Search results for 'How Long Do We Have' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. How Long Do We Have, Every Conscious Machine Brings Us Closer to Death.score: 804.0
    The Doomsday Argument is alive and kicking, and since its formulation in the beginning of the Eighties by the astrophysicist Brandon Carter it has gained wide attention, been strongly criticized and has been described in many different, and sometimes non-interchangeable analogies. I will briefly present the argument here, and departing from Nick Bostrom's interpretation, I will defend that doom may be sooner than we think if we start building conscious machines soon in the future.
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  2. Cheng Long (2008). On Ontology Being a Philosophy Tendency. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 17:275-296.score: 510.0
    This paper tries to show that ontology is one of the important tendencies in the future philosophy. The author thinks that ontology as the basic spirit makes philosophy be different from other subjects. Ontology originates from people’s examination to essence of the world. However, ancient long-term argument couldn’t get any clear conclusion. So philosophers gradually understand that ontology is connected with epistemology. If we want to make a good explanation to ontology, we must return to check ourselves cognition. And (...)
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  3. Catherine Osborne (1983). Aristotle, De Anima 3. 2: How Do We Perceive That We See and Hear? Classical Quarterly 33 (02):401-411.score: 160.8
    The second chapter of book three of the De anima marks the end of Aristotle's discussion of sense-perception. The chapter is a long one and apparently rambling in subject matter. It begins with a passage that is usually taken as a discussion of some sort of self-awareness, particularly awareness that one is perceiving, although such an interpretation raises some difficulties. This paper reconsiders the problems raised by supposing that the question discussed in the first paragraph is ‘how do we (...)
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  4. Jean Kazez (2006). How Good Do We Have To Be? Philosophy Now 58:28-29.score: 151.2
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  5. Jonathan Lear (2006). It is by Now a Terrifying Commonplace–Agreed to by People Across the Political Spectrum, Indeed Across the Divide of Civilizations–That Our Future Well-Being, and That of Future Generations, Depends on Shaping the Hearts and Minds of the Young. Why Do We Think This? And Do We Have Any Idea How to Do It Well? Plato is the First Person in the Western Tradition to Think Seriously About These Questions and It is Worth Going Back to Him; Not Only as a Return to Origins, but Because There Are Aspects of His ... [REVIEW] In Gerasimos Xenophon Santas (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Plato's Republic. Blackwell Pub.. 25.score: 149.4
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  6. Lantz Miller (2012). If We Have a Music Instinct, for Which Music? Book Review Essay of Philip Ball,The Music Instinct: How Music Works and Why We Can't Do Without It(London: The Bodley Head, 2010). [REVIEW] Philosophy of Music Education Review 20 (2):177-190.score: 147.6
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  7. Ritchie Calder (1972). How Long Have We Got? Montreal,Mcgill-Queen's University Press.score: 147.6
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  8. Frank J. Macke (2008). What Are 'We', And How Do We Know When We Have Communicated? American Journal of Semiotics 15 (1/4):233-248.score: 147.6
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  9. W. Franklin Harris (1995). Policy and Partnership What Have We Learned? How Can We Do Better? Bioscience 45 (Supplement 1):S - 64.score: 144.0
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  10. Jan Narveson Narveson (2002). AIDS in the Third World: How, If at All, Do We Help? [REVIEW] Health Care Analysis 10 (1):109-120.score: 132.6
    The duty to help our fellows is not the same,and not stringent in the same way as thefamiliar duties to refrain from violence toothers, and to be honest. In general, beinghelpful to others is commendable, and to beheld up as a virtue. Only in cases wherereciprocity is possible and likely may we speakof anything stronger along this line. Moreover,the case of AIDS in Africa is furthercomplicated by the fact that it is easilypreventable by readily understandable behavioralterations. However, there are certainpossible (...)
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  11. Ralph Schumacher (2007). Do We Have to Be Realists About Colour in Order to Be Able to Attribute Colour Perceptions to Other Persons? Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):233 - 246.score: 113.4
    One of the main targets of Barry Stroud’s criticism in his recent book ‚The Quest for Reality. Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of Colour’ are eliminativist theories of colour which he regards as a version of the metaphysical project of the unmasking of colours (Stroud, 2000). According to this view, no physical objects have any of the colours we see them or believe them to have. However, although this error theory describes all our colour perceptions as illusory, and all (...)
