Search results for 'Hallucination' (try it on Scholar)

301 found
Order:
  1.  84
    Fiona Macpherson (2013). The Philosophy and Psychology of Hallucination: An Introduction. In Fiona Macpherson Dimitris Platchias (ed.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. MIT Press
  2. István Aranyosi (forthcoming). Silencing the Argument From Hallucination. In Fiona MacPherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination (MIT Press).
    Ordinary people tend to be realists regarding perceptual experience, that is, they take perceiving the environment as a direct, unmediated, straightforward access to a mindindependent reality. Not so for (ordinary) philosophers. The empiricist influence on the philosophy of perception, in analytic philosophy at least, made the problem of perception synonymous with the view that realism is untenable. Admitting the problem (and trying to offer a view on it) is tantamount to rejecting ordinary people’s implicit realist assumptions as naive. So what (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  66
    Costas Pagondiotis (2013). Hallucination, Mental Representation, and the Presentational Character”. In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination. MIT Press 361.
    In this paper, I argue that the indirect realists’ recourse to mental representations does not allow them to account for the possibility of hallucination, nor for the presentational character of visual experience. To account for the presentational character, I suggest a kind of intentionalism that is based on the interdependency between the perceived object and the embodied perceiver. This approach provides a positive account to the effect that genuine perception and hallucination are different kinds of states. Finally, I (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Mark Johnston (2004). The Obscure Object of Hallucination. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):113-83.
    Like dreaming, hallucination has been a formative trope for modern philosophy. The vivid, often tragic, breakdown in the mind’s apparent capacity to disclose reality has long served to support a paradoxical philosophical picture of sensory experience. This picture, which of late has shaped the paradigmatic empirical understanding the senses, displays sensory acts as already complete without the external world; complete in that the direct objects even of veridical sensory acts do not transcend what we could anyway hallucinate. Hallucination (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   62 citations  
  5. Wayne Wu (2012). Explaining Schizophrenia: Auditory Verbal Hallucination and Self-Monitoring. Mind and Language 27 (1):86-107.
    Do self-monitoring accounts, a dominant account of the positive symptoms, explain auditory verbal hallucination (AVH)? In this essay, I argue that the account fails to answer many crucial questions any explanation of AVH must address. Where the account provides a plausible answer, I make a case for an alternative explanation: AVH is not the result of a failed control mechanism, namely failed self-monitoring, but the persistent automaticity of auditory experience of a voice. The argument emphasizes the importance of careful (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  6. Bence Nanay (forthcoming). Hallucination as Mental Imagery. Journal of Consciousness Studies.
    Hallucination is a big deal in contemporary philosophy of perception. The main reason for this is that the way hallucination is treated marks an important stance in one of the most vicious debates in this subdiscipline: the debate between ‘relationalists’ and ‘representationalists’. I argue that if we take hallucinations to be a form of mental imagery (as the literature in neuroscience and psychiatry routinely does), then we have a very straightforward way of arguing against disjunctivism: if hallucination (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Wayne Wu & Raymond Cho (2013). Mechanisms of Auditory Verbal Hallucination in Schizophrenia. Frontiers in Schizophrenia 4.
    Recent work on the mechanisms underlying auditory verbal hallucination (AVH) has been heavily informed by self-monitoring accounts that postulate defects in an internal monitoring mechanism as the basis of AVH. A more neglected alternative is an account focusing on defects in auditory processing, namely a spontaneous activation account of auditory activity underlying AVH. Science is often aided by putting theories in competition. Accordingly, a discussion that systematically contrasts the two models of AVH can generate sharper questions that will lead (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  8.  25
    Sam Wilkinson (2014). Accounting for the Phenomenology and Varieties of Auditory Verbal Hallucination Within a Predictive Processing Framework. Consciousness and Cognition 30:142-155.
