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Heather Battaly [12]Heather D. Battaly [3]
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Profile: Heather Battaly (California State University, Fullerton)
  1. Heather Battaly (2013). Detecting Epistemic Vice in Higher Education Policy: Epistemic Insensibility in the Seven Solutions and the REF. Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (2):263-280.
    This article argues that the Seven Solutions in the US, and the Research Excellence Framework in the UK, manifest the vice of epistemic insensibility. Section I provides an overview of Aristotle's analysis of moral vice in people. Section II applies Aristotle's analysis to epistemic vice, developing an account of epistemic insensibility. In so doing, it contributes a new epistemic vice to the field of virtue epistemology. Section III argues that the (US) Seven Breakthrough Solutions and, to a lesser extent, the (...)
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  2. Heather Battaly (2012). Sosa's Reflective Knowledge: How Damaging is Epistemic Circularity? Synthese 188 (2):289-308.
    The problem of epistemic circularity maintains that we cannot know that our central belief-forming practices (faculties) are reliable without vicious circularity. Ernest Sosa's Reflective Knowledge (2009) offers a solution to this problem. Sosa argues that epistemic circularity is virtuous rather than vicious: it is not damaging. Contra Sosa, I contend that epistemic circularity is damaging. Section 1 provides an overview of Sosa's solution. Section 2 focuses on Sosa's reply to the Crystal ballgazer Objection. Section 2 also contends that epistemic circularity (...)
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  3. Heather Battaly (2010). Attacking Character: Ad Hominem Argument and Virtue Epistemology. Informal Logic 30 (4).
    The recent literature on ad hominem argument contends that the speaker’s character is sometimes relevant to evaluating what she says. This effort to redeem ad hominems requires an analysis of character that explains why and how character is relevant. I argue that virtue epistemology supplies this analysis. Three sorts of ad hominems that attack the speaker’s intellectual character are legitimate. They attack a speaker’s: (1) possession of reliabilist vices; or (2) possession of responsibilist vices; or (3) failure to perform intellectually (...)
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  4. Heather Battaly (2010). Epistemic Self-Indulgence. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):214-234.
    I argue in this essay that there is an epistemic analogue of moral self-indulgence. Section 1 analyzes Aristotle's notion of moral temperance, and its corresponding vices of self-indulgence and insensibility. Section 2 uses Aristotle's notion of moral self-indulgence as a model for epistemic self-indulgence. I argue that one is epistemically self-indulgent only if one either : (ESI1) desires, consumes, and enjoys appropriate and inappropriate epistemic objects; or (ESI2) desires, consumes, and enjoys epistemic objects at appropriate and inappropriate times; or (ESI3) (...)
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  5. Heather Battaly (2010). Introduction: Virtue and Vice. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):1-21.
    Abstract: This introduction to the collection Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic addresses three main questions: (1) What is a virtue theory in ethics or epistemology? (2) What is a virtue? and (3) What is a vice? (1) It suggests that a virtue theory takes the virtues and vices of agents to be more fundamental than evaluations of acts or beliefs, and defines right acts or justified beliefs in terms of the virtues. (2) It argues that there are two important (...)
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  6. Heather D. Battaly (ed.) (2010). Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Machine generated contents note: Notes on Contributors -- Introduction: Virtue and Vice: Heather Battaly -- 1. Virtue Ethics and Virtue Epistemology: Roger Crisp -- 2. Exemplarist Virtue Theory: Linda Zagzebski -- 3. Right Act, Virtuous Motive: Thomas Hurka -- 4. Agency Ascriptions in Ethics and Epistemology: Or, Navigating Intersections, Narrow and Broad: Guy Axtell -- 5. Virtues, Social Roles, and Contextualism: Sarah Wright -- 6. Virtue, Emotion, and Attention: Michael S. Brady -- 7. Feeling Without Thinking: Lessons from the Ancients (...)
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  7. Heather Battaly (2009). A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I • by Ernest Sosa. Analysis 69 (2):382-385.
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  8. Heather Battaly (2009). Intellectual Virtues. International Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1):136-139.
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  9. Heather Battaly & Amy Coplan (2009). Is Dr. House Virtuous. Film and Philosophy 13:1-18.
     
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  10. Heather Battaly (2008). Metaethics Meets Virtue Epistemology: Salvaging Disagreement About the Epistemically Thick. Philosophical Papers 37 (3):435-454.
    Virtue ethics and virtue epistemology shift the focus of evaluation from thin concepts to thick ones. Simon Blackburn has argued that a shift to thick ethical concepts dooms us to talking past one another. I contend that virtue epistemologists can answer Blackburn's objection, thus salvaging genuine disagreement about the epistemically thick. Section I introduces the standard cognitivist and non-cognitivist analyses of thick concepts. Section II argues that thick epistemic concepts are subject to combinatorial vagueness. I contend that virtue epistemologists share (...)
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  11. Heather Battaly (2008). Virtue Epistemology. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):639-663.
    What are the qualities of an excellent thinker? A growing new field, virtue epistemology, answers this question. Section I distinguishes virtue epistemology from belief-based epistemology. Section II explains the two primary accounts of intellectual virtue: virtue-reliabilism and virtue-responsibilism. Virtue-reliabilists claim that the virtues are stable reliable faculties, like vision. Virtue-responsibilists claim that they are acquired character traits, like open-mindedness. Section III evaluates progress and problems with respect to three key projects: explaining low-grade knowledge, high-grade knowledge, and the individual intellectual virtues.
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  12. Heather Battaly (2006). Teaching Intellectual Virtues. Teaching Philosophy 29 (3):191-222.
    How can we cultivate intellectual virtues in our students? I provide an overview of virtue epistemology, explaining two types of intellectual virtues: reliabilist virtues and responsibilist virtues. I suggest that both types are acquired via some combination of practice on the part of the student and explanation on the part of the instructor. I describe strategies for teaching these two types of virtues in the classroom, including an activity for teaching the skill of using the square of opposition, and several (...)
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  13. Heather D. Battaly (2005). Ernest Sosa and His Critics. International Philosophical Quarterly 45 (3):395-396.
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  14. Heather Battaly (2001). Thin Concepts to the Rescue: Thinning the Concepts of Epistemic Justification and Intellectual Virtue. In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. 98--116.
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