Platonic paideia is a mainstream concept in traditional philosophy and humanistic circles generally. It is closely connected with social progress brought about by the dynamics of enlightenment and self-fulfillment, symbolized by the allegory of the cave. The main contention of this paper is that the philosophical grammar of this simile is more precarious than is often recognized. Plato’s apparently intuitive narrative blends together two features that do not easily mix, namely explicit, categorical dualisms, and temporal processes of development. The second (...) feature is superimposed upon the first, more elementary, one, suggesting that a philosopher-teacher can be in charge of mankind’s ascent towards illustrious goals. This line of thought conceals a basic rhetorical move built into Plato’s paideia, namely its initial focus on enchained humans in need of liberation. It is from this bleak view of ordinary, ‘commonsense’ life that the narrative’s drive is derived. How might... (shrink)

Current Wittgenstein scholarship is marked by a striking discrepancy. The Bergen electronic edition, which has been published starting in 1998, is now completed and has dramatically changed the field of Wittgenstein philology. Wittgenstein's entire writings are available in easily accessible facsimiles as well as in carefully prepared diplomatic and normalized transcriptions. This is nothing less than a quantum leap for anyone involved in going beyond the surface of the volumes published from the "Nachlass" by the Trustees, some of which have (...) been shown to require philological revision. The search facilities included in the Bergen edition are unique in providing almost instant access to all the data parsed by arbitrary queries. The very scope of the enterprise, offering a comprehensive, multi-layered digital rendition of the Wittgenstein corpus goes far beyond anything we can expect from traditional editions, including Michael Nedo's "WienerAusgabe", in our lifetime. And yet -- this is the discrepancy alluded to -- a significant number of recent books on Wittgenstein does not even mention the Bergen edition. "The New Wittgenstein", a collection of essays published in 2000 contains a bibliography faithfully reproducing all "primary sources", but lacking any reference to the digitized Nachlass. "Wittgenstein in America", a prestigious collection from 2001 -- ironically published by Oxford University Press -- does not do better and the same situation holds for the German language literature. To pick just two examples: neither Eike von Savigny's reader on the "Philosophische Untersuchungen", nor Wilhelm Vossenkuhl's corresponding volume on the "Tractatus" contain any pointer to the Bergen project. Something strange is, clearly, going on here. (shrink)

wo independent publishing projects have thoroughly changed the state of Wittgenstein scholarship in recent years. Michael Nedo's 'Wiener Ausgabe'1 offers a traditional critical edition of Wittgenstein's philosophical writings ranging from 1929 up to and including the 'Big Typescript' (1933). Considering the eclectic and - at times - arbitrary editorial policy underlying previous publications from the Nachlass2 Nedo's project offers unprecedented philosophical rigor as well as textual criticism in volumes designed for comfortable reading. A second, more ambitious, attempt at a critical (...) edition is the Bergen electronic edition.3 It is planned to include 4 CD-ROMs, covering the entire range of the philosopher's unpublished writing. Two disks are currently available, comprising all of Wittgenstein's manuscripts from 1929-1939, as well as type-scripts, beginning with 'Notes on Logic' (1913) and leading up to Typescript 226, composed in 1939. Wittgenstein's writings from the Thirties are, therefore, available in independent, reliable printed and electronic editions respectively. Readers can, for the first time, observe the philosopher at work, transferring paragraphs from pocket notebooks to handwritten 'volumes'; picking acceptable remarks to be included in type-scripts that are, at a later stage, cut up into slips of paper which are again annotated, rearranged and put together in further volumes and type-scripts. But this is only half the excitement. The 'Wiener Ausgabe' and the 'Bergen Edition' stake their success on different media, inevitably provoking a comparison between the well known features of printed scholarly editions and the not so familiar realm of digitized texts. (shrink)

Review of N. Immler: Das Familiengedächtnis der Wittgensteins (2011).

Review of N. Immler: Das Familiengedächtnis der Wittgensteins.

