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Profile: Daniel D. Hutto (University of Hertfordshire)
  1. Daniel D. Hutto, Composing Our "Selves&Quot;: Aristotelian and Fictional Personhood.
    The postmodern 'dismantling' of the self is often regarded, in sensationalist terms, as threatening to undermine most if not all of our familiar ideas concerning philosophy and morality. This is so because in challenging our 'commonplace' concept of what it is to be a person - a concept with a heavy Cartesian legacy (or at least a legacy that commonly traced back to Descartes) - it also challenges the standard visions of how we stand, or fail to stand, as knowers (...)
     
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  2. Daniel D. Hutto (forthcoming). Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Topoi:1-10.
    Readers beware! This book is other than it first seems. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s latest philosophical offering is unlike anything that we have had from him to date. Its preface warns that the Tractatus is no textbook. This is an extreme understatement; really it is a deep puzzle—one that must be handled with great care. As the first lines signal there has been a radical change in the author’s characteristic style. Gone are the ingenious, probing explorations of topics undertaken in his highly (...)
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  3. Daniel D. Hutto (forthcoming). Narrative Self-Shaping: A Modest Proposal. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21.
    Decoupling a modestly construed Narrative Self Shaping Hypothesis (or NSSH) from Strong Narrativism this paper attempts to motivate devoting our intellectual energies to the former. Section one briefly introduces the notions of self-shaping and rehearses reasons for thinking that self-shaping, in a suitably tame form, is, at least to some extent, simply unavoidable for reflective beings. It is against this background that the basic commitments of a modest Narrative Self-Shaping Hypothesis (or NSSH) are articulated. Section two identifies a foundational commitment—the (...)
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  4. Daniel D. Hutto & Raúl Sánchez-García (forthcoming). Choking RECtified: Embodied Expertise Beyond Dreyfus. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-23.
    On a Dreyfusian account performers choke when they reflect upon and interfere with established routines of purely embodied expertise. This basic explanation of choking remains popular even today and apparently enjoys empirical support. Its driving insight can be understood through the lens of diverse philosophical visions of the embodied basis of expertise. These range from accounts of embodied cognition that are ultra conservative with respect to representational theories of cognition to those that are more radically embodied. This paper provides an (...)
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  5. Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin (2014). Neural Representations Not Needed - No More Pleas, Please. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):241-256.
    Colombo (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2012) argues that we have compelling reasons to posit neural representations because doing so yields unique explanatory purchase in central cases of social norm compliance. We aim to show that there is no positive substance to Colombo’s plea—nothing that ought to move us to endorse representationalism in this domain, on any level. We point out that exposing the vices of the phenomenological arguments against representationalism does not, on its own, advance the case for representationalism (...)
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  6. Shaun Gallagher, Daniel D. Hutto, Jan Slaby & Jonathan Cole (2013). The Brain as Part of an Enactive System. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):421-422.
    The notion of an enactive system requires thinking about the brain in a way that is different from the standard computational-representational models. In evolutionary terms, the brain does what it does and is the way that it is, across some scale of variations, because it is part of a living body with hands that can reach and grasp in certain limited ways, eyes structured to focus, an autonomic system, an upright posture, etc. coping with specific kinds of environments, and with (...)
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  7. Daniel D. Hutto (2013). Action Understanding: How Low Can You Go? Consciousness and Cognition 22 (3):1142-1151.
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  8. Daniel D. Hutto (2013). Enactivism, From a Wittgensteinian Point of View. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (3):281-302.
    Enactivists seek to revolutionize the new sciences of the mind. In doing so, they promote adopting a thoroughly anti-intellectualist starting point, one that sees mentality as rooted in engaged, embodied activity as opposed to detached forms of thought. In advocating the so-called embodied turn, enactivists touch on recurrent themes of central importance in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. More than this, today's enactivists characterize the nature of minds and how they fundamentally relate to the world in ways that not only echo but (...)