    Two challenges that face popular self-monitoring theories (SMTs) of auditory verbal hallucination (AVH) are that they cannot account for the auditory phenomenology of AVHs and that they cannot account for their variety. In this paper I show that both challenges can be met by adopting a predictive processing framework (PPF), and by viewing AVHs as arising from abnormalities in predictive processing. I show how, within the PPF, both the auditory phenomenology of AVHs, and three subtypes of AVH, can be (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  9.  47
    Dominic Alford-Duguid & Michael Arsenault (forthcoming). On the Explanatory Power of Hallucination. Synthese:1-21.
    Pautz has argued that the most prominent naive realist account of hallucination—negative epistemic disjunctivism—cannot explain how hallucinations enable us to form beliefs about perceptually presented properties. He takes this as grounds to reject both negative epistemic disjunctivism and naive realism. Our aims are two: First, to show that this objection is dialectically ineffective against naive realism, and second, to draw morals from the failure of this objection for the dispute over the nature of perceptual experience at large.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  67
    Jennifer M. Windt (2010). The Immersive Spatiotemporal Hallucination Model of Dreaming. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):295-316.
    The paper proposes a minimal definition of dreaming in terms of immersive spatiotemporal hallucination (ISTH) occurring in sleep or during sleep–wake transitions and under the assumption of reportability. I take these conditions to be both necessary and sufficient for dreaming to arise. While empirical research results may, in the future, allow for an extension of the concept of dreaming beyond sleep and possibly even independently of reportability, ISTH is part of any possible extension of this definition and thus is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  11. David R. Hilbert (2004). Hallucination, Sense-Data and Direct Realism. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):185-191.
    Although it has been something of a fetish for philosophers to distinguish between hallucination and illusion, the enduring problems for philosophy of perception that both phenomena present are not essentially different. Hallucination, in its pure philosophical form, is just another example of the philosopher’s penchant for considering extreme and extremely idealized cases in order to understand the ordinary. The problem that has driven much philosophical thinking about perception is the problem of how to reconcile our evident direct perceptual (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  12.  66
    Jérôme Dokic & Jean-Rémy Martin (2012). Disjunctivism, Hallucination and Metacognition. WIREs Cognitive Science 3:533-543.
    Perceptual experiences have been construed either as representational mental states—Representationalism—or as direct mental relations to the external world—Disjunctivism. Both conceptions are critical reactions to the so-called ‘Argument from Hallucination’, according to which perceptions cannot be about the external world, since they are subjectively indiscriminable from other, hallucinatory experiences, which are about sense-data ormind-dependent entities. Representationalism agrees that perceptions and hallucinations share their most specific mental kind, but accounts for hallucinations as misrepresentations of the external world. According to Disjunctivism, the (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  13.  47
    Andrew Stephenson (2015). Kant on the Object-Dependence of Intuition and Hallucination. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):486-508.
    Against a view currently popular in the literature, it is argued that Kant was not a niıve realist about perceptual experience. Naive realism entails that perceptual experience is object-dependent in a very strong sense. In the first half of the paper, I explain what this claim amounts to and I undermine the evidence that has been marshalled in support of attributing it to Kant. In the second half of the paper, I explore in some detail Kant’s account of hallucination (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Charlie Pelling (2011). Characterizing Hallucination Epistemically. Synthese 178 (3):437 - 459.
    According to the epistemic theory of hallucination, the fundamental psychological nature of a hallucinatory experience is constituted by its being 'introspectively indiscriminable', in some sense, from a veridical experience of a corresponding type. How is the notion of introspective indiscriminability to which the epistemic theory appeals best construed? Following M. G. F. Martin, the standard assumption is that the notion should be construed in terms of negative epistemics: in particular, it is assumed that the notion should be explained in (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Wayne Wu & Raymond Cho (2014). Is Inner Speech the Basis of Auditory Verbal Hallucination in Schizophrenia? Frontiers in Psychiatry 14:1-3.
    We respond to Moseley and Wilkinson's defense of inner speech models of AVH.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16. David Lewis (1980). Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (September):239-249.
