개인동일성은 우리가 사람으로서 시간을 가로질러 지속하는 조건에 관한 형이상학의 오랜 논제이다. 개인동일성에 대한 지속 조건들의 문제는 ‘시간이 지남에 따른 개인동일성 문제’, 혹은 ‘지속성 질문(the Persistence question)’이라 불린다. 지속성 질문에 답하기 위한 몇 가지 시도들이 있다. 개인동일성과 관련한 지속성 질문에 대한 가장 인기 있는 답변은 심리적 연속성 견해(psychological-continuity views)이다. 이 견해는 심리주의로 알려져 있다. 이 견해에 따르면 개인의 지속은 어떤 심리적 속성들로 구성된다. 또 다른 영향력 있는 답변은 동물적-신체적 견해(brute-physical views)이다. 인간 존재를 생물학적 유기체로 보고 동물적-신체적 조건들이 인간의 지속 조건이라고 보는 (...) 이러한 입장은 우리에게 ‘애니멀리즘(animalism)’으로 알려져 있다. 본 논문은 심리적 연속성과 연결성이 우리의 지속 조건이라고 보는 심리주의와 동물적-신체적 연속성을 지속의 우선순위에 두는 애니멀리즘 혹은 생체주의의 논증들의 핵심 쟁점들을 검토하고, ‘무-사실 논제’를 통해 사실 지속성의 조건에 문제가 되는 사실이 없음을 보일 것이다. (shrink)

Derek Parfit claims that all that rationally matters for a person is psychological connectedness or continuity, even without identity. A psychological replica of a person whose body is destroyed upon the replication rationally should be considered just as valuable as the original person. I argue against this, maintaining that any such copying procedure would be objectionable. First, I argue that a copy of an original person does not preserve identity to the original person. And second, I argue that (...) because a copy does not retain the identity of the orignial, it is not irrational to regard a copy as of less value than the original. (shrink)

According to the psychological account of personal identity for someone to be one and the same person over time Y today must have some of the beliefs, desires, intentions and memories that X had yesterday, as well as some memories of the events that happened to X yesterday. But, on this account, we have the undesirable result that persons can be reduplicated unless we add an additional requirement: Y is uniquely psychologically continuous with X. In an attempt to avoid (...) the problem of reduplication in a different way I invoke arguments for active externalism and the embodied mind. The motivation for exploring embedded and embodied approaches to cognition is that they cast doubt on the easy separation of brain and body which is often taken for granted in the identity literature. With these approaches in mind, the simple assumptions by which brains are imagined to be transplanted into new bodies, and agents are said to be teletransported to new environments should be reviewed. Whilst embodiment provides us with some reasons to re-evaluate our understanding of brain transplant thought experiments, we ultimately see that the nature of teletransportation is consistent with the mind as both extended and embodied. (shrink)

Derek Parfit claims that all that rationally matters for a person is psychological connectedness or continuity, even without identity. A psychological replica of a person whose body is destroyed upon the replication rationally should be considered just as valuable as the original person. I argue against this, maintaining that any such copying procedure would be objectionable. First, I argue that a copy of an original person does not preserve identity to the original person. And second, I argue that (...) because a copy does not retain the identity of the orignial, it is not irrational to regard a copy as of less value than the original. (shrink)

This book provides the first comparative analysis of the three major streams of contemporary narrative psychology as they have been developed in North America, Europe, and Australia and New Zealand. Interrogating the historical and cultural conditions in which this important movement in psychology has emerged, the book presents clear, well-structured comparisons and critique of the key theories of narrative psychology pioneered across the globe. Examples include Dan McAdams in the US and his followers, who have developed a (...) distinctive approach to self and identity as a life story over the past two decades; in the Netherlands by Hubert Hermans, whose research on the ‘dialogical self’ has made the University of Nijmegen a centre of narrative psychological research in Europe; and in Australia and New Zealand, where the collaborative efforts of Michael White and David Epston helped to launch the narrative movement in psychotherapy in the late 1980s. (shrink)

