Hume’s view of reason is notoriously hard to pin down, not least because of the apparently contradictory positions which he appears to adopt in different places. (...) class='Hi'>The problem is perhaps most clear in his writings concerning induction - in his famous argument of Treatise I iii 6 and Enquiry IV, on the one hand, he seems to conclude that “probable inference” has no rational basis, while elsewhere, for example in much of his writing on natural theology, he seems happy to acknowledge that such inference is not only reasonable, but is even a paradigm of reasoning against which the theistic arguments must be judged. In the face of this apparent contradiction, many recent commentators have proferred “non-sceptical” interpretations of Hume’s argument concerning induction, but in this paper I sketch an alternative and perhaps less radical method of resolving the problem, by identifying a major threefold ambiguity in Hume’s use of the word “reason”. On this interpretation, Hume indeed sees induction as a paradigm of reasonableness in what is arguably the most important sense, but he nevertheless believes induction to be entirely non-reasonable in another sense, which though less important in common life is nevertheless very significant philosophically. A comparison with Locke can help to illuminate Hume’s position, which though indeed not entirely sceptical about induction, is by no means entirely non-sceptical either. (shrink)
The main thrust of my argument was that ad hoc su gge s ti ons of ch a ri ty cannot replace a systematic and theoreti c (...) a lly inform ed approach to poverty rel i ef . Ch a ri t a ble don a ti on som eti m e s h elps—and som etimes harm s — but is no general solution to global poverty, and can be po s i tively dangerous wh en pre s en ted as such. We need to consider, and often choose, other routes to helping the poor—including ethical to u rism and fair trade in lu x u ry goods. We will not be able to invest in such feasible routes if we give away all our extra income, as Singer recommends. Sticking to donation above all, when a combination of other strategies is necessary, is highly likely to harm the poor. Si n ger doe s n’t re a lly en ga ge my argumen t . In s te ad , he cari c a tu res our “f u n d a m ental disa greem en t” :a pp a ren t ly, Si n ger rej ects va ri o u s policies because he takes into account the “f act s” ; wh ereas Ku per is the one seeking a “f a i t h ,” a “po l i tical ph i l o s ophy. . . i m mune to ref ut a ti on on the basis of evi den ce .” Anyon e who has re ad my arti cle (pp. 1 07 - 2 0) must fin d this puzzling. The arti cle explains at len g t h wh i ch kinds of b ack ground theories help us to d i s cern and re s pon s i bly con s i der the rel eva n t f act s . I show that Si n ger sel ects and uses fact s u n c ri ti c a lly prec i s ely because he has no po l i tical econ omy, no po l i tical soc i o l ogy, and no t h eory of ju s ti ce . We are seri o u s ly misled if we do not draw adequ a tely on the wi s dom and.. (shrink)
Si ritiene a volte che l'invenzione della stampa abbia innescato il cambiamento nel modo di concepire l'oggetto libro, segnando il passaggio dall'idea medievale a quella (...) moderna. Occorre però tenere presente che esiste un'importante evoluzione interna al medioevo e che l'invenzione della stampa, per quanto fondamentale, è da inserire all'interno di questo processo più ampio, che a partire dal XII secolo circa trasforma l'uso e la funzione stessa della scrittura, rivoluziona il modo di leggere e di conseguenza il libro stesso, sia concettualmente sia come oggetto fisico. L'approccio scelto per questo studio mira a risalire alle radici culturali dei cambiamenti nelle pratiche del lavoro intellettuale e, viceversa, a indagare se e come tali cambiamenti abbiano potuto influenzare, attraverso le opere stesse, la cultura dell'epoca. Il fenomeno oggetto specifico dell'indagine è l'autografia letteraria d'autore che, eccezionale nell'alto medioevo, è testimoniata da una nuova e ininterrotta serie di casi a partire dall'XI-XII secolo, per poi diffondersi nei secoli successivi. Il panorama culturale della fine del medioevo appare dunque caratterizzato dalla tensione tra una ricorrente aspirazione all'individualizzazione del rapporto tra l'autore e il suo testo, che si realizzava in un modello di produzione libraria basato su uno stretto controllo dell'autore sul prodotto finale, dal punto di vista sia filologico-testuale sia grafico e materiale, e l'opposta tendenza all'allentamento del controllo dell'autore sulla propria opera, come naturale conseguenza di una sempre più vasta circolazione dei testi ma anche di una diversa concezione del ruolo autoriale. It is generally believed that the invention of printing