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Profile: Hannes Leitgeb (Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München)
  1.  69
    Hannes Leitgeb (2014). The Stability Theory of Belief. Philosophical Review 123 (2):131-171.
    This essay develops a joint theory of rational (all-or-nothing) belief and degrees of belief. The theory is based on three assumptions: the logical closure of rational belief; the axioms of probability for rational degrees of belief; and the so-called Lockean thesis, in which the concepts of rational belief and rational degree of belief figure simultaneously. In spite of what is commonly believed, this essay will show that this combination of principles is satisfiable (and indeed nontrivially so) and that the principles (...)
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  2. Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew (2010). An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy. Philosophy of Science 77 (2):236-272.
    One of the fundamental problems of epistemology is to say when the evidence in an agent’s possession justifies the beliefs she holds. In this paper and its prequel, we defend the Bayesian solution to this problem by appealing to the following fundamental norm: Accuracy An epistemic agent ought to minimize the inaccuracy of her partial beliefs. In the prequel, we made this norm mathematically precise; in this paper, we derive its consequences. We show that the two core tenets of Bayesianism (...)
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  3. Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew (2010). An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy. Philosophy of Science 77 (2):201-235.
    One of the fundamental problems of epistemology is to say when the evidence in an agent’s possession justifies the beliefs she holds. In this paper and its sequel, we defend the Bayesian solution to this problem by appealing to the following fundamental norm: Accuracy An epistemic agent ought to minimize the inaccuracy of her partial beliefs. In this paper, we make this norm mathematically precise in various ways. We describe three epistemic dilemmas that an agent might face if she attempts (...)
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  4. Hannes Leitgeb & James Ladyman (2008). Criteria of Identity and Structuralist Ontology. Philosophia Mathematica 16 (3):388-396.
    In discussions about whether the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is compatible with structuralist ontologies of mathematics, it is usually assumed that individual objects are subject to criteria of identity which somehow account for the identity of the individuals. Much of this debate concerns structures that admit of non-trivial automorphisms. We consider cases from graph theory that violate even weak formulations of PII. We argue that (i) the identity or difference of places in a structure is not to be (...)
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  5.  38
    Hannes Leitgeb (2013). Reducing Belief Simpliciter to Degrees of Belief. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (12):1338-1389.
    Is it possible to give an explicit definition of belief in terms of subjective probability, such that believed propositions are guaranteed to have a sufficiently high probability, and yet it is neither the case that belief is stripped of any of its usual logical properties, nor is it the case that believed propositions are bound to have probability 1? We prove the answer is ‘yes’, and that given some plausible logical postulates on belief that involve a contextual “cautiousness” threshold, there (...)
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  6. Darren Bradley & Hannes Leitgeb (2006). When Betting Odds and Credences Come Apart: More Worries for Dutch Book Arguments. Analysis 66 (290):119–127.
    If an agent believes that the probability of E being true is 1/2, should she accept a bet on E at even odds or better? Yes, but only given certain conditions. This paper is about what those conditions are. In particular, we think that there is a condition that has been overlooked so far in the literature. We discovered it in response to a paper by Hitchcock (2004) in which he argues for the 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem. (...)
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  7. Hannes Leitgeb (2005). What Truth Depends On. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (2):155-192.
    What kinds of sentences with truth predicate may be inserted plausibly and consistently into the T-scheme? We state an answer in terms of dependence: those sentences which depend directly or indirectly on non-semantic states of affairs (only). In order to make this precise we introduce a theory of dependence according to which a sentence φ is said to depend on a set Φ of sentences iff the truth value of φ supervenes on the presence or absence of the sentences of (...)
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  8.  28
    Hannes Leitgeb (2012). A Probabilistic Semantics for Counterfactuals. Part B. Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (1):85-121.
    This is part B of a paper in which we defend a semantics for counterfactuals which is probabilistic in the sense that the truth condition for counterfactuals refers to a probability measure. Because of its probabilistic nature, it allows a counterfactual to be true even in the presence of relevant -worlds, as long such exceptions are not too widely spread. The semantics is made precise and studied in different versions which are related to each other by representation theorems. Despite its (...)
