Search results for 'Hypotheses' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. H. G. Callaway (2008). Cultural Pluralism and the Virtues of Hypotheses. la Torre Del Virrey, Revista de Estudios Culturales:33-38.score: 24.0
    This paper focuses on the preliminary evaluation of expressions of moral sentiment under conditions of cultural pluralism. The advance of science and technology puts ever new power over nature in human hands, and if this new power is to more fully serve human ends, then it must become the means or material of human virtue. This prospect poses the question of the relationship between power and virtue, and equally, the question of how scientific advances may be understood to enter into (...)
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  2. Massimo Pigliucci (2009). Hypotheses? Forget About It! Philosophy Now (Jul/Aug):47.score: 24.0
    On the status of hypotheses in science, and why scientists would be better off asking questions.
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  3. Susanne Bobzien (1997). The Stoics on Hypotheses and Hypothetical Arguments. Phronesis 42 (3):299-312.score: 24.0
    ABSTRACT: In this paper I argue (i) that the hypothetical arguments about which the Stoic Chrysippus wrote numerous books (DL 7.196) are not to be confused with the so-called "hypothetical syllogisms", but are the same hypothetical arguments as those mentioned five times in Epictetus (e.g. Diss. 1.25.11-12); and (ii) that these hypothetical arguments are formed by replacing in a non-hypothetical argument one (or more) of the premisses by a Stoic "hypothesis" or supposition. Such "hypotheses" or suppositions differ from propositions (...)
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  4. Anja Jauernig (2008). Leibniz on Motion and the Equivalence of Hypotheses. The Leibniz Review 18:1-40.score: 24.0
    Contrary to popular belief, I argue that Leibniz is not hopelessly confused about motion: Leibniz is indeed both a relativist and an absolutist about motion, as suggested by the textual evidence, but, appearances to the contrary, this is not a problem; Leibniz’s infamous doctrine of the equivalence of hypotheses is well-supported and well-integrated within Leibniz’s physical theory; Leibniz’s assertion that the simplest hypothesis of several equivalent hypotheses can be held to be true can be explicated in such a (...)
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  5. Herbert Hoijtink Anouck Kluytmans, Rens van de Schoot, Joris Mulder (2012). Illustrating Bayesian Evaluation of Informative Hypotheses for Regression Models. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 24.0
    In the present paper we illustrate the Bayesian evaluation of informative hypotheses for regression models. This approach allows psychologists to more directly test their theories than they would using conventional statis- tical analyses. Throughout this paper, both real-world data and simulated datasets will be introduced and evaluated to investigate the pragmatical as well as the theoretical qualities of the approach. We will pave the way from forming informative hypotheses in the context of regression models to interpreting the Bayes (...)
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  6. Anouck Kluytmans, Rens Van De Schoot, Joris Mulder & Herbert Hoijtink (2012). Illustrating Bayesian Evaluation of Informative Hypotheses for Regression Models. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 24.0
    In the present paper we illustrate the Bayesian evaluation of informative hypotheses for regression models. This approach allows psychologists to more directly test their theories than they would using conventional statis- tical analyses. Throughout this paper, both real-world data and simulated datasets will be introduced and evaluated to investigate the pragmatical as well as the theoretical qualities of the approach. We will pave the way from forming informative hypotheses in the context of regression models to interpreting the Bayes (...)
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  7. Chuck Ward & Steven Gimbel (2010). Retroductive Analogy: How to and How Not to Make Claims of Good Reasons to Believe in Evolutionary and Anti-Evolutionary Hypotheses. [REVIEW] Argumentation 24 (1):71-84.score: 24.0
    This paper describes an argumentative fallacy we call ‘Retroductive Analogy.’ It occurs when the ability of a favored hypothesis to explain some phenomena, together with the fact that hypotheses of a similar sort are well supported, is taken to be sufficient evidence to accept the hypothesis. This fallacy derives from the retroductive or abductive form of reasoning described by Charles Sanders Peirce. According to Peirce’s account, retroduction can provide good reasons to pursue a hypothesis but does not, by itself, (...)