According to the author, psychology of religion should be the study of the personal experiences, tensions, conflicts and resolutions to conflict within a specific, clearly identified religion. The author opposes philosophical-psychological preconceptions which tend to eliminate the proper psychological reality of dynamic conflicts . With Freud, Evan-Pritchard and Needham, he affirms the historical dimension of civilizations and religions, and elaborates its consequences. He examines in this context work by Maslow on extrinsic and intrinsic religion and by Rokeach on mental-psychological (...) dogmatism. He stresses the largely preconscious motivations and processes that are at play in the personal interests and defense mechanisms operating in the various forms of belief and unbelief and in their changes. This preconscious reality is the psychological one par excellence and is the appropriate object for subtle psychological investigations. (shrink)

This book relates work in neuroscience, psychology and psychiatry to questions about what a person is and the nature of a persons unity across a lifetime. The neuropsychiatry is now dated. The philosophy has three themes still perhaps of interest. The first is a response to Derek Parfits powerful and influential work on personal identity, which, like many other people, I discussed with him as he worked it out. I accept his view that there is no ego that (...) owns the stream of our experiences, and the unity of a person over time is constructed out of continuities in our mental life. But I argue against Parfits view that personal unity thereby becomes less deep or less morally important. The second theme is an emphasis on the importance of self-creation and an attempt to work out how far it is possible. The third theme is about the way self-creation is linked to recognition by other people, and the importance of this for understanding the role of tribalism in human life. "This book is about what it is to be a person, to think of oneself as an "I". It is about the ways people think of themselves, and how they use these ideas in shaping their own distinctive characteristics. It is about how far we create ourslves." "When a way of life does not fit with what you think you are really like, you can feel like a plant away from the light, distorted by having to twist and grope towards the sun. This analogy suggests that we might have a genetic programme to unfold, in the way plants do. But no doubt it is too simple to think that "the real me" is genetically laid down. These strong affinities we have for some kinds of life, and the sense of drowning that others give us, are likely to have been created by the interaction of our genetic make-up with thigs we have come across and responded to... We care a bit like trees would be, if they were conscious and could partly choose their direction of growth. Perhaps oaks could not become beeches, and stunted trees could not become giants, but they could influence the angle and direction of their branches. Trees thinking about determinism and free will might find it impossible to assess their own contribution to their final shape.". (shrink)

본 논문은 현대 개인동일성 이론의 주류를 점하고 있는 심리주의와 생체주의의 개인동일성 규준을 명확히 하고, 이를 중심으로 개인동일성이 도덕적 책임 귀속의 필요조건인지 여부를 탐색한다. 심리주의는 우리가 특정한 종류의 심리적 특성을 유지함으로써 존속한다고 본다. 본 논문은 로크의 기억이론과 파핏-슈메이커류의 신(新)로크주의를 검토하면서 심리주의의 핵심주장을 분명히 한다. 특히 심리적 연결과 심리적 연속성의 개념을 명료히 함으로써 심리주의는 심리적 연속성을 개인동일성의 필요충분조건으로 간주한다는 점을 밝힌다. 한편 생체주의는 우리가 인간유기체의 종적 특성을 보존함으로써 존속한다고 본다. 본 논문은 생리적 연속성의 개념적 분석을 통해 생체주의는 생리적 연속성을 개인동일성의 필요충분조건으로 간주한다는 (...) 점을 밝히고, 생체주의가 심리주의에 대한 기존의 대안이론인 개인동일성에 대한 신체적 접근과 어떻게 다른지 논의한다. 이처럼 심리주의와 생체주의의 핵심주장을 정리한 다음 본 논문은 양자가 양립불가능하다는 점을 논증한다. 개인동일성과 도덕적 책임 귀속의 문제와 관련하여, 본 논문은 대뇌 이식과 분열의 사례를 검토함으로써 생체주의와 심리주의가 각각 개인동일성이 도덕적 책임 귀속의 필요조건이 아님을 함축한다는 것을 논증한다. 대뇌 이식의 경우 수혜자는 증여자의 성품과 성향, 반응태도 등 도덕적 책임의 귀속과 관련 있어 보이는 심리적 특성을 가질 수밖에 없다. 그러나 생체주의는 두 사람이 동일한 인물이 아님을 함축한다. 반면 심리주의는 심리적 연속성을 개인동일성의 필요충분조건으로 간주함으로써, 개인동일성이 도덕적 책임의 필요조건임을 함축하는 것처럼 보인다. 그런데 분열의 사례에서 분열하기 이전의 행위에 대한 책임은 분열 이후의 두 사람에게 귀속되는 것처럼 보인다. 그러나 분열 이전의 개인은 분열 이후의 두 사람 중 어느 누구와도 동일하지 않다. (shrink)

