Search results for 'Homunculus' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. András Lörincz, Barnabás Póczos, Gábor Szirtes & Bálint Takács (2002). Ockham's Razor at Work: Modeling of the ``Homunculus''. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 3 (2):187-220.score: 24.0
    There is a broad consensus about the fundamental role of thehippocampal system (hippocampus and its adjacent areas) in theencoding and retrieval of episodic memories. This paper presents afunctional model of this system. Although memory is not asingle-unit cognitive function, we took the view that the wholesystem of the smooth, interrelated memory processes may have acommon basis. That is why we follow the Ockham's razor principleand minimize the size or complexity of our model assumption set.The fundamental assumption is the requirement of (...)
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  2. Stephen L. White (1987). What is It Like to Be a Homunculus? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 68 (June):148-74.score: 21.0
     
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  3. Joseph Margolis (1980). The Trouble with Homunculus Theories. Philosophy of Science 47 (June):244-259.score: 18.0
    The so-called post-Wittgensteinian Oxford philosophers are often criticized not only for failing to provide for the causal explanation of human behavior and psychological states, but also for failing to recognize that psychological explanations require appeal to sub-personal or molecular processes. Three strategies accommodating this criticism appear in so-called homunculus theories and include: (1) that the sub-systems be assigned intentional or informational content purely heuristically; (2) that the intentional or informational content of molar states be analyzed without remainder in terms (...)
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  4. Francis Crick & Christof Koch (2000). The Unconscious Homunculus. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press. 3-11.score: 15.0
  5. Ray S. Jackendoff (2000). Unconscious, Yes; Homunculus,??? Neuro-Psychoanalysis 2 (1):17-20.score: 15.0
  6. Stephen P. Thornton (1993). Sempiternity, Immortality and the Homunculus Fallacy. Philosophical Investigations 16 (4):307-326.score: 15.0
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  7. Horace B. Barlow (1998). Prediction, Inference, and the Homunculus. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):750-751.score: 15.0
    Prediction, like filling-in, is an example of pattern completion and both are likely to involve processes of statistical inference. Furthermore, there is no incompatibility between inference and neural filling-in, for the neural processes may be mediating the inferential processes. The usefulness of the “bridge locus” is defended, and it is also suggested that the interpersonal level needs to be included when considering subjective experience.
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  8. Harry Smit (2010). Weismann, Wittgenstein and the Homunculus Fallacy. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 41 (3):263-271.score: 15.0
  9. George A. Michael & Janick Naveteur (2011). The Tickly Homunculus and the Origins of Spontaneous Sensations Arising on the Hands. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):603-617.score: 15.0
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  10. Jonathan Harrison (1996). How Ludwig Became a Homunculus. Philosophy 71 (277):439 - 444.score: 15.0
    Jonathan Harrison teases our minds with two short stories ….
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  11. Paul Tibbetts (1995). Neurobiology and the Homunculus Thesis. Man and World 28 (4):401-413.score: 15.0
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  12. Mary Midgley (1990). Homunculus Trouble, or, What is Applied Philosophy? Journal of Social Philosophy 21 (1):5-15.score: 15.0
  13. George J. Annas (1989). A French Homunculus in a Tennessee Court. Hastings Center Report 19 (6):20-22.score: 15.0
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  14. Gianfranco Dalla Barba (2001). Beyond the Memory-Trace Paradox and the Fallacy of Homunculus: A Hypothesis Concerning the Relationship Between Memory, Consciousness and Temporality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (3):51-78.score: 15.0
  15. Raymond Ruyer (1957). Homunculus et Méganthrope. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 62 (3):266 - 285.score: 15.0
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  16. Herman H. Spitz (1986). Ghosts of the Homunculus and of Sigmund Freud. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (3):581.score: 15.0
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  17. J. E. R. Staddon (1984). Skinner's Behaviorism Implies a Subcutaneous Homunculus. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):647.score: 15.0
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  18. Frederick M. Toates (1984). Models, Yes; Homunculus, No. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):650.score: 15.0
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  19. Erik M. Altmann (2003). Task Switching and the Pied Homunculus: Where Are We Being Led? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (8):340-341.score: 15.0
