In Silencing the Demon’s Advocate, Rubin presents an interpretation of Descartes’ Meditations that avoids many of the standard objections to Descartes’ ...
The specialised vocabularies of lawyers, ethicists, and political scientists obscure the roots of many real disagreements. In this book, the distinguished American international lawyer Alfred Rubin provides a penetrating account of where these roots lie, and argues powerfully that disagreements which have existed for 3,000 years are unlikely to be resolved soon. Current attempts to make 'war crimes' or 'terrorism' criminal under international law seem doomed to fail for the same reasons that attempts failed in the early nineteenth century (...) to make piracy, war crimes, and the international traffic in slaves criminal under the law of nations. And for the same reasons, Professor Rubin argues, it is unlikely that an international criminal court can be instituted today to enforce ethicists' versions of 'international law'. (shrink)
We prove that the logics of Magidor-Malitz and their generalization by Rubin are distinct even for PC classes. Let $M \models Q^nx_1 \cdots x_n \varphi(x_1 \cdots x_n)$ mean that there is an uncountable subset A of |M| such that for every $a_1, \ldots, a_n \in A, M \models \varphi\lbrack a_1, \ldots, a_n\rbrack$ . Theorem 1.1 (Shelah) $(\diamond_{\aleph_1})$ . For every n ∈ ω the class $K_{n + 1} = \{\langle A, R\rangle \mid \langle A, R\rangle \models \neg Q^{n + (...) 1} x_1 \cdots x_{n + 1} R(x_1, \ldots, x_{n + 1})\}$ is not an ℵ 0 -PC-class in the logic L n , obtained by closing first order logic under Q 1 , ..., Q n . I.e. for no countable L n -theory T, is K n + 1 the class of reducts of the models of T. Theorem 1.2 (Rubin) $(\diamond_{\aleph_1}).^3$ . Let $M \models Q^E x y\varphi(x, y)$ mean that there is $A \subseteq |M|$ such that $E_{A, \varphi} = \{\langle a, b \rangle \mid a, b \in A$ and $M \models \varphi\lbrack a, b\rbrack\}$ is an equivalence relation on A with uncountably many equivalence classes, and such that each equivalence class is uncountable. Let $K^E = \{\langle A, R\rangle\mid \langle A, R\rangle\models \neg Q^Exy R(x, y)\}$ . Then K E is not an ℵ 0 -PC-class in the logic gotten by closing first order logic under the set of quantifiers {Q n ∣ n ∈ ω} which were defined in Theorem 1.1. (shrink)
Richard Henson attempts to take the sting out of this view of Kant on moral worth by arguing (i) that attending to the phenomenon of the overdetermination of actions leads one to see that Kant might have had two distinct views of moral worth, only one of which requires the absence of cooperating inclinations, and (ii) that when Kant insists that there is moral worth only when an action is done from the motive of duty alone, he need not also (...) hold that such a state of affairs is morally better, all things considered, than one where supporting inclination is present. Henson's proposals seem to me both serious and plausible. I do not think that either of his models, in the end, can take on the role Kant assigns to moral worth in the argument of the Groundwork. But seeing the ways Henson's account diverges from Kant's makes clearer what Kant intended in his discussion of those actions he credits with moral worth. [...] An action has moral worth if it is required by duty and has as its primary motive the motive of duty. The motive of duty need not reflect the only interest the agent has in the action (or its effect); it must, however, be the interest that determines the agent's acting as he did. (shrink)
A number of philosophers defend naturalistic moral realism by appeal to an externalist semantics for moral predicates. The application of semantic externalism to moral predicates has been attacked by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons in a series of papers that make use of their “Moral Twin Earth” thought experiment. In response, several defenders of naturalistic moral realism have claimed that the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment is misleading and yields distorted and inaccurate semantic intuitions. If they are right, the intuitions (...) generated by Moral Twin Earth cannot be appealed to in arguments against externalist moral semantics. The most developed case against the Moral Twin Earth argument that follows this strategy is found in a paper by Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis and Angus Dawson. Here I argue that their attack on the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment fails. Laurence, Margolis and Dawson have not shown that we have reason to distrust the semantic intuitions it generates. (shrink)
