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Ian Evans [5]Ian M. Evans [1]
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Profile: Ian Evans (University of Arizona)
  1. Nathan Ballantyne & Ian Evans (2013). Schaffer's Demon. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):552-559.
    Jonathan Schaffer (2010) has summoned a new sort of demon – which he calls the debasing demon – that apparently threatens all of our purported knowledge. We show that any debasing skeptical argument must attack the justification condition and can do so only if a plausible thesis about justification is false.
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  2. Ian Evans (2013). The Problem of the Basing Relation. Synthese 190 (14):2943-2957.
    In days past, epistemologists expended a good deal of effort trying to analyze the basing relation—the relation between a belief and its basis. No satisfying account was offered, and the project was largely abandoned. Younger epistemologists, however, have begun to yearn for an adequate theory of basing. I aim to deliver one. After establishing some data and arguing that traditional accounts of basing are unsatisfying, I introduce a novel theory of the basing relation: the dispositional theory. It begins with the (...)
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  3. Ian Evans & Nicholas D. Smith (2013). Knowledge. Polity.
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  4. Nathan Ballantyne & Ian Evans (2010). Sosa's Dream. Philosophical Studies 148 (2):249 - 252.
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  5. Ian Evans, Don Fallis, Peter Gross, Terry Horgan, Jenann Ismael, John Pollock, Paul D. Thorn, Jacob N. Caton, Adam Arico, Daniel Sanderman, Orlin Vakerelov, Nathan Ballantyne, Matthew S. Bedke, Brian Fiala & Martin Fricke (2007). An Objectivist Argument for Thirdism. Analysis 68.
    Bayesians take “definite” or “single-case” probabilities to be basic. Definite probabilities attach to closed formulas or propositions. We write them here using small caps: PROB(P) and PROB(P/Q). Most objective probability theories begin instead with “indefinite” or “general” probabilities (sometimes called “statistical probabilities”). Indefinite probabilities attach to open formulas or propositions. We write indefinite probabilities using lower case “prob” and free variables: prob(Bx/Ax). The indefinite probability of an A being a B is not about any particular A, but rather about the (...)
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  6. Phil Francis Carspecken, Linda K. Johnsrud, Norman S. Kaufman, Robert Lowe, Harvey Kantor, Larry T. Mcgehee, Ian M. Evans & Michael Manley-Casimir (1991). Book Review Section 3. [REVIEW] Educational Studies 22 (1):110-142.
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