Search results for 'How Long Do We Have' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. How Long Do We Have, Every Conscious Machine Brings Us Closer to Death.score: 4020.0
    The Doomsday Argument is alive and kicking, and since its formulation in the beginning of the Eighties by the astrophysicist Brandon Carter it has gained wide attention, been strongly criticized and has been described in many different, and sometimes non-interchangeable analogies. I will briefly present the argument here, and departing from Nick Bostrom's interpretation, I will defend that doom may be sooner than we think if we start building conscious machines soon in the future.
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  2. Cheng Long (2008). On Ontology Being a Philosophy Tendency. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 17:275-296.score: 2040.0
    This paper tries to show that ontology is one of the important tendencies in the future philosophy. The author thinks that ontology as the basic spirit makes philosophy be different from other subjects. Ontology originates from people’s examination to essence of the world. However, ancient long-term argument couldn’t get any clear conclusion. So philosophers gradually understand that ontology is connected with epistemology. If we want to make a good explanation to ontology, we must return to check ourselves cognition. And (...)
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  3. Catherine Osborne (1983). Aristotle, De Anima 3. 2: How Do We Perceive That We See and Hear? Classical Quarterly 33 (02):401-411.score: 804.0
    The second chapter of book three of the De anima marks the end of Aristotle's discussion of sense-perception. The chapter is a long one and apparently rambling in subject matter. It begins with a passage that is usually taken as a discussion of some sort of self-awareness, particularly awareness that one is perceiving, although such an interpretation raises some difficulties. This paper reconsiders the problems raised by supposing that the question discussed in the first paragraph is ‘how do we (...)
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  4. Jean Kazez (2006). How Good Do We Have To Be? Philosophy Now 58:28-29.score: 604.8
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  5. Jonathan Lear (2006). It is by Now a Terrifying Commonplace–Agreed to by People Across the Political Spectrum, Indeed Across the Divide of Civilizations–That Our Future Well-Being, and That of Future Generations, Depends on Shaping the Hearts and Minds of the Young. Why Do We Think This? And Do We Have Any Idea How to Do It Well? Plato is the First Person in the Western Tradition to Think Seriously About These Questions and It is Worth Going Back to Him; Not Only as a Return to Origins, but Because There Are Aspects of His ... [REVIEW] In Gerasimos Xenophon Santas (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Plato's Republic. Blackwell Pub.. 25.score: 597.6
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  6. Lantz Miller (2012). If We Have a Music Instinct, for Which Music? Book Review Essay of Philip Ball,The Music Instinct: How Music Works and Why We Can't Do Without It(London: The Bodley Head, 2010). [REVIEW] Philosophy of Music Education Review 20 (2):177-190.score: 590.4
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  7. Ritchie Calder (1972). How Long Have We Got? Montreal,Mcgill-Queen's University Press.score: 590.4
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  8. Frank J. Macke (2008). What Are 'We', And How Do We Know When We Have Communicated? American Journal of Semiotics 15 (1/4):233-248.score: 590.4
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  9. W. Franklin Harris (1995). Policy and Partnership What Have We Learned? How Can We Do Better? Bioscience 45 (Supplement 1):S - 64.score: 576.0
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  10. Michael Dummett (2003). How Should We Conceive of Time? Philosophy 78 (3):387-396.score: 561.0
    A (would-be) sophisticated answer to the question of the title might be, ‘The question is senseless. We should not conceive of time at all. We should just get on with our ordinary lives, asking and answering the usual questions, such as “What Time is it?”, “How long will it take?”, and so on, which we understand perfectly well. St. Augustine understood such questions, phrased in Latin, as well as we do. He should have been content with that, instead (...)
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  11. Jesse Hughes & Lambèr M. M. Royakkers (2008). Don't Ever Do That! Long-Term Duties in Pd E L. Studia Logica 89 (1):59 - 79.score: 561.0
    This paper studies long-term norms concerning actions. In Meyer's Propositional Deontic Logic (PDₑL), only immediate duties can be expressed, however, often one has duties of longer durations such as: "Never do that", or "Do this someday". In this paper, we will investigate how to amend (PDₑL) so that such long-term duties can be expressed. This leads to the interesting and suprising consequence that the long-term prohibition and obligation are not interdefinable in our semantics, while there is a (...)