triggered a cultural change, marking the passage between the medieval idea of the book and the modern one. It should be noted, though, that there was an important evolution through the Late Middle Ages, and that the printing revolution, however crucial, must be placed inside the wider process that from the XIIth century onwards transformed the use and function of writing, of reading and, consequently, the book itself, both theoretically and physically. The aim of this study is to track the cultural roots of the changes in the practices of intellectual work and, viceversa, to determine whether and how such changes may have influenced, through the literary production, late medieval culture. I have focused on the phenomenon of literary autography which, very unusual in the Early Middle Ages, is attested by a new and uninterrupted series of examples from the XIth-XIIth centuries onwards. The cultural landscape of the end of the Middle Ages appears therefore marked by the tension between a recurring drive towards an individualisation of the relation between an author and his work and a strict control by the author over the final product (both philologically and graphically) and an opposite trend leading to the loosening of the author's control over his work, as a natural result of the circulation of the texts but also of a different idea of the authorial role. (shrink)
Cominciamo da lontano. Supponiamo che un giorno ci si presenti l’occasione di poter chiedere a un oracolo onnisciente di dirci, una volta per tutte, che cosa (...) class='Hi'>c’è. Non sto pensando al sogno dello scienziato pigro, che vorrebbe sentirsi dire senza troppi sforzi come è fatto il mondo. Sarebbe eccessivo, e del resto non è detto che saremmo in grado di capire la risposta. (Potrebbe essere formulata nel linguaggio di una teoria scientifica che non conosciamo.) Sto semplicemente pensando all’opportunità di sentirci dire che cosa c’è e che cosa non c’è, in modo da poter concentrare in nostri sforzi – quelli della ricerca scientifica come quelli un po’ più speculativi della riflessione filosofica – sullo studio delle cose reali, evitando così inutili sprechi di energie. Se, per esempio, l’oracolo ci dicesse che la fontana della giovinezza non esiste, come è probabile, faremmo bene a smettere di cercarla, così come se tempo fa ci avesse detto che il flogisto non esiste non avremmo sprecato il nostro tempo a cercare di studiarne le proprietà. E se ci dicesse che nell’universo non esistono altre forme di vita oltre a quelle esemplificate sul nostro pianeta, cosa peraltro improbabile, allora potremmo dirottare i cospicui investimenti dedicati alla loro ricerca verso obiettivi più realistici e, di conseguenza, più utili. (shrink)
David Bohm, Emeritus Professor of Theoretical Physics at Birkbeck College of the University of London and Fellow of the Royal Society, died of a heart attack on (...) October 29, 1992 at the age of 74. Professor Bohm had been one of the world’s leading authorities on quantum theory and its interpretation for more than four decades. His contributions have been critical to all aspects of the field. He also made seminal contributions to plasma physics. His name appears prominently in the modern physics literature, through the Aharonov- Bohm effect , the Bohm-EPR experiment , the Bohm-Pines collective description of particle interactions (random phase approximation), Bohm diffusion and the Bohm causal interpretation of quantum mechanics, also sometimes called the de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave theory. David Bohm was born in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania on December 20, 1917. A student of J. Robert Oppenheimer, Bohm received his Ph.D. from the University of California at Berkeley in 1943. In 1950 he completed the first of his six books, Quantum Theory, which became the definitive exposition of the orthodox (Copenhagen) interpretation of quantum mechanics. Here Bohm presented his reformulation of the paradox of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. It is this Bohm version of EPR which has provided the basis for the enormous expansion of research on the foundations of quantum theory, focusing on nonlocality and the possible incompleteness of the quantum description (the question of “hidden variables”), which has occurred during the past several decades. (shrink)