If, as Kant says, "the will is practical reason", we should think of willing as a mode of reasoning, and its activity represented in movement from evaluative premises to intention by way of a validity-securing principle of inference. Such a view of willing takes motive and rational choice out of empirical psychology, thereby eliminating grounds for many familiar objections to Kant's account of morally good action. The categorical imperative provides the fundamental principle of valid practical inference; however, for good willing, (...) we also require correct premises. These come from specifications of the two obligatory ends - our own perfection and the happiness of others. Interpreting good willing as good reasoning not only fits well with Kant's metaphysics of free action, it also offers a sound method for reasoning to and about individual as well as role-dependent moral obligations. (shrink)
Abstract: We challenge a line of thinking at the fore of recent work on epistemic value: the line (suggested by Kvanvig [2003] and others) that if the value of knowledge is “swamped” by the value of mere true belief, then we have good reason to doubt its theoretical importance in epistemology. We offer a value-driven argument for the theoretical importance of knowledge—one that stands even if the value of knowledge is “swamped” by the value of true belief. Specifically, we contend (...) that even if knowledge itself has no special epistemic value, its relationship to other items of value—cognitive abilities—gives ample reason to locate the concept at the very core of epistemology. (shrink)
Making room for character -- Pluralism and the community of moral judgment -- A cosmopolitan kingdom of ends --Responsibility and moral competence --Can virtue be taught?: the problem of new moral facts -- Training to autonomy: Kant and the question of moral education -- Bootstrapping -- Rethinking Kant's hedonism -- The scope of moral requirement -- The will and its objects -- Obligatory ends -- Moral improvisation -- Contingency in obligation.
This paper analyzes Kierkegaard's Religiousness A sphere of existence, presented in his edifying works, and Heidegger's concept of authenticity, proposed in Being and Time, as responses to modern nihilism. While Kierkegaard argues that Religiousness A is an unsuccessful response to modern nihilism, Heidegger claims that authenticity, a secularized version of Religiousness A, is a successful response. We argue that Heidegger's secularization of Religiousness A is incomplete and unsuccessful, that Heidegger's later work offers a reconsideration of the problem of modern nihilism, (...) and that later Heidegger suggests a way out of nihilism which is compatible with Kierkegaard's Religiousness B sphere of existence. (shrink)
The essays in this volume offer an approach to the history of moral and political philosophy that takes its inspiration from John Rawls. All the contributors are philosophers who have studied with Rawls and they offer this collection in his honor. The distinctive feature of this approach is to address substantive normative questions in moral and political philosophy through an analysis of the texts and theories of major figures in the history of the subject: Aristotle, Hobbes, Hume, Rousseau, Kant, and (...) Marx. By reconstructing the core of these theories in a way that is informed by contemporary theoretical concerns, the contributors show how the history of the subject is a resource for understanding present and perennial problems in moral and political philosophy. This outstanding collection will be of particular interest to historians of moral and political philosophy, historians of ideas, and political scientists. (shrink)
In recent years, firms have greatly increased the amount of resources allocated to activities classified as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). While an increase in CSR expenditure may be consistent with firm value maximization if it is a response to changes in stakeholders’ preferences, we argue that a firm’s insiders (managers and large blockholders) may seek to over- invest in CSR for their private benefit to the extent that doing so improves their reputations as good global citizens and has a “warm-glow” (...) effect. We test this hypothesis by investigating the relation between firms’ CSR ratings and their ownership and capital structures. Employing a unique data set that categorizes the largest 3000 U.S. corporations as either socially responsible (SR) or socially irresponsible (SI), we find that on average, insiders’ ownership and leverage are negatively related to the firm’s social rating, while institutional ownership is uncorrelated with it. Assuming that higher CSR ratings is associated with higher CSR expenditure level, these results support our hypothesis that insiders induce firms to over-invest in CSR when they bear little of the cost of doing so. (shrink)
