Search results for 'Humean Theory of Motivation' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Melissa Barry (2007). Realism, Rational Action, and the Humean Theory of Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):231-242.score: 1641.0
    Realists about practical reasons agree that judgments regarding reasons are beliefs. They disagree, however, over the question of how such beliefs motivate rational action. Some adopt a Humean conception of motivation, according to which beliefs about reasons must combine with independently existing desires in order to motivate rational action; others adopt an anti-Humean view, according to which beliefs can motivate rational action in their own right, either directly or by giving rise to a new desire that in (...)
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  2. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2008). The Humean Theory of Motivation and its Critics. In , A Companion to Hume. Wiley-Blackwell.score: 1254.0
  3. G. F. Schueler (2009). The Humean Theory of Motivation Rejected. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):103-122.score: 1242.0
    In this paper I will argue that the latter group [of Non-Humeans] is correct. My argument focuses on practical deliberation and has two parts. I will discuss two different problems that arise for the Humean Theory and suggest that while taken individually each problem appears to have a solution, for each problem the solution Humeans offer precludes solving the other problem. I will suggest that to see these difficulties we must take seriously the thought that we can only (...)
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  4. Mary Clayton Coleman (2008). Directions of Fit and the Humean Theory of Motivation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):127 – 139.score: 1236.0
    According to the Humean theory of motivation, a person can only be motivated to act by a desire together with a relevantly related belief. More specifically, a person can only be motivated to ϕ by a desire to ψ together with a belief that ϕ-ing is a means to or a way of ψ-ing. In recent writings, Michael Smith gives what has become a very influential argument in favour of the Humean claim that desire is a (...)
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  5. Neil Sinhababu (2009). The Humean Theory of Motivation Reformulated and Defended. Philosophical Review 118 (4):465-500.score: 1224.0
    This essay defends a strong version of the Humean theory of motivation on which desire is necessary both for motivation and for reasoning that changes our desires. Those who hold that moral judgments are beliefs with intrinsic motivational force need to oppose this view, and many of them have proposed counterexamples to it. Using a novel account of desire, this essay handles the proposed counterexamples in a way that shows the superiority of the Humean (...). The essay addresses the classic objection that the Humean theory cannot explain the feeling of obligation, Stephen Darwall's example of motivationally potent reasoning that is not based on preexisting desires, Thomas Scanlon's criticism that the Humean theory fails to account for the structure and phenomenology of deliberation, and the phenomenon of akrasia as discussed by John Searle. In each case a Humean account explains the data at least as thoroughly as opposing views can, while fitting within a simpler total account of how we deliberate and act. (shrink)
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  6. Jonathan Dancy (1995). Why There Is Really No Such Thing as the Theory of Motivation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:1-18.score: 1206.0
    To the extent, then, that we set our face against admitting the truth of Humeanism in the theory of motivation, to that extent we are probably going to feel that there is no such thing as the theory of motivation, so conceived, at all. And that will be the position that this paper is trying to defend, though not only for this reason. It might seem miraculous that so much can be extracted from the little distinction (...)
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  7. Michael Smith (1987). The Humean Theory of Motivation. Mind 96 (381):36-61.score: 1020.0
  8. Mark van Roojen (1995). Humean Motivation and Humean Rationality. Philosophical Studies 79 (1):37-57.score: 852.0
    Michael Smith's recent defence of the theory shows promise, in that it captures the most common reasons for accepting a Humean view. But, as I will argue, it falls short of vindicating the view. Smith's argument fails, because it ignores the role of rationality conditions on the ascription of motivating reason explanations. Because of these conditions, we must have a theory of rationality before we choose a theory of motivation. Thus, we cannot use Humean (...)
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  9. Chris Meyers (2005). Wants and Desires: A Critique of Conativist Theory of Motivation. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:357-370.score: 825.0
    In this paper I will argue against the Humean theory of motivation, or “conativism” which claims that all actions are ultimately generated by desires. Conativism is supported by (1) a behavioral analysis of desire as a disposition to act in certain ways, and (2) the difference between belief and desire in terms of their different “direction of fi t” with the world. I will show that this behavioral account of desire cannot provide an adequate explanation of action. (...)
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  10. Nicholas Shackel (2014). Still Waiting for a Plausible Humean Theory of Reasons. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):607-633.score: 810.0
    In his important recent book Schroeder proposes a Humean theory of reasons that he calls hypotheticalism. His rigourous account of the weight of reasons is crucial to his theory, both as an element of the theory and constituting his defence to powerful standard objections to Humean theories of reasons. In this paper I examine that rigourous account and show it to face problems of vacuity and consonance. There are technical resources that may be brought to (...)
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  11. Mark Schroeder (2007). The Humean Theory of Reasons. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Vol. 2. Oxford University Press. 195--219.score: 789.0
    This paper offers a simple and novel motivation for the Humean Theory of Reasons. According to the Humean Theory of Reasons, all reasons must be explained by some psychological state of the agent for whom they are reasons, such as a desire. This view is commonly thought¹ to be motivated by a substantive theory about the power of reasons to motivate known as reason internalism, and a substantive theory about the possibility of being (...)
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  12. Derek Baker (forthcoming). The Abductive Case for Humeanism Over Quasi-Perceptual Theories of Desire. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.score: 754.0
    A number of philosophers have offered quasi-perceptual theories of desire, according to which to desire something is roughly to “see” it as having value or providing reasons. These are offered as alternatives to the more traditional Humean Theory of Motivation, which denies that desires have a representational aspect. This paper examines the various considerations offered by advocates to motivate quasi-perceptualism. It argues that Humeanism is in fact able to explain the same data that the quasi-perceptualist can explain, (...)
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  13. Daniel Shaw (1989). Hume's Theory of Motivation. Hume Studies 15 (1):163-183.score: 700.0
    The paper defends a humean account of motivating desires as introspectible causes of actions against objections raised by b stroud and t nagel. Hume's doctrine of the calm passions and the incorrigibility thesis are discussed and defended with reference to conscious desires. The account is then extended to cover unconscious motivation as well.
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  14. Alex Gregory (2012). Changing Direction on Direction of Fit. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):603-614.score: 684.0
    In this paper, I show that we should understand the direction of fit of beliefs and desires in normative terms. After rehearsing a standard objection to Michael Smith’s analysis of direction of fit, I raise a similar problem for Lloyd Humberstone’s analysis. I go on to offer my own account, according to which the difference between beliefs and desires is determined by the normative relations such states stand in. I argue that beliefs are states which we have reason to change (...)
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  15. Michael A. Smith (1998). The Possibility of Philosophy of Action. In Jan Bransen & Stefaan Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 17--41.score: 672.0
    This article was conceived as a sequel to “The Humean Theory of Motivation.” The paper addresses various challenges to the standard account of the explanation of intentional action in terms of desire and means-end belief, challenges that didn’t occur to me when I wrote “The Humean Theory of Motivation.” I begin by suggesting that the attraction of the standard account lies in the way in which it allows us to unify a vast array of (...)
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  16. Melissa Barry (2010). Humean Theories of Motivation. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics , Volume 5. Oxford University Press. 195-223.score: 632.5
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  17. Neil Sinhababu (2011). The Humean Theory of Practical Irrationality. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (1):1-13.score: 623.0
    Christine Korsgaard has argued that Humean views about action and practical rationality jointly imply the impossibility of irrational action. According to the Humean theory of action, agents do what maximizes expected desire-satisfaction. According to the Humean theory of rationality, it is rational for agents to do what maximizes expected desire-satisfaction. Thus Humeans are committed to the impossibility of practical irrationality – an unacceptable consequence. -/- I respond by developing Humean views to explain how we (...)
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  18. Antti Kauppinen (2013). A Humean Theory of Moral Intuition. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):360-381.score: 620.5
    According to the quasi-perceptualist account of philosophical intuitions, they are intellectual appearances that are psychologically and epistemically analogous to perceptual appearances. Moral intuitions share the key characteristics of other intuitions, but can also have a distinctive phenomenology and motivational role. This paper develops the Humean claim that the shared and distinctive features of substantive moral intuitions are best explained by their being constituted by moral emotions. This is supported by an independently plausible non-Humean, quasi-perceptualist theory of emotion, (...)
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  19. Joshua May (2013). Because I Believe It's the Right Thing to Do. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (4):791-808.score: 618.0
    Our beliefs about which actions we ought to perform clearly have an effect on what we do. But so-called “Humean” theories—holding that all motivation has its source in desire—insist on connecting such beliefs with an antecedent motive. Rationalists, on the other hand, allow normative beliefs a more independent role. I argue in favor of the rationalist view in two stages. First, I show that the Humean theory rules out some of the ways we ordinarily explain actions. (...)
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  20. Ralph Wedgwood (1995). Theories of Content and Theories of Motivation. European Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):273-288.score: 615.0
    According to the anti-Humean theory of motivation, it is possible to be motivated to act by reason alone. According to the Humean theory of motivation, this is impossible. The debate between these two theories remains as vigorous as ever (see for example Pettit 1987, Lewis 1988, Price 1989 and Smith 1994). In this paper I shall argue that the anti-Humean theory of motivation is incompatible with a number of prominent recent theories (...)
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  21. A. Disentropic Ethic (1988). Belief, Desire, and Revision, John Collins According to Humean Theory, Conduct is Motivated by Desire and Merely Guided by Belief. An Anti-Humean View Maintains Against This That Belief Does the Whole Job, Since Desire is Just a Certain Species of Belief: Namely Belief About What Would Be Good. This Desire-as-Belief Thesis, At. [REVIEW] The Monist 71 (1).score: 615.0
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  22. Daniel M. Johnson (2012). The Objectivity of Obligations in Divine Motivation Theory: On Imitation and Submission. Journal of Religious Ethics 40 (3):504-517.score: 571.5
    To support her divine motivation theory of the good, which seeks to ground ethics in motives and emphasize the attractiveness of morality over against the compulsion of morality, Linda Zagzebski has proposed an original account of obligations which grounds them in motives. I argue that her account renders obligations objectionably person-relative and that the most promising way to avoid my criticism is to embrace something quite close to a divine command theory of obligation. This requires her to (...)
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  23. Derek Baker (2014). Akrasia and the Problem of the Unity of Reason. Ratio 27 (2).score: 536.0
    Joseph Raz and Sergio Tenenbaum argue that the Guise of the Good thesis explains both the possibility of practical reason and its unity with theoretical reason, something Humean psychological theories may be unable to do. This paper will argue, however, that Raz and Tenenbaum face a dilemma: either the version of the Guise of the Good they offer is too strong to allow for weakness of will, or it will lose its theoretical advantage in preserving the unity of reason.
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  24. Mark Schroeder (2007). Weighting for a Plausible Humean Theory of Reasons. Noûs 41 (1):110–132.score: 526.5
    This paper addresses the two extensional objections to the Humean Theory of Reasons—that it allows for too many reasons, and that it allows for too few. Although I won’t argue so here, manyof the other objections to the Humean Theoryof Reasons turn on assuming that it cannot successfully deal with these two objections.1 What I will argue, is that the force of the too many and the too few objections to the Humean Theorydepend on whether we (...)
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  25. Andrew Youpa (2007). Spinoza's Theory of Motivation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):375–390.score: 526.5
    On the basis of 3p9s and 3p39s of the Ethics, it might seem that, for Spinoza, a judgment about something's goodness or badness is motivationally inert and, moreover, that value judgments essentially reflect an individual's pre-existing motivational states. However, in this paper I show that Spinoza holds that under certain conditions a motivational state results from a value judgment. Spinoza's theory of motivation consists of two accounts of the psychological order of value judgments and motivational states: an account (...)
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  26. Sheldon Wein, A Humean Theory of Distributive Justice for a New Century.score: 526.5
    This paper suggests a strategy for constructing a contemporary Humean theory of distributive justice which would serve to ground what I call an entrepreneurial welfare state. It is argued that blending David Hume's insights about the origins and purposes of justice with Ronald Dworkin's insurance-based reasoning supporting his equality of resources model of distributive justice will yield a state which, as a matter of justice, encourages its members to engage in entrepreneurial activities and which protects them from (...)
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  27. Carolyn R. Morillo (1995). Contingent Creatures: Reward Event Theory of Motivation. Rowman & Littlefield.score: 524.3
    What motivates behavior? What are the qualities of experience which make life worth living? Taking a new interdisciplinary approach, Morillo advances the theory that pleasure—interpreted as a distinct, separable, noncognitive quality of experience—is essential for all positive motivation and is the only intrinsic, nonmoral good in the lives of human beings and many other sentient creatures. Morillo supports her arguments with recent neuropsychological evidence concerning the role of reward centers in the brain and philosophical arguments for a naturalistic (...)
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  28. John M. Cooper (1984). Plato's Theory of Human Motivation. History of Philosophy Quarterly 1 (1):3 - 21.score: 522.0
    I discuss the division of the soul in plato's "republic". i concentrate on the arguments and illustrative examples given in book iv, but i treat the descriptions of different types of person in viii-ix and elsewhere as further constituents of a single, coherent theory. on my interpretation plato distinguishes three basic kinds of motivation which he claims all human beings regularly experience in some degree. reason is itself the immediate source of certain desires. in addition, there are appetitive (...)