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  20. Lorincz Andras, Poczos Barnabas, Szirtes Gabor & Takacs Balint (2002). Ockham's Razor at Work: Modeling of the``Homunculus''. Brain and Mind 3 (2).score: 15.0
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  21. George J. Annas (forthcoming). At Law: A French Homunculus in a Tennessee Court. Hastings Center Report.score: 15.0
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  22. G. D. Barba (2001). Beyond the Memory-Trace Paradox and the Fallacy of the Homunculus: A Hypothesis Concerning the Relationship Between Memory, Consciousness and Temporality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (3):51-78.score: 15.0
     
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  23. Michael Gabriel (1982). Homunculus in the Subiculum. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (3):485.score: 15.0
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  24. A. Kenny (1971). The Homunculus Fallacy. In Marjorie Glicksman Grene & I. Prigogine (eds.), Interpretations of Life and Mind. New York,Humanities Press. 155-165.score: 15.0
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  25. Alan K. Mackworth (1984). The Homunculus as Bureaucrat. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):74.score: 15.0
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  26. Jaak Panksepp (2000). The Cradle of Consciousness: A Periconscious Emotional Homunculus? Neuro-Psychoanalysis 2 (1):24-32.score: 15.0
  27. Amelie Rorty (1971). Not Every Homunculus Spoils the Argument. In Marjorie G. Grene (ed.), Interpretations of Life and Mind: Essays Around the Problem of Reduction. Humanities Press. 75.score: 15.0
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  28. James H. Schwartz (2000). The Unconscious Homunculus: Comment. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 2 (1):36-37.score: 15.0
  29. Hannelore Schröder (1996). Who is Human? On the Antifeminist Propaganda of Herrenmenschy Homunculus, and Untermensch. The European Legacy 1 (3):1045-1051.score: 15.0
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  30. J. David Smith (1995). The Homunculus at Home. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):697.score: 15.0
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  31. E. Sayan (1988). A Closer Look at the Chinese Nation Argument. Philosophy Research Archives 13:129-36.score: 9.0
    Ned Block’s Chinese Nation Argument is offered as a counterexample to Turing-machine functionalism. According to that argument, one billion Chinese could be organized to instantiate Turing-machine descriptions of mental states. Since we wouldn’t want to impute qualia to such an organized population, functionalism cannot account for the qualitative character of mental states like pain. Paul Churchland and Patricia Churchland have challenged that argument by trying to show that an adequate representation of the complexity of mind requires at least 10 30,000,000 (...)
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  32. William G. Lycan (1987). Consciousness. MIT Press.score: 6.0
    In this book, William Lycan reviews the diverse philosophical views on consciousness--including those of Kripke, Block, Campbell, Sellars, and Casteneda--and ...
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  33. Tim Crane (2003). The Mechanical Mind: A Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines, and Mental Representation. Routledge.score: 3.0
    This edition has been fully revised and updated, and includes a new chapter on consciousness and a new section on modularity. There are also guides for further reading, and a new glossary of terms such as mentalese, connectionism, and the homunculus fallacy.
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  34. Steven Lehar (2003). Gestalt Isomorphism and the Primacy of Subjective Conscious Experience: A Gestalt Bubble Model. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):357-408.score: 3.0
    A serious crisis is identified in theories of neurocomputation, marked by a persistent disparity between the phenomenological or experiential account of visual perception and the neurophysiological level of description of the visual system. In particular, conventional concepts of neural processing offer no explanation for the holistic global aspects of perception identified by Gestalt theory. The problem is paradigmatic and can be traced to contemporary concepts of the functional role of the neural cell, known as the Neuron Doctrine. In the absence (...)
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  35. Ronald P. Endicott (1996). Searle, Syntax, and Observer-Relativity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):101-22.score: 3.0
    I critically examine some provocative arguments that John Searle presents in his book The Rediscovery of Mind to support the claim that the syntactic states of a classical computational system are "observer relative" or "mind dependent" or otherwise less than fully and objectively real. I begin by explaining how this claim differs from Searle's earlier and more well-known claim that the physical states of a machine, including the syntactic states, are insufficient to determine its semantics. In contrast, his more recent (...)
