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  1.  30
    I. T. Oakley (2001). A Skeptic's Reply to Lewisian Contextualism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):309-332.
    In his justifiedly famous paper, “Elusive Knowledge” (Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74:4, 1996), David Lewis presents a contextualist account of knowledge, which, like other contextualist accounts, depicts sceptical claims as involving application of a higher standard of knowledge than is applied in everyday ascriptions of knowledge. On Lewis’ account, the sceptic’s denials and the everyday ascriptions are made in different contexts, which allows them both to be true. His account gives detailed specification of how contexts are to be determined. My (...)
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  2.  14
    I. T. Oakley (1988). Scepticism and the Diversity of Epistemic Justification. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (152):263-279.
    Sceptics have been accused of achieving their sceptical conclusions by an arbitrary (though usually implicit) redefinition of terms like “justified”, so that, while it may be true that no belief is justified in the sceptic’s new sense of the word, all the beliefs we have taken as justified remain so in the ordinary, standard meaning of the term. This paper defends scepticism against this charge. It is pointed out that there are several sorts of case where someone’s belief may be (...)
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  3.  47
    I. T. Oakley (1976). An Argument for Scepticism Concerning Justified Beliefs. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (3):221 - 228.
    This paper argues for a completely universal scepticism, according to which no beliefs at all are justified to the least degree. The argument starts with a version of the Agrippan trilemma, according to which, if we accept that a belief is justified, we must choose between foundationalism, coherentism of a particular sort, and an infinite regress of justified beliefs. Each of these theories is given a careful specification in terms of the relationship of “justifiedness in p depending on justifiedness in (...)
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  4.  8
    I. T. Oakley (1998). The Invalidation of Induction: A Reply to Pargetter and Bigelow. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):452 – 463.
    In this paper, I respond to the paper “The Validation of Induction” by Robert Pargetter and John Bigelow (Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75:1, 1997), in which the authors propound the thesis that the arguments commonly thought of as good inductive arguments “properly construed, are deductively valid”. I maintain that they have not established this claim, and neither have they established a number of associated but logically independent claims that they make about inductive arguments and inductive inferences.
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  5.  11
    I. T. Oakley (1972). On an Account of Our Analyticity Judgements. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (2):124 – 130.
    I discuss and criticise Douglas Gasking’s paper, “The Analytic-Synthetic Controversy” (in the current issue of this journal). Gasking proposes an explanation of our classifying together as “analytic” statements like “Someone is a bachelor if and only if he is an unmarried man”. He proposes that the feature common to the statements that we so classify is that they provide the only “semantic anchor” for a word that does not have, in Quine’s terms, a socially constant stimulus meaning. I argue that, (...)
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  6. I. T. Oakley (1986). STRAWSON, P. F.: "Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64:525.
     
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  7. I. T. Oakley (1971). SUMNER, W. L. And WOODS, John : Necessary Truth: A Book of Readings. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49:320.
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