Search results for 'Hartry H. Field' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Hartry H. Field (2008). Saving Truth From Paradox. Oxford University Press.score: 870.0
    A selective background -- Broadly classical approaches -- Paracompleteness -- More on paracomplete solutions -- Paraconsistent dialetheism.
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  2. Michael Friedman (1981). Book Review:Science Without Numbers: A Defense of Nominalism Hartry H. Field. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 48 (3):505-.score: 450.0
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  3. Kenneth L. Manders (1984). Review: Hartry H. Field, Science Without Numbers. A Defence of Nominalism. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 49 (1):303-306.score: 450.0
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  4. Bernard Linsky (1982). Hartry H. Field, Science Without Numbers Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 2 (4):161-164.score: 450.0
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  5. G. C. Field (1949). The Pre-Socratic Philosophers: A Companion to Diels. By Kathleen Freeman. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1946. Pp. Xvi + 468. Price 25s.)An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy. By A. H. Armstrong. (London: Methuen & Co. 1947. Pp. Xvi + 241. Price 15s.)Knowledge and the Good in Plato's Republic. By H. W. B. Joseph. (Oxford University Press. 1948. Pp. Viii + 75. Price 5s.). [REVIEW] Philosophy 24 (88):83-.score: 360.0
  6. G. C. Field (1932). Human Values. By Dewitt H. Parker(Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan. New York and London: Harper & Bros. 1931. Pp. Viii + 415. Price 10s. 6d.). [REVIEW] Philosophy 7 (25):105-.score: 360.0
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  7. G. C. Field (1936). Two Books on Plato The Argument of Plato. By F. H. Anderson. Pp. Viii + 216. London: Dent, 1935. Cloth, 10s. 6d. Plato's Thought. By G. M. A. Grube. Pp. Xvii + 320. London: Methuen, 1935. Cloth, 12s. 6d. [REVIEW] The Classical Review 50 (02):63-64.score: 360.0
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  8. G. C. Field (1932). Neue Untersuchungen Zu Platonischen Dialogen. Von H. Rick. Pp. Viii + 391. Bonn: Röhrscheid, 1931. Paper, M. 20. The Classical Review 46 (05):232-.score: 360.0
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  9. G. C. Field (1937). Plato To-Day. By R. H. S. Crossman. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.1937. Pp. 302. Price 7s. 6d.). Philosophy 12 (48):480-.score: 360.0
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  10. Rosalind Field (1988). Norris J. Lacy, Ed.; Geoffrey Ashe, Sandra Ness Ihle, Marianne E. Kalinke, and Raymond H. Thompson, Assoc. Eds., The Arthurian Encyclopedia.(Garland Reference Library of the Humanities, 585.) New York and London: Garland, 1986. Pp. Xl, 649; 49 Black-and-White Illustrations. $60. [REVIEW] Speculum 63 (2):426-428.score: 360.0
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  11. Hartry Field (1984). Can We Dispense with Space-Time? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:33 - 90.score: 300.0
    This paper is concerned with the debate between substantival and relational theories of space-time, and discusses two difficulties that beset the relationalist: a difficulty posed by field theories, and another difficulty (discussed at greater length) called the problem of quantities. A main purpose of the paper is to argue that possibility can not always be used as a surrogate of ontology, and that in particular that there is no hope of using possibility to solve the problem of quantities.
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  12. Hartry Field (1972). Tarski's Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy 64 (13):347-375.score: 240.0
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  13. Hartry Field (2009). Epistemology Without Metaphysics. Philosophical Studies 143 (2):249 - 290.score: 240.0
    The paper outlines a view of normativity that combines elements of relativism and expressivism, and applies it to normative concepts in epistemology. The result is a kind of epistemological anti-realism, which denies that epistemic norms can be (in any straightforward sense) correct or incorrect; it does allow some to be better than others, but takes this to be goal-relative and is skeptical of the existence of best norms. It discusses the circularity that arises from the fact that we need to (...)
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  14. Hartry Field (1978). Mental Representation. Erkenntnis 13 (July):9-61.score: 240.0
  15. Hartry Field (2009). Pluralism in Logic. Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (2):342-359.score: 240.0
    There are quite a few theses about logic that are in one way or another pluralist: they hold (i) that there is no uniquely correct logic, and (ii) that because of this, some or all debates about logic are illusory, or need to be somehow reconceived as not straightforwardly factual. Pluralist theses differ markedly over the reasons offered for there being no uniquely correct logic. Some such theses are more interesting than others, because they more radically affect how we are (...)