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  12. Selmer Bringsjord (2001). Are We Evolved Computers?: A Critical Review of Steven Pinker's How the Mind Works. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):227 – 243.score: 555.0
    Steven Pinker's How the mind works (HTMW) marks in my opinion an historic point in the history of humankind's attempt to understand itself. Socrates delivered his "know thyself" imperative rather long ago, and now, finally, in this behemoth of a book, published at the dawn of a new millennium, Pinker steps up to have psychology tell us what we are: computers crafted by evolution - end of story; mystery solved; and the poor philosophers, having never managed to obey (...)
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  13. Jan Narveson Narveson (2002). AIDS in the Third World: How, If at All, Do We Help? [REVIEW] Health Care Analysis 10 (1):109-120.score: 530.4
    The duty to help our fellows is not the same,and not stringent in the same way as thefamiliar duties to refrain from violence toothers, and to be honest. In general, beinghelpful to others is commendable, and to beheld up as a virtue. Only in cases wherereciprocity is possible and likely may we speakof anything stronger along this line. Moreover,the case of AIDS in Africa is furthercomplicated by the fact that it is easilypreventable by readily understandable behavioralterations. However, there are certainpossible (...)
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  14. Kenneth A. Dahlberg (2001). Democratizing Society and Food Systems: Or How Do We Transform Modern Structures of Power? [REVIEW] Agriculture and Human Values 18 (2):135-151.score: 451.2
    The evolution of societies and food systems across the grand transitions is traced to show how nature and culture have been transformed along with the basic structures of power, politics, and governance. A central, but neglected, element has been the synergy between the creation of industrial institutions and the exponential, but unsustainable growth of the built environment. The values, goals, and strategies needed to transform and diversify these structures – generally and in terms of food and agriculture – are (...)
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  15. Jean-Christophe Sarrazin, Axel Cleeremans & Patrick Haggard (2008). How Do We Know What We Are Doing?: Time, Intention and Awareness of Action. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):602-615.score: 446.4
    Time is a fundamental dimension of consciousness. Many studies of the “sense of agency” have investigated whether we attribute actions to ourselves based on a conscious experience of intention occurring prior to action, or based on a reconstruction after the action itself has occurred. Here, we ask the same question about a lower level aspect of action experience, namely awareness of the detailed spatial form of a simple movement. Subjects reached for a target, which unpredictably jumped to the side (...)
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  16. D. Patten (2003). How Do We Deceive Ourselves. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):229-247.score: 446.4
    Mistakes about one's own psychological states generally, and about one's reasons for acting specifically, can sometimes be considered self-deceptive. In the present paper, I address the question of how someone can come to be deceived about his own motives. I propose that false beliefs about our own reasons for acting are often formed in much the same way that we acquire false beliefs about the motives of others. In particular, I argue that non-motivated biases resulting from the way we understand (...)
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  17. Gillian Brock (2005). What Do We Owe Co-Nationals and Non-Nationals? Why the Liberal Nationalist Account Fails and How We Can Do Better. Journal of Global Ethics 1 (2):127 – 151.score: 446.4
    Liberal nationalists have been trying to argue that a suitably sanitized version of nationalism - namely, one that respects and embodies liberal values - is not only morally defensible, but also of great moral value, especially on grounds liberals should find very appealing. Although there are plausible aspects to the idea and some compelling arguments are offered in defense of this position, one area still proves to be a point of considerable vulnerability for this project and that is the (...)
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  18. Dan Sperber, How Do We Communicate?score: 446.4
    Communicate. We humans do it all the time, and most of the time we do it as a matter of course, without thinking about it. We talk, we listen, we write, we read - as you are doing now - or we draw, we mimic, we nod, we point, we shrug, and, somehow, we manage to make our thoughts known to one another. Of course, there are times when we view communication as something difficult or even impossible to achieve. Yet, (...)
