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Profile: Hans Rott
  1.  55
    Hans Rott (2001). Change, Choice and Inference: A Study of Belief Revision and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Oxford University Press.
    Change, Choice and Inference develops logical theories that are necessary both for the understanding of adaptable human reasoning and for the design of intelligent systems. The book shows that reasoning processes - the drawing on inferences and changing one's beliefs - can be viewed as belonging to the realm of practical reason by embedding logical theories into the broader context of the theory of rational choice. The book unifies lively and significant strands of research in logic, philosophy, economics and artificial (...)
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  2.  15
    Hans Rott (forthcoming). Negative Doxastic Voluntarism and the Concept of Belief. Synthese:1-26.
    Pragmatists have argued that doxastic or epistemic norms do not apply to beliefs, but to changes of beliefs; thus not to the holding or not-holding, but to the acquisition or removal of beliefs. Doxastic voluntarism generally claims that humans acquire beliefs in a deliberate and controlled way. This paper introduces Negative Doxastic Voluntarism according to which there is a fundamental asymmetry in belief change: humans tend to acquire beliefs more or less automatically and unreflectively, but they tend to withdraw beliefs (...)
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  3. Hans Rott (2000). Two Dogmas of Belief Revision. Journal of Philosophy 97 (9):503-522.
    The paper attacks the almost universally held view that belief revison theories, as they have been studied in the literature of the past two decades, are founded on a Principle of Minimal Change, or Principle of Informational Economy. The principle comes in two versions. According to the first, an agent should, when accepting new information, aim at a posterior belief set that minimizes the items on which it disagrees with the prior belief set. If there are different ways to effect (...)
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  4.  23
    Hans Rott & Maurice Pagnucco (1999). Severe Withdrawal (and Recovery). Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):501-547.
    The problem of how to remove information from an agent's stock of beliefs is of paramount concern in the belief change literature. An inquiring agent may remove beliefs for a variety of reasons: a belief may be called into doubt or the agent may simply wish to entertain other possibilities. In the prominent AGM framework for belief change, upon which the work here is based, one of the three central operations, contraction, addresses this concern (the other two deal with the (...)
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  5.  45
    Hans Rott (2004). A Counterexample to Six Fundamental Principles of Belief Formation. Synthese 139 (2):225 - 240.
    In recent years there has been a growing consensus that ordinary reasoning does not conform to the laws of classical logic, but is rather nonmonotonic in the sense that conclusions previously drawn may well be removed upon acquiring further information. Even so, rational belief formation has up to now been modelled as conforming to some fundamental principles that are classically valid. The counterexample described in this paper suggests that a number of the most cherished of these principles should not be (...)
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  6. Hans Rott (2008). Belief Revision. In Jonathan Eric Adler & Lance J. Rips (eds.), Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations. Cambridge University Press 514--534.
    This is a survey paper. Contents: 1 Introduction -- 2 The representation of belief -- 3 Kinds of belief change -- 4 Coherence constraints for belief revision -- 5 Different modes of belief change -- 6 Two strategies for characterizing rational changes of belief - 6.1 The postulates strategy - 6.2 The constructive strategy -- 7 An abstract view of the elements of belief change -- 8 Iterated changes of belief -- 9 Further developments - 9.1 Variants and extensions of (...)
     
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  7.  25
    Hans Rott (1993). Belief Contraction in the Context of the General Theory of Rational Choice. Journal of Symbolic Logic 58 (4):1426-1450.
    This paper reorganizes and further develops the theory of partial meet contraction which was introduced in a classic paper by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson. Our purpose is threefold. First, we put the theory in a broader perspective by decomposing it into two layers which can respectively be treated by the general theory of choice and preference and elementary model theory. Second, we reprove the two main representation theorems of AGM and present two more representation results for the finite case that (...)
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  8.  5
    Hans Rott (2014). Four Floors for the Theory of Theory Change: The Case of Imperfect Discrimination. In Eduardo Fermé João Leite (ed.), Logics in Artificial Intelligence: 13th European Conference (JELIA 2014). Springer 368-382.
    The classical qualitative theory of belief change due to Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson has been widely known as being characterised by two packages of postulates. While the basic package consists of six postulates and is very weak, the full package that adds two further postulates is very strong. I revisit two classic constructions of theory contraction, viz., relational possible worlds contraction and entrenchment-based contraction and argue that four intermediate levels can be distinguished that play - or ought to play - (...)
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  9.  5
    Hans Rott (2014). Three Floors for the Theory of Theory Change. In Vít Punčochář Michal Dančák (ed.), The Logica Yearbook 2013. College Publications 187-205.