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  16. Hartry Field (2009). What is the Normative Role of Logic? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):251-268.score: 240.0
    The paper tries to spell out a connection between deductive logic and rationality, against Harman's arguments that there is no such connection, and also against the thought that any such connection would preclude rational change in logic. One might not need to connect logic to rationality if one could view logic as the science of what preserves truth by a certain kind of necessity (or by necessity plus logical form); but the paper points out a serious obstacle to any such (...)
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  17. Hartry Field (2005). Recent Debates About the A Priori. In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oup Oxford.score: 240.0
  18. Hartry Field, Remarks on Content and its Role in Explanation.score: 240.0
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  19. Hartry Field (1994). Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content. Mind 103 (411):249-285.score: 240.0
  20. Hartry Field (2005). Is the Liar Sentence Both True and False? In J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationism and Paradox. Clarendon Press.score: 240.0
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  21. Hartry Field (1975). Conventionalism and Instrumentalism in Semantics. Noûs 9 (4):375-405.score: 240.0
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  22. Hartry Field (1973). Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference. Journal of Philosophy 70 (14):462-481.score: 240.0
  23. Hartry Field (2004). The Semantic Paradoxes and the Paradoxes of Vagueness. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Clarendon Press.score: 240.0
    Both in dealing with the semantic paradoxes and in dealing with vagueness and indeterminacy, there is some temptation to weaken classical logic: in particular, to restrict the law of excluded middle. The reasons for doing this are somewhat different in the two cases. In the case of the semantic paradoxes, a weakening of classical logic (presumably involving a restriction of excluded middle) is required if we are to preserve the naive theory of truth without inconsistency. In the case of vagueness (...)
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  24. Hartry Field (2003). No Fact of the Matter. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):457 – 480.score: 240.0
    Are there questions for which 'there is no determinate fact of the matter' as to which answer is correct? Most of us think so, but there are serious difficulties in maintaining the view, and in explaining the idea of determinateness in a satisfactory manner. The paper argues that to overcome the difficulties, we need to reject the law of excluded middle; and it investigates the sense of 'rejection' that is involved. The paper also explores the logic that is required if (...)
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  25. Hartry Field (1982). Realism and Relativism. Journal of Philosophy 79 (10):553-567.score: 240.0
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  26. Hartry Field (1977). Logic, Meaning, and Conceptual Role. Journal of Philosophy 74 (July):379-409.score: 240.0
  27. Hartry Field (1986/2001). Stalnaker on Intentionality: On Robert Stalnaker's Inquiry. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 67 (April):98-112.score: 240.0
     
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  28. Hartry Field (1974). Quine and the Correspondence Theory. Philosophical Review 83 (2):200-228.score: 240.0
    A correspondence theory of truth explains truth in terms of various correspondence relations (e.G., Reference) between words and the extralinguistic world. What are the consequences of quine's doctrine of indeterminacy for correspondence theories? in "ontological relativity" quine implicitly claims that correspondence theories are impossible; that is what the doctrine of 'relative reference' amounts to. But quine's doctrine of relative reference is incoherent. Those who think the indeterminacy thesis valid should not try to relativize reference, They should abandon the relation and (...)
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  29. Hartry Field (2003). Causation in a Physical World. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. 435-460.score: 240.0
    1. Of what use is the concept of causation? Bertrand Russell [1912-13] argued that it is not useful: it is “a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm.” His argument for this was that the kind of physical theories that we have come to regard as fundamental leave no place for the notion of causation: not only does the word ‘cause’ not appear in the advanced sciences, but the (...)
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  30. Hartry Field (2010). Precis of Saving Truth From Paradox. Philosophical Studies 147 (3):415 - 420.score: 240.0
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  31. H. Field (1992). Critical Notice: Paul Horwich's ‘Truth'. Philosophy of Science 59 (1):321-30.score: 240.0
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  32. Hartry Field (1988). Realism, Mathematics and Modality. Philosophical Topics 16 (1):57-107.score: 240.0
  33. Hartry Field (1984). Is Mathematical Knowledge Just Logical Knowledge? Philosophical Review 93 (4):509-552.score: 240.0
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  34. Hartry Field, Vagueness, Partial Belief, and Logic.score: 240.0
    Discussion of Chapter 5 of Stephen Schiffer's "The Things We Mean' in which Stephen Schiffer advances two novel theses: 1. Vagueness (and indeterminacy more generally) is a psychological phenomenon; 2. It is indeterminate whether classical logic applies in situations where vagueness matters.
