In this talk, Hume’s distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ in the Treatise of Human Nature will be discussed. It will be argued that Hume accuses previous moral philosophers neither of committing a logical error in their reasoning, nor of falling short of a possible deduction of an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ because of false assumptions. Rather, Hume argues that these philosophers have an incorrect notion of reason: By means of reason, we do not discover eternal moral truths, and also, reason (...) does not motivate us. According to Hume, reason reveals only causal relations that exist between external facts and our emotions, which are facts as well. The ‘ought’ is located just in our emotions and not in the things which evoke the moral emotions inside us. (shrink)
Kant und die Alternativen Heiner F. Klemme Manfred Kühn, Dieter Schönecker. H . Klemme / M. Kühn / D. Schönecker (Hg.) Moralische Motivation Kant und die Alternativen Meiner KANT-FORSCHUNGEN Begründet von Reinhard Brandt und ...
