Search results for 'Harold A. Sackeim' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Harold A. Sackeim & Ruben C. Gur (1997). Flavors of Self-Deception: Ontology and Epidemiology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):125-126.score: 960.0
    Mele questions the prevalence and ontological status of strong forms of self-deception, as well as our attempt at experimental demonstration. Without validated indicators outside laboratory contexts, statements about prevalence are purely speculative. Conceptualizing self-deception without positing the motivated lack of awareness of a contradictory belief is unsatisfactory in dealing with issues of “agency,” that is, how can we stop the processing of threatening information unless we recognize that the information is threatening?
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  2. Harold A. Sackeim (1984). Not All Seizures Are Created Equal: The Importance of ECT Dose-Response Variables. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):32.score: 870.0
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  3. Irving Kirsch (1997). Hypnotic Responding and Self-Deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):118-119.score: 24.0
    As understood by neodissociation and sociocognitive theorists, hypnotic responses are instances of self-deception. Neodissociation theory matches the strict definition of Sackeim and Gur (1978) and sociocognitive theory matches Mele's looser definition. Recent data indicate that many hypnotized individuals deceive themselves into holding conflicting beliefs without dissociating, but others convince themselves that the suggested state of affairs is true without simultaneously holding a contrary belief.
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  4. Brian Garvey (2003). Darwinian Functions and Freudian Motivations. Biology and Philosophy 18 (3):427-444.score: 24.0
    Badcock, and Nesse and Lloyd, have argued that there are important points of agreement between Freud's theory of the mind and a theory of mind suggested by adaptive reasoning. Buller, on the other hand, draws attention to the need to avoid confusing an adaptive rationale with an unconscious motivation. The present paper attempts to indicate what role adaptive reasoning might have to play in justifying psychoanalytic claims. First, it is argued that psychoanalytic claims cannot be justified by the clinical experience (...)
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