    The theory of theory change due to Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson ("AGM") has been widely known as being characterized by two sets of postulates, one being very weak and the other being very strong. Commenting on the three classic constructions of partial meet contraction, safe contraction and entrenchment-based construction, I argue that three intermediate levels can be distinguished that play decisive roles within the AGM theory.
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  10.  32
    Hans Rott (2015). A Puzzle About Disputes and Disagreements. Erkenntnis 80 (1):167-189.
    The paper addresses the situation of a dispute in which one speaker says ϕ and a second speaker says not-ϕ. Proceeding on an idealising distinction between "basic" and "interesting" claims that may be formulated in a given idiolectal language, I investigate how it might be sorted out whether the dispute reflects a genuine disagreement, or whether the speakers are only having a merely verbal dispute, due to their using different interesting concepts. I show that four individually plausible principles for the (...)
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  11.  16
    Hans Rott (1992). Preferential Belief Change Using Generalized Epistemic Entrenchment. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 1 (1):45-78.
    A sentence A is epistemically less entrenched in a belief state K than a sentence B if and only if a person in belief state K who is forced to give up either A or B will give up A and hold on to B. This is the fundamental idea of epistemic entrenchment as introduced by Gärdenfors (1988) and elaborated by Gärdenfors and Makinson (1988). Another distinguishing feature of relations of epistemic entrenchment is that they permit particularly simple and elegant (...)
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  12.  4
    Hans Rott (2009). Degrees All the Way Down: Beliefs, Non-Beliefs and Disbeliefs. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer 301--339.
    This paper combines various structures representing degrees of belief, degrees of disbelief, and degrees of non-belief (degrees of expectations) into a unified whole. The representation uses relations of comparative necessity and possibility, as well as non-probabilistic functions assigning numerical values of necessity and possibility. We define all-encompassing necessity structures which have weak expectations (mere hypotheses, guesses, conjectures, etc.) occupying the lowest ranks and very strong, ineradicable ('a priori') beliefs occupying the highest ranks. Structurally, there are no differences from the top (...)
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  13.  34
    Hans Rott (1999). Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief Part I: Finding the Right Framework. Erkenntnis 50 (2):387-412.
    In this paper I discuss the foundations of a formal theory of coherent and conservative belief change that is suitable to be used as a method for constructing iterated changes of belief, sensitive to the history of earlier belief changes, and independent of any form of dispositional coherence. I review various ways to conceive the relationship between the beliefs actually held by an agent and her belief change strategies, show the problems they suffer from, and suggest that belief states should (...)
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  14.  24
    Hans Rott (1991). Two Methods of Constructing Contractions and Revisions of Knowledge Systems. Journal of Philosophical Logic 20 (2):149 - 173.
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  15.  28
    Hans Rott (1989). Conditionals and Theory Change: Revisions, Expansions, and Additions. [REVIEW] Synthese 81 (1):91-113.
    This paper dwells upon formal models of changes of beliefs, or theories, which are expressed in languages containing a binary conditional connective. After defining the basic concept of a (non-trivial) belief revision model. I present a simple proof of Gärdenfors''s (1986) triviality theorem. I claim that on a proper understanding of this theorem we must give up the thesis that consistent revisions (additions) are to be equated with logical expansions. If negated or might conditionals are interpreted on the basis of (...)
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  16.  11
    Hans Rott (2012). Bounded Revision: Two-Dimensional Belief Change Between Conservative and Moderate Revision. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):173-200.
    This paper presents the model of ‘bounded revision’ that is based on two-dimensional revision functions taking as arguments pairs consisting of an input sentence and a reference sentence. The key idea is that the input sentence is accepted as far as (and just a little further than) the reference sentence is ‘cotenable’ with it. Bounded revision satisfies the AGM axioms as well as the Same Beliefs Condition (SBC) saying that the set of beliefs accepted after the revision does not depend (...)
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  17.  24
    Hans Rott (2003). Basic Entrenchment. Studia Logica 73 (2):257 - 280.
    In contrast to other prominent models of belief change, models based on epistemic entrenchment have up to now been applicable only in the context of very strong packages of requirements for belief revision. This paper decomposes the axiomatization of entrenchment into independent modules. Among other things it is shown how belief revision satisfying only the ‘basic’ postulates of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson can be represented in terms of entrenchment.
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  18.  23
    Hans Rott (2011). Reapproaching Ramsey: Conditionals and Iterated Belief Change in the Spirit of AGM. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):155-191.
