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Hilary Kornblith [81]Hilary Stuart Kornblith [1]
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Profile: Hilary Kornblith (University of Massachusetts, Amherst)
  1.  96
    Hilary Kornblith (2002). Knowledge and its Place in Nature. Oxford University Press.
    Hilary Kornblith argues for a naturalistic approach to investigating knowledge. Knowledge, he explains, is a feature of the natural world, and so should be investigated using scientific methods. He offers an account of knowledge derived from the science of animal behavior, and defends this against its philosophical rivals. This controversial and refreshingly original book offers philosophers a new way to do epistemology.
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  2.  21
    Hilary Kornblith (2012). On Reflection. OUP Oxford.
    Hilary Kornblith presents a new account of mental reflection, and its importance for knowledge, reasoning, freedom, and normativity. He argues that reflection cannot solve the philosophical problems it has traditionally been thought to, and offers a more realistic, demystified view of its nature which draws on dual process approaches to cognition.
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  3. Hilary Kornblith (2010). Belief in the Face of Controversy. In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. OUP Oxford
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  4. Hilary Kornblith (1993). Inductive Inference and its Natural Ground. MIT.
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  5. Hilary Kornblith (2007). Naturalism and Intuitions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):27-49.
    This paper examines the relationship between methodological naturalism and the standard practice within philosophy of constructing theories on the basis of our intuitions about imaginary cases, especially in the work of Alvin Goldman. It is argued that current work in cognitive science presents serious problems for Goldman's approach.
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  6. Hilary Kornblith (ed.) (2001). Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism. Blackwell Publishers.
    This book brings together the essays which have defined and advanced this debate.
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  7. Hilary Kornblith (1993). Epistemic Normativity. Synthese 94 (3):357 - 376.
    This paper examines the source and content of epistemic norms. In virtue of what is it that epistemic norms have their normative force? A semantic approach to this question, due to Alvin Goldman, is examined and found unacceptable. Instead, accounts seeking to ground epistemic norms in our desires are argued to be most promising. All of these accounts make epistemic norms a variety of hypothetical imperative. It is argued that such an account may be offered, grounding our epistemic norms in (...)
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  8.  54
    Hilary Kornblith (2015). The Role of Reasons in Epistemology. Episteme 12 (2):225-239.
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  9. Hilary Kornblith (2009). A Reliabilist Solution to the Problem of Promiscuous Bootstrapping. Analysis 69 (2):263-267.
    Jonathan Vogel has presented a disturbing problem for reliabilism. 1 Reliabilists claim that knowledge is reliably produced true belief. Reliabilism is, of course, a version of externalism, and on such a view, a knower need have no knowledge, no justified belief, indeed, no conception that his or her belief is reliably produced. It is the fact that the knower's true belief is reliably produced which makes it a case of knowledge, not any appreciation of this fact. But Vogel now argues (...)
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  10.  69
    Hilary Kornblith (1983). Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action. Philosophical Review 92 (1):33-48.
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  11. Alvin Goldman, Ernest Sosa, Hilary Kornblith, John Greco, Jonathan Dancy, Laurence Bonjour, Linda Zagrebsky, Julia Driver, James Montmarquet, Chirstopher Hookway, Ricard Paul, Guy Axtell & Casey Swank (eds.) (2000). Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Contemporary Virtue Epistemology. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    This is a unique collection of new and recently-published articles which debate the merits of virtue-theoretic approaches to the core epistemological issues of knowledge and justified belief. The readings all contribute to our understanding of the relative importance, for a theory of justified belief, of the reliability of our cognitive faculties and of the individuals responsibility in gathering and weighing evidence. Highlights of the readings include direct exchanges between leading exponents of this approach and their critics.
     
