Search results for 'Higher-order Theory' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. David Rosenthal (2004). Varieties of Higher-Order Theory. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.score: 169.3
    A touchstone of much modern theorizing about the mind is the idea, still tac- itly accepted by many, that a state's being mental implies that it's conscious. This view is epitomized in the dictum, put forth by theorists as otherwise di-.
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  2. David Rosenthal (2012). Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation, and Function. Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation and Function 367 (1594):1424-1438.score: 135.3
    Conscious mental states are states we are in some way aware of. I compare higher-order theories of consciousness, which explain consciousness by appeal to such higher-order awareness (HOA), and first-order theories, which do not, and I argue that higher-order theories have substantial explanatory advantages. The higher-order nature of our awareness of our conscious states suggests an analogy with the metacognition that figures in the regulation of psychological processes and behaviour. I argue that, although both consciousness and (...)
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  3. Robert C. Koons (1998). Teleology as Higher-Order Causation: A Situation-Theoretic Account. Minds and Machines 8 (4):559-585.score: 129.0
    Situation theory, as developed by Barwise and his collaborators, is used to demonstrate the possibility of defining teleology (and related notions, like that of proper or biological function) in terms of higher order causation, along the lines suggested by Taylor and Wright. This definition avoids the excessive narrowness that results from trying to define teleology in terms of evolutionary history or the effects of natural selection. By legitimating the concept of teleology, this definition also provides promising new avenues for (...)
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  4. Benjamin Kozuch (2014). Prefrontal Lesion Evidence Against Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):721-746.score: 126.7
    According to higher-order theories of consciousness, a mental state is conscious only when represented by another mental state. Higher-order theories must predict there to be some brain areas (or networks of areas) such that, because they produce (the right kind of) higher-order states, the disabling of them brings about deficits in consciousness. It is commonly thought that the prefrontal cortex produces these kinds of higher-order states. In this paper, I first argue that this is likely correct, (...)
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  5. Robert Van Gulick (2004). Higher-Order Global States (Hogs): An Alternative Higher-Order Model of Consciousness. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.score: 121.3
  6. Scott Martin & Carl Pollard (2012). A Higher-Order Theory of Presupposition. Studia Logica 100 (4):727-751.score: 120.0
    So-called 'dynamic' semantic theories such as Kamp's discourse representation theory and Heim's file change semantics account for such phenomena as cross-sentential anaphora, donkey anaphora, and the novelty condition on indefinites, but compare unfavorably with Montague semantics in some important respects (clarity and simplicity of mathematical foundations, compositionality, handling of quantification and coordination). Preliminary efforts have been made by Muskens and by de Groote to revise and extend Montague semantics to cover dynamic phenomena. We present a new higher-order (...) of discourse semantics which improves on their accounts by incorporating a more articulated notion of context inspired by ideas due to David Lewis and to Craige Roberts. On our account, a context consists of a common ground of mutually accepted propositions together with a set of discourse referents preordered by relative salience. Employing a richer notion of contexts enables us to extend our coverage beyond pronominal anaphora to a wider range of presuppositional phenomena, such as the factivity of certain sentential-complement verbs, resolution of anaphora associated with arbitrarily complex definite descriptions, presupposition 'holes' such as negation, and the independence condition on the antecedents of conditionals. Formally, our theory is expressed within a higher-order logic with natural number type, separation-style subtyping, and dependent coproducts parameterized by the natural numbers. The system of semantic types builds on proposals due to Thomason and to Pollard in which the type of propositions (static meanings of sentential utterances) is taken as basic and worlds are constructed from propositions (rather than the other way around as in standard Montague semantics). (shrink)
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  7. George Seli (2012). The Utility of Conscious Thinking on Higher-Order Theory. Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):303 - 316.score: 119.3
    Higher-order theories of consciousness posit that a mental state is conscious by virtue of being represented by another mental state, which is therefore a higher-order representation (HOR). Whether HORs are construed as thoughts or experiences, higher-order theorists have generally contested whether such metarepresentations have any significant cognitive function. In this paper, I argue that they do, focusing on the value of conscious thinking, as distinguished from conscious perceiving, conscious feeling, and other forms of conscious mentality. A thinking (...)