    According to the Ramsey Test, conditionals reflect changes of beliefs: α > β is accepted in a belief state iff β is accepted in the minimal revision of it that is necessary to accommodate α. Since Gärdenfors’s seminal paper of 1986, a series of impossibility theorems (“triviality theorems”) has seemed to show that the Ramsey test is not a viable analysis of conditionals if it is combined with AGM-type belief revision models. I argue that it is possible to endorse that (...)
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  19.  12
    Hans Rott (1991). A Nonmonotonic Conditional Logic for Belief Revision. In André Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.), The Logic of Theory Change. Springer 135--181.
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  20.  39
    Georg Brun & Hans Rott (2013). Interpreting Enthymematic Arguments Using Belief Revision. Synthese 190 (18):4041-4063.
    This paper is about the situation in which an author (writer or speaker) presents a deductively invalid argument, but the addressee aims at a charitable interpretation and has reason to assume that the author intends to present a valid argument. How can he go about interpreting the author’s reasoning as enthymematically valid? We suggest replacing the usual find-the-missing-premise approaches by an approach based on systematic efforts to ascribe a belief state to the author against the background of which the argument (...)
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  21.  8
    Hans Rott (2013). Two Concepts of Plausibility in Default Reasoning. Erkenntnis 79 (S6):1219–1252.
    In their unifying theory to model uncertainty, Friedman and Halpern (1995–2003) applied plausibility measures to default reasoning satisfying certain sets of axioms. They proposed a distinctive condition for plausibility measures that characterizes “qualitative” reasoning (as contrasted with probabilistic reasoning). A similar and similarly fundamental, but more general and thus stronger condition was independently suggested in the context of “basic” entrenchment-based belief revision by Rott (1996–2003). The present paper analyzes the relation between the two approaches to formalizing basic notions of plausibility (...)
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  22.  26
    Hans Rott (1992). Modellings for Belief Change: Prioritization and Entrenchment. Theoria 58 (1):21-57.
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  23.  22
    Hans Rott (2011). Odd Choices: On the Rationality of Some Alleged Anomalies of Decision and Inference. Topoi 30 (1):59-69.
    This paper presents a number of apparent anomalies in rational choice scenarios, and their translation into the logic of everyday reasoning. Three classes of examples that have been discussed in the context of probabilistic choice since the 1960s (by Debreu, Tversky and others) are analyzed in a non-probabilistic setting. It is shown how they can at the same time be regarded as logical problems that concern the drawing of defeasible inferences from a given information base. I argue that initial appearances (...)
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  24.  57
    Sven Ove Hansson & Hans Rott (1995). How Not to Change the Theory of Theory Change: A Reply to Tennant. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (3):361-380.
    A number of seminal papers on the logic of belief change by Alchourrön, Gärden-fors, and Makinson have given rise to what is now known as the AGM paradigm. The present discussion note is a response to Neil Tennant's [1994], which aims at a critical appraisal of the AGM approach and the introduction of an alternative approach. We show that important parts of Tennants's critical remarks are based on misunderstandings or on lack of information. In the course of doing this, we (...)
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  25.  4
    Hans Rott (2003). Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief. Part II: Iterated Belief Change Without Dispositional Coherence. Journal of Logic and Computation 13 (1):111-145.
    This paper studies the idea of conservatism with respect to belief change strategies in the setting of unary, iterated belief revision functions (based on the conclusions of Rott, ‘Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief, Part I: Finding the Right Framework’, Erkenntnis 50, 1999, 387–412). Special attention is paid to the case of ‘basic belief change’ where neither the (weak) AGM postulates concerning conservatism with respect to beliefs nor the (stong) supplementary AGM postulates concerning dispositional coherence need to be (...)
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  26.  3
    Hans Rott (2004). Basic Entrenchment. Studia Logica 73 (2):257-280.
    In contrast to other prominent models of belief change, models based on epistemic entrenchment have up to now been applicable only in the context of very strong packages of requirements for belief revision. This paper decomposes the axiomatization of entrenchment into independent modules. Among other things it is shown how belief revision satisfying only the 'basic' postulates of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson can be represented in terms of entrenchment.
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  27.  48
    Bengt Hansson, Hans van Ditmarsch, Pascal Engel, Sven Ove Hansson, Vincent Hendricks, Søren Holm, Pauline Jacobson, Anthonie Meijers, Henry S. Richardson & Hans Rott (2011). A Theoria Round Table on Philosophy Publishing. Theoria 77 (2):104-116.
