There are striking structural similarities between Freud's ego and Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, which for Kant grounds our use of ‘I’ in ‘I think’. There (...) class='Hi'> are also striking similarities between Freud's superego and Kant's account of the mental structure that grounds our use of ‘I’ in the moral ‘I ought to’. The paper explores these similarities on three main points: the conflict of motivations internal to the mind, the relation between discursive and pre-discursive representation of moral motivation, and the unconscious character of moral motivation. The suggestion is that Freud offers resources for a naturalized account (an account in terms of the causal development of empirical human beings) of just those features of our moral motivation that, according to Kant, seem to make it least amenable to a naturalistic explanation. How much of a revision of Kant's analysis of moral justification is thereby entailed is beyond the purview of the paper. (shrink)
Spade 1988 sugges t s tha t t he r e are ac tua l l y two theo r i e s t o address t (...) h i s ques t i o n t o , an ear l y one and a l a t e r one . 2 Most o f the presen t pape r i s a deve l o pmen t o f t h i s i dea . I sugges t tha t ear l y work by Sherwood and o the r s was a s tudy o f quan t i f i e r s : the i r semant i c s and t he e f f e c t s o f con t e x t on i n f e r e n ce s t ha t can be made f r om quan t i f i e d te rms . La te r , i n the hands o f Bur l e y and o the r s , i t changed i n t o a s tudy o f someth i n g e l se , a s tudy o f what I ca l l g loba l quan t i f i c a t i o n a l e f f e c t . In sec t i o n 1 , I exp l a i n what these two op t i o n s are. (shrink)
Some authors have claimed that ante rem structuralism has problems with structures that have indiscernible places. In response, I argue that there is no requirement that mathematical (...) objects be individuated in a non-trivial way. Metaphysical principles and intuitions to the contrary do not stand up to ordinary mathematical practice, which presupposes an identity relation that, in a sense, cannot be defined. In complex analysis, the two square roots of –1 are indiscernible: anything true of one of them is true of the other. I suggest that i functions like a parameter in natural deduction systems. I gave an early version of this paper at a workshop on structuralism in mathematics and science, held in the Autumn of 2006, at Bristol University. Thanks to the organizers, particularly Hannes Leitgeb, James Ladyman, and Øystein Linnebo, to my commentator Richard Pettigrew, and to the audience there. The paper also benefited considerably from a preliminary session at the Arché Research Centre at the University of St Andrews. I am indebted to my colleagues Craige Roberts, for help with the linguistics literature, and Ben Caplan and Gabriel Uzquiano, for help with the metaphysics. Thanks also to Hannes Leitgeb and Jeffrey Ketland for reading an earlier version of the manuscript and making helpful suggestions. I also benefited from conversations with Richard Heck, John Mayberry, Kevin Scharp, and Jason Stanley. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)
I use some ideas of Keith DeRose's to develop an (invariantist!) account of why sceptical reasoning doesn't show that I don't know that I'm (...) class='Hi'>not a brain in a vat. I argue that knowledge is subject to the risk-of-error constraint: a true belief won’t have the status of knowledge if there is a substantial risk of the belief being in error that hasn’t been brought under control. When a substantial risk of error is present (i.e. beliefs in propositions that are false in nearby worlds), satisfying the constraint requires bringing the risk under control. This is achieved either by sensitivity, i.e. you wouldn’t have the belief if it were false, or by identifying evidence for the proposition. However, when the risk of error is not substantial (i.e. beliefs in propositions that are not false in nearby worlds), the constraint is satisfied by default. My belief that I am not a brain in a vat is insensitive and I have no evidence for it, but since it is not false in nearby worlds, it satisfies the constraint by default. (shrink)
Can we ever truly answer the question, “Who am I?” Moderated by Alex Voorhoeve (London School of Economics), neuro-philosopher Elie During (University of Paris, Ouest Nanterre), (...) class='Hi'>cognitive scientist David Jopling (York University, Canada), social psychologist Timothy Wilson (University of Virginia),and ethicist Frances Kamm (Harvard University) examine the difficulty of achieving genuine self-knowledge and how the pursuit of self-knowledge plays a role in shaping the self. (shrink)
In this paper I argue that a necessary condition of ones perceiving God is that an experience of the right phenomenological sort be caused in one directly (...) enough by God and – bypassing the issue of what is necessary for an experience to be of the right phenomenological sort – discuss some difficulties in finding reasons for thinking that God has or has not directly enough caused any such experience. (shrink)
Both David Lewis and Roderick Chisholm have proposed that beliefs are best understood, not as relations between people and the propositions they believe, but as relations between (...) people and the properties they "directly attribute" to themselves or "self-ascribe." If this account is correct for belief, it seems that it ought to be possible to extend it to other "propositional attitudes" such as considering and wishing. But the most straightforward way of extending the account to such other attitudes faces difficulties, some of which are discussed in a paper by Peter J. Markie. In this paper I will show how to apply the account to considering and wishing in a way that avoids such difficulties. (shrink)