ABSTRACT: We argue that the so-called ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ Value Problems for knowledge are more easily solved than is widely appreciated. Pritchard, for instance, has suggested that only virtue-theoretic accounts have any hopes of adequately addressing these problems. By contrast, we argue that accounts of knowledge that are sensitive to the Gettier problem are able to overcome these challenges. To first approximation, the Primary Value Problem is a problem of understanding how the property of being knowledge confers more epistemic value (...) on a belief than the property of being true. The Secondary Value is a problem of understanding how, for instance, property of being knowledge confers more epistemic value on a belief than the property of being jointly true and justified. We argue that attending to the fact that beliefs are ongoing states reveals that there is no difficulty in appreciating how knowledge might ordinarily have more epistemic value than mere true belief or mere justified true belief. We also explore in what ways ordinary cases of knowledge might be of distinctive epistemic value. In the end, our proposal resembles the original Platonic suggestion in the Meno that knowledge is valuable because knowledge is somehow tied to the good of truth. (shrink)
Broadly speaking, transhumanism is a movement seeking to advance the cause of post-humanity. It advocates using science and technology for a reconstruction of the human condition sufficiently radical to call into question the appropriateness of calling it “human” anymore. While there is not universal agreement among transhumanists as to the best path to this goal, the general outline is clear enough. Advances in genetic engineering, artificial intelligence, robotics and nanotechnology will make possible the achievement of the Baconian vision of “the (...) relief of man’s estate,” as they allow us to conquer disease, eliminate unhappiness, end scarcity and postpone, perhaps indefinitely, death itself. But fulfilling such long-standing dreams is only the beginning of what our new powers will make possible. Left to itself, the present trajectory of technological development necessarily aims at a future incomprehensible to beings such as we are – at no distant date an evolutionary leap in the way intelligence is embodied, and what it can accomplish. Transhumanism seeks to make sure no atavistic scruple obstructs this momentum, and to maximize its benefits and minimize its admitted risks. While there is no lack of illuminating print works advocating transhumanism, that its public face should be on the World Wide Web is as much a matter of course as once would have been the use by similar movements of the printed broadside or the public lecture. On the websites of the World Transhumanist Association (www. transhumanism.org) and the Extropy Institute (www.extropy. org) – premier among transhumanism’s many organizations – one finds authoritative statements explaining and justifying the transhumanist project. If transhumanism were primarily an academic school or a professional association, it would not be entirely fair to turn to these admittedly popular presentations for a critical look at the transhumanist vision. But as these are the documents by which transhumanism presents itself to the public as a movement, and through which it hopes to gain adherents, it is legitimate to make.... (shrink)
Abstract In discussing the meaning of life in the Bhagavad Git? two obvious questions arise: first, what is the meaning of ?the meaning of life'?, and second, how does that meaning apply to the Bhagavad Git?? In Part I of this brief paper I will attempt to answer the first question by focusing on one of the common meanings of that phrase; in Part II, I will apply that very common meaning to the Bhagavad Git?; and in the third and (...) final part, I will point to a puzzle, the paradox of the jivanmukta, that would seem to follow from the discussion in the first two parts of this paper. My own feeling is that the concept of ?the meaning of life? is a Western invention [1]. This being so, perhaps it would be wise to probe for that concept and its meaning among Western authors. We turn first, then, to one ancient writer, Aristotle of Stagira, and conclude Part I with a modern writer also concerned with the meaning of life, Albert Camus. (shrink)
This dissertation is a critique of synthetic ethical naturalism (SEN). SEN is a view in metaethics that comprises three key theses: first, there are moral properties and facts that are independent of the beliefs and attitudes of moral appraisers (moral realism); second, moral properties and facts are identical to (or constituted only by) natural properties and facts (ethical naturalism); and third, sentences used to assert identity or constitution relations between moral and natural properties are expressions of synthetic, a posteriori necessities. (...) The last of these theses, which distinguishes SEN from other forms of ethical naturalism, is supported by a fourth: the semantic contents of the central moral predicates such as 'morally right' and 'morally good' are fixed in part by features external to the minds of speakers (moral semantic externalism). Chapter 