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  19. Al Gini (1998). Work, Identity and Self: How We Are Formed by the Work We Do. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 17 (7):707-714.score: 436.8
    Because work looms so large in our lives I believe that most of us don't reflect on its importance and significance. For most of us, work is well – work, something we have to do to maintain our lives and pay the bills. I believe, however, that work is not just a part of our existence that can be easily separated from the rest of our lives. Work is not simply about the trading of labor for dollars. Perhaps because (...)
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  20. Diego Marconi, How Many Multiplications Can We Do?score: 432.0
    In discussions in cognitive science, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and linguistics, it is often taken for granted that we (as well as some machines) have certain abilities, such as the ability to do multiplications or the ability to identify grammatical sentences. Such abilities are regarded as in some sense infinitary, and they are identified with, or taken to be based upon, knowledge of the relevant rules (the rule of multiplication, or the rules of grammar). In what follows, (...)
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  21. Pierfrancesco Basile (2010). It Must Be True – But How Can It Be? Some Remarks on Panpsychism and Mental Composition. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):93-112.score: 426.0
    Although panpsychism has had a very long history, one that goes back to the very origin of western philosophy, its force has only recently been appreciated by analytic philosophers of mind. And even if many still reject the theory as utterly absurd, others have argued that it is the only genuine form of physicalism. This paper examines the case for panpsychism and argues that there are at least good prima facie reasons for taking it seriously. In a second (...)
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  22. Eva Feder Kittay (2013). Caring for the Long Haul: Long-Term Care Needs and the (Moral) Failure to Acknowledge Them. International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 6 (2):66-88.score: 426.0
    As the mother of a daughter who has and will always require care to meet her most basic needs, I have seen firsthand how critical it is to have adequate means by which to meet those needs—for her sake, mine, and my family’s. Her flourishing life has contributed to enhancing not only our own, but those of all who care for her and who enter our lives. I have wanted to see us do better by all the (...)
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  23. Thomas Schramme (2010). Can We Define Mental Disorder by Using the Criterion of Mental Dysfunction? Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (1):35-47.score: 420.0
    The concept of mental disorder is often defined by reference to the notion of mental dysfunction, which is in line with how the concept of disease in somatic medicine is often defined. However, the notions of mental function and dysfunction seem to suffer from some problems that do not affect models of physiological function. Functions in general have a teleological structure; they are effects of traits that are supposed to have a particular purpose, such that, for example, the (...)
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  24. John Hill (1995). Can We Talk About Ethics Anymore? Journal of Business Ethics 14 (8):585 - 592.score: 420.0
    It is difficult to talk about ethics in Australia these days, because (a) the different metamoral languages make it difficult for people to communicate on moral matters; (b) there are no generally accepted criteria for assessing the meaning and truth of moral propositions; and (c) witness talks larger in these matters than theoretical expertise, and the ideals that favour the acceptance of credible role models are no longer generally accepted. We should not assume that we can say anything meaningful about (...)
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  25. Ronald Fischer, Rohan Callander, Paul Reddish & Joseph Bulbulia (2013). How Do Rituals Affect Cooperation? Human Nature 24 (2):115-125.score: 420.0
    Collective rituals have long puzzled anthropologists, yet little is known about how rituals affect participants. Our study investigated the effects of nine naturally occurring rituals on prosociality. We operationalized prosociality as (1) attitudes about fellow ritual participants and (2) decisions in a public goods game. The nine rituals varied in levels of synchrony and levels of sacred attribution. We found that rituals with synchronous body movements were more likely to enhance prosocial attitudes. We also found that rituals judged (...)
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  26. Daniel J. Povinelli (2000). Folk Physics for Apes: The Chimpanzee's Theory of How the World Works. Oxford University Press.score: 420.0
    From an early age, humans know a surprising amount about basic physical principles, such as gravity, force, mass, and shape. We can see this in the way that young children play, and manipulate objects around them. The same behaviour has long been observed in primates - chimpanzees have been shown to possess a remarkable ability to make and use simple tools. But what does this tell us about their inner mental state - do they therefore share the same (...)
