56 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
Howard Robinson [32]Howard M. Robinson [24]
See also:
Profile: Howard Robinson (Central European University)
  1. Barry Dainton & Howard Robinson (eds.) (forthcoming). Companion to Analytic Philosophy. Continuum Press.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Andrea Lavazza & Howard Robinson (eds.) (2014). Contemporary Dualism. A Defense. 112-135. Routledge.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Howard Robinson (2013). The Failure of Disjunctivism to Deal with "Philosophers' Hallucinations&Quot;. In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination. MIT Press. 313-330.
  4. Howard Robinson (2012). Relationalism Versus Representationalism: How Deep is the Divide? [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 62 (248):614-619.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Howard Robinson (2011). Review of Mark C. Baker, Stewart Goetz (Eds.), The Soul Hypothesis: Investigations Into the Existence of the Soul. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (2).
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Howard Robinson (2011). Substance Dualism and its Rationale. In Richard Swinburne (ed.), Free Will and Modern Science. Oup/British Academy.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Howard Robinson (2011). Two Berkelian Arguments About the Nature of Space. In Timo Airaksinen & Bertil Belfrage (eds.), Berkeley's Lasting Legacy: 300 Years Later. Cambridge Scholars. 123-132.
    I consider two arguments about the nature of space that occur in George Berkeley which I think are not sufficiently discussed. The first concerns the phenomenology of space, the second its physics. The first is the "mite" argument and the second concerns Isaac Newton's two thought experiments about absolute space, the "bucket" thought experiment and the "balls" thought experiment. The former suggests that there is no such thing as objective size. Berkeley's position is more confusing on the second experiment, but (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Howard Robinson (2010). Quality, Thought and Consciousness. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):203-216.
    My objective in this essay is to argue for two things. The first is that intellectual mental states are not physicalistically reducible, just as qualia are not reducible. The second is that thoughts and qualia are not as different as is sometimes believed, but not because thoughts are qualia-like by being mental images, but because qualia are universals and their apprehension is a proto-intellectual act. I shall mainly be concerned with the first of these topics.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Howard Robinson (2009). Idealism. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oup Oxford.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Howard Robinson (2009). Selections From Perception. In Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press. 153.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Howard Robinson (2009). Supervenience, Reductionism, and Emergence. In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Howard Robinson (2009). Vagueness, Realism, Language and Thought. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt1):83-101.
    The problem of vagueness and the sorites paradox arise because we try to treat natural language as if it were a unitary formal system. In fact, natural language contains a large variety of representational ontologies that serve different purposes and which cannot be united formally, but which can intuitively be taken as ways of seeing a common basic ontology. Using this framework, we can save classical logic from vagueness and avoid the sorites.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Howard Robinson (2009). Why Phenomenal Content is Not Intentional. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):79-93.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Howard Robinson, Dualism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This entry concerns dualism in the philosophy of mind. The term ‘dualism’ has a variety of uses in the history of thought. In general, the idea is that, for some particular domain, there are two fundamental kinds or categories of things or principles. In theology, for example a ‘dualist’ is someone who believes that Good and Evil — or God and the Devil — are independent and more or less equal forces in the world. Dualism contrasts with monism, which is (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Howard Robinson (2008). 12 Why Frank Should Not Have Jilted Mary. In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. The Mit Press. 223.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Howard Robinson (2007). The Self and Time. In Peter van Inwagen & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Persons: Human and Divine. Clarendon Press.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Howard Robinson (2006). The Primacy of the Subjective. International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):384-387.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Howard Robinson (2005). Reply to Nathan: How to Reconstruct the Causal Argument. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 20 (36):7-10.
    Nicholas Nathan tries to resist the current version of the causal argument for sense-data in two ways. First he suggests that, on what he considers to be the correct reconstruction of the argument, it equivocates on the sense of proximate cause. Second, he defends a form of disjunctivism, by claiming that there might be an extra mechanism involved in producing veridical hallucination that is not present in perception. I argue that Nathan’s reconstruction of the argument is not the appropriate one, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Howard M. Robinson (2005). Sense-Data, Intentionality, and Common Sense. In G. Forrai (ed.), Intentionality: Past and Future. Rodopi NY.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Howard Robinson (2004). Review: Berkeley's Thought. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (451):571-575.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Howard Robinson (2004). Thought Experiments, Ontology, and Concept-Dependent Truthmakers. The Monist 87 (4):537-553.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Howard Robinson (2003). The Nature of Perception. International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):128-129.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Howard M. Robinson (2003). Some Externalist Strategies and Their Problems. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (7):21-34.
    I claim that there are four major strands of argument for externalism and set out to discuss three of them. The four are: (A) That referential thoughts are object-dependent. This I do not discuss. (B) That the semantics of natural kind terms is externalist. (C) That all semantic content, even of descriptive terms, stems from the causal relations of representations to the things or properties they designate in the external world. (D) That, because meaning is a social product and no (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Howard M. Robinson (2003). The Ontology of the Mental. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Howard M. Robinson (2002). Dualism. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. 85--101.