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  12. Derk Pereboom & Hilary Kornblith (1991). The Metaphysics of Irreducibility. Philosophical Studies 63 (August):125-45.
    During the 'sixties and 'seventies, Hilary Putnam, Jerry Fodor, and Richard Boyd, among others, developed a type of materialism that eschews reductionist claims.1 In this view, explana- tions, natural kinds, and properties in psychology do not reduce to counterparts in more basic sciences, such as neurophysiology or physics. Nevertheless, all token psychological entities-- states, processes, and faculties--are wholly constituted of physical entities, ultimately out of entities over which microphysics quantifies. This view quickly became the standard position in philosophy of mind, (...)
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  13. Hilary Kornblith (2010). What Reflective Endorsement Cannot Do. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):1-19.
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  14. Hilary Kornblith (2002). Knowledge and its Place in Nature. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Hilary Kornblith rejects the method by which philosophers have traditionally investigated knowledge--conceptual analysis--in favour of a naturalistic approach. Knowledge, Kornblith argues, is a feature of the natural world, and so should be investigated using scientific methods. He offers an account of knowledge derived from the science of animal behaviour, and defends this against its philosophical rivals. This controversial and refreshingly original book offers philosophers a new way to do epistemology.
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  15.  44
    Hilary Kornblith (2013). Is Philosophical Knowledge Possible? In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism. Routledge 260.
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  16.  39
    Hilary Kornblith (2000). The Contextualist Evasion of Epistemology. Noûs 34 (s1):24 - 32.
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  17.  28
    Hilary Kornblith (2013). L2 Is There Room for Armchair Theorizing in Epistemology? In Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? Routledge 195.
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  18. Hilary Kornblith (1999). Knowledge in Humans and Other Animals. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):327-346.
    This paper defends an approach to epistemology which treats the study of knowledge as on a par with the study of natural kinds. Knowledge is seen as a natural phenomenon subject to empirical investigation. In particular, it is argued that work in cognitive ethology is relevant to understanding the nature of knowledge, and that this approach sheds light on traditional philosophical questions about knowledge, including questions about the source of epistemic normativity.
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  19. Hilary Kornblith (1980). Beyond Foundationalism and the Coherence Theory. Journal of Philosophy 77 (10):597-612.
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  20. Hilary Kornblith (1999). In Defense of a Naturalized Epistemology. In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell 158--169.
     
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  21. David Christensen & Hilary Kornblith (1997). Testimony, Memory and the Limits of the a Priori. Philosophical Studies 86 (1):1-20.
    A number of philosophers, from Thomas Reid1 through C. A. J. Coady2, have argued that one is justified in relying on the testimony of others, and furthermore, that this should be taken as a basic epistemic presumption. If such a general presumption were not ultimately dependent on evidence for the reliability of other people, the ground for this presumption would be a priori. Such a presumption would then have a status like that which Roderick Chisholm claims for the epistemic principle (...)
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  22.  19
    Hilary Kornblith (2001). Epistemic Obligation and the Possibility of Internalism. In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press 231--248.
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  23. Hilary Kornblith (2006). Appeals to Intuition and the Ambitions of Epistemology. In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press 10--25.
     
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  24.  27
    Hilary Kornblith (2016). Replies to Boghossian and Smithies. Analysis 76 (1):69-80.
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  25.  26
    Hilary Kornblith (2016). Summary. Analysis 76 (1):39-40.
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  26.  16
    Hilary Kornblith (2004). Sosa on Human and Animal Knowledge. In Greco John (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics. 126--134.
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  27. Hilary Kornblith (2007). The Metaphysical Status of Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):145–164.
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  28.  68
    Hilary Kornblith (1995). Naturalistic Epistemology and Its Critics. Philosophical Topics 23 (1):237-255.
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  29. Hilary Kornblith (2008). Knowledge Needs No Justification. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press 5--23.
     
