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Profile: Hannah Ginsborg (University of California, Berkeley)
  1. Hannah Ginsborg (forthcoming). Primitive Normativity. Journal of Philosophy.
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  2. Hannah Ginsborg (2013). Kant's Perceiver. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):221-228.
  3. Hannah Ginsborg (2012). Meaning, Understanding and Normativity. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):127-146.
    I defend the normativity of meaning against recent objections by arguing for a new interpretation of the ‘ought’ relevant to meaning. Both critics and defenders of the normativity thesis have understood statements about how an expression ought to be used as either prescriptive (indicating that speakers have reason to use the expression in a certain way) or semantic (designating certain uses as correct in a sense explicable in terms of truth). I propose an alternative view of the ‘ought’ as conveying (...)
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  4. Hannah Ginsborg (2011). Inside and Outside Language: Stroud's Nonreductionism About Meaning. In Jason Bridges, Niko Kolodny & Wai-Hung Wong (eds.), The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Essays for Barry Stroud. Oxford University Press.
    I argue that Stroud's nonreductionism about meaning is insufficiently motivated. First, given that he rejects the assumption that grasp of an expression's meaning guides or instructs us in its use, he has no reason to accept Kripke's arguments against dispositionalism or related reductive views. Second, his argument that reductive views are impossible because they attempt to explain language “from outside” rests on an equivocation between two senses in which an explanation of language can be from outside language. I offer a (...)
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  5. Hannah Ginsborg (2011). Review of Oughts and Thoughts: Rule-Following and the Normativity of Content, by Anandi Hattiangadi. [REVIEW] Mind 119 (476):1175-1186.
    Anandi Hattiangadi packs a lot of argument into this lucid, well-informed and lively examination of the meaning scepticism which Kripke ascribes to Wittgenstein. Her verdict on the success of the sceptical considerations is mixed. She concludes that they are sufficient to rule out all accounts of meaning and mental content proposed so far. But she believes that they fail to constitute, as Kripke supposed they did, a fully general argument against the possibility of meaning or content. Even though we are (...)
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  6. Hannah Ginsborg (2011). Perception, Generality, and Reasons. In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. 131--57.
    During the last fifteen years or so there has been much debate, among philosophers interested in perception, on the question of whether the representational content of perceptual experience is conceptual or nonconceptual. Recently, however, a number of philosophers have challenged the terms of this debate, arguing that one of its most basic assumptions is mistaken. Experience, they claim, does not have representational content at all. On the kind of approach they suggest, having a perceptual experience is not to be understood (...)
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  7. Hannah Ginsborg (2011). Primitive Normativity and Skepticism About Rules. Journal of Philosophy 108 (5):227-254.
  8. Hannah Ginsborg, Kant's Aesthetics and Teleology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    While Kant is perhaps best known for his writings in metaphysics and epistemology (in particular the Critique of Pure Reason of 1781, with a second edition in 1787) and in ethics (the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals of 1785 and the Critique of Practical Reason of 1788), he also developed an influential and much-discussed theory of aesthetics. This theory is presented in his Critique of Judgment (Kritik der Urteilskraft, also translated as Critique of the Power of Judgment) of 1790, (...)
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  9. Hannah Ginsborg (2008). Was Kant a Nonconceptualist? Philosophical Studies 137 (1):65 - 77.
    I criticize recent nonconceptualist readings of Kant’s account of perception on the grounds that the strategy of the Deduction requires that understanding be involved in the synthesis of imagination responsible for the intentionality of perceptual experience. I offer an interpretation of the role of understanding in perceptual experience as the consciousness of normativity in the association of one’s representations. This leads to a reading of Kant which is conceptualist, but in a way which accommodates considerations favoring nonconceptualism, in particular the (...)
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  10. Mikel Burley, Anticipating Annihilation, Cheryl K. Chen & Hannah Ginsborg (2006). Index to Volume 49, 2006. Inquiry 49 (6):591-592.
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  11. Hannah Ginsborg (ed.) (2006). A Companion to Kant. Blackwell Publishing.
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  12. Hannah Ginsborg (2006). Aesthetic Judgment and Perceptual Normativity. Inquiry 49 (5):403 – 437.
    I draw a connection between the question, raised by Hume and Kant, of how aesthetic judgments can claim universal agreement, and the question, raised in recent discussions of nonconceptual content, of how concepts can be acquired on the basis of experience. Developing an idea suggested by Kant's linkage of aesthetic judgment with the capacity for empirical conceptualization, I propose that both questions can be resolved by appealing to the idea of "perceptual normativity". Perceptual experience, on this proposal, involves the awareness (...)
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  13. Hannah Ginsborg (2006). Empirical Concepts and the Content of Experience. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):349-372.
    The view that the content of experience is conceptual is often felt to conflict with the empiricist intuition that experience precedes thought, rather than vice versa. This concern is explicitly articulated by Ayers as an objection both to McDowell and Davidson, and to the conceptualist view more generally. The paper aims to defuse the objection in its general form by presenting a version of conceptualism which is compatible with empiricism. It proposes an account of observational concepts on which possession of (...)
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  14. Hannah Ginsborg (2006). Kant and the Problem of Experience. Philosophical Topics 34 (1/2):59-106.
    As most of its readers are aware, the Critique of Pure Reason is primarily concerned not with empirical, but with a priori knowledge. For the most part, the Kant of the first Critique tends to assume that experience, and the knowledge that is based on it, is unproblematic. The problem with which he is concerned is that of how we can be capable of substantive knowledge independently of experience. At the same time, however, the notion of experience plays a crucial (...)
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  15. Hannah Ginsborg (2006). Kant's Biological Teleology and Its Philosophical Significance. In A Companion to Kant. Blackwell Publishing.
    The article surveys Kant’s treatment of biological teleology in the ’Critique of Judgment’, with special attention to the question of whether the notion of natural teleology is coherent. It argues that our entitlement to regard nature as teleological is not established by the argument of the ’Antinomy’, but rather results from our entitlement to regard the workings of our own cognitive faculties in normative terms. This implies a view of the relation between biological teleology and the representational character of mind (...)
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  16. Hannah Ginsborg (2006). Thinking the Particular as Contained Under the Universal. In Rebecca Kukla (ed.), Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant's Critical Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
    In a well-known passage from the Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Judgment, Kant defines the power or faculty of judgment [Urteilskraft] as "the capacity to think the particular as contained under the universal" (Introduction IV, 5:179).1 He then distinguishes two ways in which this faculty can be exercised, namely as determining or as reflecting. These two ways are defined as follows: "If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is given, then judgment, which subsumes the particular under it... is (...)
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  17. Hannah Ginsborg (2006). Reasons for Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):286 - 318.
    Davidson claims that nothing can count as a reason for a belief except another belief. This claim is challenged by McDowell, who holds that perceptual experiences can count as reasons for beliefs. I argue that McDowell fails to take account of a distinction between two different senses in which something can count as a reason for belief. While a non-doxastic experience can count as a reason for belief in one of the two senses, this is not the sense which is (...)
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  18. Hannah Ginsborg (2004). Two Kinds of Mechanical Inexplicability in Kant and Aristotle. Journal of the History of Philosophy 42 (1):33-65.
    I distinguish two senses in which organisms are mechanically inexplicable for Kant. Mechanical inexplicability in the first sense is shared with artefacts, and consists in their exhibiting regularities irreducible to the regularities of matter. Mechanical inexplicability in the second sense is peculiar to organisms, consisting in the reciprocal causal dependence of an organism's parts. This distinction corresponds to two strands of thought in Aristotle, one supporting a teleological conception of organisms, the other supporting a conception of organisms as natural. Recognizing (...)
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  19. Hannah Ginsborg (2003). Aesthetic Judging and the Intentionality of Pleasure. Inquiry 46 (2):164 – 181.
    I point out some unclarities in Allison's interpretation of Kant's aesthetic theory, specifically in his account of the free play of the faculties. I argue that there is a tension between Allison's commitment to the intentionality of the pleasure involved in a judgment of beauty, and his view that the pleasure is distinct from the judgment, and I claim that the tension should be resolved by rejecting the latter view. I conclude by addressing Allison's objection that my own view fails (...)
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  20. Hannah Ginsborg (2002). Review: Kant, Guyer (Ed), Critique of the Power of Judgment. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 111 (3):429-435.
  21. Hannah Ginsborg (2001). Kant on Understanding Organisms as Natural Purposes. In Eric Watkins (ed.), Kant and the Sciences. Oxford University Press. 231--58.
     
