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Profile: Heather Logue (University of Leeds)
  1. Heather Logue (forthcoming). Experiential Content and Naive Realism: A Reconciliation. In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? OUP.
    In the first section of this paper, after briefly arguing for the assumption that experiential content is propositional, I’ll distinguish three interpretations of the claim that experience has content (the Mild, Medium, and Spicy Content Views). In the second section, I’ll flesh out Naïve Realism in greater detail, and I’ll reconstruct what I take to be the main argument for its incompatibility with the Content Views. The third section will be devoted to evaluation of existing arguments for the Mild Content (...)
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  2. Heather Logue (2013). Good News for the Disjunctivist About (One of) the Bad Cases. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):105-133.
    Many philosophers are skeptical about disjunctivism—a theory of perceptual experience which holds roughly that a situation in which I see a banana that is as it appears to me to be (the good case) and one in which I have a hallucination as of a banana (a certain kind of bad case) are mentally completely different. Often this skepticism is rooted in the suspicion that such a view cannot adequately account for the bad case—in particular, (i) that such a view (...)
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  3. Heather Logue (2013). Visual Experience of Natural Kind Properties: Is There Any Fact of the Matter? Philosophical Studies 162 (1):1-12.
  4. Heather Logue (2012). The Contents of Visual Experience, by Susanna Siegel. [REVIEW] Mind 121 (483):842-849.
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  5. Heather Logue (2012). Why Naive Realism? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):211-237.
    Much of the discussion of Naive Realism about veridical experience has focused on a consequence of adopting it—namely, disjunctivism about perceptual experience. However, the motivations for being a Naive Realist in the first place have received relatively little attention in the literature. In this paper, I will elaborate and defend the claim that Naive Realism provides the best account of the phenomenal character of veridical experience.
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  6. Heather Logue (2012). What Should the Naïve Realist Say About Total Hallucinations? Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):173-199.
  7. Heather Logue (2011). The Skeptic and the Naïve Realist. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):268-288.
  8. Heather Logue (2010). Getting Acquainted with Naïve Realism: Critical Notice of Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. Philosophical Books 51 (1):22-38.
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  9. Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.) (2009). Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press.
    Classic texts that define the disjunctivist theory of perception.
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  10. Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (2009). Introduction. In Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press.
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  11. Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (2008). Either/Or. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 314-19.
    This essay surveys the varieties of disjunctivism about perceptual experience. Disjunctivism comes in two main flavours, metaphysical and epistemological.
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