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  1. Heath White (2011). Mattering and Mechanism: Must a Mechanistic Universe Be Depressing? Ratio 24 (3):326-339.
    There is an intuition to the effect that, if human actions are explicable in scientific terms – that is, if mechanism holds – then our lives and actions do not matter. “Mattering” depends on successful intentional explanations of human actions. The intuition springs from an intuitive analogy between manipulation and mechanism: just as a manipulated agent's actions are not successfully explained in intentional terms, neither are the actions of a mechanistic agent. I explore ways to avoid the conclusion of this (...)
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  2. Heath White (2011). 'Ought': The Correct Intention Account. Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):297-317.
    “S ought (not) to see to it that p at t” is true iff an intention on the part of S to see to it that p at t is (in) correct. From this truth condition follows an understanding of the conceptual role of ought-claims in practical inference: ought-claims are interchangeable with intentions having the same content. From this conceptual role, it is quite clear why first-person, present-tense ought-judgments, and just those, motivate: failure to be motivated is a failure of (...)
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  3. Heath White (2010). Brandom, Robert B. Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009 . Pp. 237. $29.95 (Cloth). [REVIEW] Ethics 120 (4):836-841.
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  4. Heath White (2009). Fitting Attitudes, Wrong Kinds of Reasons, and Mind-Independent Goodness. Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (3):339-364.
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  5. Heath White (2006). Desires in Practical Reasoning. Philosophical Studies 129 (2):197 - 221.
    Inferences from desired ends to intended necessary means seem to be among the most unproblematic elements of practical reasoning. A closer look dissolves this appearance, however, when we see that such inferences are defeasible. We can nevertheless understand such inferences as leading to the adoption of plans, by analogy with inferences leading to explanations. Plans should satisfy at least some important ends desired by the agent, be consistent with the satisfaction of other desired ends, and be inconsistent with as few (...)
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  6. Nancy Sherman & Heath White (2003). Intellectual Virtue: Emotions, Luck, and the Ancients. In Linda Zagzebski & Michael DePaul (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. 34--53.
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  7. Heath White (2003). Brandom on Practical Reason. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):566–572.
    Robert Brandom claims that language expressing pro-attitudes makes explicit proprieties of practical inference. This thesis is untenable, especially given certain premises which Brandom himself endorses. Pro-attitude vocabulary has the wrong grammatical structure; other parts of vocabulary do the job he ascribes to pro-attitude vocabulary; the thesis introduces implausible differences between the inferential consequences of desires and intentions, and distorts the interpretation of conditional statements. Rather, I suggest, logical vocabulary can make proprieties of practical inference explicit, just as the inferentialist says (...)
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