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Profile: Hanno Sauer (Leiden University)
  1. Hanno Sauer (2014). It's the Knobe Effect, Stupid! Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (4):485-503.
    People asymmetrically attribute various agential features such as intentionality, knowledge, or causal impact to other agents when something of normative significance is at stake. I will argue that three questions are of primary interest in the debate about this effect. A methodological question about how to explain it at all; a substantive question about how to explain it correctly: and a normative question about whether to explain it in terms of an error or a legitimate judgmental pattern. The problem, I (...)
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  2. Hanno Sauer (2014). The Wrong Kind of Mistake: A Problem for Robust Sentimentalism About Moral Judgment. Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (2):247-269.
    IntroductionIn a 1971 interview broadcast on Granada TV Manchester, Woody Allen made one of his trademark self-deprecating remarks about an early film of his: “It was a boring picture, as I recall.” The interviewer responded with surprise: “I rather enjoyed it.” To which Allen replied: “Yes, but you’re mistaken.” In the world of humor, Allen’s reply sounds odd – which is why it is funny. In the moral domain, an exchange like this would not sound weird at all. What is (...)
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  3. Hanno Sauer & Tom Bates (2013). Chairmen, Cocaine, and Car Crashes: The Knobe Effect as an Attribution Error. Journal of Ethics 17 (4):305-330.
    In this paper, we argue that the so-called Knobe-Effect constitutes an error. There is now a wealth of data confirming that people are highly prone to what has also come to be known as the ‘side-effect effect’. That is, when attributing psychological states—such as intentionality, foreknowledge, and desiring—as well as other agential features—such as causal control—people typically do so to a greater extent when the action under consideration is evaluated negatively. There are a plethora of models attempting to account for (...)
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  4. Hanno Sauer (2012). Educated Intuitions. Automaticity and Rationality in Moral Judgement. Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):255-275.
    Moral judgements are based on automatic processes. Moral judgements are based on reason. In this paper, I argue that both of these claims are true, and show how they can be reconciled. Neither the automaticity of moral judgement nor the post hoc nature of conscious moral reasoning pose a threat to rationalist models of moral cognition. The relation moral reasoning bears to our moral judgements is not primarily mediated by episodes of conscious reasoning, but by the acquisition, formation and maintenance (...)
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  5. Hanno Sauer (2012). Morally Irrelevant Factors: What's Left of the Dual Process-Model of Moral Cognition? Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):783-811.
    Current developments in empirical moral psychology have spawned a new perspective on the traditional metaethical question of whether moral judgment is based on reason or emotion. Psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists such as Joshua Greene argue that there is empirical evidence that emotion is essential for one particularly important subclass of moral judgments: so-called ?deontological judgments.? In this paper, I scrutinize this claim and argue that neither the empirical evidence for Greene's dual process-theory of moral judgment nor the normative conclusions it (...)
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  6. Hanno Sauer (2012). Psychopaths and Filthy Desks: Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Moral Judgment? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):95-115.
    Philosophical and empirical moral psychologists claim that emotions are both necessary and sufficient for moral judgment. The aim of this paper is to assess the evidence in favor of both claims and to show how a moderate rationalist position about moral judgment can be defended nonetheless. The experimental evidence for both the necessity- and the sufficiency-thesis concerning the connection between emotional reactions and moral judgment is presented. I argue that a rationalist about moral judgment can be happy to accept the (...)
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  7. Hanno Sauer (2012). Winner of the Philosophical Explorations Essay Prize 2012 Educated Intuitions. Automaticity and Rationality in Moral Judgement. Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):96-96.
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  8. Hanno Sauer (2011). Social Intuitionism and the Psychology of Moral Reasoning. Philosophy Compass 6 (10):708-721.
    Rationalism about the psychology of moral judgment holds, among other things, that the justifying moral reasons we have for our judgments are also the causally effective reasons for why we make those judgments. This can be called the ‘effectiveness’-thesis regarding moral reasoning. The theory that best exemplifies the thesis is the traditional conscious reasoning-paradigm. Current empirical moral psychology, however, poses a serious challenge to this thesis: it argues that in fact, emotional reactions are necessary and sufficient to account for moral (...)
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  9. Hanno Sauer (2011). The Appropriateness of Emotions. Moral Judgment, Moral Emotions, and the Conflation Problem. Ethical Perspectives 18 (1):107-140.
    What is the connection between emotions and moral judgments? Neo-sentimentalism maintains that to say that something is morally wrong is to think it appropriate to resent other people for doing it or to feel guilty upon doing it oneself. But intuitively, it seems that there is no way to characterize the content of guilt and resentment independent from the fact that these emotions respond to morally wrong actions. In response to this problem of circularity, modern forms of sentimentalism have favoured (...)
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  10. Hanno Sauer, Basil Smith & Jeremy Watkins (2011). Christopher Martin is a Researcher in the Faculty of Medicine and a Lecturer in the Faculty of Education at Memorial University of Newfoundland, Canada. A Former School Principal, His Central Area of Research is Moral Philosophy and the Ethical and Political Foundations of Education. Email: Chris. Martin@ Med. Mun. Ca. [REVIEW] Ethical Perspectives 18 (1):163.
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  11. Jeremy Watkins, Basil Smith, Christopher Martin, Renate Pilapil & Hanno Sauer (2011). Matching Well-Being to Merit: The Example of Punishment. Ethical Perspectives 18 (1):5-27.
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