  17.  36
    Clare Batty (2015). Review of Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias (Eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Review.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Benj Hellie (2013). The Multidisjunctive Conception of Hallucination. In Fiona Mapherson (ed.), Hallucination. MIT Press
    Direct realists think that we can't get a clear view the nature of /hallucinating a white picket fence/: is it /representing a white picket fence/? is it /sensing white-picket-fencily/? is it /being acquainted with a white' picketed' sense-datum/? These are all epistemic possibilities for a single experience; hence they are all metaphysical possibilities for various experiences. Hallucination itself is a disjunctive or "multidisjunctive" category. I rebut MGF Martin's argument from statistical explanation for his "epistemic" conception of hallucination, but (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Paul F. Snowdon (2005). Some Reflections on an Argument From Hallucination. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):285-305.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  20.  60
    Anders Nes (2011). Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion, by William Fish. Mind 120 (479):856-859.
  21.  28
    Edward S. Casey (2003). Imagination, Fantasy, Hallucination, and Memory. In J. Philips & James Morley (eds.), Imagination and its Pathologies. MIT Press
  22. Philip Bretzevonl (1974). Cornman, Sensa, and the Argument From Hallucination. Philosophical Studies 26 (December):443-445.
  23. Daya Krishna (2003). Illusion, Hallucination and the Problem of Truth. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 20 (4):129-146.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. William C. Fish (2008). Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability, and the Nature of Hallucination. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press 144--167.
    In the eyes of some of its critics, disjunctivism fails to support adequately the key claim that a particular hallucination might be indistinguishable from a certain kind of veridical perception despite the two states having nothing other than this in common. Scott Sturgeon, for example, has complained that disjunctivism ‘‘offers no positive story about hallucination at all’’ (2000: 11) and therefore ‘‘simply takes [indistinguishability] for granted’’ (2000: 12). So according to Sturgeon, what the disjunctivist needs to provide is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  25. Susanna Schellenberg (2013). Externalism and the Gappy Content of Hallucination. In D. Platchias & F. E. Macpherson (eds.), Hallucination. MIT Press 291.
  26. Susanna Siegel (2008). The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Oxford University Press 205--224.
    Early formulations of disjunctivism about perception refused to give any positive account of the nature of hallucination, beyond the uncontroversial fact that they can in some sense seem to the same to the subject as veridical perceptions. Recently, some disjunctivists have attempt to account for hallucination in purely epistemic terms, by developing detailed account of what it is for a hallucinaton to be indiscriminable from a veridical perception. In this paper I argue that the prospects for purely epistemic (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  27.  4
    William J. McGeown, Annalena Venneri, Irving Kirsch, Luca Nocetti, Kathrine Roberts, Lisa Foan & Giuliana Mazzoni (2012). Suggested Visual Hallucination Without Hypnosis Enhances Activity in Visual Areas of the Brain. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):100-116.
    This functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging study investigated high and low suggestible people responding to two visual hallucination suggestions with and without a hypnotic induction. Participants in the study were asked to see color while looking at a grey image, and to see shades of grey while looking at a color image. High suggestible participants reported successful alterations in color perception in both tasks, both in and out of hypnosis, and showed a small benefit if hypnosis was induced. Low suggestible (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  28.  13
    Eriko Sugimori, Tomohisa Asai & Yoshihiko Tanno (2011). Sense of Agency Over Thought: External Misattribution of Thought in a Memory Task and Proneness to Auditory Hallucination. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):688-695.
    Previous studies have suggested that auditory hallucination is closely related to thought insertion. In this study, we investigated the relationship between the external misattribution of thought and auditory hallucination-like experiences. We used the AHES-17, which measures auditory hallucination-like experiences in normal, healthy people, and the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm, in which false alarms of critical lure are regarded as spontaneous external misattribution of thought. We found that critical lures elicited increased the number of false alarms as AHES-17 scores increased (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  29. Brad J. Thompson (2008). Representationalism and the Argument From Hallucination. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):384-412.