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  30. Hilary Kornblith & Brian McLaughlin (eds.) (forthcoming). Alvin Goldman and His Critics. Blackwell.
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  31.  24
    Hilary Kornblith (2011). Why Should We Care About the Concept of Knowledge? Episteme 8 (1):38-52.
    Can we learn something interesting about knowledge by examining our concept of knowledge? Quite a bit, many argue. My own view, however, is that the concept of knowledge is of little epistemological interest. In this paper, I critically examine one particularly interesting defense of the view that the concept of knowledge is of great epistemological interest: Edward Craig's Knowledge and the State of Nature. A minimalist view about the value of examining our concept of knowledge is defended.
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  32.  51
    Hilary Kornblith (1980). Referring to Artifacts. Philosophical Review 89 (1):109-114.
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  33.  82
    Hilary Kornblith (1989). Introspection and Misdirection. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (4):410 – 422.
  34. Hilary Kornblith (2009). Sosa in Perspective. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):127--136.
    Ernest Sosa draws a distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge, and this distinction forms the centerpiece of his new book, A Virtue Epistemology . This paper argues that the distinction cannot do the work which Sosa assigns to it.
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  35.  29
    Hilary Kornblith (2000). The Impurity of Reason. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1):67–89.
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  36.  63
    Hilary Kornblith (1999). Distrusting Reason. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):181–196.
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  37.  14
    Hilary Kornblith (2011). Transcendental Philosophy. In Joel Smith & Peter Sullivan (eds.), Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. Oxford University Press 96.
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  38.  19
    Hilary Kornblith (1987). Some Social Features of Cognition. Synthese 73 (1):27 - 41.
    This paper describes and assesses a number of dispositions which are instrumental in allowing us to take on the opinions of others unselfconsciously. It is argued that these dispositions are in fact reliable in the environments in which they tend to come into play. In addition, it is argued that agents are, by their own lights, justified in the beliefs they arrive at as a result of these processes. Finally, these processes are argued to provide a basis for rejecting the (...)
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  39.  74
    Hilary Kornblith (1994). Naturalism: Both Metaphysical and Epistemological. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):39-52.
  40. Hilary Kornblith (2009). Timothy Williamson's the Philosophy of Philosophy. Analysis 69 (1):109-116.
    Timothy Williamson's new book, The Philosophy of Philosophy, has a number of central themes. The very idea that philosophy has a method which is different in kind from the sciences is one Williamson rejects. “… the common assumption of philosophical exceptionalism is false. Even the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori turns out to obscure underlying similarities”. Although Williamson sees the book as “a defense of armchair philosophy”, he also argues that “the differences in subject matter between (...)
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  41.  53
    Hilary Kornblith (1992). The Laws of Thought. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):895-911.
  42.  2
    Hilary Kornblith & N. Vassallo (1996). Inductive Inference and its Natural Ground-An Essay in Naturalistic Epistemology. Epistemologia 19 (1):175-176.
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  43.  96
    Hilary Kornblith (1998). What is It Like to Be Me? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):48-60.
  44.  24
    Hilary Kornblith (2005). Replies to Alvin Goldman, Martin Kusch and William Talbott. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):427–441.
  45. Hilary Kornblith (ed.) (2001). Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism. Wiley-Blackwell.
    This anthology brings together ten papers which have defined and advanced the debate between internalism and externalism in epistemology.
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  46.  39
    Hilary Kornblith (1988). How Internal Can You Get? Synthese 74 (3):313 - 327.
    This paper examines Laurence BonJour''s defense of internalism inThe Structure of Empirical Knowledge with an eye toward better understanding the issues which separate internalists from externalists. It is argued that BonJour''s Doxastic Presumption cannot play the role which is required of it to make his internalism work. It is further argued that BonJour''s internalism, and, indeed, all other internalisms, are motivated by a Cartesian view of an agent''s access to her own mental states. This Caretsian view is argued to be (...)
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  47.  60
    Hilary Kornblith (2006). Reply to Bermudez and BonJour. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):337-349.
  48.  32
    Hilary Kornblith (2007). The Naturalistic Project in Epistemology: Where Do We Go From Here? In C. Mi & R. Chen (eds.), Naturalized Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Rodopi 39-59.
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  49. Hilary Kornblith (1994). A Conservative Approach to Social Epistemology. In Frederick F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge. Rowman and Littlefield 93--110.
     
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  50.  21
    Hilary Kornblith (1985). Ever Since Descartes. The Monist 68 (2):264-276.
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