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  9. Daniel D. Hutto (2013). Edouard Machery , Doing Without Concepts . Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 33 (2):142-145.
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  10. Daniel D. Hutto (2012). Comment: Understanding Reasons Without Reenactment: Comment on Stueber. Emotion Review 4 (1):66-67.
    This comment on Stueber’s article clarifies the nature of the core disagreement between his approach to understanding reasons and mine. The purely philosophical nature of the dispute is highlighted. It is argued that understanding someone’s narrative often suffices for understanding the person’s reasons in ordinary cases. It is observed that Stueber has yet to provide a compelling counter case. There is also a brief clarification of some of the empirical commitments of the narrative practice hypothesis.
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  11. Daniel D. Hutto (2012). The Character of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophy 87 (02):298-306.
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  12. Daniel D. Hutto (2012). Truly Enactive Emotion. Emotion Review 4 (2):176-181.
    Any adequate account of emotion must accommodate the fact that emotions, even those of the most basic kind, exhibit intentionality as well as phenomenality. This article argues that a good place to start in providing such an account is by adjusting Prinz’s (2004) embodied appraisal theory (EAT) of emotions. EAT appeals to teleosemantics in order to account for the world-directed content of embodied appraisals. Although the central idea behind EAT is essentially along the right lines, as it stands Prinz’s proposal (...)
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  13. Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin (2012). Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. The Mit Press.
    In this book, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin promote the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition that holds that some kinds of minds -- basic minds -- are neither best explained by processes involving the manipulation of ...
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  14. Daniel D. Hutto (2011). Elementary Mind Minding, Enactivist-Style. In A. Seemann (ed.), Joint Attention: New Developments in Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience. MIT Press.
    The core claim of this paper is that mind minding of the sort required for the simplest and most pervasive forms of joint attentional activity is best understood and explained in non-representational, enactivist terms. In what follows I will attempt to convince the reader of its truth in three steps. The first step, section two, clarifies the target explanandum. The second step, section three, is wholly descriptive. It highlights the core features of a Radically Enactivist proposal about elementary mind minding, (...)
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  15. Daniel D. Hutto (2011). Presumptuous Naturalism: A Cautionary Tale. American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (2):129-145.
    Concentrating on their treatment of folk psychology, this paper seeks to establish that, in the form advocated by its leading proponents, the Canberra project is presumptuous in certain key respects. Crucially, it presumes (1) that our everyday practices entail the existence of implicit folk theories; (2) that naturalists ought to be interested primarily in what such theories say; and (3) that the core content of such theories is adequately characterized by establishing what everyone finds intuitively obvious about the topics in (...)
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  16. Daniel D. Hutto (2011). Philosophy of Mind’s New Lease on Life: Autopoietic Enactivism Meets Teleosemiotics. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (5-6):44-64.
    This commentary will seek to clarify certain core features of Thompson’s proposal about the enactive nature of basic mentality, as best it can, and to bring his ideas into direct conversation with accounts of basic cognition of the sort favoured by analytical philosophers of mind and more traditional cognitive scientists – i.e. those who tend to be either suspicious or critical of enactive/embodied approaches (to the extent that they confess to understanding them at all). My proposed way of opening up (...)
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  17. Daniel D. Hutto (2011). Consciousness. Christopher S. Hill. [REVIEW] Philosophy 86 (02):303-308.
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  18. Daniel D. Hutto (2011). Review Consciousness Christopher S. Hill Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009 260 + Index Pp., ISBN: 9780521125215 £18.99 ($29.99) (Paperback); 9780521110228 £55.00 ($80.00) (Hardback). [REVIEW] Philosophy 86 (2):303-308.
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  19. Daniel D. Hutto (2011). Representation Reconsidered. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):135-139.
