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  1. Hallvard Lillehammer (2013). The Argument From Queerness. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics.
  2. Hallvard Lillehammer (2014). I—Moral Testimony, Moral Virtue, and the Value of Autonomy. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):111-127.
    According to some, taking moral testimony is a potentially decent way to exercise one's moral agency. According to others, it amounts to a failure to live up to minimal standards of moral worth. What's the issue? Is it conceptual or empirical? Is it epistemological or moral? Is there a ‘puzzle’ of moral testimony; or are there many, or none? I argue that there is no distinctive puzzle of moral testimony. The question of its legitimacy is as much a moral or (...)
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  3. Hallvard Lillehammer (2014). Minding Your Own Business? Understanding Indifference as a Virtue. Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):111-126.
    Indifference is sometimes described as a virtue. Yet who is indifferent; to what; and in what way is poorly understood, and frequently subject to controversy and confusion. This paper proposes a framework for the interpretation and analysis of ethically acceptable forms of indifference in terms of how different states of indifference can be either more or less dynamic, or more or less sensitive to the nature and state of their object.
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  4. Hallvard Lillehammer (1997). Smith on Moral Fetishism. Analysis 57 (3):187–195.
    In his book The Moral Problem and in a recent issue of this journal, Michael Smith claims to refute any theory which construes the relationship between moral judgements and motivation as contingent and rationally optional. Smith’s argument fails. In showing how it fails, I shall make three claims. First, a concern for what is right, where this is read de dicto, does not amount to moral fetishism. Second, it is not always morally preferable to care about what is right, where (...)
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  5.  73
    Hallvard Lillehammer & Niklas Möller (2015). We Can Believe the Error Theory. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (3):453-459.
    Bart Streumer argues that it is not possible for us to believe the error theory, where by ‘error theory’ he means the claim that our normative beliefs are committed to the existence of normative properties even though such properties do not exist. In this paper, we argue that it is indeed possible to believe the error theory. First, we suggest a critical improvement to Streumer’s argument. As it stands, one crucial premise of that argument—that we cannot have a belief while (...)
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  6.  2
    Hallvard Lillehammer (2010). Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons. Journal of Ethics 14 (1):17-26.
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  7. Hallvard Lillehammer (2014). Who is My Neighbour? Understanding Indifference as a Vice. Philosophy 89 (350):559-579.
    Indifference is often described as a vice. Yet who is indifferent; to what; and in what way is poorly understood, and frequently subject to controversy and confusion. This paper proposes a framework for the interpretation and analysis of ethically problematic forms of indifference in terms of how different states of indifference can be either more or less dynamic, or more or less sensitive to the nature and state of their object.
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  8. Hallvard Lillehammer (2010). Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons. Journal of Ethics 14 (1):17 - 26.
    This paper is about the relationship between two widely accepted and apparently conflicting claims about how we should understand the notion of ‘reason giving’ invoked in theorising about reasons for action. According to the first claim, reasons are given by facts about the situation of agents. According to the second claim, reasons are given by ends. I argue that the apparent conflict between these two claims is less deep than is generally recognised.
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  9.  45
    Hallvard Lillehammer (forthcoming). The Nature and Ethics of Indifference. Journal of Ethics:1-19.
    Indifference is sometimes said to be a virtue. Perhaps more frequently it is said to be a vice. Yet who is indifferent; to what; and in what way is poorly understood, and frequently subject to controversy and confusion. This paper presents a framework for the interpretation and analysis of ethically significant forms of indifference in terms of how subjects of indifference are variously related to their objects in different circumstances; and how an indifferent orientation can be either more or less (...)
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  10. Hallvard Lillehammer (2016). An Assumption of Extreme Significance: Moore, Ross and Spencer on Ethics and Evolution. In Uri D. Leibowitz & Neil Sinclair (eds.), Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability. Oxford University Press
    In recent years there has been a growing interest among mainstream Anglophone moral philosophers in the empirical study of human morality, including its evolution and historical development. This chapter compares these developments with an earlier point of contact between moral philosophy and the moral sciences in the early decades of the Twentieth century, as manifested in some of the less frequently discussed arguments of G. E. Moore and W. D. Ross. It is argued that a critical appreciation of Moore and (...)
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  11. Hallvard Lillehammer (2004). Moral Error Theory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (2):93–109.
    The paper explores the consequences of adopting a moral error theory targeted at the notion of reasonable convergence. I examine the prospects of two ways of combining acceptance of such a theory with continued acceptance of moral judgements in some form. On the first model, moral judgements are accepted as a pragmatically intelligible fiction. On the second model, moral judgements are made relative to a framework of assumptions with no claim to reasonable convergence on their behalf. I argue that the (...)
