Search results for 'Hallucination' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. István Aranyosi (forthcoming). Silencing the Argument From Hallucination. In Fiona MacPherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination (MIT Press).score: 21.0
    Ordinary people tend to be realists regarding perceptual experience, that is, they take perceiving the environment as a direct, unmediated, straightforward access to a mindindependent reality. Not so for (ordinary) philosophers. The empiricist influence on the philosophy of perception, in analytic philosophy at least, made the problem of perception synonymous with the view that realism is untenable. Admitting the problem (and trying to offer a view on it) is tantamount to rejecting ordinary people’s implicit realist assumptions as naive. So what (...)
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  2. Fiona Macpherson (2013). The Philosophy and Psychology of Hallucination: An Introduction. In Fiona Macpherson Dimitris Platchias (ed.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. MIT Press.score: 21.0
  3. Costas Pagondiotis (2013). Hallucination, Mental Representation, and the Presentational Character”. In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination. MIT Press.score: 21.0
    In this paper, I argue that the indirect realists’ recourse to mental representations does not allow them to account for the possibility of hallucination, nor for the presentational character of visual experience. To account for the presentational character, I suggest a kind of intentionalism that is based on the interdependency between the perceived object and the embodied perceiver. This approach provides a positive account to the effect that genuine perception and hallucination are different kinds of states. Finally, I (...)
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  4. Wayne Wu (2012). Explaining Schizophrenia: Auditory Verbal Hallucination and Self-Monitoring. Mind and Language 27 (1):86-107.score: 18.0
    Do self-monitoring accounts, a dominant account of the positive symptoms, explain auditory verbal hallucination (AVH)? In this essay, I argue that the account fails to answer many crucial questions any explanation of AVH must address. Where the account provides a plausible answer, I make a case for an alternative explanation: AVH is not the result of a failed control mechanism, namely failed self-monitoring, but the persistent automaticity of auditory experience of a voice. The argument emphasizes the importance of careful (...)
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  5. Mark Johnston (2004). The Obscure Object of Hallucination. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):113-83.score: 18.0
    Like dreaming, hallucination has been a formative trope for modern philosophy. The vivid, often tragic, breakdown in the mind’s apparent capacity to disclose reality has long served to support a paradoxical philosophical picture of sensory experience. This picture, which of late has shaped the paradigmatic empirical understanding the senses, displays sensory acts as already complete without the external world; complete in that the direct objects even of veridical sensory acts do not transcend what we could anyway hallucinate. Hallucination (...)
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  6. David R. Hilbert (2004). Hallucination, Sense-Data and Direct Realism. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):185-191.score: 18.0
    Although it has been something of a fetish for philosophers to distinguish between hallucination and illusion, the enduring problems for philosophy of perception that both phenomena present are not essentially different. Hallucination, in its pure philosophical form, is just another example of the philosopher’s penchant for considering extreme and extremely idealized cases in order to understand the ordinary. The problem that has driven much philosophical thinking about perception is the problem of how to reconcile our evident direct perceptual (...)
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  7. Charlie Pelling (2011). Characterizing Hallucination Epistemically. Synthese 178 (3):437 - 459.score: 18.0
    According to the epistemic theory of hallucination, the fundamental psychological nature of a hallucinatory experience is constituted by its being 'introspectively indiscriminable', in some sense, from a veridical experience of a corresponding type. How is the notion of introspective indiscriminability to which the epistemic theory appeals best construed? Following M. G. F. Martin, the standard assumption is that the notion should be construed in terms of negative epistemics: in particular, it is assumed that the notion should be explained in (...)
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  8. Jennifer M. Windt (2010). The Immersive Spatiotemporal Hallucination Model of Dreaming. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):295-316.score: 18.0
    The paper proposes a minimal definition of dreaming in terms of immersive spatiotemporal hallucination (ISTH) occurring in sleep or during sleep–wake transitions and under the assumption of reportability. I take these conditions to be both necessary and sufficient for dreaming to arise. While empirical research results may, in the future, allow for an extension of the concept of dreaming beyond sleep and possibly even independently of reportability, ISTH is part of any possible extension of this definition and thus is (...)
