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  1. Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2008). The Scientific Untraceability of Phenomenal Consciousness. Philosophia 36 (4):509-529.
    It is a common conviction among philosophers who hold that phenomenal properties, qualia, are distinct from any cognitive, intentional, or functional properties, that it is possible to trace the neural correlates of these properties. The main purpose of this paper is to present a challenge to this view, and to show that if “non-cognitive” phenomenal properties exist at all, they lie beyond the reach of neuroscience. In the final section it will be suggested that they also lie beyond the reach (...)
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  2. Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz & Amir Horowitz (2008). Conceivability, Higher Order Patterns, and Physicalism. Acta Analytica 23 (4):349-366.
  3. Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2006). Motivational Cognitivism and the Argument From Direction of Fit. Philosophical Studies 127 (3):561 - 580.
    An important argument for the belief-desire thesis is based on the idea that an agent can be motivated to act only if her mental states include one which aims at changing the world, that is, one with a “world-to-mind”, or “telic”, direction of fit. Some cognitivists accept this claim, but argue that some beliefs, notably moral ones, have not only a “mind-to-world”, or “thetic”, direction of fit, but also a telic one. The paper first argues that this cognitivist reply is (...)
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  4. Amir Horowitz & Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2005). The Knowledge Argument and Higher-Order Properties. Ratio 18 (1):48-64.
    The paper argues that Jackson's knowledge argument fails to undermine physicalist ontology. First, it is argued that, as this argument stands, it begs the question. Second, it is suggested that by supplementing the argument (and taking one of its premises for granted), this flaw can be remedied insofar as the argument is taken to be an argument against type-physicalism; however, this flaw cannot be remedied insofar as the argument is taken to be an argument against token-physicalism. The argument cannot be (...)
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  5. Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2005). Disquotation and Proper Names: Brandom on Kripke's Puzzle. Logique Et Analyse 48 (192):159-168.
     
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  6. Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2004). Syntax, Semantics, and Intentional Aspects. Philosophical Papers 33 (1):67-95.
    Abstract It is widely assumed that the meaning of at least some types of expressions involves more than their reference to objects, and hence that there may be co-referential expressions which differ in meaning. It is also widely assumed that ?syntax does not suffice for semantics?, i.e. that we cannot account for the fact that expressions have semantic properties in purely syntactical or computational terms. The main goal of the paper is to argue against a third related assumption, namely that (...)
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