1 introduces SEN and discusses the most common motivations for accepting it. The next three chapters discuss the influential "Moral Twin Earth" argument against moral semantic externalism. In Chapter 2, I defend this argument from the charge that the thought experiment upon which it depends is defective. In Chapters 3 and 4, I consider two attempts to amend SEN so as to render it immune to the Moral Twin Earth argument. I show that each of these proposed amendments amounts to an abandonment of SEN. Chapter Five explores Richard Boyd's proposal that moral goodness is a "homeostatic property cluster." If true, Boyd's hypothesis could be used to support several metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic claims made on behalf of SEN. I advance three arguments against this account of moral goodness. In the sixth chapter, I argue that moral facts are not needed in the best a posteriori explanations of our moral beliefs and moral sensibility. Because of this, those who accept a metaphysical naturalism ought to deny the existence of such facts or else accept skepticism about moral knowledge. In Chapter 7, I consider a counterargument on behalf of SEN to the effect that moral facts are needed in order to explain the predictive success of our best moral theories. I show that this argument fails. (shrink)
The two statements quoted above bring out some central features of modern Latin America. A close study of recent trends including the specific totalitarian ideology of the generals, the system of ideological manipulation and terror, the diaspora, and the defensive response of the churches (and their harassment by the military juntas) reveals startling similarities with patterns of thought and behavior under European fascism, especially under Nazism. Fascist ideology has flowed into Latin American directly and indirectly. Large numbers of Nazi refugees (...) came to Latin America during and after World War II, and important ingredients of fascist ideology have been indirectly routed into that area through the U.S. military and intelligence establishment. Whatever the source, however, it has met a need of the local and foreign elites that dominate the area, and has been modified to meet their special requirements. (shrink)
This study explores corporate social responsibility (CSR) by conducting a cross-cultural analysis of communication of CSR activities in a total of 16 U.S. and European corporations. Drawing on previous research contrasting two major approaches to CSR initiatives, it was proposed that U.S. companies would tend to communicate about and justify CSR using economic or bottom-line terms and arguments whereas European companies would rely more heavily on language or theories of citizenship, corporate accountability, or moral commitment. Results supported this expectation of (...) difference, with some modification. Specifically, results indicated that EU companies do not value sustainability to the exclusion of financial elements, but instead project sustainability commitments in addition to financial commitments. Further, U.S.-based companies focused more heavily on financial justifications whereas EU-based companies incorporated both financial and sustainability elements in justifying their CSR activities. In addition, wide variance was found in both the prevalence and use of specific CSR-related terminology. Cross-cultural distinctions in this use create implications with regard to measurability and evidence of both strategic and bottom-line impact. Directions for further research are discussed. (shrink)
Because the propaganda model challenges basic premises and suggests that the media serve antidemocratic ends, it is commonly excluded from mainstream debates on media bias. Such debates typically include conservatives, who criticize the media for excessive liberalism and an adversarial stance toward government and business, and centrists and liberals, who deny the charge of adversarialism and contend that the media behave fairly and responsibly. The exclusion of the propaganda model perspective is noteworthy, for one reason, because that perspective is consistent (...) with long standing and widely held elite views that 'the masses are notoriously short-sighted' (Bailey 1948: 13) and are 'often poor judges of their own interests' (Lasswell 1933: 527), so that 'our statesmen must deceive them' (Bailey 1948: 13); and they 'can be managed only by a specialized class whose personal interests reach beyond the locality' (Walter Lippmann 1921: 310). In Lippmann's view, the 'manufacture of consent' by an elite class had already become 'a self-conscious art and a regular organ of popular government' by the 1920s (Lippman 1921: 248). (shrink)
We show that it is not possible to construct a Fraenkel-Mostowski model in which the axiom of choice for well-ordered families of sets and the axiom of choice for sets are both true, but the axiom of choice is false.
