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  1. Hugh Clapin (ed.) (2004). Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation. Elsevier.
    'Representation in Mind' is the first book in the new series 'Perspectives on Cognitive Science' and includes well known contributors in the...
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  2. Hugh Clapin (ed.) (2002). Philosophy of Mental Representation. Oxford University Press.
    In Philosophy of Mental Representation five of the most original and important thinkers in philosophy of mind engage in an overlapping dialogue about mental representation. In new papers, contributors Andy Clark, Robert Cummins, Daniel Dennett, John Haugeland, and Brian Cantwell Smith each investigate the views and claims of one of the other contributors regarding mental representation. The subject then offers a reply. An exciting feature of this collection is the dynamic discussion among all contributors following each exchange. This collection offers (...)
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  3. Hugh Clapin (2002). Tacit Representation in Functional Architecture. In , Philosophy of Mental Representation. Oxford University Press.
     
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  4. Hugh Clapin (1999). What, Exactly, is Explicitness? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):150-151.
    O'Brien & Opie's theory of consciousness relies heavily on a distinction between explicit activation vectors and inexplicit weight vectors. But determining which representations are explicit vehicles requires appeal to process, and so their vehicle theory is in fact a process theory.
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  5. Hugh Clapin (1997). Problems with Principle P. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):261-77.
    In Psychosemantics Fodor presents three arguments for preferring the language of thought over mere intentional realism - arguments for the conclusion that intentional causes of behavior have constituent structure. The first of these, relying on the methodological 'Principle P', is considered in detail here and is found wanting. This principle does not prefer the language of thought to those very connectionist systems which Fodor criticizes; and it rests on dubious theoretical and empirical assumptions.
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  6. Hugh Clapin (1996). James S. Stramel, How to Write a Philosophy Paper Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 16 (3):211-212.
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  7. Hugh Clapin (1994). Alvin I. Goldman, Philosophical Applications of Cognitive Science Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 14 (4):256-258.
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  8. Hugh Clapin (1991). Connectionism Isn't Magic. Minds and Machines 1 (2):167-84.
    Ramsey, Stich and Garon's recent paper Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology claims a certain style of connectionism to be the final nail in the coffin of folk psychology. I argue that their paper fails to show this, and that the style of connectionism they illustrate can in fact supplement, rather than compete with, the claims of a theory of cognition based in folk psychology's ontology. Ramsey, Stich and Garon's argument relies on the lack of easily identifiable symbols (...)
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