Search results for 'Hypotheses' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  25
    John Corcoran & William Frank (2014). COSMIC JUSTICE HYPOTHESES. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 20:247-248.
    Cosmic Justice Hypotheses. -/- This applied-logic lecture builds on [1] arguing that character traits fostered by logic serve clarity and understanding in ethics, confirming hopeful views of Alfred Tarski [2, Preface, and personal communication]. Hypotheses in one strict usage are propositions not known to be true and not known to be false or—more loosely—propositions so considered for discussion purposes [1, p. 38]. Logic studies hypotheses by determining their implications (propositions they imply) and their implicants (propositions that imply (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  87
    H. G. Callaway (2008). Cultural Pluralism and the Virtues of Hypotheses. la Torre Del Virrey, Revista de Estudios Culturales:33-38.
    This paper focuses on the preliminary evaluation of expressions of moral sentiment under conditions of cultural pluralism. The advance of science and technology puts ever new power over nature in human hands, and if this new power is to more fully serve human ends, then it must become the means or material of human virtue. This prospect poses the question of the relationship between power and virtue, and equally, the question of how scientific advances may be understood to enter into (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  50
    Massimo Pigliucci (2009). Hypotheses? Forget About It! Philosophy Now (Jul/Aug):47.
    On the status of hypotheses in science, and why scientists would be better off asking questions.
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  65
    Susanne Bobzien (1997). The Stoics on Hypotheses and Hypothetical Arguments. Phronesis 42 (3):299-312.
    ABSTRACT: In this paper I argue (i) that the hypothetical arguments about which the Stoic Chrysippus wrote numerous books (DL 7.196) are not to be confused with the so-called hypothetical syllogisms" but are the same hypothetical arguments as those mentioned five times in Epictetus (e.g. Diss. 1.25.11-12); and (ii) that these hypothetical arguments are formed by replacing in a non-hypothetical argument one (or more) of the premisses by a Stoic "hypothesis" or supposition. Such "hypotheses" or suppositions differ from propositions (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  26
    Anja Jauernig (2008). Leibniz on Motion and the Equivalence of Hypotheses. The Leibniz Review 18:1-40.
    Contrary to popular belief, I argue that Leibniz is not hopelessly confused about motion: Leibniz is indeed both a relativist and an absolutist about motion, as suggested by the textual evidence, but, appearances to the contrary, this is not a problem; Leibniz’s infamous doctrine of the equivalence of hypotheses is well-supported and well-integrated within Leibniz’s physical theory; Leibniz’s assertion that the simplest hypothesis of several equivalent hypotheses can be held to be true can be explicated in such a (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  3
    Chuck Ward & Steven Gimbel (2010). Retroductive Analogy: How to and How Not to Make Claims of Good Reasons to Believe in Evolutionary and Anti-Evolutionary Hypotheses. [REVIEW] Argumentation 24 (1):71-84.
    This paper describes an argumentative fallacy we call ‘Retroductive Analogy.’ It occurs when the ability of a favored hypothesis to explain some phenomena, together with the fact that hypotheses of a similar sort are well supported, is taken to be sufficient evidence to accept the hypothesis. This fallacy derives from the retroductive or abductive form of reasoning described by Charles Sanders Peirce. According to Peirce’s account, retroduction can provide good reasons to pursue a hypothesis but does not, by itself, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  21
    Federica Russo (2011). Correlational Data, Causal Hypotheses, and Validity. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (1):85 - 107.
    A shared problem across the sciences is to make sense of correlational data coming from observations and/or from experiments. Arguably, this means establishing when correlations are causal and when they are not. This is an old problem in philosophy. This paper, narrowing down the scope to quantitative causal analysis in social science, reformulates the problem in terms of the validity of statistical models. Two strategies to make sense of correlational data are presented: first, a 'structural strategy', the goal of which (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  8. David Butorac (2012). The Place and Purposes of Hypotheses in Proclus: Method, Training and Savlation. In Angela Longo (ed.), Argument from Hypothesis in Ancient Philosophy. Bibliopolis 365–382.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  9.  18
    Aysel Dogan (2005). Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses as Relations. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (2):243 - 259.
    In spite of several attempts to explicate the relationship between a scientific hypothesis and evidence, the issue still cries for a satisfactory solution. Logical approaches to confirmation, such as the hypothetico-deductive method and the positive instance account of confirmation, are problematic because of their neglect of the semantic dimension of hypothesis confirmation. Probabilistic accounts of confirmation are no better than logical approaches in this regard. An outstanding probabilistic account of confirmation, the Bayesian approach, for instance, is found to (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  10.  6
    Alfred H. Fuchs (1962). The Progression-Regression Hypotheses in Perceptual-Motor Skill Learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 63 (2):177.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  11.  3
    Veronika Coltheart (1971). Memory for Stimuli and Memory for Hypotheses in Concept Identification. Journal of Experimental Psychology 89 (1):102.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  12.  1
    Sebastian L. Giurintano (1973). Serial Learning Process: Test of Chaining, Position, and Dual-Process Hypotheses. Journal of Experimental Psychology 97 (2):154.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13.  1
    Diane F. Halpern & Francis W. Irwin (1973). Selection of Hypotheses as Affected by Their Preference Values. Journal of Experimental Psychology 101 (1):105.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  2
    Roger L. Dominowski (1973). Requiring Hypotheses and the Identification of Unidimensional Conjunctive and Disjunctive Concepts. Journal of Experimental Psychology 100 (2):387.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  1
    Irwin D. Nahinsky, William C. Penrod & Frank L. Slaymaker (1970). Relationship of Component Cues to Hypotheses in Conjunctive Concept Learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 83 (2p1):351.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  1
    Robert K. Young, Robert Newby & Terry G. Hamon (1972). Acquisition and Familiarization Hypotheses in Paired-Associate Learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 96 (2):473.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. David D. Butorac (2012). The Place and Purpose of Hypotheses in Proclus: Method, Logic, Mathematics and Philosophy. In Angela Longo (ed.), Argument from Hypothesis in Ancient Philosophy. Bibliopolis 365–382.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Ramon J. Rhine (1959). The Relation of Achievement in Problem Solving to Rate and Kind of Hypotheses Produced. Journal of Experimental Psychology 57 (4):253.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  14
    Tom Dougherty, Samuel Baron & Kristie Miller (2015). Female Under-Representation Among Philosophy Majors: A Map of the Hypotheses and a Survey of the Evidence. Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 1 (1):1-30.
    Why is there female under-representation among philosophy majors? We survey the hypotheses that have been proposed so far, grouping similar hypotheses together. We then propose a chronological taxonomy that distinguishes hypotheses according to the stage in undergraduates’ careers at which the hypotheses predict an increase in female under-representation. We then survey the empirical evidence for and against various hypotheses. We end by suggesting future avenues for research.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  20.  61
    Mark Alfano & Gus Skorburg (forthcoming). The Embedded and Extended Character Hypotheses. In Julian Kiverstein (ed.), Philosophy of the Social Mind. Routledge
    This paper brings together two erstwhile distinct strands of philosophical inquiry: the extended mind hypothesis and the situationist challenge to virtue theory. According to proponents of the extended mind hypothesis, the vehicles of at least some mental states (beliefs, desires, emotions) are not located solely within the confines of the nervous system (central or peripheral) or even the skin of the agent whose states they are. When external props, tools, and other systems are suitably integrated into the functional apparatus of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  21.  8
    Nicola Angius (2014). The Problem of Justification of Empirical Hypotheses in Software Testing. Philosophy and Technology 27 (3):423-439.
    This paper takes part in the methodological debate concerning the nature and the justification of hypotheses about computational systems in software engineering by providing an epistemological analysis of Software Testing, the practice of observing the programs’ executions to examine whether they fulfil software requirements. Property specifications articulating such requirements are shown to involve falsifiable hypotheses about software systems that are evaluated by means of tests which are likely to falsify those hypotheses. Software Reliability metrics, used to measure (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  22.  9
    Justin Tan & Irene Hau-Siu Chow (2009). Isolating Cultural and National Influence on Value and Ethics: A Test of Competing Hypotheses. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 88 (1):197 - 210.
