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Helen Steward [41]Helen Catherine Steward [1]
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Profile: Helen Steward (University of Leeds)
  1.  57
    Helen Steward (2012). A Metaphysics for Freedom. OUP Oxford.
    Helen Steward argues that determinism is incompatible with agency itself--not only the special human variety of agency, but also powers which can be accorded to animal agents. She offers a distinctive, non-dualistic version of libertarianism, rooted in a conception of what biological forms of organisation might make possible in the way of freedom.
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  2. Helen Steward (1997). The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes, and States. Oxford University Press.
    Helen Steward puts forward a radical critique of the foundations of contemporary philosophy of mind, arguing that it relies too heavily on insecure assumptions about the sorts of things there are in the mind--events, processes, and states. She offers a fresh investigation of these three categories, clarifying the distinctions between them, and argues that the category of state has been very widely and seriously misunderstood.
     
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  3. Helen Steward (2013). Processes, Continuants, and Individuals. Mind 122 (487):fzt080.
    The paper considers and opposes the view that processes are best thought of as continuants, to be differentiated from events mainly by way of the fact that the latter, but not the former, are entities with temporal parts. The motivation for the investigation, though, is not so much the defeat of what is, in any case, a rather implausible claim, as the vindication of some of the ideas and intuitions that the claim is made in order to defend — and (...)
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  4.  50
    Helen Steward (2015). I—What is a Continuant? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):109-123.
    In this paper, I explore the question what a continuant is, in the context of a very interesting suggestion recently made by Rowland Stout, as part of his attempt to develop a coherent ontology of processes. Stout claims that a continuant is best thought of as something that primarily has its properties at times, rather than atemporally—and that on this construal, processes should count as continuants. While accepting that Stout is onto something here, I reject his suggestion that we should (...)
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  5. Helen Steward (2012). Actions as Processes. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):373-388.
  6.  35
    Helen Steward (2016). The Mind’s Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action, by Matthew Soteriou. Mind 125 (498):605-608.
    A review of Matthew Soteriou's 'The Mind's Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action'.
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  7.  99
    Helen Steward (2009). Animal Agency. Inquiry 52 (3):217-231.
    Are animals agents? This question demands a prior answer to the question of what an agent is. The paper argues that we ought not to think of this as merely a matter of choosing from a range of alternative definitional stipulations. Evidence from developmental psychology is offered in support of the view that a basic concept of agency is a very early natural acquisition, which is established prior to the development of any full-blown propositional attitude concepts. Then it is argued (...)
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  8. Helen Steward (2009). Fairness, Agency and the Flicker of Freedom. Noûs 43 (1):64 - 93.
  9.  69
    Helen Steward (2009). The Truth in Compatibilism and the Truth of Libertarianism. Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):167 – 179.
    The paper offers the outlines of a response to the often-made suggestion that it is impossible to see how indeterminism could possibly provide us with anything that we might want in the way of freedom, anything that could really amount to control, as opposed merely to an openness in the flow of reality that would constitute the injection of chance, or randomness, into the unfolding of the processes which underlie our activity. It is suggested that the best first move for (...)
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  10. Helen Steward (2009). Sub-Intentional Actions and the Over-Mentalization of Agency. In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan
  11.  20
    Helen Steward (2014). Causing Things and Doing Things. In C. G. Pulman (ed.), Hart on Responsibility.
  12.  81
    Helen Steward (2012). The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Moral Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 16 (2):241-271.
    The paper attempts to explicate and justify the position I call `Agency Incompatibilism'- that is to say, the view that agency itself is incompatible with determinism. The most important part of this task is the characterisation of the conception of agency on which the position depends; for unless this is understood, the rationale for the position is likely to be missed. The paper accordingly proceeds by setting out the orthodox philosophical position concerning what it takes for agency to exist, before (...)
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  13.  77
    Helen Steward (2008). Moral Responsibility and the Irrelevance of Physics: Fischer's Semi-Compatibilism Vs. Anti-Fundamentalism. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 12 (2):129 - 145.
    The paper argues that it is possible for an incompatibilist to accept John Martin Fischer’s plausible insistence that the question whether we are morally responsible agents ought not to depend on whether the laws of physics turn out to be deterministic or merely probabilistic. The incompatibilist should do so by rejecting the fundamentalism which entails that the question whether determinism is true is a question merely about the nature of the basic physical laws. It is argued that this is a (...)
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  14.  50
    Helen Steward (2000). Do Actions Occur Inside the Body? Mind and Society 1 (2):107-125.
    The paper offers a critical examination of Jennifer Hornsby's view that actions are internal to the body. It focuses on three of Hornsby's central claims: (P) many actions are bodily movements (in a special sense of the word “movement”) (Q) all actions are tryings; and (R) all actions occur inside the body. It is argued, contra Hornsby, that we may accept (P) and (Q) without accepting also the implausible (R). Two arguments are first offered in favour of the thesis (Contrary-R): (...)
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  15.  83
    Helen Steward (2006). 'Could Have Done Otherwise', Action Sentences and Anaphora. Analysis 66 (290):95–101.
  16.  23
    Helen Steward (2014). Replies to Randolph Clarke, John Bishop, and Helen Beebee. Res Philosophica 91 (3):547-557.
    Contains the author's responses to comments by the three named authors on her book, 'A Metaphysics for Freedom'.
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  17.  19
    Helen Steward (2014). Précis of "A Metaphysics for Freedom". Res Philosophica 91 (3):513-518.
  18.  44
    Helen Steward (2013). Responses. Inquiry 56 (6):681-706.
    As the author of A Metaphysics for Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), I respond to each of the preceding eight papers in this Special Issue.
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  19.  80
    Helen Steward (2011). Agency, Properties and Causation. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):390-401.
    The paper argues against the very commonly held view that whenever a substance may be said to be the cause of something, a fuller and metaphysically more accurate understanding of the situation can always be obtained by looking to the properties in virtue of which that substance was able to bring about the effect in question. Paul Humphreys’ argument that when a substance is said to have produced an effect, it always turns out to be an aspect or property of (...)
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  20.  6
    Helen Steward (2011). Of Causation. In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press 139.
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  21.  78
    Helen Steward (1990). Identity Statements and the Necessary a Posteriori. Journal of Philosophy 87 (8):385-398.
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  22. Helen Steward (2011). Moral Responsibility and the Concept of Agency. In Richard Swinburne (ed.), Free Will and Modern Science. OUP/British Academy
  23.  85
    Helen Steward (2002). Review: The Emergent Self. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (441):114-119.
  24.  86
    Helen Steward (2006). Determinism and Inevitability. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):535-563.
    The paper discusses one of the central arguments in Dennett’s Freedom Evolves, an argument designed to show that a deterministic universe would not necessarily be a universe of which it could truly be said that everything that occurs in it is inevitable. It suggests that on its most natural interpretation, the argument is vulnerable to a serious objection. A second interpretation is then developed, but it is argued that without placing more weight on etymological considerations than they can really bear, (...)
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  25. Helen Steward (2008). Moral Responsibility and the Irrelevance of Physics: Fischer’s Semi-Compatibilism Vs. Anti-Fundamentalism. Journal of Ethics 12 (2):129-145.
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  26.  46
    Helen Steward (2010). Holton, Richard . Willing, Wanting, Waiting . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. 203. $49.95 (Cloth). Ethics 120 (3):604-608.
  27.  55
    Helen Steward (1997). On the Notion of Cause 'Philosophically Speaking'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (2):125–140.
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  28.  13
    Helen Steward (2002). Are They Playing Our Tune? Think 1 (2):51.
    I think of myself as in large part free to do what I want. For example, I can now freely choose to raise my arm, or not to, as the fancy takes me. But perhaps this impression of freedom and control is misleading. In this article Helen Steward explains how the findings of science seems to suggest that we ultimately have no control at all over how our lives go.
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  29.  14
    Helen Steward (1992). Inner and Outer: Essays on A Philosophical Myth. Philosophical Books 33 (4):234-235.
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  30.  48
    Helen Steward (1996). Papineau's Physicalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):667-672.
    In his introduction to Philosophical Naturalism, Papineau mentions that he had intended, at one time, to call the book Philosophical Physicalism. In the end, he writes, he rejected that title, partly for fear that the term "physicalism" might have suggested commitment to a metaphysical position tied closely to the ontology and categories dictated by current physics, a commitment he is anxious not to incur; and partly because the concerns of the book as a whole are wider than would have been (...)
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  31.  45
    Helen Steward (2008). Fresh Starts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):197-217.
    The paper argues that a proper response to the absurdities which seem to be entailed by the doctrine of determinism requires that we find a way to make sense of the idea that there might be such things as 'fresh starts' in nature—times and places where the world in a sense begins itself anew by rolling forwards in ways that are not wholly attributable (given the laws) to the way it was previously. It considers three powerful orthodoxies which seem to (...)
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  32.  11
    Helen Steward (2002). The Emergent Self. Mind 111 (441):114-119.
  33. Helen Steward (2011). Perception and the Ontology of Causation. In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press
     