Biomedical images and ontologies are closely related conceptually, yet currently they are studied in isolation. Biomedical ontologies provide a representation of the canonical entities considered in biomedical research and clinical observations, and the relations among them. Images reveal instances of those entities and, taken in aggregate, inform the construction of ontologies describing the pertinent domain content revealed in the images. The article by Fielding and Marwede (2011) notes the differences between the ontology of the body and the ontology of the (...) image, developing toward an application of ontology of the psychiatric domain. Although such ontology development is important for knowledge representation .. (shrink)
Those interested in the arts, politics, history, philosophy, psychoanalysis, and sociology will delight in this important collection of essays that re-evaluate ...
The debate about what constitutes the discipline of ethics and who qualifies as an ethics consultant is linked unavoidably to a debate that is potentiated by the reality of a rapidly changing and high-stakes health care consultation marketplace. Who we are and what we can offer to the moral gesture that is medicine is shaped by our fundamental understanding of the place of expert knowledge in the transformation of social reality. The struggle for self-definition is particularly freighted since clinical ethics (...) consultation aspires to be more than academic contemplation. Two recent books (Ethics Consultation by John La Puma and David Schiedermayer and The Health Care Ethics Consultant: A Practical Guide, edited by Francoise Baylis) exemplify the two most popular but most widely divergent positions on these issues. We argue that while useful, neither book addresses fully the particular and distinct role of the professional ethicist. (shrink)
" The primary U.S. goal in the Third World is to ensure that it remains open to U.S. economic penetration and political control. Failing this the United States exerts every effort to..
Let NBG be von Neumann-Bernays-Gödel set theory without the axiom of choice and let NBGA be the modification which allows atoms. In this paper we consider some of the well-known class or global forms of the wellordering theorem, the axiom of choice, and maximal principles which are known to be equivalent in NBG and show they are not equivalent in NBGA.
The work ethic has been deeply challenged by two trends – the division of labor and the destruction of continuity in employment. Here a narrative model is proposed for reconstructing the work ethic. Narratives embody assumptions about the flow of time, and work becomes charged with meaning when "contractual time" is interrupted, when new functions are invented to cope with obstacles having to do human character and action. Content for this abstract model is provided by four historical movements in the (...) U.S. having to do with the reorganization of work or work relations: scientific management, the human-relations movement, the human-potential movement, and early management thought. (shrink)
Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons's Moral Twin Earth thought experiment poses a serious challenge for an influential kind of moral realism. It presents us with a case in which it is intuitive that two speakers are expressing a substantive disagreement with one another. However, the meta-semantics associated with this relevant form of moral realism entails that the speakers' moral predicates express different semantic contents, and thus, the moral sentences they utter do not express conflicting propositions. Consequently, this variety of moral (...) realism implies, wrongly, that the speakers do not express substantive disagreement after all. Some philosophers have objected to the Moral Twin Earth argument on the grounds that is possible for two speakers to express disagreement with one another, even if the moral sentences they utter do not express conflicting propositions. Heimer Geirsson supports this claim by appeal to the distinction between semantic reference and speaker reference. David Merli supports the same claim by noting that speakers whose moral sentences do not express conflicting propositions may nevertheless express a non-moral, practical disagreement over what to do. In this article, I argue that neither Geirsson nor Merli provides moral realists with a satisfying response to the Moral Twin Earth argument. (shrink)