Most philosophers writing about personal identity in recent years claim that what it takes for us to persist through time is a matter of psychology. In this groundbreaking new book, Eric Olson argues that such approaches face daunting problems, and he defends in their place a radically non-psychological account of personal identity. He defines human beings as biological organisms, and claims that no psychological relation is either sufficient or necessary for an organism to persist. Olson rejects several (...) famous thought-experiments dealing with personal identity. He argues, instead, that one could survive the destruction of all of one's psychological contents and capabilities as long as the human organism remains alive--as long as its vital functions, such as breathing, circulation, and metabolism, continue. (shrink)

This paper argues that if persons last over time by “enduring”, then no analysis or reduction of personal identity over time in tenus of any sort of psychological continuity can be correct. In other words, any analysis of personal identity over time in tenus of psychological continuity entails that persons are four-dimensional and have temporal parts. The paper then shows that if we abandon psychological analyses of personal identity---as we must if persons endure---Parfit’s argument for the claim (...) that identity does not matter in survival is easily undenuined. The paper then suggests that this offers support for the claim that persons endure. Along the way the paper tries to clarify the contrast between the doctrine that persons endure and its rival, four-dimensionalism. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that normative ethics is in principle independent of psychology. By contrast, the authors of these essays explore the interconnections between psychology and moral theory. They investigate the psychological constraints on realizable ethical ideals and articulate the psychological assumptions behind traditional ethics. They also examine the ways in which the basic architecture of the mind, core emotions, patterns of individual development, social psychology, and the limits on human capacities for rational deliberation affect morality.

In a recent article, Trenton Mericks argues that psychological continuity analyses of personal identity over time are incompatible with endurantism. We contend that if Merricks’s argument is valid, a parallel argument establishes that PC-analyses of personal identity are incompatible with perdurantism; hence, the correct conclusion to draw is simply that such analyses are all necessarily false. However, we also show that there is good reason to doubt that Merricks’s argument is valid.

Psychological accounts of personal identity claim that the human person is not identical to the human animal. Advocates of such accounts maintain that the definition and criterion of death for a human person should differ from the definition and criterion of death for a human animal. My contention is instead that psychological accounts of personal identity should have human persons dying deaths that are defined biologically, just like the deaths of human animals. Moreover, if brain death is the (...) correct criterion for the death of a human animal, then it is also the correct criterion for the death of a human person. What the nonidentity of persons and animals requires is only that they have distinct criteria for ceasing to exist. (shrink)

We begin by discussing some logical constraints on the psychological approach to personal identity. We consider a problem for the psychological approach that arises in fission cases. The problem engenders the need for a non-branching clause in a psychological account of the co-personality relation. We look at some difficulties in formulating such a clause. We end by rejecting a recently proposed formulation of non-branching. Our criticism of the formulation raises some interesting questions about the individuation of person stages.

(1994). Identity and autonomy of psychology in cognitive sciences: Some remarks from language processing and knowledge representation. World Futures: Vol. 42, No. 1-2, pp. 71-78.