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  8. Aysel Dogan (2005). Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses as Relations. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 36 (2):243 - 259.score: 21.0
    In spite of several attempts to explicate the relationship between a scientific hypothesis and evidence, the issue still cries for a satisfactory solution. Logical approaches to confirmation, such as the hypothetico-deductive method and the positive instance account of confirmation, are problematic because of their neglect of the semantic dimension of hypothesis confirmation. Probabilistic accounts of confirmation are no better than logical approaches in this regard. An outstanding probabilistic account of confirmation, the Bayesian approach, for instance, is found to be defective (...)
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  9. Federica Russo (2011). Correlational Data, Causal Hypotheses, and Validity. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (1):85 - 107.score: 21.0
    A shared problem across the sciences is to make sense of correlational data coming from observations and/or from experiments. Arguably, this means establishing when correlations are causal and when they are not. This is an old problem in philosophy. This paper, narrowing down the scope to quantitative causal analysis in social science, reformulates the problem in terms of the validity of statistical models. Two strategies to make sense of correlational data are presented: first, a 'structural strategy', the goal of which (...)
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  10. Veronika Coltheart (1971). Memory for Stimuli and Memory for Hypotheses in Concept Identification. Journal of Experimental Psychology 89 (1):102.score: 21.0
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  11. Alfred H. Fuchs (1962). The Progression-Regression Hypotheses in Perceptual-Motor Skill Learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 63 (2):177.score: 21.0
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  12. Roger L. Dominowski (1973). Requiring Hypotheses and the Identification of Unidimensional Conjunctive and Disjunctive Concepts. Journal of Experimental Psychology 100 (2):387.score: 21.0
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  13. Robert K. Young, Robert Newby & Terry G. Hamon (1972). Acquisition and Familiarization Hypotheses in Paired-Associate Learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 96 (2):473.score: 21.0
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  14. Sebastian L. Giurintano (1973). Serial Learning Process: Test of Chaining, Position, and Dual-Process Hypotheses. Journal of Experimental Psychology 97 (2):154.score: 21.0
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  15. Diane F. Halpern & Francis W. Irwin (1973). Selection of Hypotheses as Affected by Their Preference Values. Journal of Experimental Psychology 101 (1):105.score: 21.0
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  16. Irwin D. Nahinsky, William C. Penrod & Frank L. Slaymaker (1970). Relationship of Component Cues to Hypotheses in Conjunctive Concept Learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 83 (2p1):351.score: 21.0
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  17. Ramon J. Rhine (1959). The Relation of Achievement in Problem Solving to Rate and Kind of Hypotheses Produced. Journal of Experimental Psychology 57 (4):253.score: 21.0
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  18. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2010). Corroboration and Auxiliary Hypotheses: Duhem's Thesis Revisited. Synthese 177 (1):139-149.score: 18.0
    This paper argues that Duhem’s thesis does not decisively refute a corroboration-based account of scientific methodology (or ‘falsificationism’), but instead that auxiliary hypotheses are themselves subject to measurements of corroboration which can be used to inform practice. It argues that a corroboration-based account is equal to the popular Bayesian alternative, which has received much more recent attention, in this respect.
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  19. Greg Bamford (1999). What is the Problem of Ad Hoc Hypotheses? Science and Education 8 (4):375 - 86..score: 18.0
    The received view of an ad hochypothesis is that it accounts for only the observation(s) it was designed to account for, and so non-ad hocness is generally held to be necessary or important for an introduced hypothesis or modification to a theory. Attempts by Popper and several others to convincingly explicate this view, however, prove to be unsuccessful or of doubtful value, and familiar and firmer criteria for evaluating the hypotheses or modified theories so classified are characteristically available. These (...)
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  20. Steven L. Reynolds (2013). Effective Sceptical Hypotheses. Theoria 79 (3):262-278.score: 18.0
    The familiar Cartesian sceptical arguments all involve an explanation of our experiences. An account of the persuasive power of the sceptical arguments should explain why this is so. This supports a diagnosis of the error in Cartesian sceptical arguments according to which they mislead us into regarding our perceptual beliefs as if they were justified as inferences to the best explanation. I argue that they have instead a perceptual justification that does not involve inference to the best explanation and that (...)
