81 found
Order:
Disambiguations:
Harold I. Brown [82]Harold Irwin Brown [1]
  1.  6
    Harold I. Brown (1988). Rationality. Routledge.
  2.  88
    Harold I. Brown (1989). Book Review: Educating Reason. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences 19 (4):509-512.
  3.  28
    Harold I. Brown (1977). Perception, Theory, and Commitment: The New Philosophy of Science. Precedent Pub..
    " --Maurice A. Finocchiaro,Isis "The best and most original aspect of the book is its overall conception.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   24 citations  
  4.  4
    Harold I. Brown (forthcoming). Philosophy of Science Circa 1950–2000: Some Things We Learned. Diogenes:0392192116640719.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  72
    Harold I. Brown (1987). Observation And Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
    This book develops an explanation for the roles of observation and theory in scientific endeavor that occupies the middle ground between empiricism and rationalism, and captures the strengths of both approaches. Brown argues that philosophical theories have the same epistemological status as scientific theories and constructs an epistemological theory that provides an account of the role that theory and instruments play in scientific observation. His theory of perception yields a new analysis of objectivity that combines the traditional view of observation (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  6.  65
    Harold I. Brown (1993). A Theory-Laden Observation Can Test the Theory. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (3):555-559.
  7.  52
    Harold I. Brown (2005). Incommensurability Reconsidered. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (1):149-169.
    In his later writings Kuhn reconsidered his earlier account of incommensurability, clarifying some aspects, modifying others, and explicitly rejecting some of his earlier claims. In Kuhn’s new account incommensurability does not pose a problem for the rational evaluation of competing scientific theories, but does pose a problem for certain forms of realism. Kuhn maintains that, because of incommensurability, the notion that science might seek to learn the nature of things as they are in themselves is incoherent. I develop Kuhn’s new (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  8. Harold I. Brown (1994). Reason, Judgement and Bayes's Law. Philosophy of Science 61 (3):351-369.
    This paper argues that when used judiciously Bayes's law has a role to play in the evaluation of scientific hypotheses. Several examples are presented in which a rational response to evidence requires a judgement whether to apply Bayes's law or whether, for example, to redistribute prior probabilities. The paper concludes that reflection on Bayes's law illustrates how an adequate account of the rational evaluation of hypotheses requires an account of judgement--a point which several philosophers have noted despite few attempts to (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  9. Harold I. Brown (1986). Sellars, Concepts, and Conceptual Change. Synthese 68 (August):275-307.
    A major theme of recent philosophy of science has been the rejection of the empiricist thesis that, with the exception of terms which play a purely formal role, the language of science derives its meaning from some, possibly quite indirect, correlation with experience. The alternative that has been proposed is that meaning is internal to each conceptual system, that terms derive their meaning from the role they play in a language, and that something akin to "meaning" flows from conceptual framework (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  10.  45
    Harold I. Brown (2001). Incommensurability and Reality. In Paul Hoyningen-Huene & Howard Sankey (eds.), Incommensurability and Related Matters. Kluwer 123--142.
  11.  67
    Harold I. Brown (1988). Normative Epistemology and Naturalized Epistemology. Inquiry 31 (1):53 – 78.
    A number of philosophers have argued that a naturalized epistemology cannot be normative, and thus that the norms that govern science cannot themselves be established empirically. Three arguments for this conclusion are here developed and then responded to on behalf of naturalized epistemology. The response is developed in three stages. First, if we view human knowers as part of the natural world, then the attempt to establish epistemic norms that are immune to scientific evaluation faces difficulties that are at least (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  12.  45
    Harold I. Brown (1983). Incommensurability. Inquiry 26 (1):3 – 29.