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  36. John Gregg, The Self.score: 3.0
    One of the most certain truths in the world is Descartes' "I think, therefore I am". Descartes was so certain of the existence of some kind of essential _self_ that others have coined the term "Cartesian theater" to describe the sense that we all have of being the audience enjoying the rich play of our experiences. We tend to believe in an enduring self, independent of our individual percepts. Sometimes this virtual "self" in our mind, sitting in the audience of (...)
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  37. Reinaldo Bernal Velásquez (2011). Materialism and the Subjectivity of Experience. Philosophia 39 (1):39-49.score: 3.0
    The phenomenal properties of conscious mental states happen to be exclusively accessible from the first-person perspective. Consequently, some philosophers consider their existence to be incompatible with materialist metaphysics. In this paper I criticise one particular argument that is based on the idea that for something to be real it must (at least in principle) be accessible from an intersubjective perspective. I argue that the exclusively subjective access to phenomenal contents can be explained by the very particular nature of the epistemological (...)
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  38. Edmond L. Wright, The Defence of Qualia.score: 3.0
    In view of the excellent arguments that have been put forth recently in favour of qualia, internal sensory presentations, it would strike an impartial observer - one could imagine a future historian of philosophy - as extremely odd why so many philosophers who are opposed to qualia, that is, sensory experiences internal to the brain, have largely ignored those arguments in their own. There has been a fashionable assumption that any theory of perception which espouses qualia has long since been (...)
     
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  39. Nigel J. T. Thomas, Coding Dualism: Conscious Thought Without Cartesianism or Computationalism.score: 3.0
    The principal temptation toward substance dualisms, or otherwise incorporating a question begging homunculus into our psychologies, arises not from the problem of consciousness in general, nor from the problem of intentionality, but from the question of our awareness and understanding of our own mental contents, and the control of the deliberate, conscious thinking in which we employ them. Dennett has called this "Hume's problem". Cognitivist philosophers have generally either denied the experiential reality of thought, as did the Behaviorists, or (...)
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  40. J. Smythies (1999). Consciousness: Some Basic Issues- a Neurophilosophical Perspective. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):164-172.score: 3.0
    This paper concentrates on the basic properties of ''consciousness'' that temporal coding is postulated to relate to. A description of phenomenal consciousness based on what introspection tells us about its contents is offered. This includes a consideration of the effect of various brain lesions that result in cortical blindness, apperceptive and associative agnosia, and blindsight, together with an account of the manner in which sight is regained after cortical injuries. I then discuss two therories of perception-Direct Realism and the Representative (...)
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  41. Gianfranco Dalla Barba, Victor Rosenthal & Yves-Marie Visetti (2002). The Nature of Mental Imagery: How Null is the “Null Hypothesis”? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):187-188.score: 3.0
    Is mental imagery pictorial? In Pylyshyn's view no empirical data provides convincing support to the “pictorial” hypothesis of mental imagery. Phenomenology, Pylyshyn says, is deeply deceiving and offers no explanation of why and how mental imagery occurs. We suggest that Pylyshyn mistakes phenomenology for what it never pretended to be. Phenomenological evidence, if properly considered, shows that mental imagery may indeed be pictorial, though not in the way that mimics visual perception. Moreover, Pylyshyn claims that the “pictorial hypothesis” is flawed (...)
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  42. J. R. Smythies (1994). Requiem for the Identity Theory. Inquiry 37 (3):311-29.score: 3.0
    This paper examines the impact that recent advances in clinical neurology, introspectionist psychology and neuroscience have upon the philosophical psycho?neural Identity Theory. Topics covered include (i) the nature and properties of phenomenal consciousness based on a study of the ?basic? visual field, i.e. that obtained in the complete dark, the Ganzfeld, and during recovery from occipital lobe injuries; (ii) the nature of the ?body?image? of neurology and its relation to the physical body; (iii) Descartes? error in choosing extension in space (...)