    Phenomenal character is determined by representational content, which both hallucinatory and veridical experiences can share. But in the case of veridical experience, unlike hallucination, the external objects of experience literally have the properties one is aware of in experience. The representationalist can accept the common factor assumption without having to introduce sensory intermediaries between the mind and the world, thus securing a form of direct realism.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  30.  62
    Keith Allen (2014). Hallucination And Imagination. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):287-302.
    What are hallucinations? A common view in the philosophical literature is that hallucinations are degenerate kinds of perceptual experience. I argue instead that hallucinations are degenerate kinds of sensory imagination. As well as providing a good account of many actual cases of hallucination, the view that hallucination is a kind of imagination represents a promising account of hallucination from the perspective of a disjunctivist theory of perception like naïve realism. This is because it provides a way of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  10
    David Batho (2016). Heidegger and Hallucination. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (4):675-696.
    ABSTRACTCan Heidegger account for hallucination? I argue that while Heidegger does not develop an account of hallucination, he gives us all the resources we need to develop such an account. I first discuss a prominent argument against the very possibility of such an account. I argue that this argument is mistaken. I then discuss Heidegger's brief remarks on hallucination. In analysing a particular case study, Heidegger claims that the subject hallucinates for two reasons. First, he fails to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  39
    Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.) (2013). Hallucination. MIT Press.
    Scientific and philosophical perspectives on hallucination: essays that draw on empirical evidence from psychology, neuroscience, and cutting-edge philosophical theory.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  33.  85
    William Fish (2013). Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion: Reply to My Critics. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 163 (1):57-66.
    This book provides the first full-length treatment of disjunctivism about visual experiences in the service of defending a naive realist theory of veridical visual perception. It includes detailed theories of hallucination and illusion that show how such states can be indistinguishable from veridical experiences without sharing any common character.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  12
    Rami Ali (2016). Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias , Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):455-460.
    Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology is an edited MIT press collection that contributes to the philosophy of perception. This collection is a significant addition to the literature both for its excellent choice of texts, and its emphasis on the case of hallucinations. Dedicating a volume to hallucinatory phenomena may seem somewhat peculiar for those not entrenched in the analytic philosophy of perception, but it is easy enough to grasp their significance. Theories of perception aim to give a fundamental characterization of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  47
    Kazem Sadegh-Zadeh (1982). Perception, Illusion, and Hallucination. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 3 (2):159-191.
    Patrick Suppes'' set-theoretical approach to the analysis of theories, and Joseph D. Sneed''s metatheory are briefly outlined. The notions of observation, illusion and hallucination are reconstructed according to these approaches. It is argued that the terms perception and truth are theoretical with respect to observation but nontheoretical with respect to illusion and hallucination. Hallucination is construed as a special kind of illusion.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  36.  14
    Denis McManus (1996). Error, Hallucination and the Concept of 'Ontology' in the Early Work of Heidegger. Philosophy 71 (278):553 - 575.
    Recently the attempt has been made to demonstrate Heidegger's relevance to the concerns of analytic philosophers. A focus for this effort has been the criticism in his early work of Cartesian ontology. While a number of important works have mapped out this area of Heidegger's thought, a crucial task has not been carried out, namely that of assessing how Heidegger can accommodate those phenomena which motivate the Cartesian to adopt his highly counter-intuitive ontology. As long as we fail to examine (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  37.  26
    Peter Ulric Tse (2003). If Vision is “Veridical Hallucination,” What Keeps It Veridical? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):426-427.
    If perception is constructed, what keeps perception from becoming mere hallucination unlinked to world events? The visual system has evolved two strategies to anchor itself and correct its errors. One involves completing missing information on the basis of knowledge about what most likely exists in the scene. For example, the visual system fills in information only in cases where it might be responsible for the data loss. The other strategy involves exploiting the physical stability of the environment as a (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. William Fish (2009). Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. Oxford University Press.