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  8. Richard Brown & Pete Mandik (forthcoming). On Whether the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness Entails Cognitive Phenomenology or What is It Like to Think That One Thinks That P? Philosophical Topics 40 (2).score: 118.0
    Among our conscious states are conscious thoughts. The question at the center of the recent growing literature on cognitive phenomenology is this: In consciously thinking P, is there thereby any phenomenology—is there something it’s like? One way of clarifying the question is to say that it concerns whether there is any proprietary phenomenology associated with conscious thought. Is there any phenomenology due to thinking, as opposed to phenomenology that is due to some co-occurring sensation or mental image? In this paper (...)
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  9. Peter Carruthers (2004). Hop Over FOR, HOT Theory. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.score: 117.3
    Following a short introduction, this chapter begins by contrasting two different forms of higher-order perception (HOP) theory of phenomenal consciousness - inner sense theory versus a dispositionalist kind of higher-order thought (HOT) theory - and by giving a brief statement of the superiority of the latter. Thereafter the chapter considers arguments in support of HOP theories in general. It develops two parallel objections against both first-order representationalist (FOR) theories and actualist forms of HOT theory. (...)
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  10. Hakwan Lau (2008). A Higher Order Bayesian Decision Theory of Consciousness. In Rahul Banerjee & B. K. Chakrabarti (eds.), Models of Brain and Mind: Physical, Computational, and Psychological Approaches. Elsevier.score: 116.0
    It is usually taken as given that consciousness involves superior or more elaborate forms of information processing. Contemporary models equate consciousness with global processing, system complexity, or depth or stability of computation. This is in stark contrast with the powerful philosophical intuition that being conscious is more than just having the ability to compute. I argue that it is also incompatible with current empirical findings. I present a model that is free from the strong assumption that consciousness predicts superior performance. (...)
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  11. Jennifer Matey (2006). Two HOTS to Handle: The Concept of State Consciousness in the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):151-175.score: 116.0
    David Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory is one of the most widely argued for of the higher-order accounts of consciousness. I argue that Rosenthal vacillates between two models of the HOT theory. First, I argue that these models employ different concepts of 'state consciousness'; the two concepts each refer to mental state tokens, but in virtue of different properties. In one model, the concept of 'state consciousness' is more consistent with how the term is typically used, (...)
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  12. David M. Rosenthal (1993). Higher-Order Thoughts and the Appendage Theory of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 6 (2):155-66.score: 116.0
    Theories of what it is for a mental state to be conscious must answer two questions. We must say how we're conscious of our conscious mental states. And we must explain why we seem to be conscious of them in a way that's immediate. Thomas Natsoulas (1993) distinguishes three strategies for explaining what it is for mental states to be conscious. I show that the differences among those strategies are due to the divergent answers they give to the foregoing questions. (...)
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  13. Mark Pharoah, Enhancing Dispositional Higher-Order Thought Theory.score: 116.0
    Through the utilization of a descriptive illustration and detailed referencing of Carruthers (2000), a comparison of Hierarchical Systems theory (Pharoah, 2007) with Dispositional Higher-Order Thought theory identifies and reinforces their complementary status. However, this also determines some key distinctions, particularly with regard to the conclusions each make regarding the mentality of animals and the autistic, and regarding the moral consequences of these conclusions.
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  14. Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). What's Really Doing the Work Here? Knowledge Representation or the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):778-779.score: 116.0
    Dienes & Perner offer us a theory of explicit and implicit knowledge that promises to systematise a large and diverse body of research in cognitive psychology. Their advertised strategy is to unpack this distinction in terms of explicit and implicit representation. But when one digs deeper one finds the “Higher-Order Thought” theory of consciousness doing much of the work. This reduces both the plausibility and usefulness of their account. We think their strategy is broadly correct, but that (...)
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  15. Bart Jacobs (1989). The Inconsistency of Higher Order Extensions of Martin-Löf's Type Theory. Journal of Philosophical Logic 18 (4):399 - 422.score: 116.0
    Martin-Löf's constructive type theory forms the basis of this paper. His central notions of category and set, and their relations with Russell's type theories, are discussed. It is shown that addition of an axiom - treating the category of propositions as a set and thereby enabling higher order quantification - leads to inconsistency. This theorem is a variant of Girard's paradox, which is a translation into type theory of Mirimanoff's paradox (concerning the set of all well-founded sets). The (...)
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  16. Isabel Gois (2010). A Dilemma for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Philosophia 38 (1):143-156.score: 115.3
    Higher Order theories of consciousness have their fair share of sympathisers, but the arguments mustered in their support are—to my mind—unduly persuasive. My aim in this paper is to show that Higher Order theories cannot accommodate the possibility of misrepresentation without either falling into contradiction, or collapsing into a First-Order theory. If this diagnosis is on the right track, then Higher Order theories—at least in the specific versions here considered—fail to give an account of what they set out to (...)