Truth is an embattled concept; many different positions have been put forward. One widely influential contribution has been Donald Davidson's theory. Although it has been derived from Alred Tarski's formal account of truth it has been claimed to offer a pragmatical solution to the problem by e.g. Richard Rorty. This dialogue explores the attraction Davidson's theory offers to philosophers of realist as well as relativist persuasion. There seems to be a core position useful to any of those philosophical schools: Truth (...) occurs at the interface of two languages or two usages of a language. Some consequences of such a point of view are discursively explored. (shrink)

Doing philosophy via e-mail is a new sort of enterprise, one that is still struggling with a number of uncertainties. Neither the way the participants are assembled, nor the procedural schedule of the new experiments is easily determined by established means. Following academic custom a reasonably well-defined group of people will take part in discussions over a certain limited stretch of time. That this can be done is shown by several contributions to this volume. Still, this particular environment is apt (...) to subvert several rules that are taken for granted in conventional philosophical discourse. (shrink)

Electronic mail and information exchange on the World Wide Web have in recent years developed into indispensible features of scholarly activity. The speed and convenience of computer-mediated communication across the planet are rapidly changing the established patterns of academic transactions. While thousands of philosophers have begun to take advantage of e-mail, web-servers or digital text repositories, systematic exploration of the newly available technology has been lagging behind. There is, it has to be admitted, a colourful offspring of postmodern writing celebrating (...) this alleged telematic revolution. I give just one example. (shrink)

The notion of ‘electronic texts’ has gained universal currency. What, exactly, does this phrase refer to? Most authors answer by describing a set of surface characteristics resulting from the application of computer technology to traditional texts. Such depictions, I want to argue, can be seriously misleading. They presuppose a conventional understanding of ‘text’ in order to make sense of the phenomenon of digitised inscriptions. The simple choice of the phrase ‘electronic text’ suppresses the radical challenge raised by the new medium. (...) Its impact is supposedly captured by modification of an existing concept, so it is hardly surprising that most accounts end up with a typical ambivalence. Electronic texts, we are told, are quite different from—but, at the same time, comparable to—their traditional precursors. Some things that could not be done in the entire history of literacy have become possible nowadays. Yet, it is this very history that provides the background for the understanding of digital processes. Describing something previously unknown by means of well-known categories is bound to lead to these kinds of mildly schizophrenic pronouncements. This chapter discusses their initial plausibility and probes their underlying logic. (shrink)

The notion of ‘electronic texts’ has gained universal currency. What, exactly, does this phrase refer to? Most authors answer by describing a set of surface characteristics resulting from the application of computer technology to traditional texts. Such depictions, I want to argue, can be seriously misleading. They presuppose a conventional understanding of ‘text’ in order to make sense of the phenomenon of digitised inscriptions. The simple choice of the phrase ‘electronic text’ suppresses the radical challenge raised by the new medium. (...) Its impact is supposedly captured by modification of an existing concept, so it is hardly surprising that most accounts end up with a typical ambivalence. Electronic texts, we are told, are quite different from—but, at the same time, comparable to—their traditional precursors. Some things that could not be done in the entire history of literacy have become possible nowadays. Yet, it is this very history that provides the background for the understanding of digital processes. Describing something previously unknown by means of well-known categories is bound to lead to these kinds of mildly schizophrenic pronouncements. This chapter discusses their initial plausibility and probes their underlying logic. (shrink)

