34 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Igal Kvart (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
  1. Igal Kvart, Can Counterfactuals Save Mental Causation?
    In this paper I rely on my account of counterfactuals in order to argue that supervenience and epiphenomenalism are incompatible. This argument is strong when directed against a freestanding epiphenomenalism. Along the way I will also argue that Davidson’s argument in favor of mental causation is not valid. A crucial intermediate point in the argument is the issue of counterfactual transitivity. I argue that, even though in general counterfactual transitivity is invalid, a valid sub-inference can be specified. I also specify (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Igal Kvart, A Counter-Example to SSI and Contextualism.
    In this paper, I present a counter-example to the two most prominent theories of pragmatic encroachment (regarding knowledge ascriptions): Contextualism (specifically, DeRose's version), and Stanley's Subject-Sensitive Invariantism (SSI). The example is a variation on DeRose's bank case. -/- Key words: Knowledge, knowledge ascriptions, pragmatic encroachment, Stanley, DeRose, bank case, standards, stakes.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Igal Kvart, A Super-Light Survey of the Probabilistic Account of Knowledge.
    The two main insights of the account that are at the heart of the notion of knowledge are that the belief that p amounts to high token indicativity of the fact that p, and that knowledge endows high level of immunity from error. In this outline we shall deal with perceptual knowledge and perception-based memory. For these modes of knowledge, another condition is required, beyond that of high token indicativity, which secures the appropriate discriminability condition for knowledge. These conditions will (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Igal Kvart, Causal Relevance.
    The problem facing us in this paper is that of how to analyze the notion of causal relevance. This is the inverse relation of causal dependence: A is causally irrelevant to C iff C is causally independent of A. As an example of causal relevance, consider: Example 1: A - The American astronaut on Mir scratched his left ear exactly an hour ago B - I am writing this paper right now. Intuitively, A was not causally relevant to B. It (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Igal Kvart, Rational Assertibility, the Steering Role of Knowledge, and Pragmatic Encroachment.
    Igal Kvart RATIONAL ASSERTIBILITY, THE STEERING ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE, AND PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT Abstract In the past couple of decades, there were a few major attempts to establish the thesis of pragmatic encroachment – that there is a significant pragmatic ingredient in the truth-conditions for knowledge-ascriptions. Epistemic contextualism has flaunted the notion of a conversational standard, and Stanley's subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI) promoted stakes, each of which, according to their proponents, play a major role as pragmatic components in the truth conditions of (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Igal Kvart, The Non-Gradability of 'Know' is Not a Viable Argument Against Contextualism.
    I argue that 'know' is only partly, though considerably, gradable. Its being only partly gradable is explained by its multi-parametrical character. That is, its truth-conditions involve different parameters, which are scalar in character, each of which is fully gradable. Robustness of knowledge may be higher or lower along different dimensions and different modes. This has little to do with whether 'know' is context-dependent, but it undermines Stanley's argument that the non-gradability of 'know' renders it non-context-dependent.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Wulf Rehder, Igal Kvart, Bj Copeland, Michel V. Wedin & Howard G. Callaway (forthcoming). MJ CRESSWELL, A Canonical Model for S2 3 ROSS T. BRADY, Completeness Proofs for the Systems RM3 and BN4 9. Logique Et Analyse.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Igal Kvart (2006). A Probabilistic Theory of Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):1–43.
    In this paper I provide a probabilistic account of factual knowledge,[1] based on the notion of chance.[2] This account has some affinity with my chance account of token causation,[3] but it neither relies on it nor presupposes it. Here I concentrate on the core cases of perceptual knowledge and of knowledge by memory (based on perception). The analysis of knowledge presented below is externalist; but pursuing such an analysis need not detract from the significance of attempts to flesh out justificational (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Igal Kvart (2004). Causation: Counterfactual and Probabilistic Analyses. In J. D. Collins, E. J. Hall & L. A. Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. Mit Press.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Igal Kvart (2004). Causation: Probabilistic and Counterfactual Analyses. In Ned Hall, L. A. Paul & John Collins (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. Cambridge, Mass.: Mit Press. 359--387.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Igal Kvart (2004). Probabilistic Cause, Edge Conditions, Late Preemption, and Discrete Cases. In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. Routledge. 163-188.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Igal Kvart (2002). Probabilistic Cause and the Thirsty Traveler. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (2):139-179.
