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Harold W. Noonan [94]Harold Noonan [36]
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Profile: Harold Noonan (Nottingham University, Nottingham University)
  1. Harold Noonan (2013). Presentism and Eternalism. Erkenntnis 78 (1):219 - 227.
    How is the debate between presentism and eternalism to be characterized? It is usual to suggest that this debate about time is analogous to the debate between the actualist and the possibilist about modality. I think that this suggestion is right. In what follows I pursue the analogy more strictly than is usual and offer a characterization of what is at the core of the dispute between presentists and eternalists that may be immune to worries often raised about the substantiality (...)
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  2. Harold W. Noonan (2012). Personal Pronoun Revisionism - Asking the Right Question. Analysis 72 (2):316-318.
    Personal pronoun revisionism (so-called by Olson, E. 2007. What are We? A Study in Personal Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press) is a response to the problem of the thinking animal on behalf of the neo-Lockean theorist. Many worry about this response. The worry rests on asking the wrong question, namely: how can two thinkers that are so alike differ in this way in their cognitive capacities? This is the wrong question because they don't. The right question is: how can they (...)
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  3.  85
    Harold W. Noonan (2015). Relative Identity. Philosophical Investigations 38 (1-2):52-71.
    Examples suggest that one and the same A may be different Bs, and hence that there is some sort of incompleteness in the unqualified statement that x and y are the same which needs to be eliminated by answering the question “the same what?” One way to make this more precise is by appeal to Geach's idea that identity is relative. In this paper I evaluate Geach's relative identity thesis.
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  4.  27
    Harold W. Noonan & Peter Van Inwagen (1992). Material Beings. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):239.
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  5. Harold W. Noonan (2010). The Thinking Animal Problem and Personal Pronoun Revisionism. Analysis 70 (1):93-98.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  6.  11
    Harold Noonan, Perdurance, Location and Classical Mereology.
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  7. Harold W. Noonan (2004). Are There Vague Objects? Analysis 64 (282):131–134.
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  8. Harold W. Noonan (1994). In Defence of the Letter of Fictionalism. Analysis 54 (3):133-39.
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  9. Harold W. Noonan (1989). Personal Identity. Routledge.
    What is the self? And how does it relate to the body? In the second edition of Personal Identity, Harold Noonan presents the major historical theories of personal identity, particularly those of Locke, Leibniz, Butler, Reid and Hume. Noonan goes on to give a careful analysis of what the problem of personal identity is, and its place in the context of more general puzzles about identity. He then moves on to consider the main issues and arguments which are the subject (...)
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  10.  80
    Harold W. Noonan (2014). The Adequacy of Genuine Modal Realism. Mind 123 (491):851-860.
    What are the requirements on an adequate genuine modal realist analysis of modal discourse? One is material adequacy: the modal realist must provide for each candidate analysandum an analysans in the language of counterpart theory which by his lights has the same truth value as the candidate analysandum. Must the material biconditional joining these be necessarily true? This is the requirement of strict adequacy. It is not satisfied if Lewis’s 1968 scheme provides the analysis. John Divers puts forward a modification, (...)
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  11. Harold Noonan, Moderate Monism, Persistence and Sortal Concepts.
    Coincidence comes in two varieties – permanent and temporary. Moderate monism is the position that permanent coincidence, but not temporary coincidence, entails identity. Extreme monism is the position that even temporary coincidence entails identity. Pluralists are opponents of monism tout court. The intuitively obvious, commonsensical position is moderate monism. It is therefore important to see if it can be sustained.
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  12. Harold W. Noonan (1993). Constitution is Identity. Mind 102 (405):133-146.
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  13.  66
    Harold W. Noonan (2004). Against Absence-Dependent Thoughts. Analysis 64 (1):92 - 93.
