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Profile: Hans Rott
  1. Hans Rott (forthcoming). A Puzzle About Disputes and Disagreements. Erkenntnis:1-23.
    The paper addresses the situation of a dispute in which one speaker says ϕ and a second speaker says not-ϕ. Proceeding on an idealising distinction between “basic” and “interesting” claims that may be formulated in a given idiolectal language, I investigate how it might be sorted out whether the dispute reflects a genuine (substantive) disagreement, or whether the speakers are only having a merely verbal (terminological) dispute, due to their using different interesting concepts. I show that four individually plausible principles (...)
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  2. Hans Rott (2014). Unvergleichbarkeit und unabhängige Bedeutung. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 68 (2):237-241.
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  3. Georg Brun & Hans Rott (2013). Interpreting Enthymematic Arguments Using Belief Revision. Synthese 190 (18):4041-4063.
    This paper is about the situation in which an author (writer or speaker) presents a deductively invalid argument, but the addressee aims at a charitable interpretation and has reason to assume that the author intends to present a valid argument. How can he go about interpreting the author’s reasoning as enthymematically valid? We suggest replacing the usual find-the-missing-premise approaches by an approach based on systematic efforts to ascribe a belief state to the author against the background of which the argument (...)
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  4. Hans Rott (2013). Two Concepts of Plausibility in Default Reasoning. Erkenntnis:1-34.
    In their unifying theory to model uncertainty, Friedman and Halpern (1995–2003) applied plausibility measures to default reasoning satisfying certain sets of axioms. They proposed a distinctive condition for plausibility measures that characterizes “qualitative” reasoning (as contrasted with probabilistic reasoning). A similar and similarly fundamental, but more general and thus stronger condition was independently suggested in the context of “basic” entrenchment-based belief revision by Rott (1996–2003). The present paper analyzes the relation between the two approaches to formalizing basic notions of plausibility (...)
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  5. Giacomo Bonanno, James Delgrande & Hans Rott (2012). Guest Editors' Introduction. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):1-5.
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  6. Hans Rott (2012). Bounded Revision: Two-Dimensional Belief Change Between Conservative and Moderate Revision. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):173-200.
    This paper presents the model of ‘bounded revision’ that is based on two-dimensional revision functions taking as arguments pairs consisting of an input sentence and a reference sentence. The key idea is that the input sentence is accepted as far as (and just a little further than) the reference sentence is ‘cotenable’ with it. Bounded revision satisfies the AGM axioms as well as the Same Beliefs Condition (SBC) saying that the set of beliefs accepted after the revision does not depend (...)
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  7. Bengt Hansson, Hans van Ditmarsch, Pascal Engel, Sven Ove Hansson, Vincent Hendricks, Søren Holm, Pauline Jacobson, Anthonie Meijers, Henry S. Richardson & Hans Rott (2011). A Theoria Round Table on Philosophy Publishing. Theoria 77 (2):104-116.
    As part of the conference commemorating Theoria's 75th anniversary, a round table discussion on philosophy publishing was held in Bergendal, Sollentuna, Sweden, on 1 October 2010. Bengt Hansson was the chair, and the other participants were eight editors-in-chief of philosophy journals: Hans van Ditmarsch (Journal of Philosophical Logic), Pascal Engel (Dialectica), Sven Ove Hansson (Theoria), Vincent Hendricks (Synthese), Søren Holm (Journal of Medical Ethics), Pauline Jacobson (Linguistics and Philosophy), Anthonie Meijers (Philosophical Explorations), Henry S. Richardson (Ethics) and Hans Rott (Erkenntnis).
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  8. Hans Rott (2011). Idealizations, Intertheory Explanations and Conditionals. In. In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision Meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. 59--75.
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  9. Hans Rott (2011). Odd Choices: On the Rationality of Some Alleged Anomalies of Decision and Inference. Topoi 30 (1):59-69.
    This paper presents a number of apparent anomalies in rational choice scenarios, and their translation into the logic of everyday reasoning. Three classes of examples that have been discussed in the context of probabilistic choice since the 1960s (by Debreu, Tversky and others) are analyzed in a non-probabilistic setting. It is shown how they can at the same time be regarded as logical problems that concern the drawing of defeasible inferences from a given information base. I argue that initial appearances (...)
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  10. Hans Rott (2011). Reapproaching Ramsey: Conditionals and Iterated Belief Change in the Spirit of AGM. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):155-191.
    According to the Ramsey Test, conditionals reflect changes of beliefs: α > β is accepted in a belief state iff β is accepted in the minimal revision of it that is necessary to accommodate α. Since Gärdenfors’s seminal paper of 1986, a series of impossibility theorems (“triviality theorems”) has seemed to show that the Ramsey test is not a viable analysis of conditionals if it is combined with AGM-type belief revision models. I argue that it is possible to endorse that (...)
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  11. Hans Rott (2009). Degrees All the Way Down: Beliefs, Non-Beliefs and Disbeliefs. In. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer. 301--339.