    In this paper I start by briefly presenting an analysis of token cause and of token causal relevance that I developed elsewhere, and then apply it to the famous thirsty traveler riddle. One general outcome of the analysis of causal relevance employed here is that in preemption cases (early or late) the preempted cause is not a cause since it is causally irrelevant to the effect. I consider several variations of the thirsty traveler riddle. In the first variation the first (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Igal Kvart (2001). A Counterfactual Theory of Cause. Synthese 127 (3):389-427.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Igal Kvart (2001). The Counterfactual Analysis of Cause. Synthese 127 (3):389 - 427.
    David Lewis’s counterfactual analysis of cause consisted of the counterfactual conditional closed under transitivity.2 Namely, a sufficient condition for A’s being a cause of C is that ∼A > ∼C be true; and a necessary as well as sufficient condition is that there be a series of true counterfactuals ∼A > ∼E1, ∼E1 > ∼E2, . . . , ∼En >∼C (n > 0).
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Igal Kvart (1999). Corrections to Igal Kvart, "Cause and Some Positive Causal Impact," Philosophical Perspectives, 11, Mind, Causation, and World, 1997. Noûs 33 (s13):519-520.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Igal Kvart (1997). Cause and Some Positive Causal Impact. Noûs 31 (s11):401-432.
    No categories
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Igal Kvart (1994). A Theory of Thinker Reference. Philosophical Studies 74 (3):291 - 323.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Igal Kvart (1994). Counterfactuals: Ambiguities, True Premises, and Knowledge. Synthese 100 (1):133 - 164.
    In this paper I explore the ambiguity that arises between two readings of the counterfactual construction, then–d and thel–p, analyzed in my bookA Theory of Counterfactuals. I then extend the analysis I offered there to counterfactuals with true antecedents, and offer a more precise formulation of the conception of temporal divergence points used in thel–p interpretation. Finally, I discuss some ramifications of these issues for counterfactual analyses of knowledge.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Igal Kvart (1994). Causal Independence. Philosophy of Science 61 (1):96-114.
    In Kvart (1991a), I discussed the analysis of causal relevance presented in A Theory of Counterfactuals (1986) (and first in 1975). I explained there in what respect the notion captured by the analysis of Kvart (1986) is a mere approximation to the requisite notion of causal relevance. In this paper I present another analysis of causal relevance, devoid of the shortcoming of its predecessor. The present analysis of causal relevance is, again, grounded in a chancelike notion of objective probability. The (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Igal Kvart (1994). Overall Positive Causal Impact. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):205 - 227.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Igal Kvart (1993). Mediated Reference and Proper Names. Mind 102 (408):611 - 628.
  22. Igal Kvart (1993). Seeing That and Seeing As. Noûs 27 (3):279-302.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Igal Kvart (1992). Counterfactuals. Erkenntnis 36 (2):139 - 179.
    In this article I offer an approach to counterfactuals based on a notion of objective probability. It is in the spirit of, though it does not fall squarely under, the metalinguistic model. Thus, it is not developed in terms of possible worlds, or notions parasitic on them (e.g., similarity). Its dominant features are rooted in objective probability and causal relevance (analyzed probabilistically), and thus it is not close in spirit to a maximal similarity or a minimal change approach.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Igal Kvart (1992). The Objective Dimension of Believing "De Re". Crítica 24 (70):83 - 107.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Igal Kvart (1991). Counterfactuals and Causal Relevance. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):314-337.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Igal Kvart (1991). Transitivity and Preemption of Causal Relevance. Philosophical Studies 64 (2):125 - 160.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Igal Kvart (1989). Divided Reference. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14 (1):140-179.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Igal Kvart (1987). Kripke's Belief Puzzle. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):287-325.
    This article offers a resolution of Kripke’s well-known belief puzzle.
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Igal Kvart (1987). On Putnam's Counterexample Toa Theory of Counterfactuals. Philosophical Papers 16 (3):235-239.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Igal Kvart (1986). A Theory of Counterfactuals. Hackett.
  31. Igal Kvart (1986). Beliefs and Believing. Theoria 52 (3):129-45.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Igal Kvart (1984). The Hesperus-Phosphorus Case. Theoria 50 (1):1-35.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Igal Kvart (1982). Quine and Modalities de Re: A Way Out? Journal of Philosophy 79 (6):295 - 328.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Igal Kvart (1978). The Paradox Of Surprise Examination. Logique Et Analyse 21:337-344.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation