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  1. Susan L. Hurley (1998). Consciousness in Action. Harvard University Press.
  2. Susan Hurley & Alva Noë (2003). Neural Plasticity and Consciousness: Reply to Block. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (8):342.
    Susan Hurley Susan Hurley Susan Hurley Susan Hurley1111 andAlva Noë andAlva Noë andAlva Noë andAlva Noë2222.
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  3.  11
    S. L. Hurley (1989). Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity. Oxford University Press.
    Hurley here revives a classical idea about rationality in a modern framework, by developing analogies between the structure of personality and the structure of society in the context of contemporary work in philosophy of mind, ethics, decision theory and social choice theory. The book examines the rationality of decisions and actions, and illustrates the continuity of philosophy of mind on the one hand, and ethics and jurisprudence on the other. A major thesis of the book is that arguments drawn from (...)
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  4. Susan L. Hurley (2010). Varieties of Externalism. In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press 101-153.
    Externalism comes in varieties. While the landscape isn.
     
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  5. Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.) (2006). Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.
    To what extent can animal behaviour be described as rational? What does it even mean to describe behaviour as rational? -/- This book focuses on one of the major debates in science today - how closely does mental processing in animals resemble mental processing in humans. It addresses the question of whether and to what extent non-human animals are rational, that is, whether any animal behaviour can be regarded as the result of a rational thought processes. It does this (...)
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  6.  32
    S. L. Hurley (2003). Justice, Luck, and Knowledge. Harvard University Press.
    S. L. Hurley's ambitious work brings these two areas of lively debate into overdue contact with each other.
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  7. Susan Hurley (2008). The Shared Circuits Model (SCM): How Control, Mirroring, and Simulation Can Enable Imitation, Deliberation, and Mindreading. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):1-22.
    Imitation, deliberation, and mindreading are characteristically human sociocognitive skills. Research on imitation and its role in social cognition is flourishing across various disciplines. Imitation is surveyed in this target article under headings of behavior, subpersonal mechanisms, and functions of imitation. A model is then advanced within which many of the developments surveyed can be located and explained. The shared circuits model (SCM) explains how imitation, deliberation, and mindreading can be enabled by subpersonal mechanisms of control, mirroring, and simulation. It is (...)
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  8. Susan L. Hurley & Alva Noë (2003). Neural Plasticity and Consciousness. Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):131-168.
    and apply it to various examples of <span class='Hi'>neural</span> <span class='Hi'>plasticity</span> in which input is rerouted intermodally or intramodally to nonstandard cortical targets. In some cases but not others, cortical activity ‘defers’ to the nonstandard sources of input. We ask why, consider some possible explanations, and propose a dynamic sensorimotor hypothesis. We believe that this distinction is important and worthy of further study, both philosophical and empirical, whether or not our hypothesis turns out to be correct. In particular, the question (...)
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  9. Susan Hurley (2010). The Varieties of Externalism. In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press
     