For a complete theory of Boolean algebras T, let MT denote the class of countable models of T. For B1, B2 ∈ MT, let B1 ≤ B2 mean that B1 is elementarily embeddable in B2. Theorem 1. For every complete theory of Boolean algebras T, if T ≠ Tω, then $\langle M_T, \leq\rangle$ is well-quasi-ordered. ■ We define Tω. For a Boolean algebra B, let I(B) be the ideal of all elements of the form a + s such that $B\upharpoonright (...) a$ is an atomic Boolean algebra and $B\upharpoonright s$ is an atomless Boolean algebra. The Tarski derivative of B is defined as follows: B(0) = B and B(n + 1) = B(n)/I(B(n)). Define Tω to be the theory of all Boolean algebras such that for every n ∈ ω, B(n) ≠ {0}. By Tarski [1949], Tω is complete. Recall that $\langle A, \leq\rangle$ is a partial well-quasi-ordering, if it is a partial quasi-ordering and for every $\{a_i\mid i \in \omega\} \subseteq A$ , there are $i < j < \omega$ such that ai ≤ aj. Theorem 2. $\langle M_{T_\omega}, \leq\rangle$ contains a subset M such that the partial orderings $\langle M, \leq \upharpoonright M \rangle$ and $\langle\mathscr{P}(\omega), \subseteq\rangle$ are isomorphic. ■ Let M'0 denote the class of all countable Boolean algebras. For B1, B2 ∈ M'0, let B1 ≤' B2 mean that B1 is embeddable in B2. Remark. $\langle M'_0, \leq'\rangle$ is well-quasi-ordered. ■ This follows from Laver's theorem [1971] that the class of countable linear orderings with the embeddability relation is well-quasi-ordered and the fact that every countable Boolean algebra is isomorphic to a Boolean algebra of a linear ordering. (shrink)
My paper picks up a long ignored suggestion of Sheldon Wolin - that we use Thomas Kuhn''s analysis of scientific revolutions to examine the crisis of "normal" political science. This approach allows us to see the connection between the state of the discipline and the larger crisis of meaning afflicting modernity. I then use Eric Voegelin''s notion of a multicivilizational "truth quest" - or search for meaning - to make a case for institutionalizing "extraordinary" or "revolutionary" political science. I attempt (...) such a discipline by following Voegelin - reflecting on "the full amplitude of human experience." Such a meditation takes place within the "first reality of existence" - Plato''s metaxy or the "in-between" - the experience of human existence between the sacred and the mundane. I bring to Voegelin''s exploration of the metaxy the realm of experience which is most radically "other" for modernity - the primal political order of paleolithic and contemporary hunting gathering societies. I argue that shamanic "Urreligion" and Socratic discussion share a boundary crossing logic which provides a basis for a discipline of "extraordinary political science." Finally I suggest that such a discipline is both the quest for, and, in a sense, a realization of, the Good Life - a source of order for the individual and society. (shrink)
Clinical psychologists' and nonpsychiatric physicians' attitudes and behaviors in sexual and confidentiality boundary violations were examined. The 171 participants' responses were analyzed by profession, sex, and status (student, resident, professional) on semantic differential, boundary violation vignettes, and a version of Pope, Tabachnick, and Keith-Spiegel's (1987) ethical scale. Psychologists rated sexual boundary violation as more unethical than did physicians (p<.001). Rationale (p<.01) and timing (p<.001) influenced ratings. Psychologists reported fewer sexualized behaviors than physicians (p<05). Professional experience (p<.01) and sex (p<.05) were (...) associated with confidence-violating behavior. Overall, 78% of the sample reported attitudes or behaviors associated with boundary violations. The behavior violations were correlated (r=.49). Actual violators rated vignette violators more leniently than did nonviolators (p<.01). (shrink)
Abstract There is one assumption that is shared by practically all popular religious and philosophic systems, ancient and modern, Eastern and Western. In truth it may well be that it is this single assumption which makes such ?systems? possible. That shared assumption is the belief in a ?just universe?, i.e. ?just? in the sense of morally ordered, morally predictable and morally explainable. This assumption rests, as most assumptions must, on pragmatic grounds; that is to say, the assumption is retained or (...) used because it gets the users where they want to go, i.e. the assumption works. But if it could be shown that this assumption, aside from being useful, leads to insuperable logical or empirical problems, then this might be prima facie grounds for rejecting the assumption. Part I examines the historical roots of the assumption of a just universe. Part II, examines three implications that would seem to follow from the assumption that the universe, the world, is a just place in which to live. Part III explores the unacceptable consequences that are found in and that follow from these three implications and that necessitate the rejection of the assumption of the just universe of Part I. (shrink)
Provides a firm theoretical grounding for the increasing movement of cognitive psychologists, neuropsychologists and their students beyond the laboratory, in an ...