    As part of the conference commemorating Theoria's 75th anniversary, a round table discussion on philosophy publishing was held in Bergendal, Sollentuna, Sweden, on 1 October 2010. Bengt Hansson was the chair, and the other participants were eight editors-in-chief of philosophy journals: Hans van Ditmarsch (Journal of Philosophical Logic), Pascal Engel (Dialectica), Sven Ove Hansson (Theoria), Vincent Hendricks (Synthese), Søren Holm (Journal of Medical Ethics), Pauline Jacobson (Linguistics and Philosophy), Anthonie Meijers (Philosophical Explorations), Henry S. Richardson (Ethics) and Hans Rott (Erkenntnis).
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  28.  14
    Hans Rott (1986). Ifs, Though, and Because. Erkenntnis 25 (3):345 - 370.
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  29.  31
    Hans Rott (2004). Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief Into Knowledge. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):469-493.
    In this paper I discuss the relation between various properties that have been regarded as important for determining whether or not a belief constitutes a piece of knowledge: its stability, strength and sensitivity to truth, as well as the strength of the epistemic position in which the subject is with respect to this belief. Attempts to explicate the relevant concepts more formally with the help of systems of spheres of possible worlds (à la Lewis and Grove) must take care to (...)
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  30.  4
    Hans Rott (2006). The Value of Truth and the Value of Information : On Isaac Levi's Epistemology. In Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi. Cambridge University Press 179.
    The paper aims at a perspicuous representation of Isaac Levi's pragmatist epistemology, spanning from the 1967 classic "Gambling with Truth" to his 2004 book on "Mild Contraction". Based on a formal framework for Levi's notion of inquiry, I analyse his decision-theoretic approach with truth and information as basic cognitive values, and with Shackle measures as emerging structures. Both cognitive values figure prominently in Levi's model of inductive belief expansion, but only the value of information is employed in his model of (...)
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  31.  3
    Hans Rott (2008). A New Psychologism in Logic? Reflections From the Point of View of Belief Revision. Studia Logica 88 (1):113-136.
    This paper addresses the question whether the past couple of decades of formal research in belief revision offers evidence of a new psychologism in logic. In the first part I examine five potential arguments in favour of this thesis and find them all wanting. In the second part of the paper I argue that belief revision research has climbed up a hierarchy of models for the change of doxastic states that appear to be clearly normative at the bottom, but are (...)
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  32.  12
    Hans Rott (2004). Online Manuscript Submission. Erkenntnis 61:509-515.
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  33.  18
    Hans Rott (1987). Reduction: Some Criteria and Criticisms of the Structuralist Concept. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 27 (2):231 - 256.
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  34.  8
    Hans Rott (2014). Unvergleichbarkeit und unabhängige Bedeutung. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 68 (2):237-241.
    This paper gives critical comments on Wolfgang Spohn's Laws of Belief (2012). I argue, first, that it is important to account for incomparabilities in the plausibilities of possible worlds or propositions, and second, that the meaning of input parameters specifying the degree to which a proposition is to be accepted should be independent of the agent's belief state.
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  35.  41
    Hans Rott (2008). A New Psychologism in Logic? Reflections From the Point of View of Belief Revision. Studia Logica 88 (1):113 - 136.
    This paper addresses the question whether the past couple of decades of formal research in belief revision offers evidence of a new psychologism in logic. In the first part I examine five potential arguments in favour of this thesis and find them all wanting. In the second part of the paper I argue that belief revision research has climbed up a hierarchy of models for the change of doxastic states that appear to be clearly normative at the bottom, but are (...)
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  36.  28
    Hans Rott (2000). Words in Contexts: Fregean Elucidations. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (6):621-643.
  37. Hans Rott (2003). Lehrer's Dynamic Theory of Knowledge. In Olsson Erik (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Kluwer 219--242.
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  38.  1
    Hans Rott (1997). Drawing Inferences From Conditionals. In Eva Ejerhed Sten Lindström (ed.), Logic, Action and Cognition. Essays in Philosophical Logic. Kluwer 149-179.
    This paper compares three accounts of what can be inferred from a knowledge base that contains conditionals: Lehmann and Magidor’s Rational Entailment; Pearl’s System Z, later extended and refined in collaboration with Goldszmidt; and the present author’s Nonmonotonic conditional logic for belief revision. We show that although the ideas motivating these systems are strikingly different, they are formally equivalent. An explanation of the surprising parallel is offered in terms of the interpretation of conditionals in the context of nonmonotonic reasoning and (...)
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  39.  1
    Hans Rott (2009). Shifting Priorities: Simple Representations for Twenty-Seven Iterated Theory Change Operators. In David Makinson Jacek Malinowski & Heinrich Wansing (eds.), Towards Mathematical Philosophy. Springer 269-296.