  20. Daniel D. Hutto (2011). Understanding Fictional Minds Without Theory of Mind! Style 45 (2):276-282.
    This paper explores the idea that when dealing with certain kinds of narratives, ‘like it or not’, consumers of fiction will bring the same sorts of skills (or at least a subset of them) to bear that they use when dealing with actual minds. Let us call this the ‘Same Resources Thesis’. I believe the ‘Same Resources Thesis’ is true. But this is because I defend the view that engaging in narrative practices is the normal developmental route through which children (...)
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  21. Daniel D. Hutto, Mitchell Herschbach & Victoria Southgate (2011). Editorial: Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):375-395.
    Human beings, even very young infants, and members of several other species, exhibit remarkable capacities for attending to and engaging with others. These basic capacities have been the subject of intense research in developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, comparative psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind over the last several decades. Appropriately characterizing the exact level and nature of these abilities and what lies at their basis continues to prove a tricky business. The contributions to this special issue investigate whether and to (...)
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  22. Daniel D. Hutto (2010). Analytic Philosophy: The History of an Illusion. [REVIEW] Philosophical Investigations 33 (2):187-191.
    Analytic philosophy (AP), some proclaim, is dead or in crisis. It should be so lucky. Its status may be, in fact, much more ephemeral. In this readable and accessible monograph, Preston makes out an interesting and engaging case for the claim that AP has never really existed at all. At first blush this news is a bit hard to swallow. After all there seem to be many, many existing practitioners in our discipline that regard themselves as analytic philosophers and these (...)
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  23. Daniel D. Hutto (2010). Analytic Philosophy: The History of an Illusion–By Aaron Preston. Philosophical Investigations 33 (2):187-191.
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  24. Daniel D. Hutto (2010). Radical Enactivism and Narrative Practice: Implications for Psychopathology. In T. Fuchs, P. Henningsen & H. Sattel (eds.), Coherence and Disorders of the Embodied Self. Schattauer.
    Many psychopathological disorders – clinical depression, borderline personality disorder, schizophrenia and autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) – are commonly classified as disorders of the self. In an intuitive sense this sort of classification is unproblematic. There can be no doubt that such disorders make a difference to one’s ability to form and maintain a coherent sense of oneself in various ways. However, any theoretically rigourous attempt to show that they relate to underlying problems with say, such things as minimal selves or, (...)
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  25. Daniel D. Hutto (2009). Interacting? Yes. But, of What Kind and on What Basis? Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):543-546.
    De Jaegher’s (2009) paper argues that Gallagher, who aims to replace traditional theory-of-mind accounts of social understanding with accounts based on direct perception (hereafter DP), has missed an important opportunity. Despite a desire to break faith with tradition, there is a danger that proponents of DP accounts will remain (at least tacitly) committed to an unchallenged, and perhaps unnoticed, sort of individualism inherent in traditional theories (i.e. those that regard our engagement with others as a ‘problem’ to be solved: a (...)
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  26. Daniel D. Hutto (2009). Folk Psychology as Narrative Practice. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (6-8):6 - 8.
    There has been a long-standing interest in the putative roles that various so-called ‘theory of mind’ abilities might play in enabling us to understand and enjoy narratives. Of late, as our understanding of the complexity and diversity of everyday psychological capacities has become more nuanced and variegated, new possibilities have been articulated: (i) that our capacity for a sophisticated, everyday understanding of actions in terms of reason (our folk psychology) may itself be best characterized as a kind of narrative practice (...)
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  27. Daniel D. Hutto (2009). Philosophical Clarification, its Possibility and Point. Philosophia 37 (4):629–652.
    It is possible to pursue philosophy with a clarificatory end in mind. Doing philosophy in this mode neither reduces to simply engaging in therapy or theorizing. This paper defends the possibility of this distinctive kind of philosophical activity and gives an account of its product—non-theoretical insights—in an attempt to show that there exists a third, ‘live’ option for understanding what philosophy has to offer. It responds to criticisms leveled at elucidatory philosophy by defenders of extreme therapeutic readings and clearly demonstrates (...)