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  21. H. G. Callaway (2014). Abduction, Competing Models and the Virtues of Hypotheses. In Lorenzo Magnani (ed.), (2014) Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Springer. 263-280.score: 18.0
    This paper focuses on abduction as explicit or readily formulatable inference to possible explanatory hypotheses--as contrasted with inference to conceptual innovations or abductive logic as a cycle of hypotheses, deduction of consequences and inductive testing. Inference to an explanation is often a matter of projection or extrapolation of elements of accepted theory for the solution of outstanding problems in particular domains of inquiry. I say "projections or extrapolation" of accepted theory, but I mean to point to something broader (...)
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  22. Bryan Frances (2008). Live Skeptical Hypotheses. In John Greco (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford.score: 18.0
    Those of us who take skepticism seriously typically have two relevant beliefs: (a) it’s plausible (even if false) that in order to know that I have hands I have to be able to epistemically neutralize, to some significant degree, some skeptical hypotheses, such as the brain-in-a-vat (BIV) one; and (b) it’s also plausible (even if false) that I can’t so neutralize those hypotheses. There is no reason for us to also think (c) that the BIV hypothesis, for instance, (...)
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  23. Joshua May (2013). Skeptical Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):341-359.score: 18.0
    Moral skeptics maintain that we do not have moral knowledge. Traditionally they haven’t argued via skeptical hypotheses like those provided by perceptual skeptics about the external world, such as Descartes’ deceiving demon. But some believe this can be done by appealing to hypotheses like moral nihilism. Moreover, some claim that skeptical hypotheses have special force in the moral case. But I argue that skeptics have failed to specify an adequate skeptical scenario, which reveals a general lesson: such (...)
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  24. Giovanna Colombetti (2008). The Somatic Marker Hypotheses, and What the Iowa Gambling Task Does and Does Not Show. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (1):51-71.score: 18.0
    Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) is a prominent neuroscientific hypothesis about the mechanisms implementing decision-making. This paper argues that, since its inception, the SMH has not been clearly formulated. It is possible to identify at least two different hypotheses, which make different predictions: SMH-G, which claims that somatic states generally implement preferences and are needed to make a decision; and SMH-S, which specifically claims that somatic states assist decision-making by anticipating the long-term outcomes of available options. This paper also (...)
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  25. Victor Rodych (2003). Popper Versus Wittgenstein on Truth, Necessity, and Scientific Hypotheses. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 34 (2):323-336.score: 18.0
    Most philosophers of science maintain Confirmationism's central tenet, namely, that scientific theories are probabilistically confirmed by experimental successes. Against this dominant (and old) conception of experimental science, Popper's well-known, anti-inductivistic Falsificationism (’Deductivism’) has stood, virtually alone, since 1934. Indeed, it is Popper who tells us that it was he who killed Logical Positivism. It is also pretty well-known that Popper blames Wittgenstein for much that is wrong with Logical Positivism, just as he despises Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinian philosophers for abdicating philosophy's (...)
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  26. James Beebe (2010). Constraints on Sceptical Hypotheses. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):449 - 470.score: 18.0
    I examine the conditions which hypotheses must satisfy if they are to be used to raise significant sceptical challenges. I argue that sceptical hypotheses do not have to be logically, metaphysically or epistemically possible: they need only to depict scenarios subjectively indistinguishable from the actual world and to show how subjects can believe what they do while not having knowledge. I also argue that sceptical challenges can be raised against a priori beliefs, even if those beliefs are necessarily (...)
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  27. Iris Fry (1995). Are the Different Hypotheses on the Emergence of Life as Different as They Seem? Biology and Philosophy 10 (4):389-417.score: 18.0
    This paper calls attention to a philosophical presupposition, coined here the continuity thesis which underlies and unites the different, often conflicting, hypotheses in the origin of life field. This presupposition, a necessary condition for any scientific investigation of the origin of life problem, has two components. First, it contends that there is no unbridgeable gap between inorganic matter and life. Second, it regards the emergence of life as a highly probable process. Examining several current origin-of-life theories. I indicate the (...)
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  28. Kirk Fitzhugh (forthcoming). Species as Explanatory Hypotheses: Refinements and Implications. Acta Biotheoretica.score: 18.0
    The formal definition of species as explanatory hypotheses presented by Fitzhugh (Marine Biol 26:155–165, 2005a , b ) is emended. A species is an explanatory account of the occurrences of the same character(s) among gonochoristic or cross-fertilizing hermaphroditic individuals by way of character origin and subsequent fixation during tokogeny. In addition to species, biological systematics also employs hypotheses that are ontogenetic, tokogenetic, intraspecific, and phylogenetic, each of which provides explanatory hypotheses for distinctly different classes of causal questions. (...)