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  9. Hannes Leitgeb (2011). New Life for Carnap's "Aufbau?". Synthese 180 (2):265 - 299.
    Rudolf Carnap's Der logische Aufbau der Welt (The Logical Structure of the World) is generally conceived of as being the failed manifesto of logical positivism. In this paper we will consider the following question: How much of the Aufbau can actually be saved? We will argue that there is an adaptation of the old system which satisfies many of the demands of the original programme. In order to defend this thesis, we have to show how a new 'Aufbau-like' programme may (...)
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  10.  94
    Hannes Leitgeb (2007). What Theories of Truth Should Be Like (but Cannot Be). Philosophy Compass 2 (2):276–290.
  11.  86
    Hannes Leitgeb & Krister Segerberg (2007). Dynamic Doxastic Logic: Why, How, and Where To? Synthese 155 (2):167 - 190.
    We investigate the research programme of dynamic doxastic logic (DDL) and analyze its underlying methodology. The Ramsey test for conditionals is used to characterize the logical and philosophical differences between two paradigmatic systems, AGM and KGM, which we develop and compare axiomatically and semantically. The importance of Gärdenfors’s impossibility result on the Ramsey test is highlighted by a comparison with Arrow’s impossibility result on social choice. We end with an outlook on the prospects and the future of DDL.
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  12.  23
    Leon Horsten, Graham E. Leigh, Hannes Leitgeb & Philip Welch (2012). Revision Revisited. Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):642-664.
    This article explores ways in which the Revision Theory of Truth can be expressed in the object language. In particular, we investigate the extent to which semantic deficiency, stable truth, and nearly stable truth can be so expressed, and we study different axiomatic systems for the Revision Theory of Truth.
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  13.  19
    Hannes Leitgeb (2015). I—The Humean Thesis on Belief. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):143-185.
    This paper suggests a bridge principle for all-or-nothing belief and degrees of belief to the effect that belief corresponds to stably high degree of belief. Different ways of making this Humean thesis on belief precise are discussed, and one of them is shown to stand out by unifying the others. The resulting version of the thesis proves to be fruitful in entailing the logical closure of belief, the Lockean thesis on belief, and coherence between decision-making based on all-or-nothing beliefs and (...)
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  14. Hannes Leitgeb (2009). On Formal and Informal Provability. In Ø. Linnebo O. Bueno (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mathematics. 263--299.
     
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  15.  46
    Hannes Leitgeb (2004). Inference on the Low Level: An Investigation Into Deduction, Nonmonotonic Reasoning, and the Philosophy of Cognition. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    This monograph provides a new account of justified inference as a cognitive process. In contrast to the prevailing tradition in epistemology, the focus is on low-level inferences, i.e., those inferences that we are usually not consciously aware of and that we share with the cat nearby which infers that the bird which she sees picking grains from the dirt, is able to fly. Presumably, such inferences are not generated by explicit logical reasoning, but logical methods can be used to describe (...)
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  16.  74
    Volker Halbach, Hannes Leitgeb & Philip Welch (2003). Possible-Worlds Semantics for Modal Notions Conceived as Predicates. Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (2):179-223.
    If □ is conceived as an operator, i.e., an expression that gives applied to a formula another formula, the expressive power of the language is severely restricted when compared to a language where □ is conceived as a predicate, i.e., an expression that yields a formula if it is applied to a term. This consideration favours the predicate approach. The predicate view, however, is threatened mainly by two problems: Some obvious predicate systems are inconsistent, and possible-worlds semantics for predicates of (...)
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  17. Hannes Leitgeb, A Probabilistic Semantics for Counterfactuals.
     
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  18. Hannes Leitgeb (2007). Beliefs in Conditionals Vs. Conditional Beliefs. Topoi 26 (1):115-132.