    The thesis that certain competing scientific theories are incommensurable was introduced by Kuhn and Feyerabend in 1962 and has been a subject of widespread critique. Critics have generally taken incommensurable theories to be theories which cannot be compared in a rational manner, but both Kuhn and Feyerabend have explicitly rejected this interpretation, and Feyerabend has discussed ways in which such comparisons can be made in a number of his writings. This paper attempts to clarify the incommensurability thesis through the examination (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  13.  42
    Harold I. Brown (1988). Scientific Realism. International Studies in Philosophy 20 (3):130-131.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Harold I. Brown (1992). Direct Realism, Indirect Realism, and Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):341-363.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15.  26
    Harold I. Brown (2010). Understanding Conceptual Innovation in Science. Metascience 19 (2):273-276.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  16
    Harold I. Brown (2006). More About Judgment and Reason. Metaphilosophy 37 (5):646-651.
    : This paper is a response to Siegel 2004. I take Siegel's remarks as a basis for clarifying, defending, and further developing my account of the role of judgment in a theory of rationality.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  17.  13
    Harold I. Brown (1990). Prospective Realism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 21 (2):211-242.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  18.  8
    Harold I. Brown (1985). Galileo on the Telescope and the Eye. Journal of the History of Ideas 46 (4):487.
  19.  2
    Harold I. Brown (1986). Reviewed Work: Science and Values by Larry Laudan. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 95 (3):439-441.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  20.  18
    Harold I. Brown (1995). Empirical Testing. Inquiry 38 (4):353 – 399.
    Three major views of the observation?theory relation are now extant: (1) Observation and theory are mutually independent and observation provides the basis for evaluating theories. (2) Observations are theory?dependent and do not provide objective grounds for evaluating theories. (3) The concept of observation should be extended in a way that includes many so?called ?theoretical?entities? among the observables. Analyses of these views set the stage for a new approach that incorporates lessons learned from discussions of earlier accounts. The central idea of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  21.  14
    Harold I. Brown (1994). Circular Justifications. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:406 - 414.
    The thesis of this paper is that philosophers are often too hasty in rejecting justifications because the argument that yields the justification is circular. Circularity is distinguished from vicious circularity and several examples are examined in which a proposed justification is circular in a precise sense, but not viciously circular. These include an observational procedure which could yield a velocity in excess of the velocity of light even though the impossibility of such velocities is assumed at a key step in (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  22.  79
    Harold I. Brown (1990). Cherniak on Scientific Realism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (3):415-427.
    In the final chapter of Minimal Rationality Christopher Cherniak offers three arguments to show that an agent with finite cognitive resources is not capable of arriving at a true and complete theory of the universe. I discuss each of these arguments and show that Cherniak has not succeeded in making his antirealist case.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  18
    Harold I. Brown (2006). Conceptual Systems. London.
    New concepts are constantly being introduced into our thinking. Conceptual Systems explores how these new concepts are entered into our systems along with sufficient continuity with older ideas to ensure understanding. The encyclopaedic breadth of this text highlights the many different aspects and disciplines that together present an insightful view into the various theories of concepts. Harold Brown, a reputable author in the philosophy of science examines several historically influential theories of concepts as well as providing a clear view on (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  24.  7
    Harold I. Brown (1977). For a Modest Historicism. The Monist 60 (4):540-555.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  25.  36
    Robert Ackermann, Brian Baigrie, Harold I. Brown, Michael Cavanaugh, Paul Fox-Strangways, Gonzalo Munevar, Stephen David Ross, Philip Pettit, Paul Roth, Frederick Schmitt, Stephen Turner & Charles Wallis (1988). Responses to 'in Defense of Relativism'. Social Epistemology 2 (3):227 – 261.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  26.  24
    Harold I. Brown (1999). Why Do Conceptual Analysts Disagree? Metaphilosophy 30 (1&2):33-59.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  27.  34
    Harold I. Brown (2000). Berkeley on the Conceivability of Qualities and Material Objects. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 7:161-168.
    Berkeley’s “selective attention” account of how we establish general conclusions without abstract ideas—particularly in light of his denial of abstract ideas and rejection of the legitimacy of several subjects of scientific and philosophic study on the grounds that they presuppose abstract ideas—yields a puzzle: Why can’t we begin with ideas and use the method of selective attention to establish conclusions about qualities and material objects independently of their being perceived, even though we do not have ideas of these entities? I (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  28
    Harold I. Brown (1991). Epistemic Concepts: A Naturalistic Approach. Inquiry 34 (3 & 4):323 – 351.