We begin by discussing some logical constraints on the psychological approach to personal identity. We consider a problem for the psychological approach that arises in fission cases. The problem engenders the need for a non-branching clause in a psychological account of the co-personality relation. We look at some difficulties in formulating such a clause. We end by rejecting a recently proposed formulation of non-branching. Our criticism of the formulation raises some interesting questions about the individuation of person stages.

In a recent article, Trenton Mericks argues that psychological continuity analyses (PC-analyses) of personal identity over time are incompatible with endurantism. We contend that if Merricks’s argument is valid, a parallel argument establishes that PC-analyses of personal identity are incompatible with perdurantism; hence, the correct conclusion to draw is simply that such analyses are all necessarily false. However, we also show that there is good reason to doubt that Merricks’s argument is valid.

According to the psychological account of personal identity, our identity is based on the continuity of psychological connections, and so we do not begin to exist until these are possible, some months after conception. This entails the psychological account faces a challenge from the non-identity problem—our intuition that someone cannot be harmed by actions that are responsible for their existence, even if these actions seem clearly to cause them harm. It is usually discussed with regard to preconception (...) harms, but in the context of the psychological account, it is also applicable to prenatal harms. Inflicting prenatal injury is widely thought to be morally impermissible, but if the injury is identity-determining on the psychological account, then no-one seems to be harmed—rather, the injury is responsible for bringing them into existence. Here, I argue that identity-determining injuries can routinely occur on the psychological account, and that this undermines the account. I assess Nicola Williams’ proposal to salvage the account based on a trans-world account of personal identity, and show that it is unsuccessful. I then show that Jeff McMahan’s embodied mind account of personal identity is also susceptible. I conclude that identity-determining prenatal injuries pose a significant challenge for the psychological account and its variants, and provide a reason for supporting alternative accounts that fix personal identity at conception. (shrink)

The present article conceptualizes morally controversial innovations as a category of innovations that raise ethical issues due to their potentially undesirable long-term consequences on society or the natural environment. Then, it analyzes the case of biofuel crops by applying an extended version of the theory of planned behavior, which includes moral norm and ethical self-identity. The obtained results show that attitude and subjective norms are positively related to farmers' intention to grow biofuel crops. Yet the intention of those farmers (...) with a higher ethical self-identity is also influenced by perceived behavioral control and moral norm. In particular, moral norm negatively affects their intention to grow biofuel crops, thus restraining the adoption of this innovation. Implications for theory, as well as for policymakers interested in promoting the diffusion of morally controversial innovations, are discussed. (shrink)

Learning burnout is an important indicator that reflects an individual’s learning state. Understanding the influencing factors and mechanism of learning burnout of medical students has practical significance for improving their mental health. This study aimed to explore the mediating roles of school identity and collective self-esteem between school psychological environment and learning burnout in medical students. A total of 2,031 medical students were surveyed using the School Psychological Environment Questionnaire, School Identity Questionnaire, Collective Self-esteem Scale, and Learning Burnout (...) Scale. The results showed the following: school psychological environment had a negative effect on learning burnout among medical students, and school identity and collective self-esteem played significant mediating roles between school psychological environment and learning burnout [95% CI = ]. Specifically, there were three paths that school psychological environment and learning burnout: first, through the independent mediating role of school identity; second, through the independent mediating role of collective self-esteem; and third, through the chain mediating roles of school identity and collective self-esteem. The findings reveal that school psychological environment not only directly influences the learning burnout of medical students but also indirectly influences it through school identity and collective self-esteem. Thus, this study has some important implications for prevention and intervention of learning burnout among medical students. (shrink)