    On the basis of impossibility results on probability, belief revision, and conditionals, it is argued that conditional beliefs differ from beliefs in conditionals qua mental states. Once this is established, it will be pointed out in what sense conditional beliefs are still conditional, even though they may lack conditional contents, and why it is permissible to still regard them as beliefs, although they are not beliefs in conditionals. Along the way, the main logical, dispositional, representational, and normative properties of conditional (...)
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  19.  53
    Hannes Leitgeb (2001). Theories of Truth Which Have No Standard Models. Studia Logica 68 (1):69-87.
    This papers deals with the class of axiomatic theories of truth for semantically closed languages, where the theories do not allow for standard models; i.e., those theories cannot be interpreted as referring to the natural number codes of sentences only (for an overview of axiomatic theories of truth in general, see Halbach[6]). We are going to give new proofs for two well-known results in this area, and we also prove a new theorem on the nonstandardness of a certain theory of (...)
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  20.  79
    Hannes Leitgeb (2010). On the Ramsey Test Without Triviality. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (1):21-54.
    We present a way of classifying the logically possible ways out of Gärdenfors' inconsistency or triviality result on belief revision with conditionals. For one of these ways—conditionals which are not descriptive but which only have an inferential role as being given by the Ramsey test—we determine which of the assumptions in three different versions of Gärdenfors' theorem turn out to be false. This is done by constructing ranked models in which such Ramsey-test conditionals are evaluated and which are subject to (...)
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  21.  71
    Hannes Leitgeb (2013). Scientific Philosophy, Mathematical Philosophy, and All That. Metaphilosophy 44 (3):267-275.
    This article suggests that scientific philosophy, especially mathematical philosophy, might be one important way of doing philosophy in the future. Along the way, the article distinguishes between different types of scientific philosophy; it mentions some of the scientific methods that can serve philosophers; it aims to undermine some worries about mathematical philosophy; and it tries to make clear why in certain cases the application of mathematical methods is necessary for philosophical progress.
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  22.  41
    Leon Horsten & Hannes Leitgeb (2001). No Future. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (3):259-265.
    The difficulties with formalizing the intensional notions necessity, knowability and omniscience, and rational belief are well-known. If these notions are formalized as predicates applying to (codes of) sentences, then from apparently weak and uncontroversial logical principles governing these notions, outright contradictions can be derived. Tense logic is one of the best understood and most extensively developed branches of intensional logic. In tense logic, the temporal notions future and past are formalized as sentential operators rather than as predicates. The question therefore (...)
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  23.  36
    Hannes Leitgeb (2013). A Way Out of the Preface Paradox? Analysis 74 (1):ant091.
    The thesis defended in this article is that by uttering or publishing a great many declarative sentences in assertoric mode, one does not actually assert that their conjunction is true – one rather asserts that the vast majority of these sentences are true. Accordingly, the belief that is expressed thereby is the belief that the vast majority of these sentences are true. In the article, we make this proposal precise, we explain the context-dependency of belief that corresponds to it, we (...)
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  24.  51
    Hannes Leitgeb (2007). A New Analysis of Quasianalysis. Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (2):181 - 226.
    We investigate the conditions under which quasianalysis, i.e., Carnap's method of abstraction in his Aufbau, yields adequate results. In particular, we state both necessary and sufficient conditions for the so-called faithfulness and fullness of quasianalysis, and analyze adequacy as the conjunction of faithfulness and fullness. It is shown that there is no method of (re-)constructing properties from similarity that delivers adequate results in all possible cases, if the same set of individuals is presupposed for properties and for similarity, and if (...)
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  25. Hannes Leitgeb (2013). Criteria of Identity: Strong and Wrong. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):61-68.
    We show that finitely axiomatized first-order theories that involve some criterion of identity for entities of a category C can be reformulated as conjunctions of a non-triviality statement and a criterion of identity for entities of category C again. From this, we draw two conclusions: First, criteria of identity can be very strong deductively. Second, although the criteria of identity that are constructed in the proof of the theorem are not good ones intuitively, it is difficult to say what exactly (...)
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  26.  20
    Hannes Leitgeb (2011). God − Moore = Ramsey (A Reply to Chalmers and Hájek). Topoi 30 (1):47-51.