    We live in an increasingly globalizing world, in which countries are closely linked by international trade and investment ties. Cross-cultural comparative studies of national values and ethics have attracted growing research interest in recent years, because shared practices, values and ethical standards depend on shared beliefs. However, the findings of such studies have been unable to reach a consensus on the impact of culture on ethics-related attitudes and behavior. Empirically, many "cross–cultural" differences reported by previous studies might actually stem from (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  23. Kent Staley (2008). Error-Statistical Elimination of Alternative Hypotheses. Synthese 163 (3):397 - 408.
    I consider the error-statistical account as both a theory of evidence and as a theory of inference. I seek to show how inferences regarding the truth of hypotheses can be upheld by avoiding a certain kind of alternative hypothesis problem. In addition to the testing of assumptions behind the experimental model, I discuss the role of judgments of implausibility. A benefit of my analysis is that it reveals a continuity in the application of error-statistical assessment to low-level empirical (...) and highly general theoretical principles. This last point is illustrated with a brief sketch of the issues involved in the parametric framework analysis of tests of physical theories such as General Relativity and of fundamental physical principles such as the Einstein Equivalence Principle. (shrink)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  24.  5
    Katya Tentori, Nick Chater & Vincenzo Crupi (2015). Judging the Probability of Hypotheses Versus the Impact of Evidence: Which Form of Inductive Inference Is More Accurate and Time‐Consistent? Cognitive Science 39 (8).
    Inductive reasoning requires exploiting links between evidence and hypotheses. This can be done focusing either on the posterior probability of the hypothesis when updated on the new evidence or on the impact of the new evidence on the credibility of the hypothesis. But are these two cognitive representations equally reliable? This study investigates this question by comparing probability and impact judgments on the same experimental materials. The results indicate that impact judgments are more consistent in time and more accurate (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  25.  61
    Darrell P. Rowbottom & R. McNeill Alexander (2012). The Role of Hypotheses in Biomechanical Research. Science in Context 25 (2):247-262.
    This paper investigates whether there is a discrepancy between the stated and actual aims in biomechanical research, particularly with respect to hypothesis testing. We present an analysis of one hundred papers recently published in The Journal of Experimental Biology and Journal of Biomechanics, and examine the prevalence of papers which (a) have hypothesis testing as a stated aim, (b) contain hypothesis testing claims that appear to be purely presentational (i.e. which seem not to have influenced the actual study), and (c) (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  26.  35
    Michael Strevens (2001). The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):515-537.
    This paper examines the standard Bayesian solution to the Quine–Duhem problem, the problem of distributing blame between a theory and its auxiliary hypotheses in the aftermath of a failed prediction. The standard solution, I argue, begs the question against those who claim that the problem has no solution. I then provide an alternative Bayesian solution that is not question-begging and that turns out to have some interesting and desirable properties not possessed by the standard solution. This solution opens the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  27. Victor Rodych (2003). Popper Versus Wittgenstein on Truth, Necessity, and Scientific Hypotheses. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 34 (2):323-336.
    Most philosophers of science maintain Confirmationism's central tenet, namely, that scientific theories are probabilistically confirmed by experimental successes. Against this dominant (and old) conception of experimental science, Popper's well-known, anti-inductivistic Falsificationism (’Deductivism’) has stood, virtually alone, since 1934. Indeed, it is Popper who tells us that it was he who killed Logical Positivism. It is also pretty well-known that Popper blames Wittgenstein for much that is wrong with Logical Positivism, just as he despises Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinian philosophers for abdicating philosophy's (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  25
    Joel Katzav (2013). Severe Testing of Climate Change Hypotheses. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 44 (4):433-441.
