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Profile: Hanna Pickard (Oxford University)
  1. Hanna Pickard, Oxford Centre for Neuroethics.
    Effective treatment of personality disorder (PD) presents a clinical conundrum. Many of the behaviours constitutive of PD cause harm to self and others. Encouraging service users to take responsibility for this behaviour is central to treatment. Blame, in contrast, is detrimental. How is it possible to hold service users responsible for harm to self and others without blaming them? A solution to this problem is part conceptual, part practical. I offer a conceptual framework that clearly distinguishes between ideas of responsibility, (...)
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  2. Hanna Pickard, Responsibility Without Blame: Philosophical Reflections on Clinical Practice.
    My first experience as a clinician was in a Therapeutic Community for service users with personality disorder. As well as having personality disorder, many of the Community members also suffered from related conditions, such as addiction and eating disorders. Broadly speaking, these conditions are what we might call ‘disorders of agency’. Core diagnostic symptoms or maintaining factors of disorders of agency are actions and omissions: patterns of behaviour central to the nature or maintenance of the condition. For instance, borderline personality (...)
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  3. Hanna Pickard & Steve Pearce, Addiction in Context: Philosophical Lessons From a Personality Disorder Clinic.
    Popular and neurobiological accounts of addiction tend to treat it as a form of compulsion. This contrasts with personality disorder, where most problematic behaviours are treated as voluntary. But high levels of co-morbidity, overlapping diagnostic traits, and the effectiveness of a range of comparable clinical interventions for addiction and personality disorder suggest that this difference in treatment is unjustified. Drawing on this range of clinical interventions, we argue that addiction is not a form of compulsion. Rather, the misuse of drugs (...)
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  4. Hanna Pickard (forthcoming). The Virtuous Psychiatrist: Character Ethics in Psychiatric Practice, by Jennifer Radden and John Z. Sadler. Mind:fzu066.
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  5. Nicola Lacey & Hanna Pickard (2013). From the Consulting Room to the Court Room? Taking the Clinical Model of Responsibility Without Blame Into the Legal Realm. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 33 (1):1-29.
    Within contemporary penal philosophy, the view that punishment can only be justified if the offender is a moral agent who is responsible and hence blameworthy for their offence is one of the few areas on which a consensus prevails. In recent literature, this precept is associated with the retributive tradition, in the modern form of ‘just deserts’. Turning its back on the rehabilitative ideal, this tradition forges a strong association between the justification of punishment, the attribution of responsible agency in (...)
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  6. Hanna Pickard (2013). Irrational Blame. Analysis 73 (4):613-626.
    I clarify some ambiguities in blame-talk and argue that blame's potential for irrationality and propensity to sting vitiates accounts of blame that identify it with consciously accessible, personal-level judgements or beliefs. Drawing on the cognitive psychology of emotion and appraisal theory, I develop an account of blame that accommodates these features. I suggest that blame consists in a range of hostile, negative first-order emotions, towards which the blamer has a specific, accompanying second-order attitude, namely, a feeling of entitlement—a feeling that (...)
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  7. Hanna Pickard (2013). Psychopathology and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):n/a-n/a.
    When philosophers want an example of a person who lacks the ability to do otherwise, they turn to psychopathology. Addicts, agoraphobics, kleptomaniacs, neurotics, obsessives, and even psychopathic serial murderers, are all purportedly subject to irresistible desires that compel the person to act: no alternative possibility is supposed to exist. I argue that this conception of psychopathology is false and offer an empirically and clinically informed understanding of disorders of agency which preserves the ability to do otherwise. First, I appeal to (...)
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  8. Hanna Pickard (2012). The Purpose in Chronic Addiction. AJOB Neuroscience 3 (2):40-49.
    I argue that addiction is not a chronic, relapsing, neurobiological disease characterized by compulsive use of drugs or alcohol. Large-scale national survey data demonstrate that rates of substance dependence peak in adolescence and early adulthood and then decline steeply; addicts tend to “mature out” in their late twenties or early thirties. The exceptions are addicts who suffer from additional psychiatric disorders. I hypothesize that this difference in patterns of use and relapse between the general and psychiatric populations can be explained (...)
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  9. Hanna Pickard (2011). Book Review George Graham and Jeffrey Poland (Eds.) Addiction and Responsibility. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  10. Hanna Pickard (2011). Responsibility Without Blame: Empathy and the Effective Treatment of Personality Disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (3):209-224.
  11. Hanna Pickard (2011). The Instrumental Rationality of Addiction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (6):320-321.