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  12. Hallvard Lillehammer (2003). Debunking Morality: Evolutionary Naturalism and Moral Error Theory. Biology and Philosophy 18 (4):567-581.
    The paper distinguishes three strategies by means of which empirical discoveries about the nature of morality can be used to undermine moral judgements. On the first strategy, moral judgements are shown to be unjustified in virtue of being shown to rest on ignorance or false belief. On the second strategy, moral judgements are shown to be false by being shown to entail claims inconsistent with the relevant empirical discoveries. On the third strategy, moral judgements are shown to be false in (...)
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  13. Hallvard Lillehammer (2009). Reproduction, Partiality, and the Non-Identity Problem. In M. A. Roberts & D. T. Wasserman (eds.), Harming Future Persons. Springer Verlag 231--248.
    Much work in contemporary bioethics defends a broadly liberal view of human reproduction. I shall take this view to comprise (but not to be exhausted by) the following four claims.1 First, it is permissible both to reproduce and not to reproduce, either by traditional means or by means of assisted reproductive techniques such as IVF and genetic screening. Second, it is permissible either to reproduce or to adopt or otherwise foster an existing child to which one is not biologically related. (...)
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  14. Hallvard Lillehammer (2011). The Epistemology of Ethical Intuitions. Philosophy 86 (336):175-200.
    Intuitions are widely assumed to play an important evidential role in ethical inquiry. In this paper I critically discuss a recently influential claim that the epistemological credentials of ethical intuitions are undermined by their causal pedigree and functional role. I argue that this claim is exaggerated. In the course of doing so I argue that the challenge to ethical intuitions embodied in this claim should be understood not only as a narrowly epistemological challenge, but also as a substantially ethical one. (...)
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  15. Hallvard Lillehammer (2010). Methods of Ethics and the Descent of Man: Darwin and Sidgwick on Ethics and Evolution. Biology and Philosophy 25 (3):361-378.
    Darwin’s treatment of morality in The Descent of Man has generated a wide variety of responses among moral philosophers. Among these is the dismissal of evolution as irrelevant to ethics by Darwin’s contemporary Henry Sidgwick; the last, and arguably the greatest, of the Nineteenth Century British Utilitarians. This paper offers a re-examination of Sidgwick’s response to evolutionary considerations as irrelevant to ethics and the absence of any engagement with Darwin’s work in Sidgwick’s main ethical treatise, The Methods of Ethics . (...)
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  16.  27
    Hallvard Lillehammer (forthcoming). Smile When You're Winning: How to Become a Cambridge Pragmatist. In Sheryl Misak Huw Price (ed.), Pragmatism in Britain in the Long Twentieth Century: Proccedings of the 2014 Dawes Hicks Symposium. British Academy
    The aim of this paper is to trace the development of a particular current of thought known under the label ‘pragmatism’ in the last part of the Twentieth century and the beginning of the Twenty-first. I address three questions about this current of thought. First, what is its actual historical development? Second, does it constitute a single, coherent, philosophical outlook? Third, in what form, if any, does it constitute an attractive philosophical outlook. In the course of addressing these questions I (...)
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  17. Hallvard Lillehammer (2002). Moral Cognitivism. Philosophical Papers 31 (1):1-25.
    Abstract The paper explicates a set of criteria the joint satisfaction of which is taken to qualify moral judgements as cognitive. The paper examines evidence that some moral judgements meet these criteria, and relates the resulting conception of moral judgements to ongoing controversies about cognitivism in ethics.
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  18.  40
    Hallvard Lillehammer (forthcoming). Ethics, Evolution and the a Priori: Ross on Spencer and the French Sociologists. In Robert Richards Michael Ruse (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Evolutionary Ethics.
    In this chapter I critically discuss the dismissal of the philosophical significance of facts about human evolution and historical development in the work of W. D Ross. I address Ross’s views about the philosophical significance of the emerging human sciences of his time in two of his main works, namely The Right and the Good and The Foundations of Ethics. I argue that the debate between Ross and his chosen interlocutors (Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim and Lucien Levy-Bruhl) shows striking similarities (...)
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  19. Hallvard Lillehammer (2011). Constructivism and the Error Theory. In Christian Miller (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum
    This paper presents a comparative evaluation of constructivist and error theoretic accounts of moral claims. It is argued that constructivism has distinct advantages over error theory.
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  20. Hallvard Lillehammer (2014). Who Cares Where You Come From? Cultivating Virtues of Indifference. In Tabitha Freeman Susanna Graham & Fatemeh Ebtehaj Martin Richards (eds.), Relatedness in Assisted Reproduction: families, origins and identities. Cambridge University Press 97-112.
