Search results for 'How Long Do We Have' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. How Long Do We Have, Every Conscious Machine Brings Us Closer to Death.
    The Doomsday Argument is alive and kicking, and since its formulation in the beginning of the Eighties by the astrophysicist Brandon Carter it has gained wide attention, been strongly criticized and has been described in many different, and sometimes non-interchangeable analogies. I will briefly present the argument here, and departing from Nick Bostrom's interpretation, I will defend that doom may be sooner than we think if we start building conscious machines soon in the future.
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  2.  14
    A. A. Long (1966). Thinking and Sense-Perception in Empedocles: Mysticism or Materialism. Classical Quarterly 16 (02):256-.
    There is more evidence for Empedocles than for any early Greek philosopher before Democritus, yet the details of his philosophy remain controversial and often hopelessly obscure. Jaeger called Empedocles a ‘philosophical centaur’, which aptly sums up the seeming disparity between the and the There is no agreement about the famous simile to illustrate respiration, generally known as the Clepsydra, and the stages and nature of the cosmic cycle continue to be disputed. Perhaps we can never be certain about these aspects (...)
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  3.  7
    Eugene Thomas Long (1981). Experience and the Justification of Religious Belief. Religious Studies 17 (4):499 - 510.
    Perhaps you have heard the story of the philosopher who fell off the edge of a cliff and was hanging by the limb of a tree. After calling for help for some time he heard a voice from the heavens saying, ‘I am here’. The philosopher explained his dilemma and then asked, ‘Can you help me?’ The voice replied, ‘Do you believe in me?’, to which the philosopher without hesitation, given the circumstances, said, ‘Yes, of course’. The voice came (...)
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  4.  18
    Jean Kazez (2006). How Good Do We Have To Be? Philosophy Now 58:28-29.
  5. Jonathan Lear (2006). It is by Now a Terrifying Commonplace–Agreed to by People Across the Political Spectrum, Indeed Across the Divide of Civilizations–That Our Future Well-Being, and That of Future Generations, Depends on Shaping the Hearts and Minds of the Young. Why Do We Think This? And Do We Have Any Idea How to Do It Well? Plato is the First Person in the Western Tradition to Think Seriously About These Questions and It is Worth Going Back to Him; Not Only as a Return to Origins, but Because There Are Aspects of His ... [REVIEW] In Gerasimos Xenophon Santas (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Plato's Republic. Blackwell Pub. 25.
     
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  6.  8
    Frank J. Macke (2008). What Are 'We', And How Do We Know When We Have Communicated? American Journal of Semiotics 15 (1/4):233-248.
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  7.  7
    Lantz Miller (2012). If We Have a Music Instinct, for Which Music? Book Review Essay of Philip Ball,The Music Instinct: How Music Works and Why We Can't Do Without It(London: The Bodley Head, 2010). [REVIEW] Philosophy of Music Education Review 20 (2):177-190.
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  8. Ritchie Calder (1972). How Long Have We Got? Montreal,Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
     
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  9. Primi-Ashley Ranola, Raina M. Merchant, Sarah M. Perman, Abigail M. Khan, David Gaieski, Arthur L. Caplan & James N. Kirkpatrick (2015). How Long is Long Enough, and Have We Done Everything We Should?—Ethics of Calling Codes. Journal of Medical Ethics 41 (8):663-666.
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  10. Jan Narveson Narveson (2002). AIDS in the Third World: How, If at All, Do We Help? [REVIEW] Health Care Analysis 10 (1):109-120.
    The duty to help our fellows is not the same,and not stringent in the same way as thefamiliar duties to refrain from violence toothers, and to be honest. In general, beinghelpful to others is commendable, and to beheld up as a virtue. Only in cases wherereciprocity is possible and likely may we speakof anything stronger along this line. Moreover,the case of AIDS in Africa is furthercomplicated by the fact that it is easilypreventable by readily understandable behavioralterations. However, there are certainpossible (...)
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  11. Eric Schwitzgebel (2002). How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Visual Imagery. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5):35-53.