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  27. Dana K. Nelkin (2007). Do We Have a Coherent Set of Intuitions About Moral Responsibility? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):243–259.score: 393.6
    I believe that the data is both fascinating and instructive, but in this paper I will resist the conclusion that we must give up Invariantism, or, as I prefer to call it, Unificationism. In the process of examining the challenging data and responding to it, I will try to draw some larger lessons about how to use the kind of data being collected. First, I will provide a brief description of some influential theories of responsibility, and then explain the threat (...)
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  28. Eric Schwitzgebel (2000). How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Human Echolocation. Philosophical Topics 28 (5-6):235-46.score: 393.6
    Researchers from the 1940's through the present have found that normal, sighted people can echolocate - that is, detect properties of silent objects by attending to sound reflected from them. We argue that echolocation is a normal part of our conscious, perceptual experience. Despite this, we argue that people are often grossly mistaken about their experience of echolocation. If so, echolocation provides a counterexample to the view that we cannot be seriously mistaken about our own current conscious experience.
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  29. Jon Williamson (2013). How Uncertain Do We Need to Be? Erkenntnis:1-23.score: 393.6
    Expert probability forecasts can be useful for decision making (Sect. 1). But levels of uncertainty escalate: however the forecaster expresses the uncertainty that attaches to a forecast, there are good reasons for her to express a further level of uncertainty, in the shape of either imprecision or higher order uncertainty (Sect. 2). Bayesian epistemology provides the means to halt this escalator, by tying expressions of uncertainty to the propositions expressible in an agent’s language (Sect. 3). But Bayesian epistemology comes in (...)
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  30. Kendall D'Andrade (1986). How Badly Do We Need Theory Z? Journal of Business Ethics 5 (3):219 - 223.score: 393.6
    In Theory Z-style management everybody participates in corporate decision making. This more open process should give us fewer Pintos, Love Canals, and massive international payoffs as executives are forced to expose their reasoning to the moral sensibilities of the whole corporation. So far everything looks good. But we are a long way from showing that only corporations so managed can be fully moral. Yet Dwiggins seems to believe this, putting his faith in the basic goodness of the many while (...)
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  31. Geert Keil (2001). How Do We Ever Get Up? On the Proximate Causation of Actions and Events. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61 (1):43-62.score: 386.4
    Many candidates have been tried out as proximate causes of actions: belief-desire pairs, volitions, motives, intentions, and other kinds of pro-attitudes. None of these mental states or events, however, seems to be able to do the trick, that is, to get things going. Each of them may occur without an appropriate action ensuing. After reviewing several attempts at closing the alleged “causal gap”, it is argued that on a correct analysis, there is no missing link waiting to be discovered. (...)
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  32. Alan Randall, We Already Have Risk Management – Do We Really Need the Precautionary Principle?score: 386.4
    The precautionary principle (PP) is fundamentally a claim that acting to avoid and/or mitigate threats of serious harm should be accorded high priority in public policy. Over the last three decades, governments and international bodies have endorsed it in principle, and some of them have incorporated it into some areas of policy practice. Yet, PP is controversial in policy circles, public discussion and scholarly discourse. Here the PP literature is reviewed from the perspective of economics, where the tendency (...)
     
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  33. Joseph Millum (2010). How Do We Acquire Parental Rights? Social Theory and Practice 36 (1):112-132.score: 386.4
    In this paper I develop a theory of the acquisition of parental rights that can help us make these judgments. According to this investment theory, parental rights are generated by the performance of parental work. Thus, those who successfully parent a child have the right to continue to do so, and to exclude others from so doing. The account derives from a more general principle of desert that applies outside the domain of parenthood. It also has some interesting implications (...)
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  34. Joseph Millum (2008). How Do We Acquire Parental Responsibilities? Social Theory and Practice 34 (1):71-93.score: 386.4
    It is commonly believed that parents have special duties toward their children—weightier duties than they owe other children. How these duties are acquired, however, is not well understood. This is problematic when claims about parental responsibilities are challenged; for example, when people deny that they are morally responsible for their biological offspring. In this paper I present a theory of the origins of parental responsibilities that can resolve such cases of disputed moral parenthood.