Consider statements like ``Machines will never be able to think'' or ``You cannot turn a cat into a dog''. Many people will find such propositions evident, but we have learned to be cautious. 100 years from now things might look very different; it seems unduly dogmatic to insist on todays opinions as unrevisable points of reference, disallowing future breakthroughs in computer science or biology. The scientific outlook presupposes and enhances a high degree of curiosity and it seems a good idea (...) to generally keep one's meanings flexible so as to master break-downs of everyday understanding induced by unforseen circumstances, science or technology. Such intuitions are at the heart of Quine's philosophy. According to him we find ourselves enmeshed within a web of belief that joins together past and present attitudes, cognitive procedures and evidential tests. The strands show various degrees of coherence and interconnectedness and there are no general rules on how to proceed in case something unexpected happens. Sometimes it is ignored, sometimes it is explained away and sometimes it induces more or less extensive changes in our predictive and behavioural patterns. This seems to be the lesson drawn from the Vienna Circle's battle against metaphysics. Philosophers like Putnam, Kripke and Davidson have, it is true, come up with accounts of meaning, necessity and reality that seriously challenge Quine's indeterminacy of translation and ontological relativity, re-introducing elements of a priori presuppositions and (quasi-)transcendental arguments into philosophical discourse. But - compared to Quine's unrelenting insistence on naturalistic first-level talk - those attempts have a free-floating, speculative touch. Quine refuses to engage in elaborate philosophical constructions designed to block the permanent drift of meaning. His is a truly radical position, admirably suggestive and provocative, to be challenged on its own ground. The untenability of a priori truth is suggested by profound experiences that cannot easily be refuted by arguments purporting to show how some more or less exotic sentences could, after all, be held immune from change.1 If the untenability thesis is to be shaken a more down to earth strategy seems to be called for. It would have to be shown that Quine's radical move entails consequences that are highly unattractive even according to its own standards. (shrink)

Section: Philosophy of the Internet – Philosophie des Internets Science of Recording MAURIZIO FERRARIS, TURIN 109 Weltkommunikation und World Brain. ..

The first section of this paper examines the discursive procedure employed by Socrates to subvert common preconceptions of important socio-behavioral notions. The point of reference will be the concept of courage which is the main concern in Plato’s Laches. The key characteristics of paideia can be exhibited by reconstructing the procedure common sense is subjected to in this example. The second section discusses the tremendous influence this pattern of inquiry has had on traditional philosophy. Particular attention is drawn to the (...) way it confers superiority to philosophers in “pedagogical” discourse and to the fact that this privileged stance can by no means be taken for granted under present circumstances. (shrink)

There are three sentimental centres of 20th-century philosophical geography: Todtnauberg, Frankfurt and Vienna. Their exceptional status results not only from having given rise to decisive philosophical movements but also from the weight of stories about victimization and exile lacking with regard to Paris, Berkeley and Cambridge. Each of these centres is compromised in its own way: the Schwarzwald cottage from which Heidegger emerged to take over the Rektorat of Freiburg University and to which he returned after this disastrous intermezzo, the (...) "Institut für Sozialforschung" which on its part returned to claim moral authority at a location that increasingly turned into the most important bridgehead of transatlantic logistics, finally the former imperial city where traces of the origins of analytic philosophy were only conserved beneath the enormous sedimentation of a massive counter-reformation. Provincialism, NATO and tourism turned out to be perfectly compatible with remembrance of an heroic epoch at these sites while exiting philosophical work was being done at different locations. How much weight is carried by impressions like these? Not too much as long as well defined philosophical schools promote progress as defined within their own realm. Some doctrin, established all over the world does not depend on the place at which it is further refined. It is, however, in doubt whether philosophy counts among the disciplines so easily internationalized; Heidegger and Adorno being among those who would insist on the inseparability of a theory's fate and its place of origin. Be this as it may, my subject being the precarious relationship between the city and the Circle of Vienna I have to start from the assumption of obvious incomparability between the roots and the extension of the branches of the movement. Only a decade ago this would have presented itself as a fairly easy task. Historians were coming to this city to save the remnants of the beginnings of the movement whereas Anglo-American philosophers were busy refining the orthodoxy and hardly interested in historical matters. Much has changed since. Firstly the analytic enterprise is in certain ways approaching what can be called closure from within.gif Secondly Austrian universities have (with sometimes considerable delay) taken an interest in what is felt to be a lost opportunity.gif Both of these developments coincided with a more general renaissance of fin de siecle and modernist Vienna. Since the imminent conclusion of any movement reactualizes the circumstances of its beginning, renewed attention was drawn to what was happening within and to the Vienna Circle. (shrink)