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  1.  9
    Henrik Bohlin (2016). Effects on the Mind as Objects of Reasoning: A Perspectivist Reading of the Reason–Passion Relation in Hume's Ethics. Hume Studies 40 (1):29-51.
    Hume maintains that vice and virtue are ultimately “distinguished by our sentiments, not by reason”,1 but he is unclear about the exact relation between reason and sentiment. On the one hand, he says that moral approbation and disapprobation “cannot be the work of the judgment, but of the heart” 2: the wrongness of a crime, for example, is not a “particular fact or relation, which can be the object of the understanding”, but “lies in yourself, not in the object”. On (...)
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  2.  52
    Henrik Bohlin (2009). Sympathy, Understanding, and Hermeneutics in Hume's Treatise. Hume Studies 35 (1-2):135-170.
    With his theory of sympathy in the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume has been interpreted as anticipating later hermeneutic theories of understanding. It is argued in the present article that Hume has good reasons to consider a hermeneutic theory of empathetic understanding, that such a theory avoids a serious difficulty in Hume’s “official,” positivist theory of sympathy, that it is compatible with the complex and subtle form of positivism, or naturalism, developed in Book 1 of the Treatise, and that his (...)
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  3.  14
    Henrik Bohlin (2013). Universal Moral Standards and the Problem of Cultural Relativism in Hume's ‘A Dialogue’. Philosophy 88 (4):593-606.
    An interpretation and critical re-construction is offered of David Hume's argument on cultural relativism in the essay ‘A Dialogue’ . For any issue of moral disagreement, Hume contends, either one side can be shown right and the other wrong, or imprecision in moral principles leaves room for more than one reasonable view, or the disagreement concerns a morally indifferent aesthetic matter, or it is caused by ‘artificial’ moral sentiments. In each case, relativism is the wrong view. Following an analysis of (...)
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  4.  6
    Henrik Bohlin (2008). David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature, Edited by David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton (Two Volumes). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007 (450 & 650 Pp.). [REVIEW] SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):158-160.
  5.  2
    Henrik Bohlin (2008). David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature, Edited by David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007. SATS 9 (1).
  6.  9
    Henrik Bohlin (2009). Perspective-Dependence and Critical Thinking. Argumentation 23 (2):189-203.
    Recent theories of critical thinking have stressed the importance of taking into consideration in critical enquiry the perspectives, or presuppositions, of both the speaker whose statements are under scrutiny and the critic himself. The purpose of the paper is to explore this idea from an epistemological (rather than a pedagogical or psychological) point of view. The problem is first placed within the general context of critical thinking theory. Three types of perspective-dependence are then described, and the consequences of each for (...)
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  7.  3
    Henrik Bohlin (2008). David Hume. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):158-160.
  8.  1
    Henrik Bohlin (2009). Intuitvely Assessed Reasonableness as a Criterion of Validity in Empathetic Understanding. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):107-131.
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  9. Henrik Bohlin (2009). Intuitvely Assessed Reasonableness as a Criterion of Validity in Empathetic Understanding. SATS 10 (1).
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