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  35. Lothar Spillmann & John S. Werner (1998). How Do We See What is Not There? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):773-774.score: 386.4
    Pessoa et al. provide a valuable taxonomy of perceptual completion phenomena, but it is not yet clear whether these phenomena are mediated by one kind of neural mechanism or more. We suggest three possible neural mechanisms of long-range interaction to stimulate further perceptual and neurophysiological investigation of perceptual completion and filling-in.
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  36. Philippe Gagnon (2010). “What We Have Learnt From Systems Theory About the Things That Nature’s Understanding Achieves”. In Dirk Evers, Antje Jackelén & Taede Smedes (eds.), How do we Know? Understanding in Science and Theology. Forum Scientiarum.score: 384.0
    The problem of knowledge has been centred around the study of the content of our consciousness, seeing the world through internal representation, without any satisfactory account of the operations of nature that would be a pre-condition for our own performances in terms of concept efficiency in organizing action externally. If we want to better understand where and how meaning fits in nature, we have to find the proper way to decipher its organization, and account for the fact that we (...)
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  37. Benjamin Libet, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Lynn Nadel (eds.) (2010). Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet. Oxford University Press.score: 384.0
    Benjamin Libet, Do we have free will? -- Adina L. Roskies, Why Libet's studies don't pose a threat to free will? -- Alfred r. mele, libet on free will : readiness potentials, decisions, and awareness? -- Susan Pockett and Suzanne Purdy, Are voluntary movements initiated preconsciously? : the relationships between readiness potentials, urges, and decisions? -- William P. Banks and Eve A. Isham, Do we really know what we are doing? : implications of reported time of decision for theories (...)
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  38. Jeremy Fernando (2011). On Love and Poetry. Or, Where Philosophers Fear to Tread. Continent 1 (1):27-32.score: 384.0
    continent. 1.1 (2011): 27-32. “My”—what does this word designate? Not what belongs to me, but what I belong to,what contains my whole being, which is mine insofar as I belong to it. Søren Kierkegaard. The Seducer’s Diary . I can’t sleep till I devour you / And I’ll love you, if you let me… Marilyn Manson “Devour” The role of poetry in the relationalities between people has a long history—from epic poetry recounting tales of yore; to emotive lyric poetry; (...)
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  39. Tim Crane (2003). Mental Substances. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press. 229-250.score: 381.0
    Philosophers of mind typically conduct their discussions in terms of mental events, mental processes, mental properties, mental states – but rarely in terms of minds themselves. Sometimes this neglect is explicitly acknowledged. Donald Davidson, for example, writes that ‘there are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties, which is to say that certain psychological predicates are true of them. These properties are constantly changing, and such changes are mental events’.2 Hilary Putnam agrees, though for somewhat different (...)
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  40. Shoshana Smith (2005). Clear and Distinct Perception in Descartes's Philosophy. Dissertation, University of California Berkeleyscore: 381.0
    (Shoshana Smith now goes by her married name, Shoshana Brassfield: http://philpapers.org/profile/37640) Descartes famously claims that everything we perceive clearly and distinctly is true. Although this rule is fundamental to Descartes’s theory of knowledge, readers from Gassendi and Leibniz onward have complained that unless Descartes can say explicitly what clear and distinct perception is, how we know when we have it, and why it cannot be wrong, then the rule is empty. I offer a detailed analysis of clear and (...)
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  41. Bernard E. Rollin (2011). Animal Pain: What It is and Why It Matters. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 15 (4):425-437.score: 381.0
    The basis of having a direct moral obligation to an entity is that what we do to that entity matters to it. The ability to experience pain is a sufficient condition for a being to be morally considerable. But the ability to feel pain is not a necessary condition for moral considerability. Organisms could have possibly evolved so as to be motivated to flee danger or injury or to eat or drink not by pain, but by “pangs of pleasure” (...)
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  42. Daniel C. Dennett, Could There Be a Darwinian Account of Human Creativity?score: 381.0
    Weaver birds create intricate nests; sculptors and other artists and artisans also create intricate, ingenious constructions out of similar materials. The products may look similar, and outwardly the creative processes that create those processes may look similar, but there are surely large and important differences between them. What are they, and how important are they? The weaverbird nestmaking is ‘instinctual,’ and ‘controlled by the genes’ some would say, but we know that this is a crude approximation of a more interesting (...)