THEOREM 1. (⋄ ℵ 1 ) If B is an infinite Boolean algebra (BA), then there is B 1 such that $|\operatorname{Aut} (B_1)| \leq B_1| = \aleph_1$ and $\langle B_1, \operatorname{Aut} (B_1)\rangle \equiv \langle B, \operatorname{Aut}(B)\rangle$ . THEOREM 2. (⋄ ℵ 1 ) There is a countably compact logic stronger than first-order logic even on finite models. This partially answers a question of H. Friedman. These theorems appear in §§ 1 and 2. THEOREM 3. (a) (⋄ ℵ 1 ) If (...) B is an atomic ℵ 1 -saturated infinite BA, ψ ε L ω 1ω and $\langle B, \operatorname{Aut} (B)\rangle \models\psi$ then there is B 1 such that $|\operatorname{Aut}(B_1)| \leq |B_1| = \aleph_1$ and $\langle B_1, \operatorname{Aut}(B_1)\rangle\models\psi$ . In particular if B is 1-homogeneous so is B 1 . (b) (a) holds for B = P(ω) even if we assume only CH. (shrink)
A structure has a (finite-string) automatic presentation if the elements of its domain can be named by finite strings in such a way that the coded domain and the coded atomic operations are recognised by synchronous multitape automata. Consequently, every structure with an automatic presentation has a theory. The problems surveyed here include the classification of classes of structures with automatic presentations, the complexity of the isomorphism problem, and the relationship between definability and recognisability.
Psychotherapy clients read two consumer-oriented brochures: a general brochure on psychology and a brochure on the topic of client-therapist intimacy. Half of the participants read the general brochure first and the brochure on client-therapist intimacy second, and half the participants did the reverse. Participants reported favorable reactions to the brochures, indicating they thought both should be made available to psychotherapy clients; that neither were too long, too sensitive, or too difficult to read; and that the brochures should be made available (...) early during the therapeutic process. After reading the client-therapist intimacy brochure, participants also showed some changes in Likert-type scores measuring attitudes regarding intimate contact between clients and therapists. Although participants were more negative about issues of sexual misconduct after reading the client-therapist intimacy brochure, they did not indicate a decrease in trust of therapists, nor did they indicate a greater likelihood of filing a false complaint. We concluded that therapists' reservations about presenting clients with factual information regarding therapist sexual exploitation of clients are not empirically founded. (shrink)
Let B be a superatomic Boolean algebra (BA). The rank of B (rk(B)), is defined to be the Cantor Bendixon rank of the Stone space of B. If a ∈ B - {0}, then the rank of a in B (rk(a)), is defined to be the rank of the Boolean algebra $B b \upharpoonright a \overset{\mathrm{def}}{=} \{b \in B: b \leq a\}$ . The rank of 0 B is defined to be -1. An element a ∈ B - {0} is (...) a generalized atom $(a \in \widehat{At}(B))$ , if the last nonzero cardinal in the cardinal sequence of B $\upharpoonright$ a is 1. Let a,b $\in\widehat{At}$ (B). We denote a ∼ b, if rk(a) = rk(b) = rk(a · b). A subset H $\subseteq \widehat{At}$ (B) is a complete set of representatives (CSR) for B, if for every a $\in \widehat{At}$ (B) there is a unique h ∈ H such that h ∼ a. Any CSR for B generates B. We say that B is canonically well-generated (CWG), if it has a CSR H such that the sublattice of B generated by H is well-founded. We say that B is well-generated, if it has a well-founded sublattice L such that L generates B. THEOREM 1. Let B be a Boolean algebra with cardinal sequence $\langle\aleph_0: i . If B is CWG, then every subalgebra of B is CWG. A superatomic Boolean algebra B is essentially low (ESL), if it has a countable ideal I such that rk(B/I) ≤ 1. Theorem 1 follows from Theorem 2.9, which is the main result of this work. For an ESL BA B we define a set F B of partial functions from a certain countably infinite set to ω (Definition 2.8). Theorem 2.9 says that if B is an ESL Boolean algebra, then the following are equivalent. (1) Every subalgebra of B is CWG; and (2) F B is bounded. THEOREM 2. If an ESL Boolean algebra is not CWG, then it has a subalgebra which is not well-generated. (shrink)
