- Derek A. McDougall (1972). Religious Belief and Philosophical Analysis. Mind 81 (324):519-532.
- Hindu Nationalism Postmodernism (2005). Inthis Chapter I First Examine How Hindu Nationalists Construct the Myth of ''the Vedas as Books of Science.''I Claim That the Relativist Rhetoric of Postmodern Intellectuals has Given Philosophical Respectability to the Eclectic Patchwork of Science and Hindu Metaphysics That Goes Under the Name of ''Vedic Science.''I Argue That the Mixing Up of the Mythos of the Vedas with the Logos of Science Must Be of Great Concern Not Just to the Scientific Community, but Also to Religious People, for It is a Distortion of Both Science and Spirituality. [REVIEW] In Noretta Koertge (ed.), Scientific Values and Civic Virtues. OUP Usa
- Hindu Nationalism Postmodernism (2005). In This Chapter I First Examine How Hindu Nationalists Construct the Myth of ''the Vedas as Books of Science.''I Claim That the Relativist Rhetoric of Postmodern Intellectuals has Given Philosophical Respectability to the Eclectic Patchwork of Science and Hindu Metaphysics That Goes Under the Name of ''Vedic Science.''I Argue That the Mixing Up of the Mythos of the Vedas with the Logos of Science Must Be of Great Concern Not Just to the Scientiﬁc Community, but Also to Religious People, for It is a Distortion of Both Science and Spirituality. [REVIEW] In Noretta Koertge (ed.), Scientific Values and Civic Virtues. OUP Usa
- Herbert Schnädelbach (2007). Was ist Philosophie?: This question cannot be answered in a simple form, because philosophy is a historical phenomenon that has experienced many changes. Hence the contribution begins by sketching what was called «Philosophy» in the past in order to, against the background of this history of the concept, sketch what happens in philosophy today. The thesis is that philosophy essentially concerns attempts at conceptual orientation in the domain of our fundamentals of thought, recognition and action. In philosophical discourse explicative, normative and descriptive aspects can be distinguished. Seen on the whole, philosophy is a conversation and that explains what may seem strange about it, namely its close connection to the history of philosophy, the high measure of forgetting and remembering, and the remarkable consistency of a few core themes over the centuries. Studia Philosophica 66:11-28.
- Jes Harfeld (2011). Philosophical Ethology: On the Extents of What It Is to Be a Pig. Society and Animals 19 (1):83-101.
- Basil Mitchell (1984). How Is the Concept of Sin Related to the Concept of Moral Wrongdoing? Religious Studies 20 (2):165 - 173.
- Åsa Wikforss (2009). Are There Understanding-Assent Links?: It is Commonly Held That There Are Internal Links Between Understanding and Assent Such That Being Semantically Competent with an Expression Requires Accepting Certain Sentences as True. The Paper Discusses a Recent Challenge to This Conception of Semantic Competence, Posed by Timothy Williamson . According to Williamson There Are No Understanding-Assent Links of the Suggested Sort, No Internal Connection Between Semantic Competence and Belief. I Suggest That Williamson is Quite Right to Question the Claim That Being Semantically Competent with an Expression E Requires Accepting a Certain Sentence S as True. However, Williamson Does Not Merely Wish to Reject This Version of the Understanding-Assent View, but the Very Idea That the Connection with Belief Provides Constitutive Constraints on Linguistic Understanding and Concept Possession. This Further Move, I Argue, is Very Problematic. Giving a Plausible Account of Semantic Competence Requires Acc. [REVIEW] The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5.
- Hans Muller & Bana Bashour (2011). Why Alief is Not a Legitimate Psychological Category. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:371-389.
- Timothy Chan (1981). Paul Tillich and the Question of God: A Philosophical Appraisal. Dissertation, University of Arkansas
- Catalin Vasile Bobb (2011). From the Problem of “Evil” to Interpretation. "Hermeneutic Phenomenology" As a Method for Understanding the Religious Discourse. Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 10 (30):299-317.
- Emad H. Atiq (forthcoming). How to Be Impartial as a Subjectivist. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
- Mark Nesti (2011). Phenomenology and Sports Psychology: Back To The Things Themselves! Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 5 (3):285 - 296.
- Pascal Engel, Belief As a Disposition to Act: Variations on a Pragmatist Theme.
- Jung H. Lee (2007). What is It Like to Be a Butterfly? A Philosophical Interpretation of Zhuangzi's Butterfly Dream. Asian Philosophy 17 (2):185 – 202.
- Michael L. Peterson (ed.) (2009). Reason & Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press.
- John S. Wilkins (2003). How to Be a Chaste Species Pluralist-Realist: The Origins of Species Modes and the Synapomorphic Species Concept. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 18 (5):621-638.
- Stefano Gualeni (2014). Augmented Ontologies or How to Philosophize with a Digital Hammer. Philosophy and Technology 27 (2):177-199.
- Gregg Ten Elshof (2007). Religious Experience, Conceptual Contribution and the Problem of Diversity: How Not to Make the Problem Worse. Philosophical Explorations 32:235-250.
- Raimon Panikkar (2005). IAM Expected to Give a Philosophical Introduction. An Introduction It Will Be, Because It Will Not Enter Into the Profundities of These Three Words. It is Philosophical—in the Real Sense of the Word: Philosophy is as Much the Love Of. [REVIEW] In Bettina Baumer & John R. Dupuche (eds.), Void and Fullness in the Buddhist, Hindu, and Christian Traditions: Sunya-Purna-Pleroma. D.K. Printworld 11.