    Book synopsis: Assisted reproduction challenges and reinforces traditional understandings of family, kinship and identity. Sperm, egg and embryo donation and surrogacy raise questions about relatedness for parents, children and others involved in creating and raising a child. How socially, morally or psychologically significant is a genetic link between a donor-conceived child and their donor? What should children born through assisted reproduction be told about their origins? Does it matter if a parent is genetically unrelated to their child? How do experiences (...)
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  21. Hallvard Lillehammer (2002). Moral Realism, Normative Reasons, and Rational Intelligibility. Erkenntnis 57 (1):47-69.
    This paper concerns a prima facie tension between the claims that (a) agents have normative reasons obtaining in virtue of the nature of the options that confront them, and (b) there is a non-trivial connection between the grounds of normative reasons and the upshots of sound practical reasoning. Joint commitment to these claims is shown to give rise to a dilemma. I argue that the dilemma is avoidable on a response dependent account of normative reasons accommodating both (a) and (b) (...)
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  22.  16
    Hallvard Lillehammer, The Nature and Ethics of Indifference.
    Indifference is sometimes said to be a virtue. Perhaps more frequently it is said to be a vice. Yet who is indifferent; to what; and in what way is poorly understood, and frequently subject to controversy and confusion. This paper presents a framework for the interpretation and analysis of ethically significant forms of indifference in terms of how subjects of indifference are variously related to their objects in different circumstances; and how an indifferent orientation can be either more or less (...)
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  23. Hallvard Lillehammer (2013). A Distinction Without a Difference? Good Advice for Moral Error Theorists. Ratio 26 (3):373-390.
    This paper explores the prospects of different forms of moral error theory. It is argued that only a suitably local error theory would make good sense of the fact that it is possible to give and receive genuinely good moral advice.
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  24. Hallvard Lillehammer (2004). Who Needs Bioethicists? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 35 (1):131-144.
    Recent years have seen the emergence of a new brand of moral philosopher. Straddling the gap between academia on the one hand, and the world of law, medicine, and politics on the other, bioethicists have appeared, offering advice on ethical issues to a wider public than the philosophy classroom. Some bioethicists, like Peter Singer, have achieved wide notoriety in the public realm with provocative arguments that challenge widely held beliefs about the relative moral status of animals, human foetuses and newborn (...)
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  25. Hallvard Lillehammer (2008). Values of Art and the Ethical Question. British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (4):376-394.
    Does the ethical value of a work of art ever contribute to its aesthetic value? I argue that when conventionally interpreted as a request for a conceptual analysis the answer to this question is indeterminate. I then propose a different interpretation of the question on which it is understood as a substantial and normative question internal to the practice of aesthetic criticism.
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  26. Hallvard Lillehammer (2003). The Idea of a Normative Reason. In P. Schaber & R. Huntelmann (eds.), Grundlagen der Ethik. 41--65.
    Recent work in English speaking moral philosophy has seen the rise to prominence of the idea of a normative reason1. By ‘normative reasons’ I mean the reasons agents appeal to in making rational claims on each other. Normative reasons are good reasons on which agents ought to act, even if they are not actually motivated accordingly2. To this extent, normative reasons are distinguishable from the motivating reasons agents appeal to in reason explanations. Even agents who fail to act on their (...)
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  27. Hallvard Lillehammer (2007). Davidson on Value and Objectivity. Dialectica 61 (2):203–217.
    According to one version of objectivism about value, ethical and other evaluative claims have a fixed truth-value independently of who makes them or the society in which they happen to live (c.f. Davidson 2004, 42). Subjectivists about value deny this claim. According to subjectivism so understood, ethical and other evaluative claims have no fixed truth-value, either because their truth-value is dependent on who makes them, or because they have no truth-value at all.
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  28. Hallvard Lillehammer (2005). Benefit, Disability and the Non-Identity Problem. In Nafsika Athanassoulis (ed.), Philosophical Reflections on Medical Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan
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  29. Hallvard Lillehammer (2012). Autonomy, Value and the First Person. In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press
    This paper explores the claim that someone can reasonably consider themselves to be under a duty to respect the autonomy of a person who does not have the capacities normally associated with substantial self-governance.
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  30. Hallvard Lillehammer (2010). Scanlon on Intention and Permissibility. Analysis 70 (3):578 - 585.
  31. Hallvard Lillehammer (2013). The Companions in Guilt Strategy. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics.
  32.  7
    Hallvard Lillehammer, Moral Testimony, Moral Virtue and the Value of Autonomy.