    Famously, Frank P. Ramsey suggested a test for the acceptability of conditionals. Recently, David Chalmers and Alan Hájek (2007) have criticized a qualitative variant of the Ramsey test for indicative conditionals. In this paper we argue for the following three claims: (i) Chalmers and Hájek are right that the variant of the Ramsey test that they attack is not the correct way of spelling out an acceptability test for indicative conditionals. But there is a suppositional variant of the Ramsey test (...)
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  27. Hannes Leitgeb (2002). What is a Self-Referential Sentence? Critical Remarks on the Alleged Mbox(Non-)Circularity of Yablo's Paradox. Logique and Analyse 177 (178):3-14.
     
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  28.  30
    Hannes Leitgeb (2014). The Review Paradox: On The Diachronic Costs of Not Closing Rational Belief Under Conjunction. Noûs 48 (4):781-793.
    We argue that giving up on the closure of rational belief under conjunction comes with a substantial price. Either rational belief is closed under conjunction, or else the epistemology of belief has a serious diachronic deficit over and above the synchronic failures of conjunctive closure. The argument for this, which can be viewed as a sequel to the preface paradox, is called the ‘review paradox'; it is presented in four distinct, but closely related versions.
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  29.  34
    Hannes Leitgeb (2011). Logic in General Philosophy of Science: Old Things and New Things. Synthese 179 (2):339 - 350.
    This is a personal, incomplete, and very informal take on the role of logic in general philosophy of science, which is aimed at a broader audience. We defend and advertise the application of logical methods in philosophy of science, starting with the beginnings in the Vienna Circle and ending with some more recent logical developments.
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  30. Hannes Leitgeb (2010). Sleeping Beauty and Eternal Recurrence. Analysis 70 (2):203-205.
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  31.  18
    Hannes Leitgeb (1999). Truth and the Liar in De Morgan-Valued Models. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (4):496-514.
    The aim of this paper is to give a certain algebraic account of truth: we want to define what we mean by De Morgan-valued truth models and show their existence even in the case of semantical closure: that is, languages may contain their own truth predicate if they are interpreted by De Morgan-valued models. Before we can prove this result, we have to repeat some basic facts concerning De Morgan-valued models in general, and we will introduce a notion of truth (...)
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  32.  2
    Hannes Leitgeb (2012). A Probabilistic Semantics for Counterfactuals. Part B. Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (1):85-121.
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  33. Hannes Leitgeb (2009). Rudolf Carnap's the Logical Structure of the World. Topoi 28 (2):163-165.
  34.  31
    Hannes Leitgeb (2008). Introduction to the Special Issue. Studia Logica 88 (1):1-2.
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  35.  71
    Hannes Leitgeb (2008). On the Probabilistic Convention T. Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (2):218-224.
    We introduce an epistemic theory of truth according to which the same rational degree of belief is assigned to Tr(. It is shown that if epistemic probability measures are only demanded to be finitely additive (but not necessarily σ-additive), then such a theory is consistent even for object languages that contain their own truth predicate. As the proof of this result indicates, the theory can also be interpreted as deriving from a quantitative version of the Revision Theory of Truth.
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  36.  71
    Simone Duca & Hannes Leitgeb (2012). How Serious Is the Paradox of Serious Possibility? Mind 121 (481):1-36.
    The so-called Paradox of Serious Possibility is usually regarded as showing that the standard axioms of belief revision do not apply to belief sets that are introspectively closed. In this article we argue to the contrary: we suggest a way of dissolving the Paradox of Serious Possibility so that introspective statements are taken to express propositions in the standard sense, which may thus be proper members of belief sets, and accordingly the normal axioms of belief revision apply to them. Instead (...)
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  37. Hannes Leitgeb (2005). Paradox by (Non-Wellfounded) Definition. Analysis 65 (288):275–278.
  38.  37
    Hannes Leitgeb (2005). Interpreted Dynamical Systems and Qualitative Laws: From Neural Networks to Evolutionary Systems. Synthese 146 (1-2):189 - 202.