An d rew Ku per begins his cri ti que of my vi ews on poverty by accepti n g the crux of my moral argument: The (...) interests of all persons ought to count equally, and geographic location and citizenship m a ke no intrinsic differen ce to the ri gh t s and obl i ga ti ons of i n d ivi du a l s . Ku per also sets out some key facts about global poverty, for example, that 30,000 children die every day from preventable illness and starvation, while most people in devel oped nati on s have plenty of disposable income that they s pend on lu x u ries and items that sati s f y mere wants, not basic needs. Yet after summarizing an essay I wrote for the New York Times Magazine in which I argued that the avera ge Am erican family should don a te a l a r ge porti on of t h eir income to or ga n i z ati ons like UNICEF and Ox f a m , Ku per wri te s : “ But if Si n ger ’s ex h ort a ti ons make you want to act immediately in the ways he recom m en d s , you s h ould not do so.” Why not? Because the approach I advoc a te “would seriously harm the poor.” These are strong words. It is startling to be told that a substantial transfer of resources from comfortably-off American families to UNICEF or Oxfam would harm the poor. What abo ut those 3 0,0 0 0 ch i l d ren dyi n g from preventable illness and starvation? In its 2001 fund-raising material,the U.S. Committee for UNICEF says that a donation of $17 will provide immunization “to protect a child for life against the six leading ch i l d - killing and maiming diseases:measles,polio. (shrink)
Section 1 of this essay distinguishes between four interpretations of Socratic intellectualism, which are, very roughly: (1) a version in which on any given occasion desire, and (...) then action, is determined by what we think will turn out best for us, that being what we all, always, really desire; (2) a version in which on any given occasion action is determined by what we think will best satisfy our permanent desire for what is really best for us; (3) a version formed by the assimilation of (2) to (1), labelled the ‘standard’ version’ by Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, and treated by them as a single alternative to their own interpretation; and (4) Brickhouse and Smith’s own version. Section 2 considers, in particular, Brickhouse and Smith’s handling of the ‘appetites and passions’, which is the most distinctive feature of interpretation (4). Section 3 discusses Brickhouse and Smith’s defence of ‘Socratic studies’ in its historical context, and assesses the contribution made by their distinctive interpretation of ‘the philosophy of Socrates’. One question raised in this section, and one that is clearly fundamental to the existence of ‘Socratic studies’, is how different Brickhouse and Smith’s Socrates turns out to be from Plato himself, i.e., the Plato of the post-‘Socratic’ dialogues; to which the answer offered is that on Brickhouse and Smith’s interpretation Socratic moral psychology becomes rather less distinguishable from its ‘Platonic’ counterpart—as that is currently understood—than it is on the interpretation(s) they oppose. (shrink)
[D. H. Mellor] Kant's claim that our knowledge of time is transcendental in his sense, while false of time itself, is true of tenses, i.e. of (...) class='Hi'> the locations of events and other temporal entities in McTaggart's A series. This fact can easily, and I think only, be explained by taking time itself to be real but tenseless. /// [J. R. Lucas] Mellor's argument from Kant fails. The difficulties in his first Antinomy are due to topological confusions, not the tensed nature of time. Nor are McTaggart' s difficulties due to the tensed nature of time. The ego-centricity of tensed discourse is an essential feature of communication between selves, each of whom refers himself as 'I', and is required for talking about time as well as experience and agency. Arguments based on the Special Theory are misconceived. Some rest on a confused notion of 'topological simultaneity'. In the General Theory a cosmic time is defined, as also in quantum mechanics, where a natural present is defined by a unique hyperplane of collapse into eigen-ness. (shrink)
The prologues to the patristic commentaries on the Prophets offer an opportunity to compare these prefaces in practice. Prologues written by Cyril of Alexandria, Theodore of Mopsuestia (...) and Theodoret of Cyrus are the most similar among the Greeks, where some common points can be identified. Much shorter are the prologues written by Didymus the Blind and John Chrysostom. Longer, although with an unusual preamble, is the prologue to the comment on Isaiah which has been attributed to Basil of Caesarea. The common trait of all Greek patristic prologues lies in their impersonality, their objectivity, their scientific qualities. Among the Latins, the exuberance of Jerome’s prologues stands out with its prevailing personal traits. The reason for this difference between the Greek and Roman Fathers’ prologues has to be identified in Greek and Latin profane literature. Cicero in particular, allows for a better understanding of many peculiarities in Jerome’s prologues. (shrink)