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  12. Derek Michaud (2013). Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death? Edited by Georg Gasser . Pp. Xvi, 277, Farnham, Ashgate, 2010, £55.00/$99.95. [REVIEW] Heythrop Journal 54 (2):330-331.score: 112.8
    Book review of Georg Gasser, ed. “Personal Identity: How do we Survive Our Death?” (Ashgate, 2010).
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  13. Tyler Cowen, How Do We Define the Feasible Set?score: 112.8
    How should we define the “feasible set”? What does it mean to assert that a policy is the “best feasible option”? Feasibility is most plausibly a matter of degree rather than of kind. We therefore must think about how to do normative economics with a fuzzy social budget constraint. I consider a number of ways of proceeding, including a twodimensional social welfare function, weighting both desirability and feasibility. Focusing on the difficulties in the feasibility concept may help us resolve some (...)
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  14. Kenneth A. Dahlberg (2001). Democratizing Society and Food Systems: Or How Do We Transform Modern Structures of Power? [REVIEW] Agriculture and Human Values 18 (2):135-151.score: 112.8
    The evolution of societies and food systems across the grand transitions is traced to show how nature and culture have been transformed along with the basic structures of power, politics, and governance. A central, but neglected, element has been the synergy between the creation of industrial institutions and the exponential, but unsustainable growth of the built environment. The values, goals, and strategies needed to transform and diversify these structures – generally and in terms of food and agriculture – are (...)
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  15. Arnold M. Ludwig (1997). How Do We Know Who We Are?: A Biography of the Self. Oxford University Press.score: 112.8
    "The terrain of the self is vast," notes renowned psychiatrist Arnold Ludwig, "parts known, parts impenetrable, and parts unexplored." How do we construct a sense of ourselves? How can a self reflect upon itself or deceive itself? Is all personal identity plagiarized? Is a "true" or "authentic" self even possible? Is it possible to really "know" someone else or ourselves for that matter? To answer these and many other intriguing questions, Ludwig takes a unique approach, examining the art of biography (...)
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  16. Michael Dummett (2003). How Should We Conceive of Time? Philosophy 78 (3):387-396.score: 112.2
    A (would-be) sophisticated answer to the question of the title might be, ‘The question is senseless. We should not conceive of time at all. We should just get on with our ordinary lives, asking and answering the usual questions, such as “What Time is it?”, “How long will it take?”, and so on, which we understand perfectly well. St. Augustine understood such questions, phrased in Latin, as well as we do. He should have been content with that, instead (...)
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  17. Jesse Hughes & Lambèr M. M. Royakkers (2008). Don't Ever Do That! Long-Term Duties in Pd E L. Studia Logica 89 (1):59 - 79.score: 112.2
    This paper studies long-term norms concerning actions. In Meyer's Propositional Deontic Logic (PDₑL), only immediate duties can be expressed, however, often one has duties of longer durations such as: "Never do that", or "Do this someday". In this paper, we will investigate how to amend (PDₑL) so that such long-term duties can be expressed. This leads to the interesting and suprising consequence that the long-term prohibition and obligation are not interdefinable in our semantics, while there is a (...)
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  18. Jean-Christophe Sarrazin, Axel Cleeremans & Patrick Haggard (2008). How Do We Know What We Are Doing?: Time, Intention and Awareness of Action. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):602-615.score: 111.6
    Time is a fundamental dimension of consciousness. Many studies of the “sense of agency” have investigated whether we attribute actions to ourselves based on a conscious experience of intention occurring prior to action, or based on a reconstruction after the action itself has occurred. Here, we ask the same question about a lower level aspect of action experience, namely awareness of the detailed spatial form of a simple movement. Subjects reached for a target, which unpredictably jumped to the side (...)
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  19. D. Patten (2003). How Do We Deceive Ourselves. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):229-247.score: 111.6
    Mistakes about one's own psychological states generally, and about one's reasons for acting specifically, can sometimes be considered self-deceptive. In the present paper, I address the question of how someone can come to be deceived about his own motives. I propose that false beliefs about our own reasons for acting are often formed in much the same way that we acquire false beliefs about the motives of others. In particular, I argue that non-motivated biases resulting from the way we understand (...)