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  17. Edmund T. Rolls (2004). A Higher Order Syntactic Thought (HOST) Theory of Consciousness. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.score: 106.3
  18. John O'Dea (2007). A Higher-Order, Dispositional Theory of Qualia. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 15 (2):29-41.score: 106.3
    Higher-order theories of consciousness, such as those of Armstrong, Rosenthal and Lycan, typically distinguish sharply between consciousness and phenomenal character, or qualia. The higher-order states posited by these theories are intended only as explanations of consciousness, and not of qualia. In this paper I argue that the positing of higher-order perceptions may help to explain qualia. If we are realists about qualia, conceived as those intrinsic properties of our experience of which we are introspectibly aware, then (...) perception might have an explanatory role as the means by which we are aware of these properties. This would also allow us to treat qualia as the inner appearances resulting from inner perceptions, and therefore to treat them as intentional objects. (shrink)
     
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  19. Rocco J. Gennaro, Visual Agnosia and Higher- Order Thought Theory.score: 101.0
    In general, the idea is that what makes a mental state conscious is that it is the object of some kind of higher-order representation (HOR). A mental state M becomes conscious when there is a HOR of M. A HOR is a “meta-psychological” state, i.e. a mental state directed at another mental state. So, for example, my desire to do a good powerpoint presentation becomes conscious when I am (non-inferentially) “aware” of the desire. Intuitively, it seems that conscious states, (...)
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  20. Susanne Bobzien (2012). If It's Clear, Then It's Clear That It's Clear, or is It? Higher-Order Vagueness and the S4 Axiom. In B. Morison K. Ierodiakonou (ed.), Episteme, etc. OUP UK.score: 99.0
    The purpose of this paper is to challenge some widespread assumptions about the role of the modal axiom 4 in a theory of vagueness. In the context of vagueness, axiom 4 usually appears as the principle ‘If it is clear (determinate, definite) that A, then it is clear (determinate, definite) that it is clear (determinate, definite) that A’, or, more formally, CA → CCA. We show how in the debate over axiom 4 two different notions of clarity are in (...)
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  21. Susanne Bobzien (2010). Higher-Order Vagueness, Radical Unclarity, and Absolute Agnosticism. Philosophers' Imprint 10 (10):1-30.score: 99.0
    The paper presents a new theory of higher-order vagueness. This theory is an improvement on current theories of vagueness in that it (i) describes the kind of borderline cases relevant to the Sorites paradox, (ii) retains the ‘robustness’ of vague predicates, (iii) introduces a notion of higher-order vagueness that is compositional, but (iv) avoids the paradoxes of higher-order vagueness. The theory’s central building-blocks: Borderlinehood is defined as radical unclarity. Unclarity is defined by means of (...)
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  22. Rocco J. Gennaro (2011). The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts. Mit Pr.score: 99.0
    In The Consciousness Paradox, Rocco Gennaro aims to solve an underlying paradox, namely, how it is possible to hold a number of seemingly inconsistent views, including higher-order thought (HOT) theory, conceptualism, infant and animal ...
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  23. Elia Zardini (2013). Higher-Order Sorites Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):25-48.score: 99.0
    The naive theory of vagueness holds that the vagueness of an expression consists in its failure to draw a sharp boundary between positive and negative cases. The naive theory is contrasted with the nowadays dominant approach to vagueness, holding that the vagueness of an expression consists in its presenting borderline cases of application. The two approaches are briefly compared in their respective explanations of a paramount phenomenon of vagueness: our ignorance of any sharp boundary between positive and negative (...)
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  24. S. Shapiro (2012). Higher-Order Logic or Set Theory: A False Dilemma. Philosophia Mathematica 20 (3):305-323.score: 99.0
    The purpose of this article is show that second-order logic, as understood through standard semantics, is intimately bound up with set theory, or some other general theory of interpretations, structures, or whatever. Contra Quine, this does not disqualify second-order logic from its role in foundational studies. To wax Quinean, why should there be a sharp border separating mathematics from logic, especially the logic of mathematics?
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  25. Stephan Krämer (2014). Semantic Values in Higher-Order Semantics. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):709-724.score: 99.0
    Recently, some philosophers have argued that we should take quantification of any (finite) order to be a legitimate and irreducible, sui generis kind of quantification. In particular, they hold that a semantic theory for higher-order quantification must itself be couched in higher-order terms. Øystein Linnebo has criticized such views on the grounds that they are committed to general claims about the semantic values of expressions that are by their own lights inexpressible. I show that Linnebo’s objection rests (...)
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  26. Katalin Balog (2000). Phenomenal Judgment and the HOT Theory: Comments on David Rosenthal’s “Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments”. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):215-219.score: 96.0
    In this commentary I criticize David Rosenthal’s higher order thought theory of consciousness (HOT). This is one of the best articulated philosophical accounts of consciousness available. The theory is, roughly, that a mental state is conscious in virtue of there being another mental state, namely, a thought to the effect that one is in the first state. I argue that this account is open to the objection that it makes “HOT-zombies” possible, i.e., creatures that token higher order mental (...)
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  27. Richard W. Paul (1989). Critical Thinking in North America: A New Theory of Knowledge, Learning, and Literacy. [REVIEW] Argumentation 3 (2):197-235.score: 96.0
    The pace of change in the world is accelerating, yet educational institutions have not kept pace. Indeed, schools have historically been the most static of social institutions, uncritically passing down from generation to generation outmoded didactic, lecture-and-drill-based, models of instruction. Predictable results follow. Students, on the whole, do not learn how to work by, or think for, themselves. They do not learn how to gather, analyze, synthesize and assess information. They do not learn how to analyze the diverse logic of (...)
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  28. Josh Weisberg (2008). Same Old, Same Old: The Same-Order Representational Theory of Consciousness and the Division of Phenomenal Labor. Synthese 160 (2):161-181.score: 94.0
    The same-order representation theory of consciousness holds that conscious mental states represent both the world and themselves. This complex representational structure is posited in part to avoid a powerful objection to the more traditional higher-order representation theory of consciousness. The objection contends that the higher-order theory fails to account for the intimate relationship that holds between conscious states and our awareness of them--the theory 'divides the phenomenal labor' in an illicit fashion. This 'failure of (...)
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  29. Sue Ann Toledo (1975). Tableau Systems for First Order Number Theory and Certain Higher Order Theories. Springer-Verlag.score: 94.0
     
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  30. W. Degen & J. Johannsen (2000). Cumulative Higher-Order Logic as a Foundation for Set Theory. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 46 (2):147-170.score: 93.0
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  31. Thomas Forster (1989). A Consistent Higher‐Order Theory Without a (Higher‐Order) Model. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 35 (5):385-386.score: 90.0
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  32. William E. Seager (2004). A Cold Look at HOT Theory. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.score: 88.3
  33. Rocco J. Gennaro (1996). Consciousness and Self-Consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness. John Benjamins.score: 88.0
    This interdisciplinary work contains the most sustained attempt at developing and defending one of the few genuine theories of consciousness.
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  34. J. I. Zucker (1980). Review: Sue Toledo, Tableau Systems for First Order Number Theory and Certain Higher Order Theories. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3):636-638.score: 88.0
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  35. Beth Seacord (2011). Animals, Phenomenal Consciousness, and Higher-Order Theories of Mind. Philo 14 (2):201-222.score: 87.3
    Some advocates of higher-order theories of consciousness believe that the correct theory of consciousness together with empirical facts about animal intelligence make it highly unlikely that animals are capable of having phenomenally conscious experiences. I will argue that even if the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness is correct, there is good evidence (taken from experiments in mind reading and metacognition, as well as considerations from neurophysiology and evolutionary biology) that at least some nonhuman animals can (...)
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  36. William G. Lycan (2001). A Simple Argument for a Higher-Order Representation Theory of Consciousness. Analysis 61 (269):3-4.score: 87.0
  37. Vadim Batitsky (2000). A Realistic Look at Putnam's Argument Against Realism. Foundations of Science 5 (3):299-321.score: 87.0
    Putnam's ``model-theoretic'' argument against metaphysical realism presupposes that an ideal scientific theory is expressible in a first order language. The central aim of this paper is to show that Putnam's ``first orderization'' of science, although unchallenged by numerous critics, makes his argument unsound even for adequate theories, never mind an ideal one. To this end, I will argue that quantitative theories, which dominate the natural sciences, can be adequately interpreted and evaluated only with the help of so-called theories of (...)