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  34.  5
    Helen Steward (2009). Free Will. In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell
  35.  4
    John Hyman & Helen Steward (2004). Preface. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55.
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  36. John Hyman & Helen Steward (eds.) (2010). Agency and Action. Cambridge University Press.
    One of the most exciting developments in philosophy in the last fifty years is the resurgence in the philosophy of action. The concept of action now occupies a central place in ethics, metaphysics and jurisprudence. This collection of original essays, by some of the most astute and influential philosophers working in this area, covers the entire range of the philosophy of action. Topics covered include the nature of actions themselves; how the concepts of act, agent, cause and event are related (...)
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  37. John Hyman & Helen Steward (eds.) (2012). Agency and Action. Cambridge University Press.
    One of the most exciting developments in philosophy in the last fifty years is the resurgence in the philosophy of action. The concept of action now occupies a central place in ethics, metaphysics and jurisprudence. This collection of original essays, by some of the most astute and influential philosophers working in this area, covers the entire range of the philosophy of action. Topics covered include the nature of actions themselves; how the concepts of act, agent, cause and event are related (...)
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  38. Helen Steward (ed.) (2003). Action and Agency. Cambridge University Press.
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  39. Helen Steward (2014). A Metaphysics for Freedom. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Helen Steward argues that determinism is incompatible with agency itself--not only the special human variety of agency, but also powers which can be accorded to animal agents. She offers a distinctive, non-dualistic version of libertarianism, rooted in a conception of what biological forms of organisation might make possible in the way of freedom.
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  40. Helen Steward (2006). Understanding ‘Because’. ProtoSociology 23.
    The article considers the bearing of so-called "slingshot" arguments on the connective "because". It discusses Davidson's famous (1967) slingshot, deployed in support of the thesis that causation cannot be a relation between facts, and also a neater version developed by Stephen Neale in his (1995). The paper challenges the assumption (Anscombe (1969), Lycan (1974), Mellor (1995), Neale (1995)), that Davidson's argument, which actually concerns the connective "The fact that ... caused it to be the case that ..." (FC) might equally (...)
     
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