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  12. Hans Rott (2008). A New Psychologism in Logic? Reflections From the Point of View of Belief Revision. Studia Logica 88 (1):113 - 136.
    This paper addresses the question whether the past couple of decades of formal research in belief revision offers evidence of a new psychologism in logic. In the first part I examine five potential arguments in favour of this thesis and find them all wanting. In the second part of the paper I argue that belief revision research has climbed up a hierarchy of models for the change of doxastic states that appear to be clearly normative at the bottom, but are (...)
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  13. Hans Rott (2008). Belief Revision. In Jonathan Eric Adler & Lance J. Rips (eds.), Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations. Cambridge University Press. 514--534.
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  14. Hans Rott (2006). The Value of Truth and the Value of Information : On Isaac Levi's Epistemology. In Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi. Cambridge University Press. 179.
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  15. Hans Rott & Verena Wagner (2005). Das Ende Vom Problem des Methodischen Anfangs: Descartes' Antiskeptisches Argument. In Gereon Wolters & Martin Carrier (eds.), Homo Sapiens Und Homo Faber. De Gruyter. 133.
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  16. Hans Rott (2004). A Counterexample to Six Fundamental Principles of Belief Formation. Synthese 139 (2):225 - 240.
    In recent years there has been a growing consensus that ordinary reasoning does not conform to the laws of classical logic, but is rather nonmonotonic in the sense that conclusions previously drawn may well be removed upon acquiring further information. Even so, rational belief formation has up to now been modelled as conforming to some fundamental principles that are classically valid. The counterexample described in this paper suggests that a number of the most cherished of these principles should not be (...)
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  17. Hans Rott (2004). Online Manuscript Submission. Erkenntnis 61:509-515.
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  18. Hans Rott (2004). Supplying Planks for Neurath's Boat: Can Economists Meet the Demands of the Dynamics of Scientific Theories? In Friedrich Stadler (ed.), Induction and Deduction in the Sciences. Springer. 11--225.
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  19. Hans Rott (2004). Stability, Strength and Sensitivity:Converting Belief Into Knowledge. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):469 - 493.
    In this paper I discuss the relation between various properties that have been regarded as important for determining whether or not a belief constitutes a piece of knowledge: its stability, strength and sensitivity to truth, as well as the strength of the epistemic position in which the subject is with respect to this belief. Attempts to explicate the relevant concepts more formally with the help of systems of spheres of possible worlds (à la Lewis and Grove) must take care to (...)
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  20. Hans Rott (2004). Vom Fließen theoretischer Begriffe: Begriffliches Wissen und theoretischer Wandel. Kant Studien 95 (1):29-51.
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  21. Hans Rott (2003). Basic Entrenchment. Studia Logica 73 (2):257 - 280.
    In contrast to other prominent models of belief change, models based on epistemic entrenchment have up to now been applicable only in the context of very strong packages of requirements for belief revision. This paper decomposes the axiomatization of entrenchment into independent modules. Among other things it is shown how belief revision satisfying only the ‘basic’ postulates of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson can be represented in terms of entrenchment.
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  22. Hans Rott (2003). Editorial. Erkenntnis 59 (1):1-3.
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  23. Hans Rott (2003). Lehrer's Dynamic Theory of Knowledge. In. In Olsson Erik (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Kluwer. 219--242.
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  24. Wolfram Hinzen & Hans Rott (eds.) (2002). Belief and Meaning: Essays at the Interface. Deutsche Bibliothek der Wissenschaften.
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  25. Hans Rott (2001). Change, Choice and Inference: A Study of Belief Revision and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Oxford University Press.
    Change, Choice and Inference develops logical theories that are necessary both for the understanding of adaptable human reasoning and for the design of intelligent systems. The book shows that reasoning processes - the drawing on inferences and changing one's beliefs - can be viewed as belonging to the realm of practical reason by embedding logical theories into the broader context of the theory of rational choice. The book unifies lively and significant strands of research in logic, philosophy, economics and artificial (...)
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  26. Hans Rott (2000). Billigkeit und Nachsicht. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 54 (1):23 - 46.
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  27. Hans Rott (2000). Two Dogmas of Belief Revision. Journal of Philosophy 97 (9):503-522.
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  28. Hans Rott (2000). Words in Contexts: Fregean Elucidations. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (6):621-643.
  29. Hans Rott (1999). Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief. Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):387-412.
    In this paper I discuss the foundations of a formal theory of coherent and conservative belief change that is (a) suitable to be used as a method for constructing iterated changes of belief, (b) sensitive to the history of earlier belief changes, and (c) independent of any form of dispositional coherence. I review various ways to conceive the relationship between the beliefs actually held by an agent and her belief change strategies (that also deal with potential belief sets), show the (...)
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  30. Hans Rott (1999). Coherence and Conser Atism in the Dynamics of Belief Part I: Finding the Right Framework. Erkenntnis 50:387-412.
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  31. Hans Rott & Maurice Pagnucco (1999). Severe Withdrawal (and Recovery). Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):501-547.