    In the first monograph in this exciting area since then, William Fish develops a comprehensive disjunctive theory, incorporating detailed accounts of the three ...
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   40 citations  
  39. Olaf Blanke & Christine Mohr (2005). Out-of-Body Experience, Heautoscopy, and Autoscopic Hallucination of Neurological Origin. Implications for Neurocognitive Mechanisms of Corporeal Awareness and Self Consciousness. Brain Research Reviews 50 (1):184-199.
  40.  33
    Colin Klein (2012). Imperatives, Phantom Pains, and Hallucination by Presupposition. Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):917-928.
    Several authors have recently argued that the content of pains (and bodily sensations more generally) is imperative rather than descriptive. I show that such an account can help resolve competing intuitions about phantom limb pain. As imperatives, phantom pains are neither true nor false. However, phantom limb pains presuppose falsehoods, in the same way that any imperative which demands something impossible presupposes a falsehood. Phantom pains, like many chronic pains, are thus commands that cannot be satisfied. I conclude by showing (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  41.  48
    George Lawton (1933). L'Hallucination: Philosophes, Mystiques. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 30 (9):249-251.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Heather Logue (2010). Getting Acquainted with Naïve Realism: Critical Notice of Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. Philosophical Books 51 (1):22-38.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  43.  72
    Adam Pautz (2013). Do the Benefits of Naïve Realism Outweigh the Costs? Comments on Fish, Perception, Hallucination and Illusion. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):25-36.
  44.  47
    Craig French (2015). Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology By Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias. [REVIEW] Analysis 75 (3):528-530.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45.  10
    Ben Alderson-Day, Simon McCarthy-Jones, Sarah Bedford, Hannah Collins, Holly Dunne, Chloe Rooke & Charles Fernyhough (2014). Shot Through with Voices: Dissociation Mediates the Relationship Between Varieties of Inner Speech and Auditory Hallucination Proneness. Consciousness and Cognition 27:288-296.
  46.  87
    Komarine Romdenh-Romluc (2007). Merleau-Ponty's Account of Hallucination. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):76-90.
  47.  11
    Heather Wolffram (2012). Hallucination or Materialization? The Animism Versus Spiritism Debate in Late-19th-Century Germany. History of the Human Sciences 25 (2):45-66.
    This article considers a long-neglected episode in the disciplinary evolution of the border sciences in Germany: the so-called animism versus spiritism debate. While historians have long acknowledged the significance of this dispute, which introduced a range of new hypotheses and nomenclature to the field, there has been little detailed analysis of it. Looking closely at the arguments of the main combatants, this article attempts to highlight not just the complex multi-frontal conflicts that took place during the late 19th century between (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  48.  29
    Marilynn P. Fleckenstein & Patricia Huebsch (1999). Ethics in Tourism-Reality or Hallucination. Journal of Business Ethics 19 (1):137 - 142.
    Many professional organizations have established codes of ethics which members are expected to adhere to. These ethical codes serve an important function by containing the rules that govern the conduct of the members of the profession. Should the tourism industry be governed by a code of ethics? Is it important enough and large enough to spend a lot of time and energy developing a code of ethics since tourism is based on service rather than a physical good, which does not (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  49.  62
    M. G. F. Martin (2013). Shibboleth: Some Comments on William Fish's Perception, Hallucination & Illusion. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 163 (1):37-48.
  50.  46
    Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou (2008). Bas Van Fraassen's “Argument From Public Hallucination” and the Quest for the Real Behind Representations. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 43:199-205.
    In his article “Constructive Empiricism Now” van Fraassen chooses an extremely interesting example to defend his thesis that scientific theories are only representations, so that the aim of science is to give us reliable, empirically adequate, descriptions of the observable aspects of the world. For him, there is no continuum of observable/unobservable, as he draws a line of distinction at a point that eliminates from his ontology such cases as fields of forces and sub-atomic particles. As a result, he puts (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 301