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Profile: Hilla Jacobson (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)
  1. Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2010). . Normativity Without Reflectivity: On the Beliefs and Desires of Non-Reflective Creatures. Philosophical Psychology 23:75-93.
    The view (held, e.g., by Davidson) that the having of beliefs and desires presupposes the having of reflective capacities is sometimes supported by appealing to the idea that the concept of belief is a concept of a mental state which involves a normative aspect: beliefs can be “successful” or “unsuccessful” from the perspective of their possessors, and sometimes discarded in light of their “failure.” This naturally invites the idea that believers must be capable of reflecting on their beliefs. Desires presuppose (...)
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  2. Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2009). From Causality to Rigidity. Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 8:75-93.
    Kripke has argued that names are rigid designators, and that a name's reference is determined by a causal chain of a certain kind that connects an object with the name's use, thus making the name this object's name. He has not shown that there is a logical connection between these two theses of him. The purpose of the paper is to establish such a connection. It argues that on the assumption that names refer to objects in possible worlds other than (...)
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  3. Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2008). Externalist Trends in Descartes' Thought. Iyyun 58:1-33.
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  4. Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2008). Semantic Innateness. Analysis and Metaphysics 7:13-32.
    Various objections have been raised against the thesis of semantic innateness – the view that all (or most) of our concepts are innate – and the arguments in its favor. Its main contemporary advocate, Jerry Fodor, no longer adheres to this radical view. Yet the issue is still alive. The objections have not been very persuasive, and Fodor's own response to his argument is both controversial and involves a high price. This paper first explicates this view, exposes its radical nature, (...)
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  5. Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2008). The Scientific Untraceability of Phenomenal Consciousness. Philosophia 36 (4):509-529.
    It is a common conviction among philosophers who hold that phenomenal properties, qualia, are distinct from any cognitive, intentional, or functional properties, that it is possible to trace the neural correlates of these properties. The main purpose of this paper is to present a challenge to this view, and to show that if “non-cognitive” phenomenal properties exist at all, they lie beyond the reach of neuroscience. In the final section it will be suggested that they also lie beyond the reach (...)
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  6. Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz & Amir Horowitz (2008). Conceivability, Higher Order Patterns, and Physicalism. Acta Analytica 23 (4):349-366.
  7. Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2006). Motivational Cognitivism and the Argument From Direction of Fit. Philosophical Studies 127 (3):561 - 580.
    An important argument for the belief-desire thesis is based on the idea that an agent can be motivated to act only if her mental states include one which aims at changing the world, that is, one with a “world-to-mind”, or “telic”, direction of fit. Some cognitivists accept this claim, but argue that some beliefs, notably moral ones, have not only a “mind-to-world”, or “thetic”, direction of fit, but also a telic one. The paper first argues that this cognitivist reply is (...)
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  8. Amir Horowitz & Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2005). The Knowledge Argument and Higher-Order Properties. Ratio 18 (1):48-64.
    The paper argues that Jackson's knowledge argument fails to undermine physicalist ontology. First, it is argued that, as this argument stands, it begs the question. Second, it is suggested that by supplementing the argument (and taking one of its premises for granted), this flaw can be remedied insofar as the argument is taken to be an argument against type-physicalism; however, this flaw cannot be remedied insofar as the argument is taken to be an argument against token-physicalism. The argument cannot be (...)
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  9. Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2005). Brandom on Kripke's Puzzle. Logique Et Analyse 189:159-168.
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  10. Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2005). Disquotation and Proper Names: Brandom on Kripke's Puzzle. Logique Et Analyse 48 (192):159-168.
     
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  11. Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2004). Syntax, Semantics, and Intentional Aspects. Philosophical Papers 33 (1):67-95.
    Abstract It is widely assumed that the meaning of at least some types of expressions involves more than their reference to objects, and hence that there may be co-referential expressions which differ in meaning. It is also widely assumed that ?syntax does not suffice for semantics?, i.e. that we cannot account for the fact that expressions have semantic properties in purely syntactical or computational terms. The main goal of the paper is to argue against a third related assumption, namely that (...)
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  12. Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (1997). Belief, Desire, and Moral Motivation. Iyyun 46:355-370.
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