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  20. Gillian Brock (2005). What Do We Owe Co-Nationals and Non-Nationals? Why the Liberal Nationalist Account Fails and How We Can Do Better. Journal of Global Ethics 1 (2):127 – 151.score: 111.6
    Liberal nationalists have been trying to argue that a suitably sanitized version of nationalism - namely, one that respects and embodies liberal values - is not only morally defensible, but also of great moral value, especially on grounds liberals should find very appealing. Although there are plausible aspects to the idea and some compelling arguments are offered in defense of this position, one area still proves to be a point of considerable vulnerability for this project and that is the (...)
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  21. Erik Weber (1999). Unification: What is It, How Do We Reach and Why Do We Want It? Synthese 118 (3):479-499.score: 111.6
    This article has three aims. The first is to give a partial explication of the concept of unification. My explication will be partial because I confine myself to unification of particular events, because I do not consider events of a quantitative nature, and discuss only deductive cases. The second aim is to analyze how unification can be reached. My third aim is to show that unification is an intellectual benefit. Instead of being an intellectual benefit unification could be an intellectual (...)
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  22. Dan Sperber, How Do We Communicate?score: 111.6
    Communicate. We humans do it all the time, and most of the time we do it as a matter of course, without thinking about it. We talk, we listen, we write, we read - as you are doing now - or we draw, we mimic, we nod, we point, we shrug, and, somehow, we manage to make our thoughts known to one another. Of course, there are times when we view communication as something difficult or even impossible to achieve. Yet, (...)
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  23. Selmer Bringsjord (2001). Are We Evolved Computers?: A Critical Review of Steven Pinker's How the Mind Works. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):227 – 243.score: 111.0
    Steven Pinker's How the mind works (HTMW) marks in my opinion an historic point in the history of humankind's attempt to understand itself. Socrates delivered his "know thyself" imperative rather long ago, and now, finally, in this behemoth of a book, published at the dawn of a new millennium, Pinker steps up to have psychology tell us what we are: computers crafted by evolution - end of story; mystery solved; and the poor philosophers, having never managed to obey (...)
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  24. Al Gini (1998). Work, Identity and Self: How We Are Formed by the Work We Do. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 17 (7):707-714.score: 109.2
    Because work looms so large in our lives I believe that most of us don't reflect on its importance and significance. For most of us, work is well – work, something we have to do to maintain our lives and pay the bills. I believe, however, that work is not just a part of our existence that can be easily separated from the rest of our lives. Work is not simply about the trading of labor for dollars. Perhaps because (...)
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  25. Diego Marconi, How Many Multiplications Can We Do?score: 108.0
    In discussions in cognitive science, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and linguistics, it is often taken for granted that we (as well as some machines) have certain abilities, such as the ability to do multiplications or the ability to identify grammatical sentences. Such abilities are regarded as in some sense infinitary, and they are identified with, or taken to be based upon, knowledge of the relevant rules (the rule of multiplication, or the rules of grammar). In what follows, (...)
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  26. Ninni Wahlström (2010). Do We Need to Talk to Each Other? How the Concept of Experience Can Contribute to an Understanding of Bildung and Democracy. Educational Philosophy and Theory 42 (3):293-309.score: 101.6
    In this article I argue that the contested concept of Bildung, with its roots in the late 18th century, remains of interest in the postmodern era, even if there is also certainly a debate about it having had its day. In the specific discussion about Bildung and democracy, I suggest that Dewey's reconstructed concept of experience has several points in common with a more recent understanding of Bildung, at the same time as it can provide insight into how democracy can (...)
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  27. David Kovacs (2009). Do We Have the End of Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus? Journal of Hellenic Studies 129:53-.score: 99.6
    The objections against the transmitted ending of OT (1424-1530) raised by scholars since the eighteenth century and most recently by R.D. Dawe deserve to be taken seriously, but only the last 63 lines (1468-1530, called B below) are open to truly serious objections, both verbal and dramaturgical. By contrast, objections against 1424-67 (called A below) are mostly slight, and in addition they are protected by an earlier passage in the play that seems to prepare the audience for Creon's demand that (...)
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  28. Dana K. Nelkin (2007). Do We Have a Coherent Set of Intuitions About Moral Responsibility? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):243–259.score: 98.4
    I believe that the data is both fascinating and instructive, but in this paper I will resist the conclusion that we must give up Invariantism, or, as I prefer to call it, Unificationism. In the process of examining the challenging data and responding to it, I will try to draw some larger lessons about how to use the kind of data being collected. First, I will provide a brief description of some influential theories of responsibility, and then explain the threat (...)