    Several forms of naturalism are currently extant. Proponents of the various approaches disagree on matters of strategy and detail but one theme is common: we have not received any revelations about the nature of the world -- including our own nature. Whatever knowledge we have has been acquired through a fallible process of conjecture and revision. This common theme will bring to mind the writings of Karl Popper and, in many respects, Popper is the father of contemporary naturalism. Along with (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  29. Harold I. Brown (1987). Naturalizing Observation. In Nancy J. Nersessian (ed.), The Process of Science: Contemporary Philosophical Approaches to Understanding Scientific Practice. Distributors for the United States and Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  30.  13
    Harold I. Brown (1979). Observation and the Foundations of Objectivity. The Monist 62 (4):470-481.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  31.  28
    Harold I. Brown (1988). How the Laws of Physics Lie. [REVIEW] International Studies in Philosophy 20 (3):102-103.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  8
    Harold I. Brown (1983). Response to Siegel. Synthese 56 (1):91 - 105.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  33.  6
    Harold I. Brown (2010). Three Revolutions? Metascience 19 (3):445-447.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  47
    Harold I. Brown, Conceptual Comparison and Conceptual Innovation.
  35.  7
    Harold I. Brown (1987). Antipositivist Theories of the Sciences. International Studies in Philosophy 19 (3):115-116.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  11
    Harold I. Brown (1988). Review. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 29 (2).
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  5
    Harold I. Brown (1975). Problem Changes in Science and Philosophy. Metaphilosophy 6 (2):177–192.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  38.  4
    Harold I. Brown (1978). On Being Rational. American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (4):241 - 248.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  39.  16
    Harold I. Brown (1979). A Functional Analysis of Scientific Theories. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 10 (1):119-140.
    Scientific theories are analyzed in terms of the role that they play in science rather than in terms of their logical structure. It is maintained that theories: provide descriptions of the fundamental features of their domains; on the basis of 1, explain non-fundamental features of their domains; provide a guide for further research in their domains. Any set of propositions that carries out these functions with respect to some domain counts as a theory. This view of theories is developed and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  40.  5
    Harold I. Brown (1999). The Undivided Universe. International Studies in Philosophy 31 (4):101-102.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  5
    Harold I. Brown (1991). Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement. International Studies in Philosophy 23 (3):100-101.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  9
    Harold I. Brown (1976). Galileo, the Elements, and the Tides. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 7 (4):337-351.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  43.  2
    Harold I. Brown (1994). Judgment and Reason. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (4).
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  44.  14
    Harold I. Brown (1988). The Limits of Pragmatism. Review of Metaphysics 42 (1):166-167.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45.  14
    Harold I. Brown (2003). Critical Rationalism. International Studies in Philosophy 35 (4):378-379.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  6
    Harold I. Brown (2008). 1 The Case for Indirect Realism. In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. The MIT Press 45.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  13
    Harold I. Brown (1975). Paradigmatic Propositions. American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1):85 - 90.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  10
    Harold I. Brown (1973). Idealism, Empiricism, and Materialism. New Scholasticism 47 (3):311-323.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  11
    Harold I. Brown (2011). Van Fraassen Meets Popper: Logical Relations and Cognitive Abilities. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (2):381-385.
    Van Fraassen, like Popper before him, assumes that confirmation and disconfirmation relations are logical relations and thus hold only among abstract items. This raises a problem about how experience, for Popper, and observables, for van Fraassen, enter into epistemic evaluations. Each philosopher offers a drastic proposal: Popper holds that basic statements are accepted by convention; van Fraassen introduces his “pragmatic tautology.” Another alternative is to reject the claim that all evaluative relations are logical relations. Ayer proposed this option in responding (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  5
    Harold I. Brown (1992). Einstein Versus Bohr. International Studies in Philosophy 24 (1):130-130.
1 — 50 / 81