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  28. Daniel D. Hutto (2009). Wittgenstein and Reason. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (2).
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  29. Erik Myin & Daniel D. Hutto (2009). Enacting is Enough. Psyche 15 (1):24-30.
    In the action-space account of color, an emphasis is laid on implicit knowledge when it comes to experience, and explanatory ambitions are expressed. If the knowledge claims are interpreted in a strong way, the action-space account becomes a form of conservative enactivism, which is a kind of cognitivism. Only if the knowledge claims are weakly interpreted, the action space-account can be seen as a distinctive form of enactivism, but then all reductive explanatory ambitions must be abandoned.
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  30. Shaun Gallagher & Daniel D. Hutto (2008). Understanding Others Through Primary Interaction and Narrative Practice. In J. Zlatev, T. Racine, C. Sinha & E. Itkonen (eds.), The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity. John Benjamins. 17–38.
    We argue that theory-of-mind (ToM) approaches, such as “theory theory” and “simulation theory”, are both problematic and not needed. They account for neither our primary and pervasive way of engaging with others nor the true basis of our folk psychological understanding, even when narrowly construed. Developmental evidence shows that young infants are capable of grasping the purposeful intentions of others through the perception of bodily movements, gestures, facial expressions etc. Trevarthen’s notion of primary intersubjectivity can provide a theoretical framework for (...)
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  31. Daniel D. Hutto (2008). First Communions. In J. Zlatev, T. Racine, C. Sinha & E. Itkonen (eds.), The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity. John Benjamins. 12--245.
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  32. Daniel D. Hutto (2008). Limited Engagements and Narrative Extensions. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):419 – 444.
    E-approaches to the mind stress the embodied, embedded and enactive nature of mental phenomena. In their more radical, non-representational variants these approaches offer innovative and powerful new ways of understanding fundamental modes of intersubjective social interaction: I-approaches. While promising, E and I accounts have natural limits. In particular, they are unable to explain human competence in making sense of reasons for actions in folk-psychological terms. In this paper I outline the core features of the 'Narrative Practice Hypothesis' (NPH), showing how (...)
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  33. Daniel D. Hutto (2008). The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Clarifications and Implications. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):175 – 192.
    The Narrative Practice Hypothesis (NPH) is a recently conceived, late entrant into the contest of trying to understand the basis of our mature folk psychological abilities, those involving our capacity to explain ourselves and comprehend others in terms of reasons. This paper aims to clarify its content, importance and scientific plausibility by: distinguishing its conceptual features from those of its rivals, articulating its philosophical significance, and commenting on its empirical prospects. I begin by clarifying the NPH's target explanandum and the (...)
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  34. Daniel D. Hutto (2008). Articulating and Understanding the Phenomenological Manifesto. Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente E Ação 10 (19):10-19.
    Focusing on the manifesto provided by Gallagher and Zahavi's The Phenomenological Mind, this paper critically examines how we should understand and asses the prospects of allying phenomenological approaches to mind with work in the cognitive sciences. It is argued that more radical and revolutionary adjustments to our standard conceptions of the mind than suggested by (at least some) the proponents of the phenomenological movement are required before such alliances will bear fruit.
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  35. Daniel D. Hutto (2007). Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons. A Bradford Book.
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  36. Daniel D. Hutto (2007). Folk Psychology Without Theory or Simulation. In D. Hutto & M. Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Reassessed. Springer. 115--135.
    This paper spells out just how the Narrative Practice Hypothesis, if true, undercuts any need to appeal to either theory or simulation when it comes to explaining the basis of folk psychological understanding: these heuristics do not come into play other than in cases of in which the framework is used to speculate about why another may have acted. To add appropriate force to this observation, I first say something about why we should reject the widely held assumption that the (...)