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  22. Hannah Ginsborg (1998). Korsgaard on Choosing Nonmoral Ends. Ethics 109 (1):5-21.
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  23. Hannah Ginsborg, Paul Guyer, J. B. Schneewind, Christine M. Korsgaard, Michael Byron, Michael Weber, Patrick Fitzgerald & Claudia Mills (1998). 10. David Braybrooke, Bryson Brown, and Peter K. Schotch, with Laura Byrne, Logic on the Track of Social Change David Braybrooke, Bryson Brown, and Peter K. Schotch, with Laura Byrne, Logic on the Track of Social Change (Pp. 190-193). [REVIEW] In Stephen Everson (ed.), Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  24. Hannah Ginsborg (1997). Lawfulness Without a Law. Philosophical Topics 25 (1):37-81.
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  25. Hannah Ginsborg (1991). On the Key to Kant's Critique of Taste. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):290-313.
     
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  26. Hannah Ginsborg (1990). Reflective Judgment and Taste. Noûs 24 (1):63-78.
  27. Hannah Ginsborg (1990). Reflective Judgment and Taste in On the Bicentenary of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Judgment. Noûs 24 (1):63-78.
     
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  28. Hannah Ginsborg (1990). The Role of Taste in Kant's Theory of Cognition. Garland.
  29. Hannah Ginsborg, Qu'est-Ce Que la Faculté de Juger?
    L’idée d’un jugement [Urteil], et du pouvoir de juger [Vermögen zu urteilen], joue un rôle cardinal dans l’argumentation de la Critique de la raison pure. L’argument central de la première Critique vise à montrer comment les concepts purs de l’entendement peuvent s’appliquer aux objets qui nous sont donnés dans l’expérience. Cet argument dépend de l’idée que l’expérience n’est pas l’affaire de la sensibilité à elle seule, mais qu’elle implique, dès le début, le concours de l’entendement. Or, l’entendement n’est rien d’autre (...)
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