    I examine, from Mayo's severe testing perspective, the case found in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change fourth report for the claim that increases in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations caused most of the post-1950 global warming. My examination begins to provide an alternative to standard, probabilistic assessments of OUR FAULT. It also brings out some of the limitations of variety of evidence considerations in assessing this and other hypotheses about the causes of climate change, and illuminates the epistemology of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  29.  35
    Stéphane Vautier (2011). The Operationalization of General Hypotheses Versus the Discovery of Empirical Laws in Psychology. Philosophia Scientiae 15 (2):105-122.
    Psychology students learn to operationalize 'general hypotheses' as a paradigm of scientific Psychology: relatively vague ideas result in an attempt to reject the null hypothesis in favour of an alternative hypothesis, a so-called research hypothesis, which operationalizes the general idea. Such a practice turns out to be particularly at odds with the discovery of empirical laws. An empirical law is defined as a nomothetic gap emerging from a reference system of the form O x M(X) x M(Y), where O (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2010). Corroboration and Auxiliary Hypotheses: Duhem's Thesis Revisited. Synthese 177 (1):139-149.
    This paper argues that Duhem’s thesis does not decisively refute a corroboration-based account of scientific methodology (or ‘falsificationism’), but instead that auxiliary hypotheses are themselves subject to measurements of corroboration which can be used to inform practice. It argues that a corroboration-based account is equal to the popular Bayesian alternative, which has received much more recent attention, in this respect.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  31.  78
    Branden Fitelson & Andrew Waterman (2005). Bayesian Confirmation and Auxiliary Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):293-302.
    has proposed an interesting and novel Bayesian analysis of the Quine-Duhem (Q–D) problem (i.e., the problem of auxiliary hypotheses). Strevens's analysis involves the use of a simplifying idealization concerning the original Q–D problem. We will show that this idealization is far stronger than it might appear. Indeed, we argue that Strevens's idealization oversimplifies the Q–D problem, and we propose a diagnosis of the source(s) of the oversimplification. Some background on Quine–Duhem Strevens's simplifying idealization Indications that (I) oversimplifies Q–D Strevens's (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  32.  31
    Joseph L. Austerweil & Thomas L. Griffiths (2011). Seeking Confirmation Is Rational for Deterministic Hypotheses. Cognitive Science 35 (3):499-526.
    The tendency to test outcomes that are predicted by our current theory (the confirmation bias) is one of the best-known biases of human decision making. We prove that the confirmation bias is an optimal strategy for testing hypotheses when those hypotheses are deterministic, each making a single prediction about the next event in a sequence. Our proof applies for two normative standards commonly used for evaluating hypothesis testing: maximizing expected information gain and maximizing the probability of falsifying the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  33. Steven L. Reynolds (2013). Effective Sceptical Hypotheses. Theoria 79 (3):262-278.
    The familiar Cartesian sceptical arguments all involve an explanation of our experiences. An account of the persuasive power of the sceptical arguments should explain why this is so. This supports a diagnosis of the error in Cartesian sceptical arguments according to which they mislead us into regarding our perceptual beliefs as if they were justified as inferences to the best explanation. I argue that they have instead a perceptual justification that does not involve inference to the best explanation and that (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  57
    James Beebe (2010). Constraints on Sceptical Hypotheses. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):449-470.
    I examine the conditions which hypotheses must satisfy if they are to be used to raise significant sceptical challenges. I argue that sceptical hypotheses do not have to be logically, metaphysically or epistemically possible: they need only to depict scenarios subjectively indistinguishable from the actual world and to show how subjects can believe what they do while not having knowledge. I also argue that sceptical challenges can be raised against a priori beliefs, even if those beliefs are necessarily (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  35.  28
    Michael Strevens (2005). The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses: Reply to Fitelson and Waterman. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4):913-918.
    Bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses rests on a misinterpretation of Strevens's central claim about the negligibility of certain small probabilities. The present paper clarifies and proves a very general version of the claim. The project Clarifications The negligibility argument Generalization and proof.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  36.  87
    Joshua May (2013). Skeptical Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):341-359.