    According to some, taking moral testimony is a potentially decent way to exercise one’s moral agency. According to others, it amounts to a failure to live up to minimal standards of moral worth. What’s the issue? Is it conceptual or empirical? Is it epistemological or moral? Is there a ‘puzzle’ of moral testimony; or are there many, or none? I argue that there is no distinctive puzzle of moral testimony. The question of its legitimacy is as much a moral or (...)
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  33.  15
    Hallvard Lillehammer (forthcoming). Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, Written by Jonas Olson. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
  34. Hallvard Lillehammer, Moral Realism, Normative Reasons, Rational Intelligibility, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Does Practical Deliberation, Crowd Out Self-Prediction & Peter McLaughlin (2002). (Hard Ernst) Corrigendum Van Brakel, J., Philosophy of Chemistry (U. Klein). Erkenntnis 57 (1).
     
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  35.  90
    Hallvard Lillehammer (1999). Analytical Dispositionalism and Practical Reason. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (2):117-133.
    The paper examines the plausibility of analytical dispositionalism about practical reason, according to which the following claims are conceptual truths about common sense ethical discourse: i) Ethics: agents have reasons to act in some ways rather than others, and ii) Metaphysical Modesty: there is no such thing as a response independent normative reality. By elucidating two uncontroversial assumptions which are fundamental to the common sense commitment to ethics, I argue that common sense ethical discourse is most plausibly construed as committed (...)
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  36.  36
    Hallvard Lillehammer & D. H. Mellor (eds.) (2005). Ramsey's Legacy. Oxford University Press.
    The Cambridge philosopher Frank Ramsey died tragically in 1930 at the age of 26, but had already established himself as one of the most brilliant minds of the twentieth century. Besides groundbreaking work in philosophy, particularly in logic, language, and metaphysics, he created modern decision theory and made substantial contributions to mathematics and economics. In these original essays, written to commemorate the centenary of Ramsey's birth, a distinguished international team of contributors offer fresh perspectives on his work and show its (...)
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  37. Hallvard Lillehammer, Gonzalo Rodríguez Pereyra & D. H. Mellor (2003). Real Metaphysics Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor.
     
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  38.  24
    D. H. Mellor, Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodríguez Pereyra (eds.) (2003). Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor. Routledge.
    This text brings together a collection of new essays by a number of philosophers to honor Hugh Mellor's contribution to philosophy. The collection stands as an original exploration of some of the most central issues in philosophy.
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  39.  6
    Hallvard Lillehammer (forthcoming). Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence_, _written by Jonas Olson. Brill.
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  40.  7
    Hallvard Lillehammer (forthcoming). The Nature and Ethics of Indifference. Journal of Ethics:1-19.
    Indifference is sometimes said to be a virtue. Perhaps more frequently it is said to be a vice. Yet who is indifferent; to what; and in what way is poorly understood, and frequently subject to controversy and confusion. This paper presents a framework for the interpretation and analysis of ethically significant forms of indifference in terms of how subjects of indifference are variously related to their objects in different circumstances; and how an indifferent orientation can be either more or less (...)
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  41. Hallvard Lillehammer (2004). Review: The Myth of Morality. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (452):760-763.
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  42. Hallvard Lillehammer (2011). Consequentialism and Global Ethics. In Michael Boylan (ed.), The Morality and Global Justice Reader. Westview Press 89.
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  43.  33
    Hallvard Lillehammer (1999). Normative Antirealism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):201-225.
  44.  62
    Hallvard Lillehammer (2001). Socratic Puzzles. Robert Nozick. Mind 110 (439):802-806.
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  45.  12
    Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.) (2003). Real Metaphysics. Routledge.
    This text brings together a collection of new essays by a number of philosophers to honor Hugh Mellor's contribution to philosophy.
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  46. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra & Hallvard Lillehammer (eds.) (2003). Real Metaphysics. Routledge.
    Real Metaphysics brings together new articles by leading metaphysicians to honour Hugh Mellor's outstanding contribution to metaphysics. Some of the most outstanding minds of current times shed new light on all the main topics in metaphysics: truth, causation, dispositions and properties, explanation, and time. At the end of the book, Hugh Mellor responds to the issues raised by each of the thirteen contributors and gives us new insight into his own highly influential work on metaphysics.
     
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  47.  56
    Hallvard Lillehammer (2010). Scanlon on Intention and Permissibility. Analysis 70 (3):578-585.
  48.  2
    Hallvard Lillehammer (2014). I—Hallvard Lillehammer: Moral Testimony, Moral Virtue, and the Value of Autonomy. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):111-127.
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  49.  3
    Hallvard Lillehammer (2004). V-Moral Error Theory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (2):93-109.
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  50.  33
    Hallvard Lillehammer (2004). Review of Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defense. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (5).
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