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  10. Susan L. Hurley (2001). Perception and Action: Alternative Views. Synthese 129 (1):3-40.
    A traditional view of perception and action makestwo assumptions: that the causal flow betweenperception and action is primarily linear or one-way,and that they are merely instrumentally related toeach other, so that each is a means to the other.Either or both of these assumptions can be rejected. Behaviorism rejects the instrumental but not theone-way aspect of the traditional view, thus leavingitself open to charges of verificationism. Ecologicalviews reject the one-way aspect but not theinstrumental aspect of the traditional view, so thatperception and (...)
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  11. Susan L. Hurley (2008). The Shared Circuits Model. How Control, Mirroring, and Simulation Can Enable Imitation and Mind Reading. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):1-22.
    Imitation, deliberation, and mindreading are characteristically human sociocognitive skills. Research on imitation and its role in social cognition is flourishing across various disciplines; it is here surveyed under headings of behavior, subpersonal mechanisms, and functions of imitation. A model is then advanced within which many of the developments surveyed can be located and explained. The shared circuits model explains how imitation, deliberation, and mindreading can be enabled by subpersonal mechanisms of control, mirroring and simulation. It is cast at a middle, (...)
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  12. Susan L. Hurley (2003). Animal Action in the Space of Reasons. Mind and Language 18 (3):231-256.
    I defend the view that we should not overintellectualize the mind. Nonhuman animals can occupy islands of practical rationality: they can have contextbound reasons for action even though they lack full conceptual abilities. Holism and the possibility of mistake are required for such reasons to be the agent's reasons, but these requirements can be met in the absence of inferential promiscuity. Empirical work with animals is used to illustrate the possibility that reasons for action could be bound to symbolic or (...)
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  13. Susan Hurley (2004). Imitation, Media Violence, and Freedom of Speech. Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):165-218.
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  14. Susan L. Hurley (1998). Vehicles, Contents, Conceptual Structure and Externalism. Analysis 58 (1):1-6.
    We all know about the vehicle/content distinction (see Dennett 1991a, Millikan 1991, 1993). We shouldn't confuse properties represented in content with properties of vehicles of content. In particular, we shouldn't confuse the personal and subpersonal levels. The contents of the mental states of subject/agents are at the personal level. Vehicles of content are causally explanatory subpersonal events or processes or states. We shouldn't suppose that the properties of vehicles must be projected into what they represent for subject/agents, or vice versa. (...)
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  15. Susan Hurley & Nick Chater (eds.) (2005). Perspectives on Imitation: From Mirror Neurons to Memes, Vol II. MIT Press.
  16.  32
    Susan Hurley (2005). Social Heuristics That Make Us Smarter. Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):585 – 612.
    I argue that an ecologically distributed conception of instrumental rationality can and should be extended to a socially distributed conception of instrumental rationality in social environments. The argument proceeds by showing that the assumption of exogenously fixed units of activity cannot be justified; different units of activity are possible and some are better means to independently given ends than others, in various circumstances. An important social heuristic, the mirror heuristic, enables the flexible formation of units of activity in game theoretic (...)
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  17.  36
    Susan Hurley (2008). Understanding Simulation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):755-774.
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  18. Alva Noë & Susan L. Hurley (2003). The Deferential Brain in Action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (5):195-196.
    binding of colour and alphanumeric form in synaesthesia. Nature 410.
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  19.  12
    S. L. Hurley (2006). Coherence, Hypothetical Cases, and Precedent. In Scott Hershovitz (ed.), Exploring Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin. Oxford University Press 221-251.
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  20. Susan L. Hurley (2006). Active Perception and Perceiving Action: The Shared Circuits Model. In Tamar Szab Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press
    Recently research on imitation and its role in social cognition has been flourishing across various disciplines. After briefly reviewing these developments under the headings of behavior, subpersonal mechanisms, and functions of imitation, I advance the _shared circuits_.
     
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  21.  96
    Susan L. Hurley (2001). Overintellectualizing the Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):423-431.
  22. Susan Hurley & Alva Noë (2007). Can Hunter-Gatherers Hear Color? In Michael Smith, Robert Goodin & Geoffrey Geoffrey (eds.), Common Minds. Oxford 55--83.
     
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  23. Susan L. Hurley (2006). Bypassing Conscious Control: Media Violence, Unconscious Imitation, and Freedom of Speech. In S. Pockett, W. Banks & S. Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press
    Why does it matter whether and how individuals consciously control their behavior? It matters for many reasons. Here I focus on concerns about social influences of which agents are typically unaware on aggressive behavior.
     
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  24.  78
    Susan L. Hurley (2000). Is Responsibility Essentially Impossible? Philosophical Studies 99 (2):229-268.
    Part 1 reviews the general question of when elimination of an entity orproperty is warranted, as opposed to revision of our view of it. Theconnections of this issue with the distinction between context-drivenand theory-driven accounts of reference and essence are probed.Context-driven accounts tend to be less hospitable to eliminativism thantheory-driven accounts, but this tendency should not be overstated.However, since both types of account give essences explanatory depth,eliminativist claims associated with supposed impossible essences areproblematic on both types of account.Part 2 applies (...)
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  25.  69
    Susan L. Hurley (2002). Luck, Responsibility, and the 'Natural Lottery'. Journal of Political Philosophy 10 (1):79–94.
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  26.  71
    Susan Hurley (2001). Luck and Equality: Susan Hurley. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):51–72.
    [ Susan Hurley] I argue that the aim to neutralize the influence of luck on distribution cannot provide a basis for egalitarianism: it can neither specify nor justify an egalitarian distribution. Luck and responsibility can play a role in determining what justice requires to be redistributed, but from this we cannot derive how to distribute: we cannot derive a pattern of distribution from the 'currency' of distributive justice. I argue that the contrary view faces a dilemma, according to whether it (...)
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  27.  85
    Susan L. Hurley (1998). Nonconceptual Self-Consciousness and Agency: Perspective and Access. Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 30 (3-4):207-247.
  28.  4
    S. L. Hurley (2001). Reason and Motivation: The Wrong Distinction? Analysis 61 (2):151-155.
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    S. L. Hurley (1998). Vehicles, Contents, Conceptual Structure, and Externalism. Analysis 58 (1):1-6.
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  30. S. L. Hurley (2001). Reason and Motivation: The Wrong Distinction? Analysis 61 (270):151–155.
  31.  55
    S. L. Hurley (1994). A New Take From Nozick on Newcomb's Problem and Prisoners' Dilemma. Analysis 54 (2):65 - 72.
  32.  7
    S. L. Hurley (2006). Replies. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):447 - 465.
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  33.  4
    S. L. Hurley (2001). Review: Overintellectualizing the Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):423 - 431.
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  34. Susan L. Hurley, Precis of Consciousness in Action.
  35.  7
    Susan Hurley (2005). Summary. Philosophical Books 46 (3):183-187.
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  36. Susan Hurley (2011). Of Responsibility1. In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford University Press 187.
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  37. Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (2006). The Questions of Animal Rationality: Theory and Evidence. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press
    This introductory chapter explains the coverage of this book, which is about animal rationality and mental processing in animals. This book discusses the theoretical issues and distinctions that bear on attributions of rationality to animals and draws some contrasts between rationality and certain other traits of animals to determine the relationships between them. It explores the relations between behaviour and the processes that explain behaviour, and the senses in which animal behaviour might be rational in virtue of features other than (...)
     