    Philosophers tend to assume that we have excellent knowledge of our own current conscious experience or 'phenomenology'. I argue that our knowledge of one aspect of our experience, the experience of visual imagery, is actually rather poor. Precedent for this position is found among the introspective psychologists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Two main arguments are advanced toward the conclusion that our knowledge of our own imagery is poor. First, the reader is asked to form a (...)
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  12. Michael Dummett (2003). How Should We Conceive of Time? Philosophy 78 (3):387-396.
    A (would-be) sophisticated answer to the question of the title might be, ‘The question is senseless. We should not conceive of time at all. We should just get on with our ordinary lives, asking and answering the usual questions, such as “What Time is it?”, “How long will it take?”, and so on, which we understand perfectly well. St. Augustine understood such questions, phrased in Latin, as well as we do. He should have been content with that, instead (...)
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  13.  19
    Jesse Hughes & Lambèr M. M. Royakkers (2008). Don't Ever Do That! Long-Term Duties in Pd E L. Studia Logica 89 (1):59 - 79.
    This paper studies long-term norms concerning actions. In Meyer's Propositional Deontic Logic (PDₑL), only immediate duties can be expressed, however, often one has duties of longer durations such as: "Never do that", or "Do this someday". In this paper, we will investigate how to amend (PDₑL) so that such long-term duties can be expressed. This leads to the interesting and suprising consequence that the long-term prohibition and obligation are not interdefinable in our semantics, while there is a (...)
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  14.  10
    Kenneth A. Dahlberg (2001). Democratizing Society and Food Systems: Or How Do We Transform Modern Structures of Power? [REVIEW] Agriculture and Human Values 18 (2):135-151.
    The evolution of societies and food systems across the grand transitions is traced to show how nature and culture have been transformed along with the basic structures of power, politics, and governance. A central, but neglected, element has been the synergy between the creation of industrial institutions and the exponential, but unsustainable growth of the built environment. The values, goals, and strategies needed to transform and diversify these structures – generally and in terms of food and agriculture – are (...)
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  15. Jean-Christophe Sarrazin, Axel Cleeremans & Patrick Haggard (2008). How Do We Know What We Are Doing?: Time, Intention and Awareness of Action. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):602-615.
    Time is a fundamental dimension of consciousness. Many studies of the “sense of agency” have investigated whether we attribute actions to ourselves based on a conscious experience of intention occurring prior to action, or based on a reconstruction after the action itself has occurred. Here, we ask the same question about a lower level aspect of action experience, namely awareness of the detailed spatial form of a simple movement. Subjects reached for a target, which unpredictably jumped to the side (...)
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  16.  43
    D. Patten (2003). How Do We Deceive Ourselves. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):229-247.
    Mistakes about one's own psychological states generally, and about one's reasons for acting specifically, can sometimes be considered self-deceptive. In the present paper, I address the question of how someone can come to be deceived about his own motives. I propose that false beliefs about our own reasons for acting are often formed in much the same way that we acquire false beliefs about the motives of others. In particular, I argue that non-motivated biases resulting from the way we understand (...)
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  17.  27
    Selmer Bringsjord (2001). Are We Evolved Computers?: A Critical Review of Steven Pinker's How the Mind Works. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):227 – 243.
    Steven Pinker's How the mind works (HTMW) marks in my opinion an historic point in the history of humankind's attempt to understand itself. Socrates delivered his "know thyself" imperative rather long ago, and now, finally, in this behemoth of a book, published at the dawn of a new millennium, Pinker steps up to have psychology tell us what we are: computers crafted by evolution - end of story; mystery solved; and the poor philosophers, having never managed to obey (...)
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  18.  13
    J. Sarrazin, A. CleeremAns & P. Haggard (2008). How Do We Know What We Are Doing? Time, Intention and Awareness of Action☆. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):602-615.
    Time is a fundamental dimension of consciousness. Many studies of the “sense of agency” have investigated whether we attribute actions to ourselves based on a conscious experience of intention occurring prior to action, or based on a reconstruction after the action itself has occurred. Here, we ask the same question about a lower level aspect of action experience, namely awareness of the detailed spatial form of a simple movement. Subjects reached for a target, which unpredictably jumped to the side (...)