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  29. Eric Schwitzgebel (2000). How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Human Echolocation. Philosophical Topics 28 (5-6):235-46.score: 98.4
    Researchers from the 1940's through the present have found that normal, sighted people can echolocate - that is, detect properties of silent objects by attending to sound reflected from them. We argue that echolocation is a normal part of our conscious, perceptual experience. Despite this, we argue that people are often grossly mistaken about their experience of echolocation. If so, echolocation provides a counterexample to the view that we cannot be seriously mistaken about our own current conscious experience.
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  30. Jon Williamson (2013). How Uncertain Do We Need to Be? Erkenntnis:1-23.score: 98.4
    Expert probability forecasts can be useful for decision making (Sect. 1). But levels of uncertainty escalate: however the forecaster expresses the uncertainty that attaches to a forecast, there are good reasons for her to express a further level of uncertainty, in the shape of either imprecision or higher order uncertainty (Sect. 2). Bayesian epistemology provides the means to halt this escalator, by tying expressions of uncertainty to the propositions expressible in an agent’s language (Sect. 3). But Bayesian epistemology comes in (...)
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  31. D. Strech (2010). How Factual Do We Want the Facts? Criteria for a Critical Appraisal of Empirical Research for Use in Ethics. Journal of Medical Ethics 36 (4):222-225.score: 98.4
    Most contributions to the current debate about the consideration and application of empirical information in ethics scholarship deal with epistemological issues such as the role and the meaning of empirical research in ethical reasoning. Despite the increased publication of empirical data in ethics literature we still lack systematic analyses and conceptual frameworks that would help us to understand the rarely discussed methodological and practical problems in appraising empirical research. This paper demonstrates the need for critical appraisal and its crucial methodological (...)
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  32. Kendall D'Andrade (1986). How Badly Do We Need Theory Z? Journal of Business Ethics 5 (3):219 - 223.score: 98.4
    In Theory Z-style management everybody participates in corporate decision making. This more open process should give us fewer Pintos, Love Canals, and massive international payoffs as executives are forced to expose their reasoning to the moral sensibilities of the whole corporation. So far everything looks good. But we are a long way from showing that only corporations so managed can be fully moral. Yet Dwiggins seems to believe this, putting his faith in the basic goodness of the many while (...)
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  33. Josefa Toribio (2008). How Do We Know How? Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):39 – 52.score: 96.6
    I raise some doubts about the plausibility of Stanley and Williamson's view that all knowledge-how is just a species of propositional knowledge. By tackling the question of what is involved in entertaining a proposition, I try to show that Stanley and Williamson's position leads to an uncomfortable dilemma. Depending on how we understand the notion of contemplating a proposition, either intuitively central cases of knowing-how cannot be thus classified or we lose our grip on the very idea of propositional knowledge, (...)
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  34. Berit Brogaard (2012). What Do We Say When We Say How or What We Feel? Philosophers' Imprint 12 (11).score: 96.6
    Discourse containing the verb ‘feel’, almost without exception, purports to describe inner experience. Though this much is evident, the question remains what exactly is conveyed when we talk about what and how we feel? Does discourse containing the word ‘feel’ actually succeed in describing the content and phenomenology of inner experience? If so, how does it reflect the phenomenology and content of the experience it describes? Here I offer a linguistic analysis of ‘feels’ reports and argue that a subset of (...)
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  35. Alan Randall, We Already Have Risk Management – Do We Really Need the Precautionary Principle?score: 96.6
    The precautionary principle (PP) is fundamentally a claim that acting to avoid and/or mitigate threats of serious harm should be accorded high priority in public policy. Over the last three decades, governments and international bodies have endorsed it in principle, and some of them have incorporated it into some areas of policy practice. Yet, PP is controversial in policy circles, public discussion and scholarly discourse. Here the PP literature is reviewed from the perspective of economics, where the tendency (...)
