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Profile: Henrik Hallsten (Stockholm University)
  1.  4
    Henrik Hållsten (2007). What to Ask of an Explanation-Theory. In Johannes Persson & Petri Ylikoski (eds.), Rethinking Explanation. Springer 13--26.
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    Henrik Hallsten (2005). The Explanatory Virtues of Probabilistic Causal Laws. In Jan Faye, Paul Needham, Uwe Scheffler & Max Urchs (eds.), Nature's Principles. Springer 137--150.
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    Henrik Hållsten (1999). Deductive Chauvinism. Synthese 120 (1):49-59.
    Any theory of explanation must account for the explanatory successes of statistical scientific theories. This should not be done by endorsing determinism. These considerations have been taken as sufficient ground for rejecting the demand on explanations to be deductive. The arguments for doing so, in Coffa (1974) and Salmon (1977, 1984, 1988), are, however, not persuasive. Deductivism is a viable position. Considering that doubts can be raised against the explanatory validity of probabilistic causal relations and the intuitive plausibility of deductivism, (...)
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  4. Henrik Hållsten (2001). Explanation and Deduction a Defence of Deductive Chauvinism.