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  43. Aaron James (2007). Constructivism About Practical Reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):302–325.score: 381.0
    Philosophers commonly wonder what a constructivist theory as applied to practical reasons might look like. For the methods or procedures of reasoning familiar from moral constructivism do not clearly apply generally, to all practical reasons. The paper argues that procedural specification is not necessary, so long as our aims are not first-order but explanatory. We can seek to explain how there could be facts of the matter about reasons for action without saying what reasons we have. Explanatory constructivism (...)
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  44. Andrew Sayer (2009). Contributive Justice and Meaningful Work. Res Publica 15 (1):1-16.score: 381.0
    The dominant focus of thinking about economic justice is overwhelmingly distributive, that is, concerned with what people get in terms of resources and opportunities. It views work mainly negatively, as a burden or cost, or else is neutral about it, rather than seeing it as a source of meaning and fulfilment—a good in its own right. However, what we do in life has at least as much, if not more, influence on whom we become, as does what we get . (...)
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  45. Graham Harman (2011). Meillassoux's Virtual Future. Continent 1 (2):78-91.score: 381.0
    continent. 1.2 (2011): 78-91. This article consists of three parts. First, I will review the major themes of Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude . Since some of my readers will have read this book and others not, I will try to strike a balance between clear summary and fresh critique. Second, I discuss an unpublished book by Meillassoux unfamiliar to all readers of this article, except those scant few that may have gone digging in the microfilm archives of the (...)
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  46. Graham Harman (2011). The Road to Objects. Continent 3 (1):171-179.score: 381.0
    continent. 1.3 (2011): 171-179. Since 2007 there has been a great deal of interest in speculative realism, launched in the spring of that year at a well-attended workshop in London. It was always a loose arrangement of people who shared few explicit doctrines and no intellectual heroes except the horror writer H.P. Lovecraft, an improbable patron saint for a school of metaphysics. Lovecraft serves as a sort of mascot for the “speculative” part of speculative realism, since his grotesque semi-Euclidean monsters (...)
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  47. David Sedley (1998). Platonic Causes. Phronesis 43 (2):114-132.score: 381.0
    This paper examines Plato's ideas on cause-effect relations in the "Phaedo." It maintains that he sees causes as things (not events, states of affairs or the like), with any information as to how that thing brings about the effect relegated to a strictly secondary status. This is argued to make good sense, so long as we recognise that aition means the "thing responsible" and exploit legal analogies in order to understand what this amounts to. Furthermore, provided that we do (...)
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  48. John White (2007). What Schools Are for and Why. Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain IMPACT pamphlet No 14.score: 381.0
    In England and Wales we have had a National Curriculum since 1988. How can it have survived so long without aims to guide it? This IMPACT pamphlet argues that curriculum planning should begin not with a boxed set of academic subjects of a familiar sort, but with wider considerations of what schools should be for. We first work out a defensible set of wider aims backed by a well-argued rationale. From these we develop sub-aims constituting an aims-based (...)
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  49. Graham Harman (2012). Object-Oriented France: The Philosophy of Tristan Garcia. Continent 2 (1):6-21.score: 381.0
    continent. 2.1 (2012): 6–21. The French philosopher and novelist Tristan Garcia was born in Toulouse in 1981. This makes him rather young to have written such an imaginative work of systematic philosophy as Forme et objet , 1 the latest entry in the MétaphysiqueS series at Presses universitaires de France. But this reference to Garcia’s youthfulness is not a form of condescension: by publishing a complete system of philosophy in the grand style, he has already done what none of (...)
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  50. Benedikt Paul Göcke (2012). Panentheism and Classical Theism. Sophia - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysical Theology and Ethics 52 (1):61-75.score: 381.0
    Panentheism seems to be an attractive alternative to classical theism. It is not clear, though, what exactly panentheism asserts and how it relates to classical theism. By way of clarifying the thesis of panentheism, I argue that panentheism and classical theism differ only as regards the modal status of the world. According to panentheism, the world is an intrinsic property of God – necessarily there is a world – and according to classical theism the world is an extrinsic property of (...)
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