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Hartry Field [73]Hartry H. Field [1]
  1. Hartry Field, Remarks on Content and its Role in Explanation.
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  2. Hartry Field, Vagueness, Partial Belief, and Logic.
    Discussion of Chapter 5 of Stephen Schiffer's "The Things We Mean' in which Stephen Schiffer advances two novel theses: 1. Vagueness (and indeterminacy more generally) is a psychological phenomenon; 2. It is indeterminate whether classical logic applies in situations where vagueness matters.
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  3. Hartry Field (forthcoming). Disarming a Paradox of Validity. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic.
    Abstract. Any theory of truth must find a way around Curry’s paradox, and there are well-known ways to do so. This paper concerns an apparently analogous paradox, about validity rather than truth, which JC Beall and Julien Murzi (“Two Flavor's of Curry's Paradox”) call the v-Curry. They argue that there are reasons to want a common solution to it and the standard Curry paradox, and that this rules out the solutions to the latter offered by most “naive truth theorists”. To (...)
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  4. Hartry Field (forthcoming). What Is Logical Validity? In Colin Caret & Ole Hjortland (eds.), Foundations of Logical Consequence.
    What are people who disagree about logic disagreeing about? The paper argues that (in a wide range of cases) they are primarily disagreeing about how to regulate their degrees of belief. An analogy is drawn between beliefs about validity and beliefs about chance: both sorts of belief serve primarily to regulate degrees of belief about other matters, but in both cases the concepts have a kind of objectivity nonetheless.
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  5. Hartry Field (2013). Naive Truth and Restricted Quantification: Saving Truth a Whole Lot Better. Review of Symbolic Logic:1-45.
    Restricted quantification poses a serious and under-appreciated challenge for nonclassical approaches to both vagueness and the semantic paradoxes. It is tempting to explain as ; but in the nonclassical logics typically used in dealing with vagueness and the semantic paradoxes (even those where thend expect. If we’re going to use a nonclassical logic, we need one that handles restricted quantification better.
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  6. Hartry Field (2011). Comments on Martin's and Welch's Comments. Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (3):360-366.
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  7. Hartry Field (2011). Introduction to Author Meets Critics Session on Saving Truth From Paradox. Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (3):337-338.
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  8. Hartry Field (2010). Precis of Saving Truth From Paradox. Philosophical Studies 147 (3):415 - 420.
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  9. Hartry Field (2010). Replies to Commentators on Saving Truth From Paradox. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 147 (3):457 - 470.
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  10. Hartry Field (2010). This Magic Moment: Horwich on the Boundary of Vague Terms. In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oup Oxford.
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  11. Hartry Field (2009). Epistemology Without Metaphysics. Philosophical Studies 143 (2):249 - 290.
    The paper outlines a view of normativity that combines elements of relativism and expressivism, and applies it to normative concepts in epistemology. The result is a kind of epistemological anti-realism, which denies that epistemic norms can be (in any straightforward sense) correct or incorrect; it does allow some to be better than others, but takes this to be goal-relative and is skeptical of the existence of best norms. It discusses the circularity that arises from the fact that we need to (...)
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  12. Hartry Field (2009). Pluralism in Logic. Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (2):342-359.
    There are quite a few theses about logic that are in one way or another pluralist: they hold (i) that there is no uniquely correct logic, and (ii) that because of this, some or all debates about logic are illusory, or need to be somehow reconceived as not straightforwardly factual. Pluralist theses differ markedly over the reasons offered for there being no uniquely correct logic. Some such theses are more interesting than others, because they more radically affect how we are (...)
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  13. Hartry Field (2009). What is the Normative Role of Logic? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):251-268.
    The paper tries to spell out a connection between deductive logic and rationality, against Harman's arguments that there is no such connection, and also against the thought that any such connection would preclude rational change in logic. One might not need to connect logic to rationality if one could view logic as the science of what preserves truth by a certain kind of necessity (or by necessity plus logical form); but the paper points out a serious obstacle to any such (...)