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  9. Wayne Wu & Raymond Cho (2013). Mechanisms of Auditory Verbal Hallucination in Schizophrenia. Frontiers in Schizophrenia 4.score: 18.0
    Recent work on the mechanisms underlying auditory verbal hallucination (AVH) has been heavily informed by self-monitoring accounts that postulate defects in an internal monitoring mechanism as the basis of AVH. A more neglected alternative is an account focusing on defects in auditory processing, namely a spontaneous activation account of auditory activity underlying AVH. Science is often aided by putting theories in competition. Accordingly, a discussion that systematically contrasts the two models of AVH can generate sharper questions that will lead (...)
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  10. Jérôme Dokic & Jean-Rémy Martin (2012). Disjunctivism, Hallucination and Metacognition. WIREs Cognitive Science 3:533-543.score: 18.0
    Perceptual experiences have been construed either as representational mental states—Representationalism—or as direct mental relations to the external world—Disjunctivism. Both conceptions are critical reactions to the so-called ‘Argument from Hallucination’, according to which perceptions cannot be about the external world, since they are subjectively indiscriminable from other, hallucinatory experiences, which are about sense-data ormind-dependent entities. Representationalism agrees that perceptions and hallucinations share their most specific mental kind, but accounts for hallucinations as misrepresentations of the external world. According to Disjunctivism, the (...)
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  11. David Lewis (1980). Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (September):239-249.score: 15.0
  12. Benj Hellie (2013). The Multidisjunctive Conception of Hallucination. In Fiona Mapherson (ed.), Hallucination. MIT Press.score: 15.0
    Direct realists think that we can't get a clear view the nature of /hallucinating a white picket fence/: is it /representing a white picket fence/? is it /sensing white-picket-fencily/? is it /being acquainted with a white' picketed' sense-datum/? These are all epistemic possibilities for a single experience; hence they are all metaphysical possibilities for various experiences. Hallucination itself is a disjunctive or "multidisjunctive" category. I rebut MGF Martin's argument from statistical explanation for his "epistemic" conception of hallucination, but (...)
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  13. Paul F. Snowdon (2005). Some Reflections on an Argument From Hallucination. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):285-305.score: 15.0
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  14. Anders Nes (2011). Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion, by William Fish. Mind 120 (479):856-859.score: 15.0
  15. Wayne Wu & Raymond Cho (2014). Is Inner Speech the Basis of Auditory Verbal Hallucination in Schizophrenia? Frontiers in Psychiatry 14:1-3.score: 15.0
    We respond to Moseley and Wilkinson's defense of inner speech models of AVH.
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  16. Edward S. Casey (2003). Imagination, Fantasy, Hallucination, and Memory. In J. Philips & James Morley (eds.), Imagination and its Pathologies. MIT Press.score: 15.0
  17. Philip Bretzevonl (1974). Cornman, Sensa, and the Argument From Hallucination. Philosophical Studies 26 (December):443-445.score: 15.0
  18. Daya Krishna (2003). Illusion, Hallucination and the Problem of Truth. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 20 (4):129-146.score: 15.0
     
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  19. Martin Debbane Tarik Dahoun, Stephan Eliez, Fei Chen, Deborah Badoud, Maude Schneider, Frank Larøi (2013). Action Simulation in Hallucination-Prone Adolescents. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.score: 14.0
    Theoretical and empirical accounts suggest that impairments in self-other discrimination processes are likely to promote the expression of hallucinations. However, our understanding of such processes during adolescence is still at an early stage. The present study thus aims 1) to delineate the neural correlates sustaining mental simulation of actions involving self-performed actions (first-person perspective; 1PP) and other-performed actions (third-person perspective; 3PP) during adolescence 2) to identify atypical activation patterns during 1PP/3PP mental simulation of actions in hallucination-prone adolescents 3) to (...)
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  20. Ian Phillips (forthcoming). Hallucinating Silence. In Dimitri Platchias & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Hallucination. MIT Press.score: 13.0
    Tradition has it that, although we experience darkness, we can neither hear nor hallucinate silence. At most, we hear that it is silent, in virtue of lacking auditory experience. This cognitive view is at odds with our ordinary thought and talk. Yet it is not easy to vouchsafe the perception of silence: Sorensen‘s recent account entails the implausible claim that the permanently and profoundly deaf are perpetually hallucinating silence. To better defend the view that we can genuinely hear and hallucinate (...)
     
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  21. Susanna Siegel (2008). The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 205--224.score: 12.0
    Early formulations of disjunctivism about perception refused to give any positive account of the nature of hallucination, beyond the uncontroversial fact that they can in some sense seem to the same to the subject as veridical perceptions. Recently, some disjunctivists have attempt to account for hallucination in purely epistemic terms, by developing detailed account of what it is for a hallucinaton to be indiscriminable from a veridical perception. In this paper I argue that the prospects for purely epistemic (...)
