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  1. Herman E. Stark (2005). Philosophy as Wonder. Dialogue and Universalism 15 (1-2):133-140.
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  2. Herman E. Stark (2004). Reasons Without Principles. Inquiry 47 (2):143 – 167.
    What is required for one thing to be a reason for another? Must the reason, more precisely, be or involve a principle? In this essay I target the idea that justification via reasons of one's beliefs (e.g., epistemic or moral) requires that the 'justifying reasons' be or involve (substantive and significant) principles. I identify and explore some potential sources of a principles requirement, and conclude that none of them (i.e., the normative function of reasons, the abstract structure of reasons, the (...)
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  3. Herman E. Stark (2003). Hempel and Oppenbeim Revisited, Again. Epistemologia 26 (2):237-266.
     
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  4. Herman E. Stark (2000). Fallacies and Logical Errors. Inquiry 20 (1):23-32.
    I explore a distinction that is philosophically significant but rarely a cynosure. The distinction is betvveen fallacies and logical errors, and I approach it by advancing overlooked albeit deleterious logical errors that are not fallacies but that fall squarely within the purview of Critical Thinking if not also Informal Logic. One key claim to emerge is that these logical errors -- just as basic and thought-impeding as the fallacies -- demand that we take a hard look at what is and (...)
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  5. Herman E. Stark (2000). Logic in a Pincers. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 7 (2/3):61-69.
    The essay challenges the de facto dichotomy between the discipline of logic and the activity of social criticism, i.e., it provides an illustrated reminder to philosophers that the gulf between these two areas of philosophy is not quite as wide as our curriculum andspecialization designations tend to suggest. Social criticism plays some necessary roles in certain branches of logic, and the second-order accounting of the contents of these branches leads back to social criticism. These points suggest an adjusted conception of (...)
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  6. Herman E. Stark (2000). The Lord Scroop Fallacy. Informal Logic 20 (3).
    In this paper I identify a fallacy. The fallacy is worth noting for practical and theoretical reasons. First, the rampant occurrences ofthis fallacy-especially at moments calling for careful thought-indicate that it is more pernicious to clear thinking than many of those found in standard logic texts. Second, the fallacy stands apart from most others in that it contains multiple kinds oflogical error (i.e., fallacious and non-fallacious logical errors) that are themselves committed in abnormal ways, and thus it presents a two-tiered (...)
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  7. Herman E. Stark (1999). What the Dynamical Cognitive Scientist Said to the Epistemologist. Acta Analytica 22 (22):241-260.
     
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  8. Herman E. Stark (1994). Connectionism and the Form of Rational Norms. Acta Analytica 12 (12):39-53.
     
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