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  43. Cosma Shalizi, Artificial Life.score: 3.0
    We have created the homunculus and have seen the monstrous being. Forty days the sperm lay buried in manure and each day at noon the Master turned his magnet across it, muttering foreign words. Then, on the fortieth day he showed me the resemblance of a man, but it was transparent, without a corpus. He told me we should feed the loathsome object for exactly forty weeks, and all this time allow it to lie in its bed of manure (...)
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  44. Panayiota Vassilopoulou & Jonardon Ganeri (2012). The Geography of Shadows: Souls and Cities in P. Pullman's His Dark Materials. Philosophy and Literature 35 (2):269-281.score: 3.0
    The soul is an elusive thing, and anyone who wants to describe it must do so with metaphors, painting it in a picture of words. The metaphors one chooses for this task will reflect the aspects one is most eager to promote of what it is to be a person, a living, breathing, thinking presence in the world. Popularly, the soul is often pictured as a little fellow inside one's head, a homunculus with whom one is in constant communication. (...)
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  45. Cyril Latimer (1999). Binary Oppositions and What Focuses in Focal Attention. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):383-384.score: 3.0
    Pylyshyn makes a convincing case that early visual processing is cognitively impenetrable, and although I question the utility of binary oppositions such as penetrable/impenetrable, for the most part I am in agreement. The author does not provide explicit designations or denotations for the terms penetrable and impenetrable, which appear quite arbitrary. Furthermore, the use of focal attention smacks of an homunculus, and the account appears to slip too easily between the perceptual, the cognitive, and the neurophysiological.
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  46. Arthur Falk (1995). A Connectionist Solution to Problems Posed by Plato and Aristotle. Behavior and Philosophy 23 (3-1):1 - 12.score: 3.0
    Intentionality occurs in connectionist nets among those traits of the nets that scientists call flaws. This label has obscured for philosophers the fact that the naturalistic basis of intentionality has been discovered. I show this while staying on our profession's common ground of discourse about ancient philosophy. In the "Theaetetus", Plato invokes a homunculus to explain perceptual misrecognition, and in "On Memory and Recollection", Aristotle invokes a mental operation of disregarding in order to overcome the extraneous determinateness of mental (...)
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  47. Ute Deichmann (2013). Crystals, Colloids, or Molecules?: Early Controversies About the Origin of Life and Synthetic Life. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 55 (4):521-542.score: 3.0
    In Goethe's Faust, the poet refers to alchemists' widespread ideas on artificial creation of life in the laboratory. In Faust, such an attempt was not successful: the little man,Homunculus, created by the scholar Wagner through crystallization, was a pure spirit; his form and light disappeared in an attempt to become real life. According to Goethe, life was obviously not a crystal, and he pointed to decisive differences between crystals and organic beings, the latter for example elaborating their food into (...)
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  48. Jürgen Schröder (1991). Searles Kritik Am Funktionalismus — Eine Untersuchung Des Chinesischzimmers. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 22 (2):321-336.score: 3.0
    Summary Searle claims that for a machine to have intentional states it is not sufficient that a formal programme be instantiated. Various types of objections to this claim have been brought up by Searle's critics. Searle's replies to some of these objections are analysed. It turns out that it is more to these objections than Searle wants to make us believe. What is crucial, however, is that Searle's „Gedankenexperiment results in a dilemma. At the outset of the dilemma there are (...)
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  49. Thomas Wynn & Fred Coolidge (2002). The Role of Working Memory in Skilled and Conceptual Thought. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):703-704.score: 3.0
    Models of working memory challenge some aspects of Carruthers’ account but enhance others. Although the nature of the phonological store and central executive appear fully congruent with Carruthers’ proposal, current models of the visuo-spatial sketchpad provide a better account of skilled action. However, Carruthers’ model may provide a way around the homunculus problem that has plagued models of working memory.
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  50. Endre E. Kadar & M. T. Turvey (1997). Process Based Functionalism Instead of Structural Functionalism is Needed. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (3):533-533.score: 3.0
    Latash & Anson's intention to describe only the regularities of motor behavior is compromised by the homunculus paradigm. Although we concur on the need to redefine in atypical populations, we contend that this enterprise requires a process based functionalism. We argue for accommodating movement control and perceptual processes with physical and task constraints in a natural setting.
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