From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to consciousness according to which an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic.

Summary Ordinary language philosophers frequently draw on the fact that an appropriately selected sentential combination of the form p but not q can, or cannot, be uttered without absurdity; however, they do so without sufficient reflection on the methodology of such combination tests, which results in considerable shortcomings even in practical application. To improve things, I shall discuss two criteria for distinguishing ‘pragmatic’ from ‘non-pragmatic’ implications and for separating the latter into ‘linguistic’ (‘semantic’ and ‘syntactical’) and ‘non-linguistic’ ones (2–3); consider (...) the bearing of the principle of ‘sense-constancy‘ on the applicability of combination tests (4); and call attention to the important, though merely heuristic, function of investigating pragmatic, as opposed to semantic, implications (5.1–5.2). Finally, I shall hint at a striking analogy between the linguistic (yet non-empirical) method of combination tests, the phenomenological method of ‘fictional variation’, and the empirical method of ‘conjectures and refutations’ (5.3). (shrink)

The symbolic paraphrase of 'because' sentences suggested by Frege, which is still widely accepted, will be gradually developed into a more adequate, though much more complicated, form. Out of the different types of such sentences, the 'for the only reason that' type will be given especial consideration. Furthermore, it will be expounded that contrary-to-fact conditionals may function either as 'for the only reason that' explanations, or as 'for at least the reason that' explanations, or as arguments, the difference being dependent (...) partly on certain temporal characteristics of their constituents and partly on the pragmatic features of the speech act situation. Consequently, counterfactuals have no definite logical structure, which is a reason, hitherto unnoticed, why they cannot be used in defining dispositional predicates. It will be shown, however, that 'for the only reason that' explanations can serve this purpose quite properly. (shrink)

If identity is to be taken as a relation, not between any object and itself, nor between expressions , but between "intensions" or Fregean "Sinnen" of individual constants , then not only definite descriptions but also grammatically proper names ought to have intensions. This, however, has been repudiated by J. St. Mill and, more recently and more persuasively, by Saul Kripke. So an attempt will be made to interpret proper names as definite descriptions sui generis, namely, "rigid" descriptions referring to (...) the way the bearer of the name is called, in certain contexts, in the real world. To avoid circularity or a vicious regressus in infinitum, however, one has to do this on the basis of a distinction between "names" and "name-radicals". (shrink)

Having briefly sketched the aims of our paper, namely, to logically analyse the ascription of propositional attitudes to somebody else in terms, not of Fregean senses or of intensions-with-s, but of the intentional object of the person spoken about, say, the believer or intender (Section 1), we try to introduce the concept of an intentional object as simply as possible, to wit, as coming into view whenever two (or more) subjective belief-worlds strikingly diverge (Section 2). Then, we assess the pros (...) and cons of Frege’s view that the indirect reference of an expression is nothing but its customary sense (Sections 3–4), and call the reader’s attention to the fact that in belief ascriptions de re we take it for granted that the believer’s intentional object is at the same time a ‘citizen’ of the belief ascriber’s subjective world (or, for that matter, the real word), and that the idea of such a ‘dual citizenship’ is even more obviously presupposed in the cases of true belief and propositional knowledge (Section 5). Then, we try to argue that it is more fertile to take the belief ascriber’s intentional object to be, not the whole state of affairs the believer has in mind and thinks to exist, but the latter’s intentional object as such, that is, as being his intentional object (Section 6). Finally, we discuss the intricate and mostly neglected question of whether an intentional object’s inhabiting two or more subjective belief-worlds should be considered to be sort of a ‘transmundane identity’ in the numerical sense or rather in some deviant sense of the term, which can be specified as a momentous subcase of a ‘categorial difference’ (Section 7). (shrink)

Husserl’s transcendental reduction admits of two motivations: the general methodological ban on begging the question, and the principle that a typology of objects ought to be based on a typology of my ways of cognizing them. As Husserl’s ‘transcendental phenomenology’ agrees with the ‘linguistic phenomenology’ of many analytic philosophers in being at bottom an effort to understand what precisely we mean to say by asserting that there ‘exists’ a ‘consciousness-independent’ or ‘transcendent’ world, the ‘residue’ of transcendental reduction is my subjective (...) consciousness. My cognitive approaches to the latter and to that of somebody else are not only entirely different but ‘complementary’ in the sense of Bohr’s. In the course of searching for an identity criterion for temporal entities lacking a spatial localisation in the world, we can show that the allegedly noetic phenomenon of, say, my now seeing a cat is a noema, to wit, the cat-as-now-beingseen-by-me-in-such-and-such-a-manner. There is no sound base for postulating, over and above the noematic nature of my consciousness, a second, noetic, aspect thereof. (shrink)

The goal of the paper is to offer a model of self-awareness that fits the testimony of both good and bad responders to selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), of which fluoxetine (Prozac; Lilly, Indianapolis, IN) is probably the most well known. After a review of troubling current uncertainties concerning how and for whom SSRIs are therapeutic, it is argued that SSRIs, as a rule, lessen the emotionality of SSRI subjects in favor of an increased cognitive and volitional orientation. Traditional empiricist (...) and rationalist accounts self-awareness fail to provide models that adequately explain how such a shift from an active emotional response to an increased cognitive/volitional orientation is possible. Instead, notions of self-awareness, as understood by founding phenomenologist, Edmund Husserl, fit the testimony of SSRI subjects. (shrink)