The aim of study was to investigate the relationship between proactive coping strategies and the dimensions of identity formation, along with the role of biological sex and psychological gender as moderators for this relationship. We conducted analyses aimed at showing differences in terms of identity dimensions levels and proactive coping strategies used by a group of individuals with different biological sex and psychological gender. A group of 101 students from upper secondary schools from Pomeranian Voivodeship took part in (...) the study. We used in our research The Dimensions of Identity Development Scale; The Psychological Gender Inventory and The Proactive Coping Inventory for Adolescents. We found, among others, that in the case of a proactive strategy, biological sex turned out to be a significant moderator in the relationship between this variable and identity dimensions: ruminative exploration, commitment-making and identification with commitment. In the case of instrumental support seeking, psychological gender turned out to be a significant moderator for the relationship between these variables and a part of identity dimensions. The obtained results show that, regardless of whether young people, in terms of characteristics that are stereotypically associated with biological sex, are described as aschematic or schematic when entering adulthood and attempting to constitute themselves, more often cope in a task-oriented manner by trying to create a set of information useful in difficult situations and aspire to obtain informational support from individuals in one’s own social network, who are regarded as safe people. (shrink)

The concept of the person, and the notion that the latter is an entity separate and distinct from other persons, has persisted as one of the more secure ‘givens’ of philosophical thought. We have very little difficulty, in observer language, in pointing to a person, describing his or her attributes, distinguishing him or her from other persons, etc. Likewise, it is ordinarily not much of a problem to subjectively experience, both sensorially and conceptually, the self – that is, to distinguish (...) in agent language ‘my person’ from the rest of the universe. The second of these two perspectives on the person defines the ‘I,’ ‘ego,’ or ‘identity.’ Several recent developments in experimental psychology and brain science – while not defeating the ordinary notion of the person on the merits of data per se – at least force a re-thinking of tacit assumptions basic to our sense of the concepts of both the person and personal identity. In this paper, I would like to show how the concept of the person needs revision, and at the same time to raise some objections to Shaffer's (1977) account of the consequences of brain bisection and brain transplant with respect to the fate of the person and his identity. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

A very clear and powerfully argued defence of a most important and surprisingly neglected view."--Derek Parfit, All Souls College, Oxford. "If Dr. Olson is right, we are living animals and what goes on in our minds is wholly irrelevant to questions about our persistence through time....[Should] transform philosophical thinking about personal identity."--Peter van Inwagen, University of Notre Dame.

People’s attitudes towards social norms play a crucial role in understanding group behavior. Norm psychology accounts focus on processes of norm internalization that influence people’s norm following attitudes but pay considerably less attention to social identity and group identification processes. Social identity theory in contrast studies group identity but works with a relatively thin and instrumental notion of social norms. We argue that to best understand both sets of phenomena, it is important to integrate the insights (...) of both approaches. Social status, social identity, and social norms are considered separate phenomena in evolutionary accounts. We discuss assumptions and views that support this separation, and suggest an integrated view of our own. We argue that we should be open to the early origins of human social complexity, and conjecture that the longer that the human social world involved multi-level societies the more probable it is that norm psychology and social identity interacted in rich ways. (shrink)

Our aim in this entry is to articulate the state of the art in the moral psychology of personal identity. We begin by discussing the major philosophical theories of personal identity, including their shortcomings. We then turn to recent psychological work on personal identity and the self, investigations that often illuminate our person-related normative concerns. We conclude by discussing the implications of this psychological work for some contemporary philosophical theories and suggesting fruitful areas for future work (...) on personal identity. (shrink)

In this introduction to the special issue of Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics on the topic of personal identity and bioethics, I provide a background for the topic and then discuss the contributions in the special issue by Eric Olson, Marya Schechtman, Tim Campbell and Jeff McMahan, James Delaney and David Hershenov, and David DeGrazia.

This paper considers the question whether a psychological approach to personal identity can be formulated within an endurantist, as opposed to four-dimensionalist, framework. Trenton Merricks has argued that this cannot be done. I argue to the contrary: a perfectly coherent endurantist version of the psychological approach can indeed be formulated.