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  19. John Kekes (2014). How Should We Live?: A Practical Approach to Everyday Morality. University of Chicago Press.
    What is your highest ideal? What code do you live by? We all know that these differ from person to person. Artists, scientists, social activists, farmers, executives, and athletes are guided by very different ideals. Nonetheless for hundreds of years philosophers have sought a single, overriding ideal that should guide everyone, always, everywhere, and after centuries of debate we’re no closer to an answer. In _How Should We Live?_, John Kekes offers a refreshing alternative, one in which we eschew (...)
     
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  20.  35
    Gillian Brock (2005). What Do We Owe Co-Nationals and Non-Nationals? Why the Liberal Nationalist Account Fails and How We Can Do Better. Journal of Global Ethics 1 (2):127 – 151.
    Liberal nationalists have been trying to argue that a suitably sanitized version of nationalism - namely, one that respects and embodies liberal values - is not only morally defensible, but also of great moral value, especially on grounds liberals should find very appealing. Although there are plausible aspects to the idea and some compelling arguments are offered in defense of this position, one area still proves to be a point of considerable vulnerability for this project and that is the (...)
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  21.  38
    Dan Sperber, How Do We Communicate?
    Communicate. We humans do it all the time, and most of the time we do it as a matter of course, without thinking about it. We talk, we listen, we write, we read - as you are doing now - or we draw, we mimic, we nod, we point, we shrug, and, somehow, we manage to make our thoughts known to one another. Of course, there are times when we view communication as something difficult or even impossible to achieve. Yet, (...)
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  22. Benjamin W. Libet (1999). Do We Have Free Will? Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):47-57.
    I have taken an experimental approach to this question. Freely voluntary acts are preceded by a specific electrical change in the brain that begins 550 ms before the act. Human subjects became aware of intention to act 350-400 ms after RP starts, but 200 ms. before the motor act. The volitional process is therefore initiated unconsciously. But the conscious function could still control the outcome; it can veto the act. Free will is therefore not excluded. These findings put constraints (...)
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  23. Benjamin W. Libet (2002). Do We Have Free Will? In Robert H. Kane (ed.), Journal of Consciousness Studies. Oxford University Press 551--564.
    I have taken an experimental approach to this question. Freely voluntary acts are preceded by a specific electrical change in the brain that begins 550 ms before the act. Human subjects became aware of intention to act 350-400 ms after RP starts, but 200 ms. before the motor act. The volitional process is therefore initiated unconsciously. But the conscious function could still control the outcome; it can veto the act. Free will is therefore not excluded. These findings put constraints (...)
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  24.  74
    Al Gini (1998). Work, Identity and Self: How We Are Formed by the Work We Do. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 17 (7):707-714.
    Because work looms so large in our lives I believe that most of us don't reflect on its importance and significance. For most of us, work is well – work, something we have to do to maintain our lives and pay the bills. I believe, however, that work is not just a part of our existence that can be easily separated from the rest of our lives. Work is not simply about the trading of labor for dollars. Perhaps because (...)
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  25. Diego Marconi, How Many Multiplications Can We Do?
    In discussions in cognitive science, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and linguistics, it is often taken for granted that we (as well as some machines) have certain abilities, such as the ability to do multiplications or the ability to identify grammatical sentences. Such abilities are regarded as in some sense infinitary, and they are identified with, or taken to be based upon, knowledge of the relevant rules (the rule of multiplication, or the rules of grammar). In what follows, (...)
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  26.  94
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2000). How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Human Echolocation. Philosophical Topics 28 (5-6):235-46.
    Researchers from the 1940's through the present have found that normal, sighted people can echolocate - that is, detect properties of silent objects by attending to sound reflected from them. We argue that echolocation is a normal part of our conscious, perceptual experience. Despite this, we argue that people are often grossly mistaken about their experience of echolocation. If so, echolocation provides a counterexample to the view that we cannot be seriously mistaken about our own current conscious experience.
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  27.  69
    Dana K. Nelkin (2007). Do We Have a Coherent Set of Intuitions About Moral Responsibility? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):243–259.