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  14. Hartry H. Field (2008). Saving Truth From Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    A selective background -- Broadly classical approaches -- Paracompleteness -- More on paracomplete solutions -- Paraconsistent dialetheism.
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  15. Hartry Field (2007). Solving the Paradoxes, Escaping Revenge. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    It is “the received wisdom” that any intuitively natural and consistent resolution of a class of semantic paradoxes immediately leads to other paradoxes just as bad as the first. This is often called the “revenge problem”. Some proponents of the received wisdom draw the conclusion that there is no hope of any natural treatment that puts all the paradoxes to rest: we must either live with the existence of paradoxes that we are unable to treat, or adopt artificial and ad (...)
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  16. Hartry Field (2006). Compositional Principles Vs. Schematic Reasoning. The Monist 89 (1):9-27.
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  17. Hartry Field (2006). Maudlin's Truth and Paradox. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):713–720.
    Tim Maudlin’s Truth and Paradox is terrific. In some sense its solution to the paradoxes is familiar—the book advocates an extension of what’s called the Kripke-Feferman theory (although the definition of validity it employs disguises this fact). Nonetheless, the perspective it casts on that solution is completely novel, and Maudlin uses this perspective to try to make the prima facie unattractive features of this solution seem palatable, indeed inescapable. Moreover, the book deals with many important issues that most writers on (...)
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  18. Hartry Field (2006). Review of Graham Priest, Doubt Truth to Be a Liar. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (3).
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  19. Hartry Field (2006). Truth and the Unprovability of Consistency. Mind 115 (459):567 - 605.
    It might be thought that we could argue for the consistency of a mathematical theory T within T, by giving an inductive argument that all theorems of T are true and inferring consistency. By Gödel's second incompleteness theorem any such argument must break down, but just how it breaks down depends on the kind of theory of truth that is built into T. The paper surveys the possibilities, and suggests that some theories of truth give far more intuitive diagnoses of (...)
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  20. Hartry Field (2005). A. Reply to Anil Gupta and Jose Martinez-Fernandez. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 124 (1):105 - 128.
  21. Hartry Field (2005). Is the Liar Sentence Both True and False? In J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationism and Paradox. Clarendon Press.
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  22. Hartry Field (2005). –Precis. Philosophical Studies 124 (1):41-44.
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  23. Hartry Field (2005). Recent Debates About the A Priori. In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oup Oxford.
  24. Hartry Field (2005). Truth and the Absence of Fact – Precis. Philosophical Studies 124 (1):41 - 44.
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  25. Hartry Field (2005). Variations on a Theme by Yablo. In J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationism and Paradox. Clarendon Press.
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  26. Hartry Field (2004). The Semantic Paradoxes and the Paradoxes of Vagueness. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Clarendon Press.
    Both in dealing with the semantic paradoxes and in dealing with vagueness and indeterminacy, there is some temptation to weaken classical logic: in particular, to restrict the law of excluded middle. The reasons for doing this are somewhat different in the two cases. In the case of the semantic paradoxes, a weakening of classical logic (presumably involving a restriction of excluded middle) is required if we are to preserve the naive theory of truth without inconsistency. In the case of vagueness (...)
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  27. Hartry Field (2003). A Revenge-Immune Solution to the Semantic Paradoxes. Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (2):139-177.
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  28. Hartry Field (2003). Causation in a Physical World. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. 435-460.
    1. Of what use is the concept of causation? Bertrand Russell [1912-13] argued that it is not useful: it is “a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm.” His argument for this was that the kind of physical theories that we have come to regard as fundamental leave no place for the notion of causation: not only does the word ‘cause’ not appear in the advanced sciences, but the (...)
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  29. Hartry Field (2003). Do We Have a Determinate Conception of Finiteness and Natural Number? In Matthias Schirn (ed.), The Philosophy of Mathematics Today. Clarendon Press.