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  29. Dag Olberg (1995). The Theory of Heroic Defeats: A Mixed Motivation Approach. Sociological Theory 13 (2):178-196.score: 519.0
    The category of heroic action is important in both everyday life and the wider social context. This article argues that interest in the notion of heroic actions and heroic defeats also brings out an important set of sociological problems, such as disagreements on identity, norms, and rational choice explanations. Illustrations are provided from recent analyses of union militancy in Britain and Italy, and of the student movement in Beijing. Different versions of the critique of rational choice theory often take (...)
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  30. Derek Parfit (1997). Reasons and Motivation. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):99–130.score: 516.0
    When we have a normative reason, and we act for that reason, it becomes our motivating reason. But we can have either kind of reason without having the other. Thus, if I jump into the canal, my motivating reason was provided by my belief; but I had no normative reason to jump. I merely thought I did. And, if I failed to notice that the canal was frozen, I had a reason not to jump that, because it was unknown to (...)
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  31. Dominic Klyve (2013). Darwin, Malthus, Süssmilch, and Euler: The Ultimate Origin of the Motivation for the Theory of Natural Selection. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Biology:1-24.score: 513.0
    It is fairly well known that Darwin was inspired to formulate his theory of natural selection by reading Thomas Malthus’s Essay on the Principle of Population. In fact, by reading Darwin’s notebooks, we can even locate one particular sentence which started Darwin thinking about population and selection. What has not been done before is to explain exactly where this sentence – essentially Malthus’s ideas about geometric population growth – came from. In this essay we show that eighteenth century mathematician (...)
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  32. Jeremy Joyner White & John A. Gueguen (1998). A Humean Critique of David Hume's Theory of Knowledge. University Press of America.score: 513.0
    A Humean Critique of David Hume's Theory of Knowledge provides the first full-length Aristotilian-Thomistic critique of Hume's most mature and familiar work.
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  33. Barry Loewer (2004). David Lewis's Humean Theory of Objective Chance. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):1115--25.score: 503.3
    The most important theories in fundamental physics, quantum mechanics and statistical mechanics, posit objective probabilities or chances. As important as chance is there is little agreement about what it is. The usual “interpretations of probability” give very different accounts of chance and there is disagreement concerning which, if any, is capable of accounting for its role in physics. David Lewis has contributed enormously to improving this situation. In his classic paper “A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance” he described a framework (...)
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  34. Danielle Bromwich (2010). Clearing Conceptual Space for Cognitivist Motivational Internalism. Philosophical Studies 148 (3):343 - 367.score: 498.0
    Cognitivist motivational internalism is the thesis that, if one believes that 'It is right to ϕ', then one will be motivated to ϕ. This thesis—which captures the practical nature of morality—is in tension with a Humean constraint on belief: belief cannot motivate action without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire. When defending cognitivist motivational internalism it is tempting to either argue that the Humean constraint only applies to non-moral beliefs or that moral beliefs only motivate ceteris paribus (...)
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  35. Daniel Friedrich (2014). Belief and Motivation. Theoria 80 (3):255-268.score: 492.0
    Humeans claim that all motivation is by desire. Anti-Humeans maintain that some beliefs can motivate all by themselves. This dispute, I argue, hinges on the question whether belief can rationalize motivation. Moreover, I argue belief can rationalize motivation since rationality requires that one be motivated to φ if one believes one has most reason to φ, and it is possible to be motivated to φ because one believes one has most reason to φ and one exercises one's (...)
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  36. Robert F. Bornstein (1999). Unconscious Motivation and Phenomenal Knowledge: Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Implicit Mental States. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):758-758.score: 483.0
    A comprehensive theory of implicit and explicit knowledge must explain phenomenal knowledge (e.g., knowledge regarding one's affective and motivational states), as well as propositional (i.e., “fact”-based) knowledge. Findings from several research areas (i.e., the subliminal mere exposure effect, artificial grammar learning, implicit and self-attributed dependency needs) are used to illustrate the importance of both phenomenal and propositional knowledge for a unified theory of implicit and explicit mental states.
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  37. Catherine Legg (forthcoming). “Things Unreasonably Compulsory”: A Peircean Challenge to a Humean Theory of Perception, Particularly With Respect to Perceiving Necessary Truths. Cognitio.score: 479.3
    Much mainstream analytic epistemology is built around a sceptical treatment of modality which descends from Hume. The roots of this scepticism are argued to lie in Hume’s (nominalist) theory of perception, which is excavated, studied and compared with the very different (realist) theory of perception developed by Peirce. It is argued that Peirce’s theory not only enables a considerably more nuanced and effective epistemology, it also (unlike Hume’s theory) does justice to what happens when we appreciate (...)