- Kyungsuk Choi (2008). “Bioethics” as a New Challenge to Philosophy. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:37-51.
- Steven Horst, How (Not) to Give a Theory of Concepts.
- Hans van Ditmarsch, Wiebe van der Hoek & Petar Iliev (2011). Everything is Knowable – How to Get to Know Whether a Proposition is True. Theoria 78 (2):93-114.
- Roxana Baiasu (2014). How is Philosophy Supposed to Engage with Religion? Heidegger's Philosophical Atheism and Its Limits. Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):113-136.
- Kate Nolfi (2015). How to Be a Normativist About the Nature of Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):181-204.
- David Ingram, Poverty Knowledge, Coercion, and Social Rights: A Discourse Ethical Contribution to Social Epistemology.
- Vincent W. J. Van Gerven Oei (2012). Cumposition: Theses on Philosophy's Etymology. Continent 2 (1).
- Christopher Coope (1973). Wittgenstein's Theory of Knowledge. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 7:246-267.
- Anja Jauernig (2007). Must Empiricism Be a Stance, and Could It Be One? How to Be an Empiricist and a Philosopher at the Same Time. In Bradley John Monton (ed.), Images of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply From Bas C. Van Fraassen. Oxford University Press
- Vincent Brümmer (2002). On Three Ways to Justify Religious Beliefs. Ars Disputandi. The Online Journal for Philosophy of Religion. Available: Www. Arsdisputandi. Org/. Accessed January 12:2009.
- Joel Krueger (2006). This Article Presents a Novel Defense of Sartrean Ethics Based on the Concept of Interpersonal Recognition. The Immediate Post-War Texts Anti-Semite and Jew, What is Literature? And Notebooks for an Ethics Express Sartre's Inchoate yet Ultimately Defensible View of Obligations to Others. Such Obligations Are Not Best Understood as Kantian Duties, but Rather as Hegelian Obligations of Mutual Recognition. The Emerging Portrait of Sartrean Ethics Offers a Strong Reply to the Classical Criticism That Authenticity Would License Vicious Lifestyles Like Serial Killing. In Addition to Acting with Clarity and Responsibility, Existentially Authentic Individuals Must Respect Others. [REVIEW] Sartre Studies International 12:44-60.
- Clare Palmer (2000). Religion in the Making? Animality, Savagery, and Civilization in the Work of A. N. Whitehead. Society and Animals 8 (3):287-304.
- Joel D. Velasco (2009). When Monophyly is Not Enough: Exclusivity as the Key to Defining a Phylogenetic Species Concept. Biology and Philosophy 24 (4):473-486.
- Genia Schönbaumsfeld, 'Objectively There is No Truth' - Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard on Religious Belief.
- D. Gene Witmer (2006). How to Be a (Sort of) A Priori Physicalist. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):185-225.
- Kristen A. Irwin (2010). The Core Mysteries: Pierre Bayle's Philosophical Fideism. Dissertation, Proquest
- Michael H. G. Hoffmann (2004). How to Get It. Diagrammatic Reasoning as a Tool of Knowledge Development and its Pragmatic Dimension. Foundations of Science 9 (3):285-305.
- Jonathan Kvanvig (1986). How to Be a Reliabilist. American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (2):189 - 198.
- M. F. Peschl, G. Bottaro, M. Hartner-Tiefenthaler & K. Rötzer (2014). Learning How to Innovate as a Socio-Epistemological Process of Co-Creation: Towards a Constructivist Teaching Strategy for Innovation. Constructivist Foundations 9 (3):421-433.
- Victoria Harrison (2012). An Internalist Pluralist Solution to the Problem of Religious and Ethical Diversity. Sophia 51 (1):71-86.
- Ann Taves (2009). Religious Experience Reconsidered: A Building Block Approach to the Study of Religion and Other Special Things. Princeton University Press.
- Simon A. Hailwood (2003). How to Be a Green Liberal: Nature, Value and Liberal Philosophy. Routledge.
- Edward Gilman Slingerland (1998). Effortless Action: Wu-Wei as a Spiritual Ideal in Early China. Dissertation, Stanford University
- Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos (2006). Severe Testing as a Basic Concept in a Neyman–Pearson Philosophy of Induction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):323-357.
- B. J. C. Madison (2004). Plantinga on Warrant and Religious Belief. Dissertation, King's College London
- Seung-Ju Lee (2008). Philosophical Community of Inquiry as a New Approach to Moral Education in Korea. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 37:181-188.
- G. Anthony Bruno (forthcoming). 'As From a State of Death': Schelling's Idealism as Mortalism. Comparative and Continental Philosophy.
- Ines Langemeyer & Wolf-Michael Roth (2006). Is Cultural-Historical Activity Theory Threatened to Fall Short of its Own Principles and Possibilities as a Dialectical Social Science? Outlines. Critical Practice Studies 8 (2):20-42.
- Elaine Landry (2011). How to Be a Structuralist All the Way Down. Synthese 179 (3):435 - 454.
- Ian Ker (2004). Newman's Standing as a Philosopher. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 78:71-81.
- Mark McCullagh (2011). How to Use a Concept You Reject. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):293-319.
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