    I believe that the data is both fascinating and instructive, but in this paper I will resist the conclusion that we must give up Invariantism, or, as I prefer to call it, Unificationism. In the process of examining the challenging data and responding to it, I will try to draw some larger lessons about how to use the kind of data being collected. First, I will provide a brief description of some influential theories of responsibility, and then explain the threat (...)
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  28.  4
    Janina Sombetzki (2016). How “Post” Do We Want to Be – Really?: The Boon and Bane of Enlightenment Humanism. Cultura 13 (1):161-180.
    Popular posthumanist theories are revealing a lot about their origin from enlightenment humanism. In this paper I will firstly have a closer look on the history of the enlightenment-humanistic concept of human nature and its roots in the Mesopotamian Epic of Gilgamesh. Afterwards I will show how this notion of human nature will be broadened in transhumanist thinking, turned upside down as a modern enlightenment humanism, or even deformed and perverted in the popular posthumanist vision of the immortal and (...)
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  29.  32
    Jon Williamson (2014). How Uncertain Do We Need to Be? Erkenntnis 79 (6):1249-1271.
    Expert probability forecasts can be useful for decision making . But levels of uncertainty escalate: however the forecaster expresses the uncertainty that attaches to a forecast, there are good reasons for her to express a further level of uncertainty, in the shape of either imprecision or higher order uncertainty . Bayesian epistemology provides the means to halt this escalator, by tying expressions of uncertainty to the propositions expressible in an agent’s language . But Bayesian epistemology comes in three main varieties. (...)
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  30.  66
    Grazer Philosophise he Studien (2001). How Do We Ever Get Up? On the Proximate Causation of Actions and Events. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61:43.
    Many candidates have been tried out as proximate causes of actions: belief-desire pairs, volitions, motives, intentions, and other kinds of pro-attitudes. None of these mental states or events, however, seems to be able to do the trick, that is, to get things going. Each of them may occur without an appropriate action ensuing. After reviewing several attempts at closing the alleged “causal gap”, it is argued that on a correct analysis, there is no missing link waiting to be discovered. (...)
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  31.  12
    Michael S. Gordon (2000). How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? Philosophical Topics 28 (2):235-246.
    Researchers from the 1940's through the present have found that normal, sighted people can echolocate - that is, detect properties of silent objects by attending to sound reflected from them. We argue that echolocation is a normal part of our perceptual experience and that there is something 'it is like' to echolocate. Furthermore, we argue that people are often grossly mistaken about their experience of echolocation. If so, echolocation provides a counterexample to the view that we cannot be mistaken (...)
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  32.  2
    Jon Williamson, How Uncertain Do We Need to Be?
    Expert probability forecasts can be useful for decision making. But levels of uncertainty escalate: however the forecaster expresses the uncertainty that attaches to a forecast, there are good reasons for her to express a further level of uncertainty, in the shape of either imprecision or higher order uncertainty. Bayesian epistemology provides the means to halt this escalator, by tying expressions of uncertainty to the propositions expressible in an agent’s language. But Bayesian epistemology comes in three main varieties. Strictly subjective Bayesianism (...)
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  33.  2
    Andrei Marmor (2001). Do We Have a Right to Common Goods? Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 14 (2):213-225.
    The essay explores the question of whether people can have a right to common goods, such as the flourishing of their culture or national heritage. It first explains the concept of a common good and its distinction from other similar concepts, such as collective and public goods. Second, it argues that individuals ought not to have a right to common goods, unless a particular distributive principle applies to the good in question, and then the individual's right is the (...)
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  34.  3
    Kendall D'Andrade (1986). How Badly Do We Need Theory Z? Journal of Business Ethics 5 (3):219 - 223.
    In Theory Z-style management everybody participates in corporate decision making. This more open process should give us fewer Pintos, Love Canals, and massive international payoffs as executives are forced to expose their reasoning to the moral sensibilities of the whole corporation. So far everything looks good. But we are a long way from showing that only corporations so managed can be fully moral. Yet Dwiggins seems to believe this, putting his faith in the basic goodness of the many while (...)
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  35. Geert Keil (2001). How Do We Ever Get Up? On the Proximate Causation of Actions and Events. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61 (1):43-62.