    The claim that non-addictive drug use is instrumental must be distinguished from the claim that its desired ends are evolutionarily adaptive or easy to comprehend. Use can be instrumental without being adaptive or comprehensible. This clarification, together with additional data, suggests that Müller & Schumann's (M&S's) instrumental framework may explain addictive, as well as non-addictive consumption.
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  12. Hanna Pickard (2011). What Is Personality Disorder? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (3):181-184.
    The DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association 1994, 689) defines personality disorder (PD) as: An enduring pattern of experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of an individual’s culture. This pattern is manifested in two (or more) of the following areas: 1 Cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and events); 2 Affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, lability, and appropriateness of emotional response); 3 Interpersonal functioning; and 4 Impulse control. B The enduring ..
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  13. Hanna Pickard (2010). Book Review Grant Gillett The Mind and Its Discontents. [REVIEW] Journal of Applied Philosophy.
    Philosophy of psychiatry is on the rise. The last decade has seen an explosion in philosophical interest in psychiatric disorder, supported by flourishing research in adjacent disciplines, particularly clinical and cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and, of course, psychiatry itself. The publication of the first edition of The Mind and its Discon- tents in 1999 helped spark this explosion. The publication of this second edition is a welcome addition to OUP’s blossoming International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry Series.
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  14. Hanna Pickard (2010). Schizophrenia and the Epistemology of Self-Knowledge. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (1):55 - 74.
    Extant philosophical accounts of schizophrenic alien thought neglect three clinically signifi cant features of the phenomenon. First, not only thoughts, but also impulses and feelings, are experienced as alien. Second, only a select array of thoughts, impulses, and feelings are experienced as alien. Th ird, empathy with experiences of alienation is possible. I provide an account of disownership that does justice to these features by drawing on recent work on delusions and selfknowledge. Th e key idea is that disownership occurs (...)
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  15. Hanna Pickard (2010). The Mind and its Discontents (2nd Edition) – By Grant Gillett. Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (3):320-322.
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  16. Hanna Pickard & Steve Pearce (2010). Finding the Will to Recover: Philosophical Perspectives on Agency and the Sick Role. Journal of Medical Ethics 36 (12):2010-035865.
    Advance online articles have been peer reviewed and accepted for publication but have not yet appeared in the paper journal (edited, typeset versions may be posted when available prior to final publication). Advance online articles are citable and establish publication priority; they are indexed by PubMed from initial publication. Citations to Advance online articles must include the digital object identifier (DOIs) and date of initial publication.
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  17. Hanna Pickard (2009). Mental Illness is Indeed a Myth. In Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (eds.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience. Oup Oxford.
    This chapter offers a novel defence of Szasz’s claim that mental illness is a myth by bringing to bear a standard type of thought experiment used in philosophical discussions of the meaning of natural kind concepts. This makes it possible to accept Szasz’s conclusion that mental illness involves problems of living, some of which may be moral in nature, while bypassing the debate about the meaning of the concept of illness. The chapter then considers the nature of schizophrenia and the (...)
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  18. Hanna Pickard (2009). Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience.
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  19. Hanna Pickard & Steve Pearce (2009). The Moral Content of Psychiatric Treatment. British Journal of Psychiatry.
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  20. Hanna Pickard (2004). Knowledge of Action Without Observation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):203–228.
    This paper argues that perception of one's body ‘from the inside’ provides one with an awareness of acting, and that this awareness explains a previously overlooked feature of one's knowledge of one's own actions. Actions are events: they occur during periods of time. Knowledge of such events must be sensitive to their course through time. Perception of one's body ‘from the inside’ allows one to monitor one's actions as they unfold, thereby sustaining one's knowledge of what one is doing over (...)
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  21. Hanna Pickard (2003). Emotions and the Problem of Other Minds. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press. 87-103.
    The problem of other minds is a collection of problems centering upon the extent to which our belief in other minds or other's minds can be justified. Swedish psychologist, Gunnar Borg has developed a principle called "the range principle" which helps fill out our "knowledge" of other minds. Borg developed this principle partly in response to the skeptical challenge of Harvard psychophysicist S S Stevens. Stevens claimed that the intersubjective comparison of experience was scientifically impossible. Borg postulates that the range (...)
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  22. Hanna Pickard (2003). Emotions and the Problem of Other Minds. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. 87-103.
    Can consideration of the emotions help to solve the problem of other minds? Intuitively, it should. We often think of emotions as public: as observable in the body, face, and voice of others. Perhaps you can simply see another's disgust or anger, say, in her demeanour and expression; or hear the sadness clearly in his voice. Publicity of..
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