    The problem of how to remove information from an agent's stock of beliefs is of paramount concern in the belief change literature. An inquiring agent may remove beliefs for a variety of reasons: a belief may be called into doubt or the agent may simply wish to entertain other possibilities. In the prominent AGM framework for belief change, upon which the work here is based, one of the three central operations, contraction, addresses this concern (the other two deal with the (...)
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  32. Sven Ove Hansson & Hans Rott (1998). A Plea for Accuracy. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 8 (3):221-224.
    ABSTRACT In his paper ?On Having Bad Contractions, Or: No Room for Recovery? [Te97], N. Tennant attacks the AGM research program of belief revision. We show that he misrepresents the state of affairs in this field of research.
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  33. Sven Ove Hansson & Hans Rott (1998). Beyond Recovery? A Reply to Tennant. Erkenntnis 49:387-392.
    In his paper 'Changing the Theory of Theory Change: Reply to My Critics', N. Tennant (1997b) reacts to the critical reception of an earlier article of his. The present note rectifies some of the most serious misrepresentations in Tennant's reply.
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  34. Sven-Ove Hansson & Hans Rott (1998). Beyond Recovery? A Reply to Tennant. Erkenntnis 49 (3):387-392.
    In his paper ‘Changing the Theory of Theory Change: Reply to My Critics’, N. Tennant (1997b) reacts to the critical reception of an earlier article of his. The present note rectifies some of the most serious misrepresentations in Tennant's reply.
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  35. Hans Rott (1997). Vom Primat der praktischen Vernunft: Logische Regeln als Regeln rationaler Wahl. In Georg Meggle (ed.), Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy. De Gruyter. 1--138.
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  36. A. Fuhrmann & Hans Rott (eds.) (1996). Logic, Action, and Information: Essays on Logic in Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence. W. De Gruyter.
    Janusz Czelakowski Elements of Formal Action Theory 1. Elementary Action Systems 1.1 Introductory Remarks. In contemporary literature one may distinguish ...
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  37. André Fuhrmann & Hans Rott (eds.) (1996). Logic, Action and Information. de Gruyter.
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  38. Sven Ove Hansson & Hans Rott (1995). How Not to Change the Theory of Theory Change: A Reply to Tennant. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (3):361-380.
    A number of seminal papers on the logic of belief change by Alchourrön, Gärden-fors, and Makinson have given rise to what is now known as the AGM paradigm. The present discussion note is a response to Neil Tennant's [1994], which aims at a critical appraisal of the AGM approach and the introduction of an alternative approach. We show that important parts of Tennants's critical remarks are based on misunderstandings or on lack of information. In the course of doing this, we (...)
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  39. Hans Rott (1994). Zur Wissenschaftsphilosophie von Imre Lakatos. Philosophia Naturalis 31:25-62.
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  40. Hans Rott (1993). Belief Contraction in the Context of the General Theory of Rational Choice. Journal of Symbolic Logic 58 (4):1426-1450.
    This paper reorganizes and further develops the theory of partial meet contraction which was introduced in a classic paper by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson. Our purpose is threefold. First, we put the theory in a broader perspective by decomposing it into two layers which can respectively be treated by the general theory of choice and preference and elementary model theory. Second, we reprove the two main representation theorems of AGM and present two more representation results for the finite case that (...)
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  41. Hans Rott (1992). Modellings for Belief Change: Prioritization and Entrenchment. Theoria 58 (1):21-57.
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  42. Hans Rott (1992). Preferential Belief Change Using Generalized Epistemic Entrenchment. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 1 (1):45-78.
    A sentence A is epistemically less entrenched in a belief state K than a sentence B if and only if a person in belief state K who is forced to give up either A or B will give up A and hold on to B. This is the fundamental idea of epistemic entrenchment as introduced by Gärdenfors (1988) and elaborated by Gärdenfors and Makinson (1988). Another distinguishing feature of relations of epistemic entrenchment is that they permit particularly simple and elegant (...)
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  43. Hans Rott (1991). A Nonmonotonic Conditional Logic for Belief Revision. In. In André Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.), The Logic of Theory Change. Springer. 135--181.
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  44. Hans Rott (1991). Two Methods of Constructing Contractions and Revisions of Knowledge Systems. Journal of Philosophical Logic 20 (2):149 - 173.
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  45. Hans Rott (1989). Conditionals and Theory Change: Revisions, Expansions, and Additions. [REVIEW] Synthese 81 (1):91-113.
    This paper dwells upon formal models of changes of beliefs, or theories, which are expressed in languages containing a binary conditional connective. After defining the basic concept of a (non-trivial) belief revision model. I present a simple proof of Gärdenfors''s (1986) triviality theorem. I claim that on a proper understanding of this theorem we must give up the thesis that consistent revisions (additions) are to be equated with logical expansions. If negated or might conditionals are interpreted on the basis of (...)
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  46. Hans Rott (1987). Reduction: Some Criteria and Criticisms of the Structuralist Concept. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 27 (2):231 - 256.
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  47. Hans Rott (1986). Ifs, Though, and Because. Erkenntnis 25 (3):345 - 370.
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