    Many candidates have been tried out as proximate causes of actions: belief-desire pairs, volitions, motives, intentions, and other kinds of pro-attitudes. None of these mental states or events, however, seems to be able to do the trick, that is, to get things going. Each of them may occur without an appropriate action ensuing. After reviewing several attempts at closing the alleged “causal gap”, it is argued that on a correct analysis, there is no missing link waiting to be discovered. (...)
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  36.  59
    Joseph Millum (2008). How Do We Acquire Parental Responsibilities? Social Theory and Practice 34 (1):71-93.
    It is commonly believed that parents have special duties toward their children—weightier duties than they owe other children. How these duties are acquired, however, is not well understood. This is problematic when claims about parental responsibilities are challenged; for example, when people deny that they are morally responsible for their biological offspring. In this paper I present a theory of the origins of parental responsibilities that can resolve such cases of disputed moral parenthood.
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  37.  44
    Joseph Millum (2010). How Do We Acquire Parental Rights? Social Theory and Practice 36 (1):112-132.
    In this paper I develop a theory of the acquisition of parental rights that can help us make these judgments. According to this investment theory, parental rights are generated by the performance of parental work. Thus, those who successfully parent a child have the right to continue to do so, and to exclude others from so doing. The account derives from a more general principle of desert that applies outside the domain of parenthood. It also has some interesting implications (...)
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  38. Alan Randall, We Already Have Risk Management – Do We Really Need the Precautionary Principle?
    The precautionary principle (PP) is fundamentally a claim that acting to avoid and/or mitigate threats of serious harm should be accorded high priority in public policy. Over the last three decades, governments and international bodies have endorsed it in principle, and some of them have incorporated it into some areas of policy practice. Yet, PP is controversial in policy circles, public discussion and scholarly discourse. Here the PP literature is reviewed from the perspective of economics, where the tendency (...)
     
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  39.  11
    Lothar Spillmann & John S. Werner (1998). How Do We See What is Not There? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):773-774.
    Pessoa et al. provide a valuable taxonomy of perceptual completion phenomena, but it is not yet clear whether these phenomena are mediated by one kind of neural mechanism or more. We suggest three possible neural mechanisms of long-range interaction to stimulate further perceptual and neurophysiological investigation of perceptual completion and filling-in.
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  40.  30
    Ibo van de Poel (2008). How Should We Do Nanoethics? A Network Approach for Discerning Ethical Issues in Nanotechnology. NanoEthics 2 (1):25-38.
    There is no agreement on how nanoethics should proceed. In this article I focus on approaches for discerning ethical issues in nanotechnology, which is as of yet one of the most difficult and urging tasks for nanoethics. I discuss and criticize two existing approaches for discerning ethical issues in nanotechnology and propose a network approach as alternative. I discuss debates in nanoethics about the desirable role of ethics in nanotechnological development and about the newness of ethical issues in nanotechnology. On (...)
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  41.  84
    O. A. Donskikh & A. N. Kochergin (1992). Do We Have a Scientific Conception of the History of Philosophy? Polemical Notes. Russian Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):26-48.
    A necessary condition for the development of a philosophical culture is the possession of a history of philosophy that conserves the experience of posing and discussing philosophical problems. Apologetics, dogmatism, a rigid devotion to the class approach, and ignoring universal human values for a long time dominated our social science and substantially deformed the way the history of philosophy was taught, giving rise to a number of stereotypes that hinder the revival of the skills of a culture of professional (...)
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  42.  29
    Joachim Boldt (2013). Do We Have A Moral Obligation to Synthesize Organisms to Increase Biodiversity? On Kinship, Awe, and the Value of Life's Diversity. Bioethics 27 (8):411-418.
    Synthetic biology can be understood as expanding the abilities and aspirations of genetic engineering. Nonetheless, whereas genetic engineering has been subject to criticism due to its endangering biodiversity, synthetic biology may actually appear to prove advantageous for biodiversity. After all, one might claim, synthesizing novel forms of life increases the numbers of species present in nature and thus ought to be ethically recommended. Two perspectives on how to spell out the conception of intrinsic value of biodiversity are examined in order (...)
