.
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  13. Christopher D. Frith & Hakwan C. Lau (2006). The Problem of Introspection. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):761-764.
  14. Hakwan C. Lau & Richard E. Passingham (2006). Relative Blindsight in Normal Observers and the Neural Correlate of Visual Consciousness. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 103 (49):18763-18768.
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  15. Richard E. Passingham & Hakwan C. Lau (2006). Free Choice and the Human Brain. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press. 53-72.