According to the psychological account of personal identity, our identity is based on the continuity of psychological connections, and so we do not begin to exist until these are possible, some months after conception. This entails the psychological account faces a challenge from the non-identity problem—our intuition that someone cannot be harmed by actions that are responsible for their existence, even if these actions seem clearly to cause them harm. It is usually discussed with regard to preconception (...) harms, but in the context of the psychological account, it is also applicable to prenatal harms. Inflicting prenatal injury is widely thought to be morally impermissible, but if the injury is identity-determining on the psychological account, then no-one seems to be harmed—rather, the injury is responsible for bringing them into existence. Here, I argue that identity-determining injuries can routinely occur on the psychological account, and that this undermines the account. I assess Nicola Williams’ proposal to salvage the account based on a trans-world account of personal identity, and show that it is unsuccessful. I then show that Jeff McMahan’s embodied mind account of personal identity is also susceptible. I conclude that identity-determining prenatal injuries pose a significant challenge for the psychological account and its variants, and provide a reason for supporting alternative accounts that fix personal identity at conception. (shrink)

Towards Identity in the Psychoanalytic Encounter addresses the theme of identification and identity in the psychoanalytic clinic as elaborated by Jacques Lacan over the course of his teaching. In psychoanalysis the subject who is summoned "to speak himself", is by definition lacking in identity. His question is "What am I?" but, as he is only represented by his words, his being is "always elsewhere", within other words that are yet to come. Thus a paradox: one seeks via (...) speech the identity of a being who, through his speech, is not identifiable. Yet the fact remains, he has a body, and he is riveted to sufferings that psychoanalysis, from Freud to Lacan, identified, which are not accidental, which we call repetition and symptom, and which shift the question of identity, because a One, real, is at play in them. Towards Identity in the Psychoanalytic Encounter will be key reading for the study and research of Lacanian psychoanalysis and all practitioners interested in Lacan's teaching, as well as other discourses such as philosophy, art, literature and history. (shrink)

Lynne Rudder Baker’s Constitution View of human persons has come under much recent scrutiny. Baker argues that each human person is constituted by, but not identical to, a human animal. Much of the critical discussion of Baker’s Constitution View has focused upon this aspect of her account. Less has been said about the positive diachronic account of personal identity offered by Baker. Baker argues that it is sameness of what she labels ‘first-person perspective’ that is essential to understanding personal (...) identity over time . Baker claims that her account avoids the commitment to indeterminacy of personal identity entailed by the psychological account. Further, the psychological account, but not her account, is plagued by what Baker labels the ‘duplication problem’. In the end, I argue that neither of these considerations forces us to renounce the psychological account and adopt Baker’s favored account. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to Analysed the influence of Chinese traditional culture identity education on the positive psychology of university students. The study selected 200 students as the research object and divided into experimental group and control group. The students in the experimental group received traditional cultural identity education courses combined with practical activities, while the control group implemented conventional courses. After implementing the program, students’ learning efficiency is significantly improved and their learning anxiety is (...) reduced. The learning effectiveness, cultural identity, and interpersonal communication barriers of the experimental group students have all improved, and the improvement in positive psychological status of the experimental group is significantly higher than that of the control group. The difference between the two groups is statistically significant. Chinese culture has a long history and contains profound life truth and positive thoughts. Good traditional cultural identity education can cultivate college students’ correct political position and establish correct outlook on life, values and the world. This study showed effective cultural identity education and practical activities in colleges and universities can effectively promote the cultivation of students’ positive psychology, improve students’ self-confidence and enhance national pride. Contribution: The result of this study is applicable for scholars in the field of psychology of religion and the sociology of religion, as well as cultural studies and public theology. (shrink)

Olson (1997a) tries to refute the Psychological Approach to personal identity with his Fetus Argument, and Mackie (1999) aims to do the same with the Death Argument. With the help of a suggestion made by Baker (1999), the following discussion shows that these arguments fail. In the process of defending the Psychological Approach, it is made clear exactly what one is and is not committed to as a proponent of the theory.