     
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  36. Daniel A. Sternberg & James L. McClelland (2009). How Do We Get From Propositions to Behavior? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):226-227.score: 96.6
    Mitchell et al. describe many fascinating studies, and in the process, propose what they consider to be a unified framework for human learning in which effortful, controlled learning results in propositional knowledge. However, it is unclear how any of their findings privilege a propositional account, and we remain concerned that embedding all knowledge in propositional representations obscures the tight interdependence between learning from experiences and the use of the results of learning as a basis for action.
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  37. Geert Keil (2001). How Do We Ever Get Up? On the Proximate Causation of Actions and Events. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61 (1):43-62.score: 96.6
    Many candidates have been tried out as proximate causes of actions: belief-desire pairs, volitions, motives, intentions, and other kinds of pro-attitudes. None of these mental states or events, however, seems to be able to do the trick, that is, to get things going. Each of them may occur without an appropriate action ensuing. After reviewing several attempts at closing the alleged “causal gap”, it is argued that on a correct analysis, there is no missing link waiting to be discovered. (...)
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  38. Joseph Millum (2010). How Do We Acquire Parental Rights? Social Theory and Practice 36 (1):112-132.score: 96.6
    In this paper I develop a theory of the acquisition of parental rights that can help us make these judgments. According to this investment theory, parental rights are generated by the performance of parental work. Thus, those who successfully parent a child have the right to continue to do so, and to exclude others from so doing. The account derives from a more general principle of desert that applies outside the domain of parenthood. It also has some interesting implications (...)
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  39. Joseph Millum (2008). How Do We Acquire Parental Responsibilities? Social Theory and Practice 34 (1):71-93.score: 96.6
    It is commonly believed that parents have special duties toward their children—weightier duties than they owe other children. How these duties are acquired, however, is not well understood. This is problematic when claims about parental responsibilities are challenged; for example, when people deny that they are morally responsible for their biological offspring. In this paper I present a theory of the origins of parental responsibilities that can resolve such cases of disputed moral parenthood.
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  40. Mark Schweda & Georg Marckmann (2013). How Do We Want to Grow Old? Anti‐Ageing‐Medicine and the Scope of Public Healthcare in Liberal Democracies. Bioethics 27 (7):357-364.score: 96.6
    Healthcare counts as a morally relevant good whose distribution should neither be left to the free market nor be simply imposed by governmental decisions without further justification. This problem is particularly prevalent in the current boom of anti-ageing medicine. While the public demand for medical interventions which promise a longer, healthier and more active and attractive life has been increasing, public healthcare systems usually do not cover these products and services, thus leaving their allocation to the mechanisms of supply and (...)
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  41. Lothar Spillmann & John S. Werner (1998). How Do We See What is Not There? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):773-774.score: 96.6
    Pessoa et al. provide a valuable taxonomy of perceptual completion phenomena, but it is not yet clear whether these phenomena are mediated by one kind of neural mechanism or more. We suggest three possible neural mechanisms of long-range interaction to stimulate further perceptual and neurophysiological investigation of perceptual completion and filling-in.
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  42. Thierry Chaminade, Delphine Rosset, David Da Fonseca, Bruno Nazarian, Ewald Lutcher, Gordon Cheng & Christine Deruelle (2012). How Do We Think Machines Think? An fMRI Study of Alleged Competition with an Artificial Intelligence. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6.score: 96.6
    Humans are particularly skilled in mentalizing, the inference of other agents’ hidden mental states. Here we question whether activity in brain areas involved in mentalizing is specific to the processing of mental states or can be generalized to the inference of non-mental states by investigating brain responses during the interaction with an artificial agent. Participants were scanned using fMRI during interactive rock-paper-scissors games while believing the opponent was a fellow human (Intentional agent), a humanoid robot endowed with an algorithm developed (...)
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  43. Caterina Artuso, Paola Palladino & Paola Ricciardelli (2012). How Do We Update Faces? Effects of Gaze Direction and Facial Expressions on Working Memory Updating. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 96.6
    The aim of the study was to investigate how the biological binding between different facial dimensions, and their social and communicative relevance, may impact updating processes in working memory (WM). We focused on WM updating because it plays a key role in ongoing processing. Gaze direction and facial expression are crucial and changeable components of face processing. Direct gaze enhances the processing of approach-oriented facial emotional expressions (e.g. joy), while averted gaze enhances the processing of avoidance-oriented facial emotional expressions (e.g. (...)
