The main theses of this paper are: assuming the possibility of what can reasonably be called “moral education”, its goal ought to be that people should become autonomous and responsible moral agents who take serious things seriously; the more fundamental elements of this goal cannot be brought about through educational procedures, and moral education, therefore, is to this extent impossible; the elements in question develop as the result of social growth and interaction; education can help to achieve some of the (...) less fundamental elements of the goal, and may, in the form of educational therapy, perhaps even to some degree stimulate the development of the more fundamental elements whose growth has been impaired through destructive experiences during childhood; self-education, i.e. rational and sensitive examination of important happenings and the way in which we react to them, can further, in a more or less indirect way, the fulfillment of the goal, especially during maturity. (shrink)

Utilitarian deliberation has a number of weak or open points where the agent's judgements tend to be influenced by psychological and sociological factors, e.g., by his prejudices, anxieties, insecurities or group-identifications. The most vulnerable points are: the formulation of the problem, the selection of alternatives, the calculation of consequences, the weighing of evidence, the selection of ultimate values and the comparison of different values towards each other.— The utilitarian vocabulary provides the chooser with misleading expressions such as "The action A1 (...) produces more value on the whole than A2" backing up his cpnviction of acting rationally. — In order to improve the situation, we must become aware of the delusiveness of such expressions and of society's and our own irrationality and try to develop more rational feelings and attitudes. (shrink)

Utilitarian deliberation has a number of weak or open points where the agent's judgements tend to be influenced by psychological and sociological factors, e.g., by his prejudices, anxieties, insecurities or group-identifications. The most vulnerable points are: the formulation of the problem, the selection of alternatives, the calculation of consequences, the weighing of evidence, the selection of ultimate values and the comparison of different values towards each other.— The utilitarian vocabulary provides the chooser with misleading expressions such as "The action A1 (...) produces more value on the whole than A2" backing up his cpnviction of acting rationally. — In order to improve the situation, we must become aware of the delusiveness of such expressions and of society's and our own irrationality and try to develop more rational feelings and attitudes. (shrink)

The present paper tries to analyse the way in which Judge William, in Sören Kierkegaard's work Either/Or, distinguishes between the aesthetic and the ethical way of life. Basically his distinctions seem to be that the ethicist is a seriously committed person (has inwardness) whereas the aestheticist is indifferent, and that the former accepts universal rules whereas the latter makes an exception for himself. ? In order to come from the aesthetic to the ethical stage one must, according to Judge William, (...) make a choice of oneself. We try to show that such a choice is only one among several factors implicit in his reasoning and that he does not at all consider it as a ?leap?, but as based upon reasons, though his reasons are mostly of an aesthetic nature. Far from seeing the Judge as a champion of choice, we maintain that the book primarily contains a plea for a certain personality ideal. This probably has to do with the fact that he does not seem to be in doubt as to what one ought to do, only as to how to become a person who does what he ought to do. We shall also argue that a choice of oneself, as a matter of fact, is neither necessary nor sufficient in order to bring a person within the ethical stage, as described by the Judge. ? A person who lives ethically does not, according to Judge William, necessarily act rightly, but his actions are either right or wrong, as opposed to the actions of the aestheticist which fall outside the domain of the ethical. In order to obtain a tenable distinction within his philosophy between ?being within the ethical stage? and ?acting ethically rightly? the first concept should be defined in terms of inwardness (serious commitment), the latter as inward conformity with certain universal rules. ? This idea of inwardness, probably the most original and fruitful contribution of ?Equilibrium?, seems to be based, however, like most of his ethical reasoning, on certain controversial assumptions about human nature. (shrink)

In his lecture “Must Morality have an Object?” Frankena, among other things, tries to distinguish between the moral and the nonmoral domain. People within the former may act morally rightly as well as wrongly. None of them are innocent. They all have eaten of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. “Moralmaid” is Frankena's name of a typical representative of this domain. Whether she tries to act rightly or wrongly is an open question. “Lover-boy” is Frankena's name of one (...) of the more interesting representatives of the nonmoral domain. He is a person who many of us would maintain belongs to the moral domain, but Frankena denies this. Since Frankena sees him as an important test case, he conducts his discussion of how to distinguish between the moral and the nonmoral domain partly in terms of the distinction between moralmaid and loverboy. I shall follow him in this. (shrink)