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  35. Hartry Field (1999). Deflating the Conservativeness Argument. Journal of Philosophy 96 (10):533-540.score: 240.0
  36. Hartry Field (forthcoming). What Is Logical Validity? In Colin Caret & Ole Hjortland (eds.), Foundations of Logical Consequence.score: 240.0
    What are people who disagree about logic disagreeing about? The paper argues that (in a wide range of cases) they are primarily disagreeing about how to regulate their degrees of belief. An analogy is drawn between beliefs about validity and beliefs about chance: both sorts of belief serve primarily to regulate degrees of belief about other matters, but in both cases the concepts have a kind of objectivity nonetheless.
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  37. Hartry Field (1991). Metalogic and Modality. Philosophical Studies 62 (1):1 - 22.score: 240.0
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  38. Hartry Field (1978). A Note on Jeffrey Conditionalization. Philosophy of Science 45 (3):361-367.score: 240.0
    Bayesian decision theory can be viewed as the core of psychological theory for idealized agents. To get a complete psychological theory for such agents, you have to supplement it with input and output laws. On a Bayesian theory that employs strict conditionalization, the input laws are easy to give. On a Bayesian theory that employs Jeffrey conditionalization, there appears to be a considerable problem with giving the input laws. However, Jeffrey conditionalization can be reformulated so that the problem disappears, and (...)
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  39. Hartry Field (2000). Indeterminacy, Degree of Belief, and Excluded Middle. Noûs 34 (1):1–30.score: 240.0
  40. Hartry Field (2007). Solving the Paradoxes, Escaping Revenge. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
    It is “the received wisdom” that any intuitively natural and consistent resolution of a class of semantic paradoxes immediately leads to other paradoxes just as bad as the first. This is often called the “revenge problem”. Some proponents of the received wisdom draw the conclusion that there is no hope of any natural treatment that puts all the paradoxes to rest: we must either live with the existence of paradoxes that we are unable to treat, or adopt artificial and ad (...)
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  41. Hartry Field (1993). The Conceptual Contingency of Mathematical Objects. Mind 102 (406):285-299.score: 240.0
  42. Hartry Field (1994). Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse. Philosophical Review 103 (3):405-452.score: 240.0
  43. Hartry Field (2005). A. Reply to Anil Gupta and Jose Martinez-Fernandez. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 124 (1):105 - 128.score: 240.0
  44. Hartry Field (2010). Replies to Commentators on Saving Truth From Paradox. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 147 (3):457 - 470.score: 240.0
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  45. Hartry Field (2010). This Magic Moment: Horwich on the Boundary of Vague Terms. In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oup Oxford.score: 240.0
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  46. Hartry Field (forthcoming). Disarming a Paradox of Validity. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic.score: 240.0
    Abstract. Any theory of truth must find a way around Curry’s paradox, and there are well-known ways to do so. This paper concerns an apparently analogous paradox, about validity rather than truth, which JC Beall and Julien Murzi (“Two Flavor's of Curry's Paradox”) call the v-Curry. They argue that there are reasons to want a common solution to it and the standard Curry paradox, and that this rules out the solutions to the latter offered by most “naive truth theorists”. To (...)
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  47. Hartry Field (2005). Variations on a Theme by Yablo. In J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationism and Paradox. Clarendon Press.score: 240.0
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  48. Hartry Field (2005). Truth and the Absence of Fact – Precis. Philosophical Studies 124 (1):41 - 44.score: 240.0
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  49. Hartry Field (2006). Review of Graham Priest, Doubt Truth to Be a Liar. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (3).score: 240.0
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  50. Hartry Field (2002). Saving the Truth Schema From Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (1):1-27.score: 240.0
    The paper shows how we can add a truth predicate to arithmetic (or formalized syntactic theory), and keep the usual truth schema Tr( ) ↔ A (understood as the conjunction of Tr( ) → A and A → Tr( )). We also keep the full intersubstitutivity of Tr(>A>)) with A in all contexts, even inside of an →. Keeping these things requires a weakening of classical logic; I suggest a logic based on the strong Kleene truth tables, but with → (...)
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