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Hilary Kornblith [69]Hilary Stuart Kornblith [1]
  1. Hilary Kornblith & Brian McLaughlin (eds.) (forthcoming). Alvin Goldman and His Critics. Blackwell.
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  2. Hilary Kornblith (2014). A Naturalistic Epistemology: Selected Papers. Oup Oxford.
    This volume draws together influential work by Hilary Kornblith on naturalistic epistemology. This approach sees epistemology not as conceptual analysis, but as an explanatory project constrained and informed by work in cognitive science. These essays expound and defend Kornblith's distinctive view of how we come to have knowledge of the world.
     
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  3. Hilary Kornblith (2013). Is Philosophical Knowledge Possible? In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism. Routledge. 260.
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  4. Hilary Kornblith (2013). L2 Is There Room for Armchair Theorizing in Epistemology? In Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? Routledge. 195.
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  5. Hilary Kornblith (2012). On Reflection. Oup Oxford.
    Hilary Kornblith presents a new account of mental reflection, and its importance for knowledge, reasoning, freedom, and normativity. He argues that reflection cannot solve the philosophical problems it has traditionally been thought to, and offers a more realistic, demystified view of its nature which draws on dual process approaches to cognition.
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  6. Hilary Kornblith (2011). Transcendental Philosophy. In Joel Smith & Peter Sullivan (eds.), Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. Oxford University Press. 96.
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  7. Hilary Kornblith (2011). Why Should We Care About the Concept of Knowledge? Episteme 8 (1):38-52.
    Can we learn something interesting about knowledge by examining our concept of knowledge? Quite a bit, many argue. My own view, however, is that the concept of knowledge is of little epistemological interest. In this paper, I critically examine one particularly interesting defense of the view that the concept of knowledge is of great epistemological interest: Edward Craig's Knowledge and the State of Nature. A minimalist view about the value of examining our concept of knowledge is defended.
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  8. Hilary Kornblith (2010). Belief in the Face of Controversy. In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oup Oxford.
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  9. Hilary Kornblith (2010). What Reflective Endorsement Cannot Do. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):1-19.
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  10. Hilary Kornblith (2009). A Reliabilist Solution to the Problem of Promiscuous Bootstrapping. Analysis 69 (2):263-267.
    Jonathan Vogel has presented a disturbing problem for reliabilism. 1 Reliabilists claim that knowledge is reliably produced true belief. Reliabilism is, of course, a version of externalism, and on such a view, a knower need have no knowledge, no justified belief, indeed, no conception that his or her belief is reliably produced. It is the fact that the knower's true belief is reliably produced which makes it a case of knowledge, not any appreciation of this fact. But Vogel now argues (...)
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  11. Hilary Kornblith (2009). Sosa in Perspective. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):127--136.
    Ernest Sosa draws a distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge, and this distinction forms the centerpiece of his new book, A Virtue Epistemology . This paper argues that the distinction cannot do the work which Sosa assigns to it.
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  12. Hilary Kornblith (2009). Timothy Williamson's the Philosophy of Philosophy. Analysis 69 (1):109-116.
    Timothy Williamson's new book, The Philosophy of Philosophy, has a number of central themes. The very idea that philosophy has a method which is different in kind from the sciences is one Williamson rejects. “… the common assumption of philosophical exceptionalism is false. Even the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori turns out to obscure underlying similarities” . Although Williamson sees the book as “a defense of armchair philosophy” , he also argues that “the differences in subject (...)
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  13. Hilary Kornblith (2008). Knowledge Needs No Justification. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press. 5--23.
     
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  14. Hilary Kornblith (2007). Naturalism and Intuitions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):27-49.
    This paper examines the relationship between methodological naturalism and the standard practice within philosophy of constructing theories on the basis of our intuitions about imaginary cases, especially in the work of Alvin Goldman. It is argued that current work in cognitive science presents serious problems for Goldman's approach.
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  15. Hilary Kornblith (2007). The Metaphysical Status of Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):145–164.
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  16. Hilary Kornblith (2007). The Naturalistic Project in Epistemology: Where Do We Go From Here? In C. Mi & R. Chen (eds.), Naturalized Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Rodopi. 39-59.
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  17. Hilary Kornblith (2006). Appeals to Intuition and the Ambitions of Epistemology. In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. 10--25.
     