This paper aims at further elucidating our understanding of social identities. It does so by focusing on a kind of subjective attachment people have to their social (...) statuses, e.g., their race, ethnicity, gender, familial roles, and other social roles. Specifically, the kind of subjective attachment at issue is identification. Some philosophers have argued that we identify with our social statuses when we self-consciously adopt them as our own. This paper argues against this view and instead suggests that we identify with our social statuses when we care about them. Moreover, it theorizes care as a kind of emotional attunement to our social statuses that sometimes operates below the surface of self-reflective awareness. (shrink)
<span class='Hi'>span><span class='Hi'>span><span class='Hi'>span><span class='Hi'>span><span class='Hi'>span><span class='Hi'>span><span class='Hi'>span> readers of Greek ethics tend to (...) class='Hi'> favour those accounts of the virtuous ideal according to which virtue involves the development of our non-rational—appetitive and emotional—<span class='Hi'>span> motivations as well as of our rational motivations.<span class='Hi'>span> So our contemporaries find much of interest and sympathy in Aristotle’s conception of virtue as a condition in which reason does not simply override our appetites and emotions,<span class='Hi'>span> but these non-rational motivations themselves <span class='Hi'>span>‘speak with the same voice as reason’<span class='Hi'>span>.2 By contrast,<span class='Hi'>span> the Stoic.<span class='Hi'>span>. (shrink)
Jean-Marc Narbonne | : Pour parler de la chute ou de la déclinaison de l’Âme (Sophia) dans le cadre des récits cosmogoniques gnostiques, Plotin a recours, en (...) sus du terme νεῦσις, au substantif σφάλμα (ou encore au verbe correspondant σφάλλεσθαι), comme s’il s’agissait d’un synonyme de νεῦσις. L’enquête que nous avons menée montre le bien-fondé de cet usage, puisque le terme σφάλμα est, de fait, utilisé par les hérésiologues pour décrire, dans un langage hérité du néo-pythagorisme et donc rythmé par le nombre, la chute de Sophia, laquelle incarne le douzième éon de la Dodécade en même temps que le trentième et dernier éon de l’ensemble du Plérôme. Rapporté à la métaphysique pythagoricienne dont il relève, le récit gnostique perd toute apparence d’arbitraire et révèle enfin sa véritable structure, commandée de bout en bout par le nombre. Il est raisonnable de penser que l’arithmologie rivale du traité 34 de Plotin est là pour y couper court. | : When speaking of the fall or decline of the Soul (Sophia) within the context of the Gnostic cosmogonic narratives, Plotinus, in addition to the term νεῦσις, resorts to the substantive σφάλμα (or the corresponding verb σφάλλεσθαι), as if it were a synonym of νεῦσις. The following investigation demonstrates the validity of this usage, as the term σφάλμα is, in fact, used by the heresiologists to describe, in a language inherited from Neopythagoreanism, and therefore structured by number, the fall of Sophia, which embodies both the twelfth aeon of the Dodecade as well as the thirtieth and final aeon of the entire Pleroma. Related back to the Pythagorean metaphysics whence it is stems, the Gnostic narrative loses any appearance of arbitrariness and finally reveals its true structure, ordered from start to finish by number. It is reasonable to think that the rival arithmology of Plotinus’ Treatise 34 was created in order to undermine this very narrative. (shrink)
Paul-Hubert Poirier | : Cet article inventorie les références à la νεῦσις, ou inclination, de l’âme dans le corpus des textes gnostiques de Nag Hammadi et dans (...) le Berolinensis gnosticus 8502. | : This paper considers the attestations of the νεῦσις, or inclination, of the soul in the Gnostic Nag Hammadi corpus abd in the Berolinensis gnosticus 8502. (shrink)
We examine the question of how many Boolean algebras, distinct up to isomorphism, that are quotients of the powerset of the naturals by Borel ideals, can be (...) proved to exist in ZFC alone. The maximum possible value is easily seen to be the cardinality of the continuum $2^{\aleph_{0}}$ ; earlier work by Ilijas Farah had shown that this was the value in models of Martin's Maximum or some similar forcing axiom, but it was open whether there could be fewer in models of the Continuum Hypothesis. We develop and apply a new technique for constructing many ideals whose quotients must be nonisomorphic in any model of ZFC. The technique depends on isolating a kind of ideal, called shallow, that can be distinguished from the ideal of all finite sets even after any isomorphic embedding, and then piecing together various copies of the ideal of all finite sets using distinct shallow ideals. In this way we are able to demonstrate that there are continuum-many distinct quotients by Borel ideals, indeed by analytic P-ideals, and in fact that there is in an appropriate sense a Borel embedding of the Vitali equivalence relation into the equivalence relation of isomorphism of quotients by analytic P-ideals. We also show that there is an uncountable definable wellordered collection of Borel ideals with distinct quotients. (shrink)