    . Interpreted dynamical systems are dynamical systems with an additional interpretation mapping by which propositional formulas are assigned to system states. The dynamics of such systems may be described in terms of qualitative laws for which a satisfaction clause is defined. We show that the systems Cand CL of nonmonotonic logic are adequate with respect to the corresponding description of the classes of interpreted ordered and interpreted hierarchical systems, respectively. Inhibition networks, artificial neural networks, logic programs, and evolutionary systems are (...)
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  39.  33
    Hannes Leitgeb (2005). Hodges' Theorem Does Not Account for Determinacy of Translation. A Reply to Werning. Erkenntnis 62 (3):411 - 425.
    Werning applies a theorem by Hodges in order to put forward an argument against Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation (understood as a thesis on meaning, not on reference) and in favour of what Werning calls ‘semantic realism’. We show that the argument rests on two critical premises both of which are false. The reasons for these failures are explained and the actual place of this application of Hodges’ theorem within Quine’s philosophy of language is outlined.
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  40. Hannes Leitgeb (1997). A Class of N-Valued Statement Calculi: Many Universes Statement Calculus. Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 11 (1):3-15.
     
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  41.  68
    Hannes Leitgeb (2001). Truth as Translation – Part A. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (4):281-307.
    This is the second part of a paper dealing with truth and translation. In Part A a revised version of Tarski's Convention T has been presented, which explicitly refers to a translation mapping from the object language to the metalanguage; the vague notion of a translation has been replaced by a precise definition. At the end of Part A it has been shown that interpreted languages exist, which allow for vicious self-reference but which nevertheless contain their own truth predicate - (...)
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  42. Hannes Leitgeb (2007). A New Analysis of Quasianalysis. Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (2):181-226.
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  43. Hannes Leitgeb (2007). On the Metatheory of Field's 'Solving the Paradoxes, Escaping Revenge'. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press
     
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  44.  3
    Anne Siegetsleitner & Hannes Leitgeb (2010). Mengers Logik für Ethik und Moral: Nichts von Sollen, nichts von Güte, nichts von Sinnlosigkeit. In Logischer Empirismus, Werte und Moral. Eine Neubewertung. Springer 197-218.
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  45.  29
    Hannes Leitgeb (2014). A Lottery Paradox for Counterfactuals Without Agglomeration. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):605-636.
    We will present a new lottery-style paradox on counterfactuals and chance. The upshot will be: combining natural assumptions on the truth values of ordinary counterfactuals, the conditional chances of possible but non-actual events, the manner in which and relate to each other, and a fragment of the logic of counterfactuals leads to disaster. In contrast with the usual lottery-style paradoxes, logical closure under conjunction—that is, in this case, the rule of Agglomeration of counterfactuals—will not play a role in the derivation (...)
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  46. Hannes Leitgeb (2005). What Truth Depends On. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (2):155-192.
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  47. Denis M. Walsh, Leah Henderson, Noah D. Goodman, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, James F. Woodward, Hannes Leitgeb, Richard Pettigrew, Brad Weslake & John Kulvicki (2010). 1. Not a Sure Thing: Fitness, Probability, and Causation Not a Sure Thing: Fitness, Probability, and Causation (Pp. 147-171). [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 77 (2).
     
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  48.  2
    Hannes Leitgeb (2001). Truth as Translation – Part B. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (4):309-328.
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  49.  57
    Hannes Leitgeb (2008). An Impossibility Result on Semantic Resemblance. Dialectica 62 (3):293-306.
    We show that a set of prima facie plausible assumptions on the relation of meaning resemblance – one of which is a compositionality postulate – is inconsistent. On this basis we argue that either there is no theoretically useful notion of semantic resemblance at all, or the traditional conception of the compositionality of meaning has to be adapted. In the former case, arguments put forward by Nelson Goodman and Paul Churchland in favor of the concept of meaning resemblance are defeated. (...)
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  50.  57
    Hannes Leitgeb (2003). Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):195-205.
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