  14. Harold W. Noonan (1998). Animalism Versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):302-318.
  15.  49
    Harold Noonan & Benjamin L. Curtis, Identity. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Much of the debate about identity in recent decades has been about personal identity, and specifically about personal identity over time, but identity generally, and the identity of things of other kinds, have also attracted attention. Various interrelated problems have been at the centre of discussion, but it is fair to say that recent work has focussed particularly on the following areas: the notion of a criterion of identity; the correct analysis of identity over time, and, in particular, the disagreement (...)
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  16. Harold W. Noonan (1991). Indeterminate Identity, Contingent Identity and Abelardian Predicates. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (163):183-193.
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  17.  63
    Harold W. Noonan (1985). The Only X and y Principle. Analysis 45 (2):79-83.
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  18.  17
    Harold W. Noonan (2015). Against Strong Pluralism. Philosophia 43 (4):1081-1087.
    Strong pluralists hold that not even permanent material coincidence is enough for identity. Strong pluralism entails the possibility of purely material objects -- even if not coincident -- alike in all general respects, categorial and dispositional, relational and non-relational, past, present and future, at the microphysical level, but differing in some general modal, counterfactual or dispositional repscts at the macrophysical level. It is objectionable because it thus deprives us of the explanatory resources to explain why evident absurdities are absurd. A (...)
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  19.  27
    Harold W. Noonan (2016). Two Boxing is Not the Rational Option. Ratio 29 (2):168-183.
    In the standard Newcomb scenario two-boxing is not the rational act and, in general, in Newcomb-style cases the ‘two-boxing’ choice is not the rational act. Hence any decision theory which recommends two-boxing is unacceptable.
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  20. Harold W. Noonan (2010). Bird Against the Humeans. Ratio 23 (1):73-86.
    Debate between Humean contingentists and anti-Humean necessitarians in the philosophy of science is ongoing. One of the most important contemporary anti-Humeans is Alexander Bird. Bird calls the particular version of Humeanism he is opposed to 'categoricalism'. In his paper (2005) and in Chapter 4 of his book (2007) Bird argues against categoricalism about properties and laws. His arguments against categoricalism about properties are intended to support the necessitarian position he calls dispositional monism. His arguments against categoricalism about laws are intended (...)
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  21.  95
    Harold W. Noonan (2006). Non-Branching and Circularity -- Reply to Brueckner. Analysis 66 (290):163-167.
  22. Harold W. Noonan (2001). Animalism Versus Lockeanism: Reply to Mackie. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):83-90.
  23.  24
    Benjamin L. Curtis & Harold W. Noonan (2014). Castles Built on Clouds: Vague Identity and Vague Objects. In Ken Akiba & Ali Abasnezhad (eds.), Vague Objects and Vague Identity: New Essays on Ontic Vagueness. Springer 305-326.
    Can identity itself be vague? Can there be vague objects? Does a positive answer to either question entail a positive answer to the other? In this paper we answer these questions as follows: No, No, and Yes. First, we discuss Evans’s famous 1978 argument and argue that the main lesson that it imparts is that identity itself cannot be vague. We defend the argument from objections and endorse this conclusion. We acknowledge, however, that the argument does not by itself establish (...)
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  24.  84
    Harold W. Noonan (1990). Vague Identity Yet Again. Analysis 50 (3):157 - 162.
    The paper defends Gareth Evans's argument against vague identity. It appeals to a principle I name the principle of the diversity of the definitely dissimilar to defend the thesis that vague identity statements owe their indeterminacy to vagueness in language.
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  25. Harold W. Noonan (1990). Object-Dependent Thoughts and Psychological Redundancy. Analysis 50 (January):1-9.
  26.  76
    Harold W. Noonan (1988). Reply to Lowe on Ships and Structures. Analysis 48 (4):221 - 223.
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  27.  40
    Harold W. Noonan (1987). Reply to Spinks on Temporal Parts. Analysis 47 (4):187 - 188.
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  28. Harold W. Noonan (2009). Perdurance, Location and Classical Mereology. Analysis 69 (3):448-452.