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  29. John C. Harsanyi (1983). Bayesian Decision Theory, Subjective and Objective Probabilities, and Acceptance of Empirical Hypotheses. Synthese 57 (3):341 - 365.score: 18.0
    It is argued that we need a richer version of Bayesian decision theory, admitting both subjective and objective probabilities and providing rational criteria for choice of our prior probabilities. We also need a theory of tentative acceptance of empirical hypotheses. There is a discussion of subjective and of objective probabilities and of the relationship between them, as well as a discussion of the criteria used in choosing our prior probabilities, such as the principles of indifference and of maximum entropy, (...)
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  30. David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg & Theo Kuipers (2009). How to Confirm the Conjunction of Disconfirmed Hypotheses. Philosophy of Science 76 (1):1-21.score: 18.0
    Can some evidence confirm a conjunction of two hypotheses more than it confirms either of the hypotheses separately? We show that it can, moreover under conditions that are the same for ten different measures of confirmation. Further we demonstrate that it is even possible for the conjunction of two disconfirmed hypotheses to be confirmed by the same evidence.
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  31. Matti Sintonen (2004). Reasoning to Hypotheses: Where Do Questions Come? Foundations of Science 9 (3):249-266.score: 18.0
    Detectives and scientists are in the business of reasoning from observations to explanations. This they often do by raising cunning questionsduring their inquiries. But to substantiate this claim we need to know how questions arise and how they are nurtured into more specific hypotheses. I shall discuss what the problem is, and then introduce the so-called interrogative model of inquiry which makes use of an explicit logic of questions. On this view, a discovery processes can be represented as a (...)
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  32. Lorenzo Magnani & Matteo Piazza (2005). Morphodynamical Abduction. Causation by Attractors Dynamics of Explanatory Hypotheses in Science. Foundations of Science 10 (1):107-132.score: 18.0
    Philosophers of science today by and large reject the cataclysmic and irrational interpretation of the scientific enterprise claimed by Kuhn. Many computational models have been implemented to rationally study the conceptual change in science. In this recent tradition a key role is played by the concept of abduction as a mechanism by which new explanatory hypotheses are introduced. Nevertheless some problems in describing the most interesting abductive issues rise from the classical computational approach. It describes a cognitive process (and (...)
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  33. Darrell P. Rowbottom & R. McNeill Alexander (2012). The Role of Hypotheses in Biomechanical Research. Science in Context 25 (2):247-262.score: 18.0
    This paper investigates whether there is a discrepancy between the stated and actual aims in biomechanical research, particularly with respect to hypothesis testing. We present an analysis of one hundred papers recently published in The Journal of Experimental Biology and Journal of Biomechanics, and examine the prevalence of papers which (a) have hypothesis testing as a stated aim, (b) contain hypothesis testing claims that appear to be purely presentational (i.e. which seem not to have influenced the actual study), and (c) (...)
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  34. Branden Fitelson & Andrew Waterman (2005). Bayesian Confirmation and Auxiliary Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):293-302.score: 18.0
    has proposed an interesting and novel Bayesian analysis of the Quine-Duhem (Q–D) problem (i.e., the problem of auxiliary hypotheses). Strevens's analysis involves the use of a simplifying idealization concerning the original Q–D problem. We will show that this idealization is far stronger than it might appear. Indeed, we argue that Strevens's idealization oversimplifies the Q–D problem, and we propose a diagnosis of the source(s) of the oversimplification. Some background on Quine–Duhem Strevens's simplifying idealization Indications that (I) oversimplifies Q–D Strevens's (...)
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  35. I. A. Kieseppä (1996). Truthlikeness for Hypotheses Expressed in Terms of N Quantitative Variables. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (2):109 - 134.score: 18.0
    A qualitative theory of truthlikeness, based on a family of quantitative measures, is developed for hypotheses that are concerned with the values of a finite number of real-valued quantities. Representing hypotheses by subsets of $R^{n}$ , I first show that a straightforward application of the basic ideas of the similarity approach to truthlikeness does not work out for hypotheses with zero n-dimensional Lebesgue measure. However, it is easy to give a counterpart for the average measure preferred by (...)