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  37. Daniel D. Hutto (2007). Getting Clear About Perspicuous Representations : Wittgenstein, Baker and Fodor. In Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (ed.), Perspicuous Presentations: Essays on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Deciding what role perspicuous representations play in Wittgenstein’s philosophy matters, not only for determining what one thinks of the contributions of this great figure of twentieth century philosophy but also for recognising the ‘live options’ for conducting philosophical enquiries full stop. It is not surprising, given this importance, that perspicuous representations is the topic of the opening chapter of Gordon Baker’s posthumous collection of essays on philosophical method. In that contribution he offers grounds for thinking that the relevant passage in (...)
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  38. Daniel D. Hutto (2007). Narrative and Understanding Persons. In Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements. 1-.
    The human world is replete with narratives – narratives of our making that are uniquely appreciated by us. Some thinkers have afforded special importance to our capacity to generate such narratives, seeing it as variously enabling us to: exercise our imaginations in unique ways; engender an understanding of actions performed for reasons; and provide a basis for the kind of reflection and evaluation that matters vitally to moral and self development. Perhaps most radically, some hold that narratives are essential for (...)
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  39. Daniel D. Hutto (2007). Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements.
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  40. Daniel D. Hutto (2007). Rethinking Commonsense Psychology: A Critique of Folk Psychology, Theory of Mind and Simulation. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (11).
    Ask nearly any analytic philosopher of mind how we understand intentional actions performed for reasons and you are bound to be told that we do so by deploying mental concepts, such as beliefs and desires, in systematic ways. This way of making sense of actions is known as commonsense or folk psychology (or CSP or FP for short). There have been many interesting debates about CSP over the years. These have focused on questions including: How fundamental and universal is this (...)
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  41. Daniel D. Hutto (2007). The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Origins and Applications of Folk Psychology. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (60):43-68.
    This paper promotes the view that our childhood engagement with narratives of a certain kind is the basis of sophisticated folk psychological abilities —i.e. it is through such socially scaffolded means that folk psychological skills are normally acquired and fostered. Undeniably, we often use our folk psychological apparatus in speculating about why another may have acted on a particular occasion, but this is at best a peripheral and parasitic use. Our primary understanding and skill in folk psychology derives from and (...)
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  42. Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.) (2007). Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Kluwer/Springer Press.
    This is a truly groundbreaking work that examines today’s notions of folk psychology. Bringing together disciplines as various as cognitive science and anthropology, the authors analyze and question key assumptions about the nature, scope and function of folk psychology.
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  43. Daniel D. Hutto (2006). Against Passive Intellectualism: Reply to Crane. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.
  44. Daniel D. Hutto (2006). Misreadings, Clarifications and Reminders: A Reply to Hutchinson and Read. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (4):561 - 567.
    We want to say that there can’t be any vagueness in logic. The idea that now absorbs us, that the ideal ‘must’ be found in reality. Meanwhile we do not as yet see how it occurs there, nor do we understand the nature of this ‘must’. We think it must be in reality; for we think we already see it there.
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  45. Daniel D. Hutto (2006). Embodied Expectations and Extended Possibilities: Reply to Goldie. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.
  46. Daniel D. Hutto (2006). Narrative Practice and Understanding Reasons: Reply to Gallagher. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.
  47. Daniel D. Hutto (2006). Turning Hard Problems on Their Heads. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):75-88.
    Much of the difficulty in assessing theories of consciousness stems from their advocates not supplying adequate or convincing characterisations of the phenomenon (or data) they hope to explain. Yet, to make any reasonable assessment this is precisely what is required, for it is not as if our ‘pre-theoretical’ intuitions are philosophically innocent. I attempt to reveal, using a recent debate between Chalmers and Dennett as a foil, why, in approaching this topic, we cannot characterise the data purely first-personally or third-personally (...)
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  48. Daniel D. Hutto (2006). Unprincipled Engagement: Emotional Experience, Expression and Response. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.
  49. Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.) (2006). Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. 63-78. Dordrecht: Springer Publishers.
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