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Profile: Ian Benjamin Phillips (Oxford University)
Profile: Ian B. Phillips (Oxford University)
  1.  49
    Ian B. Phillips (2011). Perception and Iconic Memory: What Sperling Doesn't Show. Mind and Language 26 (4):381-411.
    Philosophers have lately seized upon Sperling's partial report technique and subsequent work on iconic memory in support of controversial claims about perceptual experience, in particular that phenomenology overflows cognitive access. Drawing on mounting evidence concerning postdictive perception, I offer an interpretation of Sperling's data in terms of cue-sensitive experience which fails to support any such claims. Arguments for overflow based on change-detection paradigms (e.g. Landman et al., 2003; Sligte et al., 2008) cannot be blocked in this way. However, such paradigms (...)
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    Ian B. Phillips (2009). Robin le Poidevin the Images of Time: An Essay on Temporal Representation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2):439-446.
  3. Ian B. Phillips (2010). Review of Matthew Nudds & Casey O’Callaghan, 'Sounds & Perception: New Philosophical Essays'. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10):245-248.
    A Martian reading contemporary work on perception might be forgiven for thinking that humans had only one sense: vision. Witness the title of one popular recent collection: Vision and mind: selected readings in the philosophy of perception. Our obsession with sight is stifling. It leads to distorted vision-based models of the other senses, and it means that the distinctive puzzles raised by non-visual modalities are routinely neglected. With this pioneering and long-overdue collection of essays on auditory perception, Nudds and O’Callaghan (...)
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