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  22. William C. Fish (2008). Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability, and the Nature of Hallucination. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 144--167.score: 12.0
    In the eyes of some of its critics, disjunctivism fails to support adequately the key claim that a particular hallucination might be indistinguishable from a certain kind of veridical perception despite the two states having nothing other than this in common. Scott Sturgeon, for example, has complained that disjunctivism ‘‘offers no positive story about hallucination at all’’ (2000: 11) and therefore ‘‘simply takes [indistinguishability] for granted’’ (2000: 12). So according to Sturgeon, what the disjunctivist needs to provide is (...)
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  23. Brad J. Thompson (2008). Representationalism and the Argument From Hallucination. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):384-412.score: 12.0
    Phenomenal character is determined by representational content, which both hallucinatory and veridical experiences can share. But in the case of veridical experience, unlike hallucination, the external objects of experience literally have the properties one is aware of in experience. The representationalist can accept the common factor assumption without having to introduce sensory intermediaries between the mind and the world, thus securing a form of direct realism.
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  24. Nigel J. T. Thomas (2014). The Multidimensional Spectrum of Imagination: Images, Dreams, Hallucinations, and Active, Imaginative Perception. Humanities 3 (2):132-184.score: 12.0
    A theory of the structure and cognitive function of the human imagination that attempts to do justice to traditional intuitions about its psychological centrality is developed, largely through a detailed critique of the theory propounded by Colin McGinn. Like McGinn, I eschew the highly deflationary views of imagination, common amongst analytical philosophers, that treat it either as a conceptually incoherent notion, or as psychologically trivial. However, McGinn fails to develop his alternative account satisfactorily because (following Reid, Wittgenstein and Sartre) he (...)
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  25. Susanna Schellenberg (2013). Externalism and the Gappy Content of Hallucination. In D. Platchias & F. E. Macpherson (eds.), Hallucination. MIT Press. 291.score: 12.0
  26. Jesús Vega-Encabo (2010). Hallucinations for Disjunctivists. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):281-293.score: 12.0
    In this paper, I examine the so-called disjunctive views on hallucinations. I argue that neither of the options open to the disjunctivist is capable of accommodating basic phenomenological facts about hallucinatory experiences and the explanatory demands behind the classical argument from hallucination. A positive characterization of the hallucinatory case is not attractive to a disjunctivist once she is disposed to accept certain commonalities with veridical experiences. Negative disjunctivism glosses the hallucinatory disjunct in terms of indiscriminability. I will argue that (...)
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  27. Daniel Collerton, Elaine Perry & Ian McKeith (2005). Why People See Things That Are Not There: A Novel Perception and Attention Deficit Model for Recurrent Complex Visual Hallucinations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):737-757.score: 12.0
    As many as two million people in the United Kingdom repeatedly see people, animals, and objects that have no objective reality. Hallucinations on the border of sleep, dementing illnesses, delirium, eye disease, and schizophrenia account for 90% of these. The remainder have rarer disorders. We review existing models of recurrent complex visual hallucinations (RCVH) in the awake person, including cortical irritation, cortical hyperexcitability and cortical release, top-down activation, misperception, dream intrusion, and interactive models. We provide evidence that these can neither (...)
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  28. William Fish (2013). Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion: Reply to My Critics. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 163 (1):57-66.score: 12.0
    This book provides the first full-length treatment of disjunctivism about visual experiences in the service of defending a naive realist theory of veridical visual perception. It includes detailed theories of hallucination and illusion that show how such states can be indistinguishable from veridical experiences without sharing any common character.
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  29. Kazem Sadegh-Zadeh (1982). Perception, Illusion, and Hallucination. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 3 (2):159-191.score: 12.0
    Patrick Suppes'' set-theoretical approach to the analysis of theories, and Joseph D. Sneed''s metatheory are briefly outlined. The notions of observation, illusion and hallucination are reconstructed according to these approaches. It is argued that the terms perception and truth are theoretical with respect to observation but nontheoretical with respect to illusion and hallucination. Hallucination is construed as a special kind of illusion.
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  30. Peter Ulric Tse (2003). If Vision is “Veridical Hallucination,” What Keeps It Veridical? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):426-427.score: 12.0
    If perception is constructed, what keeps perception from becoming mere hallucination unlinked to world events? The visual system has evolved two strategies to anchor itself and correct its errors. One involves completing missing information on the basis of knowledge about what most likely exists in the scene. For example, the visual system fills in information only in cases where it might be responsible for the data loss. The other strategy involves exploiting the physical stability of the environment as a (...)