In recent years there has been a growth of single-issue campaigns in western democracies and a proliferation of groups attempting to exert political influence and achieve social change. In this context, it is important to consider why individuals do or don't get involved in collective action, for example in the trade union movement and the women's movement. Social psychologists have an important contribution to make in addressing this question. The social psychological approach directly concerns the relationship between the individual and (...) society and a number of theories have been developed in the field, particularly by contemporary European researchers. Yet, surprisingly, there has never been, until now, a concerted attempt to bring these various strands of research together in a coherent, detailed presentation of the social psychological approach to collective action. The authors of _The Social Psychology of Collective Action _review and integrate a number of theories developed in this field as well as presenting their own original research and data. The research discussed in the book ranges over a number of different contexts, with a particular focus on women's groups organizing around issues of gender. Questions addressed include: why do women get involved in women's groups? What part is played by experiences of discrimination in the family and in the workplace? What are the benefits of group involvement? How are feminist activists perceived by others who choose not to get involved? Findings from questionnaires and interviews are integrated with contemporary social psychological theory, especially social identity theory. (shrink)

This article shows how the construction of transnational migrant communities across international borders poses a challenge to the assumed "natural" isomorphism of space, nations, and cultures that typically exists in theories of cultural and cross-cultural psychology. One of the principal aims of this article is to add to the critical impulse that initially defined the vision of cultural psychology by analyzing how transnational diaspora communities have become new sites for the rethinking of core concepts such as culture, self, (...) nation and identity. By drawing on Gupta and Ferguson's work, I present three important ways through which cultural theorizing can be reconfigured in the present transnational context. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Identity and Experience: The Constitution of the Human Being According to Early Buddhism. Sue Hamilton. Luzac Oriental, London 1996. xxxi, 218 pp. £30.00. ISBN 0 898942 10 2. The Five Aggregates: Understanding Theravada Psychology and Soteriology. Mathieu Boisvert. (Canadian Corporation for Studies in Religious Writings, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Waterloo, Ontario, 1995. xii, 168 pp. $24.95. ISBN 0-88920-257-5.

This book examines the psychological responses of people to the excitements and terrors that characterise the modern world. Beginning with a description of modernist and post-modernist accounts of contemporary life, it then moves into detailed discussions of narcissism and psychosis - two states of mind that seem to characterise the 'crises of self' to which the modern world gives rise. With an interweaving of social theory and psychodynamic explanations, this is a sophisticated and compelling text. Identity Crisis will be (...) of interest to students in a wide range of disciplines including psychology, sociology, psychoanalysis, politics and cultural studies. (shrink)

This book is an examination of how the law understands human identity and the whole notion of 'human being'. On these two notions the law, usually unconsciously, builds the superstructure of 'human rights'. It explores how the law understands the concept of a human being, and hence a person who is entitled to human rights. This involves a discussion of the legal treatment of those of so-called "marginal personhood" (e.g. high functioning non-human animals; humans of limited intellectual capacity, and (...) fetuses). It also considers how we understand our identity as people, and hence how we fall into different legal categories: such as gender, religion and so on. The law makes a number of huge assumptions about some fundamental issues of human identity and authenticity - for instance that we can talk meaningfully about the entity that we call 'our self'. Until now it has rarely, if ever, identified those assumptions, let alone interrogated them. This failure has led to the law being philosophically dubious and sometimes demonstrably unfit for purpose. Its failure is increasingly hard to cover up. What should happen legally, for instance, when a disease such as dementia eliminates or radically transforms all the characteristics that most people regard as foundational to the 'self'? This book seeks to plug these gaps in the literature. (shrink)

This book offers an interdisciplinary approach - historical, literary, art-historical and archaeological - to the topics of ideology and identity in the medieval East Roman world. The individual chapters explore ideological discourses and practices in various contexts. In particular, they focus on the content of ideas and their role in shaping different kinds of group attachments and identifications within the imperial social order. Moreover, they explore the various visions of community which different collective identity discourses projected within and (...) beyond the political boundaries of the empire. Including both top-down and bottom-up perspectives, and exploring both the empire's centre and its periphery, this collection offers new insights into ideology and identity in the Byzantine world. (shrink)