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  44. Paola Ricciardelli Caterina Artuso, Paola Palladino (2012). How Do We Update Faces? Effects of Gaze Direction and Facial Expressions on Working Memory Updating. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 96.6
    The aim of the study was to investigate how the biological binding between different facial dimensions, and their social and communicative relevance, may impact updating processes in working memory (WM). We focused on WM updating because it plays a key role in ongoing processing. Gaze direction and facial expression are crucial and changeable components of face processing. Direct gaze enhances the processing of approach-oriented facial emotional expressions (e.g. joy), while averted gaze enhances the processing of avoidance-oriented facial emotional expressions (e.g. (...)
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  45. M. -C. Jaberoo, J. Joseph, G. Korgaonkar, K. Mylvaganam, B. Adams & M. Keene (2013). Medico-Legal and Ethical Aspects of Nasal Fractures Secondary to Assault: Do We Owe a Duty of Care to Advise Patients to Have a Facial X-Ray? Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (2):125-126.score: 96.6
    Guidelines advise that x-rays do not contribute to the clinical management of simple nasal fractures. However, in cases of simple nasal fracture secondary to assault, a facial x-ray may provide additional legal evidence should the victim wish to press charges, though there is no published guidance. We examine the ethical and medico-legal issues surrounding this controversial area.
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  46. Christine Deruelle Thierry Chaminade, Delphine Rosset, David Da Fonseca, Bruno Nazarian, Ewald Lutcher, Gordon Cheng (2012). How Do We Think Machines Think? An fMRI Study of Alleged Competition with an Artificial Intelligence. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6.score: 96.6
    Humans are particularly skilled in mentalizing, the inference of other agents’ hidden mental states. Here we question whether activity in brain areas involved in mentalizing is specific to the processing of mental states or can be generalized to the inference of non-mental states by investigating brain responses during the interaction with an artificial agent. Participants were scanned using fMRI during interactive rock-paper-scissors games while believing the opponent was a fellow human (Intentional agent), a humanoid robot endowed with an algorithm developed (...)
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  47. Philippe Gagnon (2010). “What We Have Learnt From Systems Theory About the Things That Nature’s Understanding Achieves”. In Dirk Evers, Antje Jackelén & Taede Smedes (eds.), How do we Know? Understanding in Science and Theology. Forum Scientiarum.score: 96.0
    The problem of knowledge has been centred around the study of the content of our consciousness, seeing the world through internal representation, without any satisfactory account of the operations of nature that would be a pre-condition for our own performances in terms of concept efficiency in organizing action externally. If we want to better understand where and how meaning fits in nature, we have to find the proper way to decipher its organization, and account for the fact that we (...)
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  48. Ibo van de Poel (2008). How Should We Do Nanoethics? A Network Approach for Discerning Ethical Issues in Nanotechnology. NanoEthics 2 (1):25-38.score: 93.0
    There is no agreement on how nanoethics should proceed. In this article I focus on approaches for discerning ethical issues in nanotechnology, which is as of yet one of the most difficult and urging tasks for nanoethics. I discuss and criticize two existing approaches for discerning ethical issues in nanotechnology and propose a network approach as alternative. I discuss debates in nanoethics about the desirable role of ethics in nanotechnological development and about the newness of ethical issues in nanotechnology. On (...)
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  49. J. S. Jordan (2012). The Wild Ways of Conscious Will: What We Do, How We Do It, and Why It has Meaning. Frontiers in Psychology 4:574-574.score: 93.0
    It is becoming increasingly mainstream to claim that conscious will is an illusion. This assertion is based on a host of findings that indicate conscious will does not share an efficient-cause relationship with actions. As an alternative, the present paper will propose that conscious will is not about causing actions, but rather, about constraining action systems toward producing outcomes. In addition, it will be proposed that we generate and sustain multiple outcomes simultaneously because the multi-scale dynamics by which we do (...)
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  50. Patricia Churchland, The Big Questions: Do We Have Free Will?score: 89.4
    As neuroscience uncovers these and other mechanisms regulating choices and social behaviour, we cannot help but wonder whether anyone truly chooses anything (though see "Is the universe deterministic?"). As a result, profound questions about responsibility are inescapable, not just regarding criminal justice, but in the day-to-day business of life. Given that, I suggest that free will, as traditionally understood, needs modification. Because of its importance in society, any description of free will updated to fit what we know about the nervous (...)
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