Abstract: Contrary to criticisms by Thomas McInerney,Durable Goods proposes a realistic and empirically testable “covenantal” ethic for moving management and labor beyond tactics of mutual coercion and evasion. Nonetheless, two questions asked by McInerney remain germane. First, should the moral claims of management and labor always receive equal moral consideration, as a matter of justice? To this substantive question Durable Goods admittedly provides a less than satisfactory answer. Second, can the normative theory proposed by Durable Goods, based in part as (...) it is on the Bible, meet the standards of cogency, coherence, and parsimony appropriate to business ethics as a field of rigorous inquiry? This methodological question remains unaddressed. (shrink)
In this manuscript Hobson et al. propose a model exploring qualitative differences between the three states of consciousness, waking, NREM sleep, and REM sleep, in terms of state-related brain activity. The model consists of three factors, each of which varies along a continuum, creating a three-dimensional space: activation (A), information flow (I), and mode of information processing (M). Hobson has described these factors previously (1990; 1992a). Two of the dimensions, activation and modulation, deal directly with subcortical influences upon cortical structures (...) – the reticular activation system, with regard to the activation dimension and the locus coeruleus and the pontine raphe neuclei, with regard to the modulation dimension. The focus of this review is a further exploration of the interaction between dreaming and the cortical and subcortical structures relevant to REM sleep eye movements. [Hobson et al. ]. (shrink)
Edward Conze once observed of the thirty-eight books constituting the Praj p ramit S tras that their central message could be summed up in two sentences: (1) One should become a Bodhisattva (or Buddha-to-be), i.e. one who is content with nothing less than all-knowledge attained through the perfection of wisdom for the sake of all beings. (2) There is no such thing as a Bodhisattva or as all-knowledge or as a being or as the perfection of wisdom or as an (...) attainment. [1] It seems to me that Conze was profoundly correct, as far as he went, and that what he said of the Praj p ramit literary corpus might apply to other Mah y na S tras , as well. One test of this broad application of Conze's observation to the whole of the Mah y na scriptural tradition lies in a close reading of one of the Mah y na S tras from that tradition, the Saddharmapundarika S tra, “the scripture of the lotus blossom of the wonderful law”, or the Lotus S utra . The Lotus S tra not only makes Conze's point, as I shall try to show, but it goes further in offering a new middle path between the two summary sentences above. In doing this it brings forth a practical ethical-religious way for Buddhists and others to follow who will be caught in the sufferings and terrors of the 21st century. We shall refer to this way as “the way of the Lotus” or “the Lotus way”. In what follows I want to attempt three things. First, using Edward Conze's summary sentences above, I identify and explicate three ways to liberation in the Lotus Sutra , viz. the way of ethics and attachment, i.e. “the Bodhisattva way” ("One should become a Bodhisattva...”); next, the way of emptiness and unattachment, i.e. “the Buddha way” ("There is no such thing as a Bodhisattva...”); and, finally, the Lotus way wherein the Bodhisattva way and the Buddha way combine to form a single and powerful new way of liberation. This third way is indirectly referred to in the remark which Edward Conze makes in his summary of the Praj p ramit immediately following his previous two sentences: “To accept both of these contradictory facts is to be perfect”. [2] To accept the Bodhisattva way together with the Buddha way yields the Lotus way. Second, I demonstrate the significance of the Lotus way as a practical way of solving moral problems for Buddhists and others in the 21st century. Third, and finally, I raise and attempt to answer and solve several questions and puzzles about the Lotus way as a way to peace and liberation for Buddhists and others in the 21st century. (shrink)