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  18. Hilary Kornblith (2006). Reply to Bermudez and BonJour. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):337-349.
  19. Hilary Kornblith (2005). Précis of Knowledge and its Place in Nature. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):399–402.
  20. Hilary Kornblith (2005). Review: Précis of "Knowledge and Its Place in Nature". [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):399 - 402.
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  21. Hilary Kornblith (2005). Replies to Alvin Goldman, Martin Kusch and William Talbott. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):427–441.
  22. Hilary Kornblith (2004). Conditions on Cognitive Sanity and the Death of Internalism. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. 77--88.
  23. Hilary Kornblith (2004). Does Reliabilism Make Knowledge Merely Conditional? Philosophical Issues 14 (1):185–200.
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  24. Hilary Kornblith (2004). Sosa on Human and Animal Knowledge. In Greco John (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics. 126--134.
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  25. Hilary Kornblith (2004). Social Prerequisites for the Proper Function of Individual Reason. Episteme 1 (3):169-176.
    Human beings form beliefs by way of a variety of psychological processes. Some of these processes of belief acquisition are innate; others are acquired. A good deal of interesting work has been done in assessing the reliability of these processes. Any such assessment must examine not only features intrinsic to the psychological processes themselves, but also features of the environments in which those processes are exercised; a mechanism which is reliable in one sort of environment may be quite unreliable in (...)
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  26. Hilary Kornblith (2003). Can Internalism Be Saved? Metaphilosophy 34 (5):621-629.
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  27. Hilary Kornblith (2003). Roderick Chisholm and The Shaping of American Epistemology. Metaphilosophy 34 (5):582-602.
  28. Hilary Kornblith (2003). How Scientific Practices Matter: Reclaiming Philosophical Naturalism. [REVIEW] Isis 94:791-792.
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  29. Hilary Kornblith (2003). 38. Naturalistic Epistemology and its Critics. In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. 383.
     
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  30. Hilary Kornblith (2002). Knowledge and its Place in Nature. Oxford University Press.
    Hilary Kornblith argues for a naturalistic approach to investigating knowledge. Knowledge, he explains, is a feature of the natural world, and so should be investigated using scientific methods. He offers an account of knowledge derived from the science of animal behavior, and defends this against its philosophical rivals. This controversial and refreshingly original book offers philosophers a new way to do epistemology.
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  31. Hilary Kornblith (ed.) (2001). Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism. Blackwell Publishers.
    This book brings together the essays which have defined and advanced this debate.
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  32. Hilary Kornblith (2001). Epistemic Obligation and the Possibility of Internalism. In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. 231--248.
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  33. Alvin Goldman, Ernest Sosa, Hilary Kornblith, John Greco, Jonathan Dancy, Laurence Bonjour, Linda Zagrebsky, Julia Driver, James Montmarquet, Chirstopher Hookway, Ricard Paul, Guy Axtell & Casey Swank (2000). Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Contemporary Virtue Epistemology. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
     
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  34. Hilary Kornblith (2000). The Contextualist Evasion of Epistemology. Noûs 34 (s1):24 - 32.
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  35. Hilary Kornblith (2000). La evasión contextualista de la epistemología. Teorema 19 (3):33-40.
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  36. Hilary Kornblith (2000). Linda Zagzebski's Virtues of the Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):197-201.
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  37. Hilary Kornblith (2000). Review: Linda Zagzebski's Virtues of the Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):197 - 201.
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  38. Hilary Kornblith (2000). The Impurity of Reason. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1):67–89.
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  39. Hilary Kornblith (1999). Distrusting Reason. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):181–196.
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  40. Hilary Kornblith (1999). In Defense of a Naturalized Epistemology. In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell. 158--169.
     
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  41. Hilary Kornblith (1999). Knowledge in Humans and Other Animals. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):327-346.
    This paper defends an approach to epistemology which treats the study of knowledge as on a par with the study of natural kinds. Knowledge is seen as a natural phenomenon subject to empirical investigation. In particular, it is argued that work in cognitive ethology is relevant to understanding the nature of knowledge, and that this approach sheds light on traditional philosophical questions about knowledge, including questions about the source of epistemic normativity.
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  42. Hilary Kornblith (1999). The Epistemology of Science and the Epistemology of Everyday Life. Facta Philosophica 1 (1999):21-37.
     
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  43. George Bealer, Robert Cummings, Michael DePaul, Richard Foley, Alvin Goldman, Alison Gopnik, George Graham, Gary Gutting, Tery Horgan, Tamara Horowitz, Hilary Kornblith, Joel Pust, E. Rosch, Eldar Shafir, Stephen Stitch, Ernest Sosa & Edward Wisniewkski (1998). Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
     
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  44. Hilary Kornblith (1998). Book Review:Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind Lynne Rudder Baker. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 65 (2):377-.
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  45. Hilary Kornblith (1998). What is It Like to Be Me? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):48-60.
  46. David Christensen & Hilary Kornblith (1997). Testimony, Memory and the Limits of the a Priori. Philosophical Studies 86 (1):1-20.
    A number of philosophers, from Thomas Reid1 through C. A. J. Coady2, have argued that one is justified in relying on the testimony of others, and furthermore, that this should be taken as a basic epistemic presumption. If such a general presumption were not ultimately dependent on evidence for the reliability of other people, the ground for this presumption would be a priori. Such a presumption would then have a status like that which Roderick Chisholm claims for the epistemic principle (...)
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  47. Hilary Kornblith & N. Vassallo (1996). Inductive Inference and its Natural Ground-An Essay in Naturalistic Epistemology. Epistemologia 19 (1):175-176.
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  48. Hilary Kornblith (1995). Naturalistic Epistemology and Its Critics. Philosophical Topics 23 (1):237-255.
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  49. Hilary Kornblith (1994). Naturalism: Both Metaphysical and Epistemological. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):39-52.
  50. Hilary Kornblith (1994). A Conservative Approach to Social Epistemology. In Frederick F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge. Rowman and Littlefield. 93--110.
     
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