Having stated, in section I., what the reader may expect from this paper, I will sum up, in section II., my views on the question how to justify a moral ‚ought‘-statement (a statement of moral obligation), notably a statement of the first-person form ‚I morally ought not to act in such and such a way if and when (I believe that) I am in such und such a situation.‘ In my view, its justification should consist of two quite different parts. (...) The first part is a logical proof based on my own personal language usage (‚idiolect‘) – namely, the proof that a time-honoured and highly efficient moral principle that I suggest to call the Universalized Golden Rule (UGR) is, in my idiolect (which I think to be shared by many other speakers of any sufficiently developed natural language), a locically true conditional statement (II. 1. – 5.). This part belongs, of course, to the jobs of the philosophical ethicist (metaethicist), who has to cope with it once for all. The second part, however, is a daily task of each of us and seems to me, pace R. M. Hare, to be a kind of ‚verification‘; I use to call it a ‚Nathan-David‘ procedure and will expound it in detail (II. 6. – 9.). In section III., I will try to offer an array of more or less elaborated Nathan-David procedures to the effect that he who shares my personal idiolect, my basic preferences, and my factual knowledge cannot but consider himself morally obligated to ask for his Covid-19 vaccinations as soon as possible. In section IV., I will argue in favour of the view that the German State is not only entitled but, if need be, legally obligated to make the Covid-19 vaccination compulsary. In the final section V., I will try and give a relentless assessment of the situation, a short outlook into the future, and a succinct analysis of how to most efficiently handle the pandemic under the factual boundary conditions given. (shrink)

The authors believe that the questions raised at the beginning of Frege’s On Sense and Reference – ‘Is [identity] a relation? A relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects?’ – set the course for a long-lasting but not at all satisfying discussion. For the disputants tend to advocate, either a ‘name-view’ of identity in a straightforward but rudimentary and logically untenable form, or else a version of an ‘object-view’ that makes all too light of the analysandum–analysans distinction (...) and hence is damned to analytical barrenness. In contrast, by unfolding the underlying idea of the original ‘name-view’, the authors offer three alternative and mutually compatible interpretations of identity that may best be characterized as the ‘name-based’, the ‘hybrid’ and the ‘sense-based’ variant of a ‘concept-view of identity’. At the same time, however, these interpretations may well be considered variants of a non-barren ‘object-view’. (shrink)

Hare believeded to have good reasons for stressing tho role of falsification in justifying a moral judgment. Taking this seriously, we cannot accept the objection that he should have tailored his creditor example in terns of pemission rather than in terms of prescription. Difficulties, howerer, are due to the fact that, according to Hare, respectively my volitional reaction to a fictional situation is part and parcel of moral reasoning; for this kind of evidence turns out to he no less 'verifying' (...) than 'falsifying'. So it seems that the distinction between verificationism and falsificationism, though useful in metascience, cannot properly be transferred to metaethics. (shrink)

Adopting an ontology of full concreteness , one has to distinguish between human action in the internal view of the actor himself and human action in the external view of a fellow human being, or spectator. As seen from the latter point of view, human action is nothing but observable behavior. As such, it belongs in the objective realm of natural necessity, as does any other macrophysical event . As seen from the former point of view, human action may be (...) characterized as a system of non-indicative subjective traits of the actor's intentional objects, appealing to him, in the light of his motives, in a 'gerundive' way. As such, it does not belong in the objective realm of natural necessity, and is free, moreover, in the positive sense that the actor could have acted otherwise. If these perspectives are commingled - as there is a strong tendency to do by arguing, or construing, from analogy -, the result is confusion. But if they are seen as disjunct alternatives, the result is complementarity in the sense of Bohr. However, we must not misconstrue such complementarity as a dual-aspect-conception, for there seems to be no good sense in saying that action as a system of non-indicative subjective traits and action as objective behavior are but two aspects of one and the same human action 'in itself', i.e., irrespective of the modes of subjective givenness. Auf dem Boden einer Ontologie der vollen Konkretion muß man zwischen dem menschlichen Handeln in der Innensicht des Handelnden selbst und dem menschlichen Handeln in der Außensicht eines Mitmenschen unterscheiden. Vom Standpunkt eines mitmenschlichen Zuschauers aus ist menschliches Handeln nichts anderes als beobachtbares Verhalten; als solches gehört es, genau wie jedes andere makrophysikalische Ereignis, ungeachtet mikrophysikalischer Indeterminismen in den objektiven Bereich der Naturnotwendigkeit. Vom Standpunkt des Handelnden selbst aus läßt sich menschliches Handeln dagegen als ein System motivbedingter 'gerundiver' Charaktere der subjektiven Bezugsgegenstände des jeweils Handelnden kennzeichnen; als solches gehört es nicht in den objektiven Bereich der Naturnotwendigkeit und ist überdies auch in dem positiven Sinne frei, daß der Handelnde auch anders hätte handeln können. Wenn man beide Perspektiven vermengt - und es gibt eine starke Tendenz, dies aufgrund von Analogieschlüssen oder analogisierenden Auffassungen zu tun -, entsteht Konfusion; aber wenn man die beiden Perspektiven als disjunkte Alternativen sieht, ergibt sich Komplementarität im Sinne Bohrs. Wir dürfen solche Komplementarität freilich nicht als eine Zwei-Aspekte-Konzeption mißdeuten; denn man scheint nicht wirklich sinnvoll sagen zu können, Handeln als ein System von gerundiven subjektiven Charakteren und Handeln als objektives Verhalten seien nur zwei Aspekte einer und derselben menschlichen Handlung 'an sich', nämlich ohne Rücksicht auf ihre subjektiven Gegebenheitsweisen. (shrink)