    Moral skeptics maintain that we do not have moral knowledge. Traditionally they haven’t argued via skeptical hypotheses like those provided by perceptual skeptics about the external world, such as Descartes’ deceiving demon. But some believe this can be done by appealing to hypotheses like moral nihilism. Moreover, some claim that skeptical hypotheses have special force in the moral case. But I argue that skeptics have failed to specify an adequate skeptical scenario, which reveals a general lesson: such (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  45
    David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg & Theo Kuipers (2009). How to Confirm the Conjunction of Disconfirmed Hypotheses. Philosophy of Science 76 (1):1-21.
    Can some evidence confirm a conjunction of two hypotheses more than it confirms either of the hypotheses separately? We show that it can, moreover under conditions that are the same for ten different measures of confirmation. Further we demonstrate that it is even possible for the conjunction of two disconfirmed hypotheses to be confirmed by the same evidence.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  38.  53
    Giovanna Colombetti (2008). The Somatic Marker Hypotheses, and What the Iowa Gambling Task Does and Does Not Show. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (1):51-71.
    Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) is a prominent neuroscientific hypothesis about the mechanisms implementing decision-making. This paper argues that, since its inception, the SMH has not been clearly formulated. It is possible to identify at least two different hypotheses, which make different predictions: SMH-G, which claims that somatic states generally implement preferences and are needed to make a decision; and SMH-S, which specifically claims that somatic states assist decision-making by anticipating the long-term outcomes of available options. This paper also (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  39.  84
    H. G. Callaway (2014). Abduction, Competing Models and the Virtues of Hypotheses. In Lorenzo Magnani (ed.), (2014) Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Springer 263-280.
    This paper focuses on abduction as explicit or readily formulatable inference to possible explanatory hypotheses--as contrasted with inference to conceptual innovations or abductive logic as a cycle of hypotheses, deduction of consequences and inductive testing. Inference to an explanation is often a matter of projection or extrapolation of elements of accepted theory for the solution of outstanding problems in particular domains of inquiry. I say "projections or extrapolation" of accepted theory, but I mean to point to something broader (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. J. -W. Romeyn (2004). Hypotheses and Inductive Predictions. Synthese 141 (3):333-364.
    ABSTRACT. This paper studies the use of hypotheses schemes in generating inductive predictions. After discussing Carnap –Hintikka inductive logic, hypotheses schemes are defined and illustrated with two partitions. One partition results in the Carnapian continuum of inductive methods, the other results in predictions typical for hasty generalization. Following these examples I argue that choosing a partition comes down to making inductive assumptions on patterns in the data, and that by choosing appropriately any inductive assumption can be made. Further (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Greg Bamford (1999). What is the Problem of Ad Hoc Hypotheses? Science and Education 8 (4):375 - 86..
    The received view of an ad hochypothesis is that it accounts for only the observation(s) it was designed to account for, and so non-ad hocness is generally held to be necessary or important for an introduced hypothesis or modification to a theory. Attempts by Popper and several others to convincingly explicate this view, however, prove to be unsuccessful or of doubtful value, and familiar and firmer criteria for evaluating the hypotheses or modified theories so classified are characteristically available. These (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  23
    Marion Vorms (2013). Models of Data and Theoretical Hypotheses: A Case-Study in Classical Genetics. Synthese 190 (2):293-319.
    Linkage (or genetic) maps are graphs, which are intended to represent the linear ordering of genes on the chromosomes. They are constructed on the basis of statistical data concerning the transmission of genes. The invention of this technique in 1913 was driven by Morgan's group's adoption of a set of hypotheses concerning the physical mechanism of heredity. These hypotheses were themselves grounded in Morgan's defense of the chromosome theory of heredity, according to which chromosomes are the physical basis (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  43.  58
    Iris Fry (1995). Are the Different Hypotheses on the Emergence of Life as Different as They Seem? Biology and Philosophy 10 (4):389-417.