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  38.  51
    Susan L. Hurley (2003). Making Sense of Animals: Interpretation Vs. Architecture. Mind and Language 18 (3):273-280.
    i>: We should not overintellectualize the mind. Nonhuman animals can occupy islands of practical rationality: they can have specific, context-bound reasons for action even though they lack full conceptual abilities. Holism and the possibility of mistake are required for such reasons to be the agent’s reasons, but these requirements can be met in the absence of inferential promiscuity. Empirical work with animals is used to illustrate the possibility that reasons for action could be bound to symbolic or social contexts, and (...)
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  39. Susan Hurley (2011). The Public Ecology of Responsibility. In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and Distributive Justice. OUP Oxford
     
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  40.  85
    Susan L. Hurley, Consciousness in Action: Clarifications.
    Philosophy of neuroscience may seem an odd thing to do. What can a philosopher add to what neuroscience itself has to say, other than at some very abstract level, far removed from empirical details and the interests of scientists? At some point you take a deep breath, acknowledge the methodological questions, and just go ahead, spurred on by the sheer philosophical interest and excitement abroad in the neurosciences today. So it is very gratifying to a philosopher of neuroscience for such (...)
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  41.  84
    Susan L. Hurley, Is There a Substantive Disagreement Here? Reply to Chemero and Cordeiro.
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  42.  2
    Ian Chowcat, Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley (1996). On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (184):403.
  43.  60
    S. L. Hurley (1991). Newcomb's Problem, Prisoners' Dilemma, and Collective Action. Synthese 86 (2):173 - 196.
    Among various cases that equally admit of evidentialist reasoning, the supposedly evidentialist solution has varying degrees of intuitive attractiveness. I suggest that cooperative reasoning may account for the appeal of apparently evidentialist behavior in the cases in which it is intuitively attractive, while the inapplicability of cooperative reasoning may account for the unattractiveness of evidentialist behaviour in other cases. A collective causal power with respect to agreed outcomes, not evidentialist reasoning, makes cooperation attractive in the Prisoners' Dilemma. And a natural (...)
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  44. Susan L. Hurley (2003). Action, the Unity of Consciousness, and Vehicle Externalism. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press 78--91.
  45.  17
    S. L. Hurley (1994). Kant on Spontaneity and the Myth of the Giving. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:137 - 164.
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  46.  18
    Justin D'Arms, Robert Francesscotti, I. Haji, Susan Hurley, Leonard Kahn, Brian Kierland, K. Lippert-Rasmussen, Douglas Portmore, Betsy Postow & Bernard Rollin (2006). Manuscript Referees for The Journal of Ethics: August 2005–July 2006. Journal of Ethics 10 (4):507.
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    Susan L. Hurley & Nick Chater (eds.) (2004). Perspectives on Imitation. MIT Press.
    These volumes provide a resource that makes this research accessible across disciplines and clarifies its importance for the social sciences and philosophy as ...
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  48.  27
    Susan Hurley (2003). The Limits of Individualism Are Not the Limits of Rationality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):164-165.
    Individualism fixes the unit of rational agency at the individual, creating problems exemplified in Hi-Lo and Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) games. But instrumental evaluation of consequences does not require a fixed individual unit. Units of agency can overlap, and the question of which unit should operate arises. Assuming a fixed individual unit is hard to justify: It is natural, and can be rational, to act as part of a group rather than as an individual. More attention should be paid to how (...)
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  49.  63
    Susan L. Hurley, The Space of Reasons Vs. The Space of Inference: Reply to Noe.
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  50. Susan L. Hurley (1994). Unity and Objectivity. In Christopher Peacocke (ed.), Objectivity, Simulation, and the Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press 49--77.
     
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