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  31. Steven P. James (forthcoming). Hallucinating Real Things. Synthese:1-22.score: 12.0
    No particular dagger was the object of Macbeth’s hallucination of a dagger. In contrast, when he hallucinated his former comrade Banquo, Banquo himself was the object of the hallucination. Although philosophers have had much to say about the nature and philosophical import of hallucinations (e.g. Macpherson and Platchias, Hallucination, 2013) and object-involving attitudes (e.g. Jeshion, New essays on singular thought, 2010), their intersection has largely been neglected. Yet, object-involving hallucinations raise interesting questions about memory, perception, and the (...)
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  32. Yoshihiko Tanno Mari Kanemoto, Tomohisa Asai, Eriko Sugimori (2013). External Misattribution of Internal Thoughts and Proneness to Auditory Hallucinations: The Effect of Emotional Valence in the Deese–Roediger–McDermott Paradigm. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.score: 12.0
    Previous studies have suggested that a tendency to externalize internal thought is related to auditory hallucinations or even proneness to auditory hallucinations (AHp) in the general population. However, although auditory hallucinations are related to emotional phenomena, few studies have investigated the effect of emotional valence on the aforementioned relationship. In addition, we do not know what component of psychotic phenomena relate to externalizing bias. The current study replicated our previous research, which suggested that individual differences in auditory hallucination-like experiences (...)
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  33. Costas Pagondiotis (2013). 16 Hallucination, Mental Representation, and the Presentational. In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination. Mit Press. 361.score: 12.0
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  34. Olaf Blanke & Christine Mohr (2005). Out-of-Body Experience, Heautoscopy, and Autoscopic Hallucination of Neurological Origin. Implications for Neurocognitive Mechanisms of Corporeal Awareness and Self Consciousness. Brain Research Reviews 50 (1):184-199.score: 11.0
  35. D. G. Ellson (1941). Experimental Extinction of an Hallucination Produced by Sensory Conditioning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 28 (4):350.score: 11.0
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  36. Fabian Dorsch (2010). The Unity of Hallucinations. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):171-191.score: 10.0
    My primary aim in this article is to provide a philosophical account of the unity of hallucinations, which can capture both perceptual hallucinations (which are subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions) and non-perceptual hallucinations (all others). Besides, I also mean to clarify further the division of labour and the nature of the collaboration between philosophy and the cognitive sciences. Assuming that the epistemic conception of hallucinations put forward by M. G. F. Martin and others is largely on the right track, I will (...)
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  37. Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou (2008). Bas Van Fraassen's “Argument From Public Hallucination” and the Quest for the Real Behind Representations. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 43:199-205.score: 10.0
    In his article “Constructive Empiricism Now” van Fraassen chooses an extremely interesting example to defend his thesis that scientific theories are only representations, so that the aim of science is to give us reliable, empirically adequate, descriptions of the observable aspects of the world. For him, there is no continuum of observable/unobservable, as he draws a line of distinction at a point that eliminates from his ontology such cases as fields of forces and sub-atomic particles. As a result, he puts (...)
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  38. Simon R. Jones, Charles Fernyhough & Frank Larøi (2010). A Phenomenological Survey of Auditory Verbal Hallucinations in the Hypnagogic and Hypnopompic States. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):213-224.score: 10.0
    The phenomenology of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) occurring in hypnagogic and hypnopompic (H&H) states has received little attention. In a sample of healthy participants ( N = 325), 108 participants reported H&H AVHs and answered subsequent questions on their phenomenology. AVHs in the H&H state were found (1) to be more likely to only feature the occasional clear word than to be clear, (2) to be more likely (...)
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  39. André Aleman & René S. Kahn (2002). Top-Down Modulation, Emotion, and Hallucination. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (5):578-578.score: 10.0
    We argue that the pivotal role assigned by Northoff to the principle of top-down modulation in catatonia might successfully be applied to other symptoms of schizophrenia, for example, hallucinations. Second, we propose that Northoff's account would benefit from a more comprehensive analysis of the cognitive level of explanation. Finally, contrary to Northoff, we hypothesize that “top-down modulation” might play as important a role as “horizontal modulation” in affective-behavioral alterations.