    Prioritized bases, i.e., weakly ordered sets of sentences, have been used for specifying an agent’s ‘basic’ or ‘explicit’ beliefs, or alternatively for compactly encoding an agent’s belief state without the claim that the elements of a base are in any sense basic. This paper focuses on the second interpretation and shows how a shifting of priorities in prioritized bases can be used for a simple, constructive and intuitive way of representing a large variety of methods for the change of belief (...)
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  40.  12
    A. Fuhrmann & Hans Rott (eds.) (1996). Logic, Action, and Information: Essays on Logic in Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence. W. De Gruyter.
    Janusz Czelakowski Elements of Formal Action Theory 1. Elementary Action Systems 1.1 Introductory Remarks. In contemporary literature one may distinguish ...
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  41.  4
    Sven Ove Hansson & Hans Rott (1998). A Plea for Accuracy. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 8 (3):221-224.
    ABSTRACT In his paper ?On Having Bad Contractions, Or: No Room for Recovery? [Te97], N. Tennant attacks the AGM research program of belief revision. We show that he misrepresents the state of affairs in this field of research.
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  42.  9
    Giacomo Bonanno, James Delgrande & Hans Rott (2012). Guest Editors' Introduction. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):1-5.
    The contributions to the Special Issue on Multiple Belief Change, Iterated Belief Change and Preference Aggregation are divided into three parts. Four contributions are grouped under the heading "multiple belief change" (Part I, with authors M. Falappa, E. Fermé, G. Kern-Isberner, P. Peppas, M. Reis, and G. Simari), five contributions under the heading "iterated belief change" (Part II, with authors G. Bonanno, S.O. Hansson, A. Nayak, M. Orgun, R. Ramachandran, H. Rott, and E. Weydert). These papers do not only pick (...)
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  43.  4
    Hans Rott (1994). Zur Wissenschaftsphilosophie von Imre Lakatos. Philosophia Naturalis 31:25-62.
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  44.  8
    Hans Rott (2000). Billigkeit und Nachsicht. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 54 (1):23 - 46.
    Dieser Beitrag vergleicht G. F. Meiers Prinzip der hermeneutischen Billigkeit mit D. Davidsons „Principle of Charity". In der Literatur wurde darauf hingewiesen, daß diese sehr allgemeinen Prinzipien wohlwollender Interpretation insofern verwandt sind, als sie Sprechern und Autoren generell eine gewisse Form von Rationalität unterstellen. Doch weisen sie auch deutlich erkennbare Unterschiede auf. Während Meiers Auslegungskunst einen naiven Bedeutungsbegriff voraussetzt, wirkt Davidsons Prinzip in erster Linie bedeutungskonstitutiv. Ich setze die beiden Prinzipien in den Rahmen einer allgemeinen, hier nur grob entworfenen Theorie (...)
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  45.  3
    Hans Rott (1997). Vom Primat der praktischen Vernunft: Logische Regeln als Regeln rationaler Wahl. In Georg Meggle (ed.), Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy. De Gruyter 1--138.
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  46.  7
    Sven-Ove Hansson & Hans Rott (1998). Beyond Recovery? A Reply to Tennant. Erkenntnis 49 (3):387-392.
    In his paper ‘Changing the Theory of Theory Change: Reply to My Critics’, N. Tennant (1997b) reacts to the critical reception of an earlier article of his. The present note rectifies some of the most serious misrepresentations in Tennant's reply.
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  47.  3
    Hans Rott & Verena Wagner (2005). Das Ende Vom Problem des Methodischen Anfangs: Descartes' Antiskeptisches Argument. In Gereon Wolters & Martin Carrier (eds.), Homo Sapiens Und Homo Faber. De Gruyter 133.
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  48.  7
    Hans Rott (2004). Vom Fließen theoretischer Begriffe: Begriffliches Wissen und theoretischer Wandel. Kant-Studien 95 (1):29-51.
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  49.  5
    Hans Rott (2003). Editorial. Erkenntnis 59 (1):1-3.
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  50.  1
    Hans Rott (2011). Idealizations, Intertheory Explanations and Conditionals. In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision Meets Philosophy of Science. Springer 59--75.
    Drawing inspiration from Lakatos’s philosophy of science, the paper presents a notion of intertheory explanation that is suitable to explain, from the point of view of a successor theory, its predecessor theory’s success (where it is successful) as well as the latter’s failure (where it fails) at the same time. A variation of the Ramsey-test is used, together with a standard AGM belief revision model, to give a semantics for open and counterfactual conditionals and ’because’-sentences featuring in such intertheory explanations. (...)
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