    This paper calls attention to a philosophical presupposition, coined here the continuity thesis which underlies and unites the different, often conflicting, hypotheses in the origin of life field. This presupposition, a necessary condition for any scientific investigation of the origin of life problem, has two components. First, it contends that there is no unbridgeable gap between inorganic matter and life. Second, it regards the emergence of life as a highly probable process. Examining several current origin-of-life theories. I indicate (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  44.  40
    Itay Neeman & John Steel (2006). Counterexamples to the Unique and Cofinal Branches Hypotheses. Journal of Symbolic Logic 71 (3):977 - 988.
    We produce counterexamples to the unique and cofinal branches hypotheses, assuming (slightly less than) the existence of a cardinal which is strong past a Woodin cardinal.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45.  6
    Valdas Noreika (2011). Dreaming and Waking Experiences in Schizophrenia: How Should the (Dis)Continuity Hypotheses Be Approached Empirically? Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):349-352.
    A number of differences between the dreams of schizophrenia patients and those of healthy participants have been linked to changes in waking life that schizophrenia may cause. This way, the “continuity hypothesis” has become a standard way to relate dreaming and waking experiences in schizophrenia. Nevertheless, some of the findings in dream literature are not compatible with the continuity hypothesis and suggest some other ways how dream content and waking experiences could interact. Conceptually, the continuity hypothesis could be sharpened into (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  46.  98
    Bryan Frances (2008). Live Skeptical Hypotheses. In John Greco (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford 225-245.
    Those of us who take skepticism seriously typically have two relevant beliefs: (a) it’s plausible (even if false) that in order to know that I have hands I have to be able to epistemically neutralize, to some significant degree, some skeptical hypotheses, such as the brain-in-a-vat (BIV) one; and (b) it’s also plausible (even if false) that I can’t so neutralize those hypotheses. There is no reason for us to also think (c) that the BIV hypothesis, for instance, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  47.  4
    Rune Nyrup, Pursuing and Accepting Hypotheses: A Peircean View of IBE.
    It is often observed that explanatory reasoning, especially the so-called inference to best explanation, plays a crucial role in theory choice in scientific practice. This paper defends an alternative account of the justificatory role of explanatory reasoning in general, and IBE in particular, inspired by C.S. Peirce's account of abduction. Most contemporary proponents of IBE take it to provide justification for accepting hypotheses as true. In contrast to this, the Peircean view defended here takes explanatory reasoning to first and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  38
    Matti Sintonen (2004). Reasoning to Hypotheses: Where Do Questions Come? Foundations of Science 9 (3):249-266.
    Detectives and scientists are in the business of reasoning from observations to explanations. This they often do by raising cunning questionsduring their inquiries. But to substantiate this claim we need to know how questions arise and how they are nurtured into more specific hypotheses. I shall discuss what the problem is, and then introduce the so-called interrogative model of inquiry which makes use of an explicit logic of questions. On this view, a discovery processes can be represented as a (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  49.  18
    Cameron Shelley (2002). Analogy Counterarguments and the Acceptability of Analogical Hypotheses. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):477-496.
    The logical empiricists held that an analogical hypothesis does not gain any acceptability from the analogy on which it is founded. On this view, the acceptability of a hypothesis cannot be discounted by criticizing the foundational analogy. Yet scientists commonly appear to level exactly this sort of criticism. If scientists are able to discount the acceptability of analogical hypotheses in this way, then the logical empiricist view is mistaken. I analyze four forms of analogy counterargument, disanalogy, misanalogy, counteranalogy, and (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  50.  47
    John C. Harsanyi (1983). Bayesian Decision Theory, Subjective and Objective Probabilities, and Acceptance of Empirical Hypotheses. Synthese 57 (3):341 - 365.
    It is argued that we need a richer version of Bayesian decision theory, admitting both subjective and objective probabilities and providing rational criteria for choice of our prior probabilities. We also need a theory of tentative acceptance of empirical hypotheses. There is a discussion of subjective and of objective probabilities and of the relationship between them, as well as a discussion of the criteria used in choosing our prior probabilities, such as the principles of indifference and of maximum entropy, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000