    In his Ted Sider takes care to define the notion of a temporal part and his doctrine of perdurantism using only the temporally indexed notion of parthood – ‘ x is part of y at t’ – rather than the atemporal notion of classical mereology – ‘ x is a part of y’ – in order to forestall accusations of unintelligibility from his opponents. However, as he notes, endurantists do not necessarily reject the classical mereological notion as unintelligible. They allow (...)
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  29.  76
    Harold W. Noonan (1995). E. J. Lowe on Vague Identity and Quantum Indeterminacy. Analysis 55 (1):14 - 19.
    The paper defends Gareth Evan's argument against vague identity "de re" from a criticism that quantum mechanics provides actual counter-examples to its validity. A more general version of Evans's argument is stated in which identity involving properties are not essential and it is claimed that the scientific facts as so far known are consistent with the Evansian thesis that indeterminacy in truth-value must always be due to semantic indecision.
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  30.  30
    Harold W. Noonan (2013). In Defence of the Sensible Theory of Indeterminacy. Metaphysica 14 (2):239-252.
    Can the world itself be vague, so that rather than vagueness be a deficiency in our mode of describing the world, it is a necessary feature of any true description of it? Gareth Evans famously poses this question in his paper ‘Can There Be Vague Objects’ :208, 1978). In his recent paper ‘Indeterminacy and Vagueness: Logic and Metaphysics’, Peter van Inwagen elaborates the account of vagueness and, in particular, in the case of sentences, consequent indeterminacy in truth value, to which (...)
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  31.  57
    Harold Noonan (2013). Moderate Monism, Sortal Concepts, and Relative Identity. The Monist 96 (1):101-130.
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  32.  74
    Harold W. Noonan (2009). What is a One-Level Criterion of Identity? Analysis 69 (2):274-277.
    Standardly, a one-level criterion of identity 1 is given in the form: ∀ x∀ y )where ‘ K’ denotes the kind of thing for which the criterion is being given and ‘ R’ denotes the criterial relation.Thus, we have, for example, the criterion of identity for sets: ∀ x∀ y))and for composites: ∀ x∀ y))and for events: ∀ x∀ y)). is equivalent to the conjunction of: ∀ x and ∀ x )),which just give two necessary 2 conditions for application of (...)
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  33.  67
    Harold Noonan & Mark Jago (2012). The Accidental Properties of Numbers and Properties. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):134-140.
    According to genuine modal realism, some things (including numbers and properties) lack distinct counterparts in different worlds. So how can they possess any of their properties contingently? Egan (2004) argues that to explain such accidental property possession, the genuine modal realist must depart from Lewis and identify properties with functions, rather than with sets of possibilia. We disagree. The genuine modal realist already has the resources to handle Egan's proposed counterexamples. As we show, she does not need to amend her (...)
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  34.  76
    Harold W. Noonan (1982). Vague Objects. Analysis 42 (1):3-6.
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  35.  56
    Harold W. Noonan (1999). Identity, Constitution and Microphysical Supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (3):273-288.
    The aim of the paper is to discuss some recent variants of familiar puzzles concerning the relations of parts to wholes put forward by Trenton Merricks and Eric Olson. The argument is put forward that so long as the familiar distinction between 'loose and popular' and 'strict and philosophical' senses of identity claims is accepted the paradoxical conclusions at which Merricks and Olson arrive can be resisted. It is not denied that accepting the distinction between 'loose and popular' and 'strict (...)
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  36.  5
    Harold W. Noonan (2003). Personal Identity (2nd Edition). Routledge.
    Personal Identity is a comprehensive introduction to the nature of the self and its relation to the body. Harold Noonan places the problem of personal identity in the context of more general puzzles about identity, discussing the major historical theories and more recent debates. The second edition of Personal Identity contains a new chapter on 'animalism' and a new section on vagueness.