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  36. Michael Strevens (2005). The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses: Reply to Fitelson and Waterman. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4):913-918.score: 18.0
    Bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses rests on a misinterpretation of Strevens's central claim about the negligibility of certain small probabilities. The present paper clarifies and proves a very general version of the claim. The project Clarifications The negligibility argument Generalization and proof.
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  37. Joseph L. Austerweil & Thomas L. Griffiths (2011). Seeking Confirmation Is Rational for Deterministic Hypotheses. Cognitive Science 35 (3):499-526.score: 18.0
    The tendency to test outcomes that are predicted by our current theory (the confirmation bias) is one of the best-known biases of human decision making. We prove that the confirmation bias is an optimal strategy for testing hypotheses when those hypotheses are deterministic, each making a single prediction about the next event in a sequence. Our proof applies for two normative standards commonly used for evaluating hypothesis testing: maximizing expected information gain and maximizing the probability of falsifying the (...)
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  38. Michael Strevens (2001). The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):515-537.score: 18.0
    This paper examines the standard Bayesian solution to the Quine–Duhem problem, the problem of distributing blame between a theory and its auxiliary hypotheses in the aftermath of a failed prediction. The standard solution, I argue, begs the question against those who claim that the problem has no solution. I then provide an alternative Bayesian solution that is not question-begging and that turns out to have some interesting and desirable properties not possessed by the standard solution. This solution opens the (...)
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  39. Moon-Heum Yang (2005). The Relationship Between Hypotheses and Images in the Mathematical Subsection of the Divided Line of Plato's Republic. Dialogue 44 (2):285-312.score: 18.0
    In explaining the relationship between hypotheses and images in the Line of Plato’s Republic VI, I first focus on Plato’s elucidation of the nature of mathematics as the mathematician himself understands it. I go on to criticize traditional interpretations of the relationship above based on the doubtful assumption that mathematics concerns Platonic Forms. To formulate my view of that relationship I exploit the notion of “structure.” I show how “hypotheses” as principles of proof can determine the structures of (...)
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  40. Struan Jacobs (1991). John Stuart Mill on Induction and Hypotheses. Journal of the History of Philosophy 29 (1):69-83.score: 18.0
    A study of the development of Mill's thought through successive editions of _A System of Logic. His view of the genesis of most scientific laws, it is argued, progressively shifted from inductivism to hypothetico-deductivism. Mill's analysis of hypotheses and of methods for their assessment is considered in detail. New light is shed on relations between Mill's metascience and that of William Whewell.
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  41. Marion Vorms (2013). Models of Data and Theoretical Hypotheses: A Case-Study in Classical Genetics. Synthese 190 (2):293-319.score: 18.0
    Linkage (or genetic) maps are graphs, which are intended to represent the linear ordering of genes on the chromosomes. They are constructed on the basis of statistical data concerning the transmission of genes. The invention of this technique in 1913 was driven by Morgan's group's adoption of a set of hypotheses concerning the physical mechanism of heredity. These hypotheses were themselves grounded in Morgan's defense of the chromosome theory of heredity, according to which chromosomes are the physical basis (...)
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  42. Jukka Mikkonen (2010). Contemplation and Hypotheses in Literature. Philosophical Frontiers 5 (1):73-83.score: 18.0
    In literary aesthetics, the debate on whether literary fictions provide propositional knowledge generally centres around the question whether there are authors’ explicit or implicit truth-claims in literary works and whether the reader’s act of looking for and assessing such claims as true or false is an appropriate stance toward the works as literary works. Nevertheless, in reading literary fiction, readers cannot always be sure whether the author is actually asserting or suggesting a view she expresses or presents because of the (...)
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  43. Malcolm R. Forster (1988). Sober's Principle of Common Cause and the Problem of Comparing Incomplete Hypotheses. Philosophy of Science 55 (4):538-559.score: 18.0
    Sober (1984) has considered the problem of determining the evidential support, in terms of likelihood, for a hypothesis that is incomplete in the sense of not providing a unique probability function over the event space in its domain. Causal hypotheses are typically like this because they do not specify the probability of their initial conditions. Sober's (1984) solution to this problem does not work, as will be shown by examining his own biological examples of common cause explanation. The proposed (...)