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  40. Simon McCarthy-Jones, Joel Krueger, Frank Larøi, Matthew R. Broome & Charles Fernyhough (2013). Stop, Look, Listen: The Need for Philosophical Phenomenological Perspectives on Auditory Verbal Hallucinations. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.score: 10.0
    One of the leading cognitive models of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) proposes such experiences result from a disturbance in the process by which inner speech is attributed to the self. Research in this area has, however, proceeded in the absence of thorough cognitive and phenomenological investigations of the nature of inner speech, against which AVHs are implicitly or explicitly defined. In this paper we begin by introducing philosophical phenomenology and highlighting its relevance to AVHs, before briefly examining the evolving literature (...)
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  41. Michael G. F. Martin (2006). On Being Alienated. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.score: 9.0
    Disjunctivism about perceptual appearances, as I conceive of it, is a theory which seeks to preserve a naïve realist conception of veridical perception in the light of the challenge from the argument from hallucination. The naïve realist claims that some sensory experiences are relations to mind-independent objects. That is to say, taking experiences to be episodes or events, the naïve realist supposes that some such episodes have as constituents mind-independent objects. In turn, the disjunctivist claims that in a case (...)
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  42. Gregory Currie (2000). Imagination, Delusion and Hallucinations. In Max Coltheart & Martin Davies (eds.), Pathologies of Belief. Blackwell. 168-183.score: 9.0
  43. Clare Batty (2010). What the Nose Doesn't Know: Non-Veridicality and Olfactory Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):10-17.score: 9.0
    We can learn much about perceptual experience by thinking about how it can mislead us. In this paper, I explore whether, and how, olfactory experience can mislead. I argue that, in the case of olfactory experience, the traditional distinction between illusion and hallucination does not apply. Integral to the traditional distinction is a notion of ‘object-failure’—the failure of an experience to present objects accurately. I argue that there are no such presented objects in olfactory experience. As a result, olfactory (...)
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  44. Heather Logue (2010). Getting Acquainted with Naïve Realism: Critical Notice of Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. Philosophical Books 51 (1):22-38.score: 9.0
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  45. Jeffrey Dunn (2008). The Obscure Act of Perception. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):367-393.score: 9.0
    Finding disjunctivist versions of direct realism unexplanatory, Mark Johnston [(2004). Philosophical Studies, 120, 113–183] offers a non-disjunctive version of direct realism in its place and gives a defense of this view from the problem of hallucination. I will attempt to clarify the view that he presents and then argue that, once clarified, it either does not escape the problem of hallucination or does not look much like direct realism.
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  46. Uriah Kriegel (2011). The Veil of Abstracta. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):245-267.score: 9.0
    Of all the problems attending the sense-datum theory, arguably the deepest is that it draws a veil of appearances over the external world. Today, the sense-datum theory is widely regarded as an overreaction to the problem of hallucination. Instead of accounting for hallucination in terms of intentional relations to sense data, it is often thought that we should account for it in terms of intentional relations to properties. In this paper, however, I argue that in the versions that (...)
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  47. Katalin Farkas (2006). Indiscriminability and the Sameness of Appearance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2):39-59.score: 9.0
    Abstract: How exactly should the relation between a veridical perception and a corresponding hallucination be understood? I argue that the epistemic notion of ‘indiscriminability’, understood as lacking evidence for the distinctness of things, is not suitable for defining this relation. Instead, we should say that a hallucination and a veridical perception involve the same phenomenal properties. This has further consequences for attempts to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of phenomenal properties in terms of indiscriminability, and (...)
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  48. Paul Coates (2000). Deviant Causal Chains and Hallucinations: A Problem for the Anti-Causalist. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):320-331.score: 9.0
    The subjective character of a given experience leaves open the question of its precise status. If it looks to a subject K as if there is an object of a kind F in front of him, the experience he is having could be veridical, or hallucinatory. Advocates of the Causal Theory of perception (whom I shall call.
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  49. Gordon Knight (2013). Disjunctivism Unmotivated. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2):1-18.score: 9.0
    Many naive realists endorse a negative disjunctivist strategy in order to deal with the challenge presented by the possibility of phenomenologically indistinguishable halucination. In the first part of this paper I argue that this approach is methodologically inconsistent because it undercuts the phenomenological motivation that underlies the the appeal of naive realism. In the second part of the paper I develop an alternative to the negative disjunctivist account along broadly Meinongian lines. In the last section of this paper I consider (...)
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  50. Peter R. King (2010). Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):715-719.score: 9.0
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