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  30. Hartry Field (2003). No Fact of the Matter. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):457 – 480.
    Are there questions for which 'there is no determinate fact of the matter' as to which answer is correct? Most of us think so, but there are serious difficulties in maintaining the view, and in explaining the idea of determinateness in a satisfactory manner. The paper argues that to overcome the difficulties, we need to reject the law of excluded middle; and it investigates the sense of 'rejection' that is involved. The paper also explores the logic that is required if (...)
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  31. Hartry Field (2002). Saving the Truth Schema From Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (1):1-27.
    The paper shows how we can add a truth predicate to arithmetic (or formalized syntactic theory), and keep the usual truth schema Tr( ) ↔ A (understood as the conjunction of Tr( ) → A and A → Tr( )). We also keep the full intersubstitutivity of Tr(>A>)) with A in all contexts, even inside of an →. Keeping these things requires a weakening of classical logic; I suggest a logic based on the strong Kleene truth tables, but with → (...)
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  32. Hartry Field (2001). Attributions of Meaning and Content. In , Truth and the Absence of Fact. Oxford University Press.
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  33. Hartry Field (2001). Truth and the Absence of Fact. Oxford University Press.
    Presenting a selection of thirteen essays on various topics at the foundations of philosophy--one previously unpublished and eight accompanied by substantial new postscripts--this book offers outstanding insight on truth, meaning, and propositional attitudes; semantic indeterminacy and other kinds of "factual defectiveness;" and issues concerning objectivity, especially in mathematics and in epistemology. It will reward the attention of any philosopher interested in language, epistemology, or mathematics.
     
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  34. Hartry Field (2000). A Priority as an Evaluative Notion. In Paul A. Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the a Priori. Oxford University Press.
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  35. Hartry Field (2000). Indeterminacy, Degree of Belief, and Excluded Middle. Noûs 34 (1):1–30.
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  36. Hartry Field (2000). 1. The Concept of Apriority. In Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the a Priori. Oxford University Press. 117.
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  37. Hartry Field (1999). Deflating the Conservativeness Argument. Journal of Philosophy 96 (10):533-540.
  38. Hartry Field (1998). ``Epistemological Nonfactualism and the A Prioricity of Logic&Quot. Philosophical Studies 92 (1/2):1--24.
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  39. Hartry Field (1998). Mathematical Objectivity and Mathematical Objects. In S. Laurence C. MacDonald (ed.), Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics. Basil Blackwell.
     
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  40. Hartry Field (1998). State of the Art Essay. In S. Laurence C. MacDonald (ed.), Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics. Basil Blackwell. 387.
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  41. Hartry Field (1998). Some Thoughts on Radical Indeterminacy. The Monist 81 (2):253-273.
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  42. Hartry Field (1998). Which Undecidable Mathematical Sentences Have Determinate Truth Values. In H. G. Dales & Gianluigi Oliveri (eds.), Truth in Mathematics. Oxford University Press, Usa. 291--310.
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  43. Hartry Field (1996). ``The A Prioricity of Logic&Quot. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:359--379.
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  44. Hartry Field (1996). The a Prioricity of Logic. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:359 - 379.
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  45. Hartry Field (1995). 96,The A Prioricity of Logic “. Proceedings of Aristotelian Society 96:359379.
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  46. Hartry Field (1994). Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse. Philosophical Review 103 (3):405-452.
  47. Hartry Field (1994). Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content. Mind 103 (411):249-285.
  48. Hartry Field (1994). Are Our Logical and Mathematical Concepts Highly Indeterminate? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):391-429.
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  49. Hartry Field (1993). The Conceptual Contingency of Mathematical Objects. Mind 102 (406):285-299.
  50. Hartry Field (1992). A Nominalistic Proof of the Conservativeness of Set Theory. Journal of Philosophical Logic 21 (2):111 - 123.
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