    This entry concerns dualism in the philosophy of mind. The term ‘dualism’ has a variety of uses in the history of thought. In general, the idea is that, for some particular domain, there are two fundamental kinds or categories of things or principles. In theology, for example a ‘dualist’ is someone who believes that Good and Evil — or God and the Devil — are independent and more or less equal forces in the world. Dualism contrasts with monism, which is (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Howard Robinson (2001). Perception, Knowledge and Belief. International Philosophical Quarterly 41 (3):380-381.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Howard M. Robinson (2001). Davidson and Nonreductive Materialism: A Tale of Two Cultures. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
  28. Howard Robinson (1998). Some Problems with the Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Acta Analytica 21:147-161.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Howard M. Robinson (1998). Materialism in the Philosophy of Mind. In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
  30. Howard Robinson (1997). How to Give Analytical Rigour to 'Soupy' Metaphysics. Inquiry 40 (1):95 – 113.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Howard Robinson (1996). Vision. Philosophical Review 105 (1):97-99.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Howard Robinson (1995). Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness: Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind Ed.Christopher Peacocke Oxford University Press,Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol.83,1994, 162 + Xxvi, £14.95. [REVIEW] Philosophy 70 (273):469-.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Howard M. Robinson (1994). Perception. New York: Routledge.
    Questions about perception remain some of the most difficult and insoluble in both epistemology and in the philosophy of mind. This controversial but highly accessible introduction to the area explores the philosophical importance of those questions by re-examining what had until recent times been the most popular theory of perception - the sense-datum theory. Howard Robinson surveys the history of the arguments for and against the theory from Descartes to Husserl. He then shows that the objections to the theory, particularly (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Howard M. Robinson (1993). Dennett on the Knowledge Argument. Analysis 53 (3):174-7.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Howard M. Robinson (ed.) (1993). Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
    Physicalism has, over the past twenty years, become almost an orthodoxy, especially in the philosophy of mind. Many philosophers, however, feel uneasy about this development, and this volume is intended as a collective response to it. Together these papers, written by philosophers from Britain, the United States, and Australasia, show that physicalism faces enormous problems in every area in which it is discussed. The contributors not only investigate the well-known difficulties that physicalism has in accommodating sensory consciousness, but also bring (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Howard M. Robinson (1993). Physicalism, Externalism and Perceptual Representation. In Edmond Leo Wright (ed.), New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception. Brookfield: Avebury.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Howard M. Robinson (1993). The Anti-Materialist Strategy and the "Knowledge Argument". In , Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press. 159--83.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Howard M. Robinson (1992). Experience and Externalism: A Reply to Peter Smith. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92:221-223.
  39. Raymond Tallis & Howard Robinson (eds.) (1991). The Pursuit of Mind. Carcanet.
  40. Frank Cioffi Obscurantism, G. A. Equality, Keith Graham, Peter Carruthers, Cynthia MacDonald, Paul Snowden, Howard Robinson, David Over, Paul Guyer & Ralph Walker (1990). The Mind Bursary. Mind 99:394.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Howard M. Robinson (1990). The Objects of Perceptual Experience--II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 151:151-166.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Howard M. Robinson (1989). A Dualist Account of Embodiment. In J. R. Smythies & J. Beloff (eds.), The Case for Dualism. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. 43-57.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Howard M. Robinson (1989). The Case for Dualism. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Howard Robinson (1988). Un dilemme pour le physicalisme (critères structuraux et fonctionnels pour l'identité des événements mentaux). Hermès 3:128.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Howard M. Robinson (1988). A Dualist Perspective on Psychological Development. Philosophical Perspectives 2:119-139.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. T. L. S. Sprigge, John Foster & Howard Robinson (1987). Essays on Berkeley: A Tercentenary Celebration. Philosophical Quarterly 37 (147):218.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Howard M. Robinson (1986). 'Abstract Ideas' and Immaterialism. History of European Ideas 7 (6):617-622.
    Berkeley confidently asserts the connection between his attack on abstract ideas and immaterialism, But how the connection works has puzzled modern commentators. I construct an argument resting on the imagist theory of thought which connects anti-ionism and immaterialism and try to show that it is berkeleian. I then suggest that, Without the mistaken imagist theory, A similar and still interesting argument can be constructed to the weaker conclusion that matter is essentially unknowable.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. John Foster & Howard Robinson (eds.) (1985). Essays on Berkeley: A Tercentennial Celebration. Oxford University Press.
    Marking the tercentenary of Berkeley's birth, this collection of previously unpublished essays covers such Berkeleian topics as: imagination, experience, and possibility; the argument against material substance; the physical world; idealism; science; the self; action and inaction; beauty; and the general good. Among the contributors are: Christopher Peacocke, Ernest Sosa, Margaret Wilson, C.C.W. Taylor, and J.O. Urmson.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Howard Robinson (1985). The General Form of the Argument for Berkeleian Idealism. In John Foster & Howard Robinson (eds.), Essays on Berkeley: A Tercentennial Celebration. Oxford University Press. 163--186.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Howard M. Robinson (1982). Behaviorism and Stimulus Materialism. In , Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism. Cambridge University Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 56