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  38. Paul Égré & Denis Bonnay (2010). Vagueness, Uncertainty and Degrees of Clarity. Synthese 174 (1):47 - 78.score: 87.0
    In this paper we compare different models of vagueness viewed as a specific form of subjective uncertainty in situations of imperfect discrimination. Our focus is on the logic of the operator “clearly” and on the problem of higher-order vagueness. We first examine the consequences of the notion of intransitivity of indiscriminability for higher-order vagueness, and compare several accounts of vagueness as inexact or imprecise knowledge, namely Williamson’s margin for error semantics, Halpern’s two-dimensional semantics, and the system we call (...)
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  39. Rocco J. Gennaro (1993). Brute Experience and the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness. Philosophical Papers 22 (1):51-69.score: 87.0
  40. Scott Soames (2008). No Class: Russell on Contextual Definition and the Elimination of Sets. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):213 - 218.score: 87.0
    The article rebutts Michael Kremer’s contention that Russell’s contextual definition of set-theoretic language in Principia Mathematica constituted the ontological achievement of eliminating commitment to classes. Although Russell’s higher-order quantifiers, used in the definition, need not range over classes, none of the plausible substitutes provide a solid basis for eliminating them. This point is used to defend the presentation, in The Dawn of Analysis, of Russell’s logicist reduction, using a first-order version of naive set theory.
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  41. Aaron Sloman, Spatial Prepositions as Higher Order Functions: And Implications of Grice's Theory for Evolution of Language.score: 87.0
    What evolved first: Languages for communicating, or languages for thinking (Generalised Languages: GLs)? (PDF) http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/#glang Presented to Language and Cognition Seminar, School of Psychology, University of Birmingham. 19th Oct 2007..
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  42. Wilfred G. Malcolm (1974). Some Results and Algebraic Applications in the Theory of Higher-Order Ultraproducts. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 15 (1):1-15.score: 87.0
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  43. Richard Mansfield (1975). Review: Richard Montague, J. N. Crossley, M. A. E. Dummett, Set Theory and Higher-Order Logic. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 40 (3):459-459.score: 87.0
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  44. Susumu Hayashi (1980). Derived Rules Related to a Constructive Theory of Metric Spaces in Intuitionistic Higher Order Arithmetic Without Countable Choice. Annals of Mathematical Logic 19 (1-2):33-65.score: 87.0
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  45. K. Schutte (1974). Review: Dag Prawitz, Hauptsatz for Higher Order Logic; Dag Prawitz, Completeness and Hauptsatz for Second Order Logic; Moto-o Takahashi, A Proof of Cut-Elimination in Simple Type-Theory. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 39 (3):607-607.score: 87.0
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  46. Kurt Schutte (1962). Review: Steven Orey, Model Theory for the Higher Order Predicate Calculus. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 27 (1):96-96.score: 87.0
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  47. Neil Campbell Manson (2002). What Does Language Tell Us About Consciousness? First-Person Mental Discourse and Higher-Order Thought Theories of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):221 – 238.score: 86.0
    The fact that we can engage in first-person discourse about our own mental states seems, intuitively, to be bound up with consciousness. David Rosenthal draws upon this intuition in arguing for his higher-order thought theory of consciousness. Rosenthal's argument relies upon the assumption that the truth-conditions for "p" and "I think that p" differ. It is argued here that the truth-conditional schema debars "I think" from playing one of its (expressive) roles and thus is not a good (...)
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  48. Allan Hazlett (2012). Higher-Order Epistemic Attitudes and Intellectual Humility. Episteme 9 (3):205-223.score: 84.0
    This paper concerns would-be necessary connections between doxastic attitudes about the epistemic statuses of your doxastic attitudes, or , and the epistemic statuses of those doxastic attitudes. I will argue that, in some situations, it can be reasonable for a person to believe p and to suspend judgment about whether believing p is reasonable for her. This will set the stage for an account of the virtue of intellectual humility, on which humility is a matter of your higher-order epistemic (...)
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  49. Richard Feldman (2009). Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement. Episteme 6 (3):294-312.score: 84.0
    Evidentialism is the thesis that a person is justified in believing a proposition iff the person's evidence on balance supports that proposition. In discussing epistemological issues associated with disagreements among epistemic peers, some philosophers have endorsed principles that seem to run contrary to evidentialism, specifying how one should revise one's beliefs in light of disagreement. In this paper, I examine the connection between evidentialism and these principles. I argue that the puzzles about disagreement provide no reason to abandon evidentialism and (...)
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