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  43.  7
    James Griffin (1993). How We Do Ethics Now. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 35:159-177.
    By far the most common form of argument in ethics nowadays is what can be called piecemeal appeal to intuition. Any reader of philosophy will know the kind of thing I mean. ‘On your principle, it would be all right to do such-and-such. But that's counter-intuitive. So your principle is wrong.’ The word ‘intuition’ here is not used, as it was in earlier times, to refer to a special way of knowing; instead it is used to mean merely a moral (...)
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  44.  59
    G. Sereny (2011). How Do We Know That the Godel Sentence of a Consistent Theory Is True? Philosophia Mathematica 19 (1):47-73.
    Some earlier remarks Michael Dummett made on Gödel’s theorem have recently inspired attempts to formulate an alternative to the standard demonstration of the truth of the Gödel sentence. The idea underlying the non-standard approach is to treat the Gödel sentence as an ordinary arithmetical one. But the Gödel sentence is of a very specific nature. Consequently, the non-standard arguments are conceptually mistaken. In this paper, both the faulty arguments themselves and the general reasons underlying their failure are analysed. The (...)
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  45.  56
    Robert Hanna (1998). How Do We Know Necessary Truths? Kant's Answer. European Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):115–145.
    It is traditionally held that our knowledge of necessity is a priori; but the familiar theories of a priori knowledge – platonism and conventionalism – have now been discredited, and replaced by either modal skepticism or a posteriori essentialism. The main thesis of this paper is that Kant's theory of a priori knowledge, when detached from his transcendental idealism, offers a genuine alternative to these unpalatable options. According to Kant's doctrine, all epistemic necessity is grounded directly or indirectly on (...)
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  46.  8
    Georg Marckmann (2001). Teaching Science Vs. The Apprentice Model €“ Do We Really Have the Choice? Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 4 (1):85-89.
    The debate about the appropriate methodology of medical education has been (and still is) dominated by the opposing poles of teaching science versus teaching practical skills. I will argue that this conflict between scientific education and practical training has its roots in the underlying, more systematic question about the conceptual foundation of medicine: how far or in what respects can medicine be considered to be a science? By analyzing the epistemological status of medicine I will show that the internal aim (...)
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  47. Mary Ann Baily (2006). How Do We Avoid Compounding the Damage? American Journal of Bioethics 6 (5):36 – 38.
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  48.  10
    Margaret C. Jacob (2014). How Radical Was the Enlightenment? What Do We Mean by Radical? Diametros 40:99-114.
    The Radical Enlightenment has been much discussed and its original meaning somewhat distorted. In 1981 my concept of the storm that unleashed a new, transnational intellectual movement possessed a strong contextual and political element that I believed, and still believe, to be critically important. Idealist accounts of enlightened ideas that divorce them from politics leave out the lived quality of the new radicalism born in reaction to monarchical and clerical absolutism. Taking the religious impulse seriously and working to defang it (...)
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  49.  13
    Gavriel Rosenfeld (2002). Why Do We Ask "What If?" Reflections on the Function of Alternate History. History and Theory 41 (4):90–103.
    The new prominence of alternate history in Western popular culture has increasingly prompted scholars to historicize it as a broader phenomenon. What has largely escaped notice until now, however, has been the question of the underlying function of alternate history as a genre of speculative narrative representation. In this essay, I argue that writers and scholars have long produced “allohistorical narratives” out of fundamentally presentist motives. Allohistorical tales have assumed different typological forms depending upon how their authors (...)
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  50.  6
    Manfred Kuehn (2011). How, or Why, Do We Come to Think of a World of Things in Themselves? Kantian Review 16 (2):221-233.
    The interpretation of Kant's Critical philosophy as a version of traditional idealism has a long history. In spite of Kant's and his commentators’ various attempts to distinguish between traditional and transcendental idealism, his philosophy continues to be construed as committed to various features usually associated with the traditional idealist project. As a result, most often, the accusation is that his Critical philosophy makes too strong metaphysical and epistemological claims.In his The Revolutionary Kant, Graham Bird engages in a systematic and (...)
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