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  38. Melissa Zinkin (2006). Respect for the Law and the Use of Dynamical Terms in Kant's Theory of Moral Motivation. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 88 (1):31-53.score: 478.5
    Kant's discussion of the feeling of respect presents a puzzle regarding both the precise nature of this feeling and its role in his moral theory as an incentive that motivates us to follow the moral law. If it is a feeling that motivates us to follow the law, this would contradict Kant's view that moral obligation is based on reason alone. I argue that Kant has an account of respect as feeling that is nevertheless not separate from the use (...)
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  39. Steven Swartzer (2013). Appetitive Besires and the Fuss About Fit. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):975-988.score: 476.0
    Some motivational cognitivists believe that there are besires—cognitive mental states (typically moral beliefs) that share the key feature of desire (typically desire’s ‘direction of fit’) in virtue of which they are capable of being directly motivational. Besires have been criticized by Humeans and cognitivists alike as philosophically extravagant, incoherent, ad hoc, and incompatible with folk psychology. I provide a response to these standard objections to besires—one motivated independently of common anti-Humean intuitions about the motivational efficacy of moral judgments. I (...)
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  40. Peter Railton (2006). Humean Theory of Practical Rationality. In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. 265--81.score: 474.8
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  41. Hugh C. Willmott (1986). Unconscious Sources of Motivation in the Theory of the Subject; an Exploration and Critique of Giddens' Dualistic Models of Action and Personality. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 16 (1):105–121.score: 468.0
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  42. Charles R. Pigden (ed.) (2009). Hume on Motivation and Virtue: New Essays. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 468.0
    Contemporary ethical thought owes a great deal to David Hume whose work has inspired theories as diverse as non-cognitivism, error theory, quasi-realism, and instrumentalism about practical reason. This timely volume brings together an international range of distinguished scholars to discuss and dispute issues revolving around three closely related Humean themes which have recently come under close scrutiny. First is Hume's infamous claim that 'Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions'. Second, the Motivation (...)
     
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  43. Jane L. Mcintyre (2006). Strength of Mind: Prospects and Problems for a Humean Account. [REVIEW] Synthese 152 (3):393 - 401.score: 462.0
    References to strength of mind, a character trait implying “the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent”, occur in a number of important discussions of motivation in the Treatise and the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. Nevertheless, Hume says surprisingly little about what strength of mind is, or how it is achieved. This paper argues that Hume’s theory of the passions can provide an interesting and defensible account of strength of mind. The paper concludes with a (...)
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  44. William Kline (2012). Hume's Theory of Business Ethics Revisited. Journal of Business Ethics 105 (2):163-174.score: 461.3
    Hume’s examination of the conventions of property, trade, and contract addresses the moral foundations that make business possible. In this light, Hume’s theory of justice is also a foundational work in business ethics. In Hume’s analysis of these conventions, both philosophers and game theorists have correctly identified “proto” game-theoretic elements. One of the few attempts to offer a Humean theory of business ethics rests on this game-theoretic interpretation of Hume’s argument. This article argues that game-theoretic reasoning is (...)
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  45. Thomas S. Hyde, Milton A. Trapold & Douglas M. Gross (1968). Facilitative Effect of a CS for Reinforcement Upon Instrumental Responding as a Function of Reinforcement Magnitude: A Test of Incentive-Motivation Theory. Journal of Experimental Psychology 78 (3p1):423.score: 450.0
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  46. David Lundie (2009). A Theory of Motivation and Ontological Enhancement: The Role of Disability Policy in Student Empowerment and Institutional Change. Educational Philosophy and Theory 41 (5):539-552.score: 447.8
  47. Jonathan Dancy (1995). The Presidential Address: Why There Is Really No Such Thing as the Theory of Motivation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:1 - 18.score: 447.8
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  48. Pegge L. Alciatore & Robert T. Alciatore (1972). Thomism and a Theory of Motivation. Journal of Thought 7 (2):84-9.score: 447.8
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  49. Joseph P. Fell (1970). Sartres Theory of Motivation-Some Clarifications. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 1 (2):27-34.score: 447.8
     
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  50. Andrew Landreth (2009). The Emerging Theory of Motivation. In John Bickle (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press. 381--418.score: 447.8
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