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  44. C. McLarty (2012). Introduction: Hypotheses and Progress. Philosophia Mathematica 20 (2):135-142.score: 18.0
    The unifying theme of this issue is Plato’s dialectical view of mathematical progress and hypotheses. Besides provisional propositions, he calls concepts and goals also hypotheses. He knew mathematicians create new concepts and goals as well as theorems, and abandon many along the way, and erase the creative process from their proofs. So the hypotheses of mathematics necessarily change through use — unless Benson is correct that Plato believed mathematics could reach the unhypothetical goals of dialectic. Landry discusses (...)
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  45. Henry A. Finch (1960). Confirming Power of Observations Metricized for Decisions Among Hypotheses. Philosophy of Science 27 (3):293-307.score: 18.0
    Experimental observations are often taken in order to assist in making a choice between relevant hypotheses ∼ H and H. The power of observations in this decision is here metrically defined by information-theoretic concepts and Bayes' theorem. The exact (or maximum power) of a new observation to increase or decrease Pr(H) the prior probability that H is true; the power of that observation to modify the total amount of uncertainty involved in the choice between ∼ H and H: the (...)
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  46. Rainer Gottlob (2000). New Aspects of the Probabilistic Evaluation of Hypotheses and Experience. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (2):147 – 163.score: 18.0
    The probabilistic corroboration of two or more hypotheses or series of observations may be performed additively or multiplicatively . For additive corroboration (e.g. by Laplace's rule of succession), stochastic independence is needed. Inferences, based on overwhelming numbers of observations without unexplained counterinstances permit hyperinduction , whereby extremely high probabilities, bordering on certainty for all practical purposes may be achieved. For multiplicative corroboration, the error probabilities (1 - Pr) of two (or more) hypotheses are multiplied. The probabilities, obtained by (...)
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  47. Jan-Willem Romeijn (2004). Hypotheses and Inductive Predictions. Synthese 141 (3):333 - 364.score: 18.0
    This paper studies the use of hypotheses schemes in generatinginductive predictions. After discussing Carnap–Hintikka inductive logic,hypotheses schemes are defined and illustrated with two partitions. Onepartition results in the Carnapian continuum of inductive methods, the otherresults in predictions typical for hasty generalization. Following theseexamples I argue that choosing a partition comes down to making inductiveassumptions on patterns in the data, and that by choosing appropriately anyinductive assumption can be made. Further considerations on partitions makeclear that they do not suggest (...)
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  48. Cameron Shelley (2002). Analogy Counterarguments and the Acceptability of Analogical Hypotheses. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):477-496.score: 18.0
    The logical empiricists held that an analogical hypothesis does not gain any acceptability from the analogy on which it is founded. On this view, the acceptability of a hypothesis cannot be discounted by criticizing the foundational analogy. Yet scientists commonly appear to level exactly this sort of criticism. If scientists are able to discount the acceptability of analogical hypotheses in this way, then the logical empiricist view is mistaken. I analyze four forms of analogy counterargument, disanalogy, misanalogy, counteranalogy, and (...)
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  49. Kent Staley (2008). Error-Statistical Elimination of Alternative Hypotheses. Synthese 163 (3):397 - 408.score: 18.0
    I consider the error-statistical account as both a theory of evidence and as a theory of inference. I seek to show how inferences regarding the truth of hypotheses can be upheld by avoiding a certain kind of alternative hypothesis problem. In addition to the testing of assumptions behind the experimental model, I discuss the role of judgments of implausibility. A benefit of my analysis is that it reveals a continuity in the application of error-statistical assessment to low-level empirical (...) and highly general theoretical principles. This last point is illustrated with a brief sketch of the issues involved in the parametric framework analysis of tests of physical theories such as General Relativity and of fundamental physical principles such as the Einstein Equivalence Principle. (shrink)
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  50. Timo P. Kylmälä (2011). Post-Organic Informational Condition: Hypotheses on the Nature and Role of Information in Human Systems. World Futures 67 (2):93-105.score: 18.0
    (2011). Post-Organic Informational Condition: Hypotheses on the Nature and Role of Information in Human Systems. World Futures: Vol. 67, No. 2, pp. 93-105.
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