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  37.  87
    Harold W. Noonan (2003). A Flawed Argument for Perdurance. Analysis 63 (279):213–215.
  38.  73
    Harold W. Noonan (1986). Relative Identity: A Reconsideration. Analysis 46 (1):6 - 10.
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  39.  75
    Harold W. Noonan (1983). Personal Identity and Bodily Continuity: A Further Note on 'The Self and the Future'. Analysis 43 (2):98 - 104.
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  40.  65
    Harold W. Noonan (1986). Reply to Lowe. Analysis 46 (4):218 - 221.
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  41.  58
    Harold W. Noonan (2008). Does Ontic Indeterminacy in Boundaries Entail Ontic Indeterminacy in Identity? Analysis 68 (298):174–176.
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  42.  4
    Harold W. Noonan (2013). Frege: A Critical Introduction. Polity.
    This new book offers a comprehensive and accessible introduction to Frege's remarkable philosophical work, examining the main areas of his writings and demonstrating the connections between them. Frege's main contribution to philosophy spans philosophical logic, the theory of meaning, mathematical logic and the philosophy of mathematics. The book clearly explains and assesses Frege's work in these areas, systematically examining his major concepts, and revealing the links between them. The emphasis is on Frege's highly influential work in philosophical logic and the (...)
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  43.  33
    Harold W. Noonan (2014). Tollensing van Inwagen. Philosophia 42 (4):1055-1061.
    Van Inwagen has an ingenious argument for the non-existence of human artefacts . But the argument cannot be accepted, since human artefacts are everywhere. However, it cannot be ignored. The proper response to it is to treat it as a refutation of its least plausible premise, i.e., to ‘tollens’ it. I first set out van Inwagen’s argument. I then identify its least plausible premise and explain the consequence of denying it, that is, the acceptance of a plenitudinous, pluralist ontology. I (...)
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  44.  51
    Harold Noonan (2013). A Flaw in Kripke's Modal Argument? Philosophia 41 (3):841-846.
    The response to Kripke’s modal argument I wish to propose appeals to the distinction between indicative descriptions, i.e., descriptions formed using indicative verb forms, and what I shall call subjunctive descriptions, descriptions formed using non-indicative verb forms used in subjunctive conditionals. The contrast is between ‘the person who is richer than anyone else in the world’ and ‘the person who would have been richer than anyone else in the world’. The response to Kripke’s modal argument is that indicative descriptions are (...)
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  45.  50
    Harold W. Noonan (1985). The Closest Continuer Theory of Identity. Inquiry 28 (1-4):195 – 229.
    A plausible principle governing identity is that whether a later individual is identical with an earlier individual cannot ever merely depend on whether there are, at the later time, any better candidates for identity with the earlier individual around. This principle has been a bone of contention amongst philosophers interested in identity for many years. In his latest book Philosophical Explanations Robert Nozick presents what I believe to be the strongest case yet made out for the rejection of this principle. (...)
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  46.  86
    Harold W. Noonan (1981). Methodological Solipsism. Philosophical Studies 40 (September):269-274.
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  47. Harold W. Noonan (1993). Object-Dependent Thoughts: A Case of Superficial Necessity but Deep Contingency? In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press
     
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  48.  46
    Harold W. Noonan (2008). Moderate Monism and Modality. Analysis 68 (297):88–94.
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  49.  83
    Harold W. Noonan (2000). McKinsey-Brown Survives. Analysis 60 (268):353-356.
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  50.  13
    Harold W. Noonan (2015). Two-Boxing is Irrational. Philosophia 43 (2):455-462.
    Philosophers debate whether one-boxing or two-boxing is the rational act in a Newcomb situation. I shall argue that one-boxing is the only rational choice. This is so because there is no intelligible aim by reference to which you can justify the choice of two-boxing over one-boxing once you have come to think that you will two-box. The only aim by which the agent in the Newcomb situation can justify his two-boxing is the subjunctively described aim of ‘getting more than I (...)
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