Mele questions the prevalence and ontological status of strong forms of self-deception, as well as our attempt at experimental demonstration. Without validated indicators outside laboratory contexts, statements about prevalence are purely speculative. Conceptualizing self-deception without positing the motivated lack of awareness of a contradictory belief is unsatisfactory in dealing with issues of “agency,” that is, how can we stop the processing of threatening information unless we recognize that the information is threatening?
Hamilton-Jacobi theory is applied to find appropriate canonical transformations for the calculation of the phase-space path integrals of the relativistic particle equations. Hence, canonical transformations and Hamilton-Jacobi theory are also introduced into relativistic quantum mechanics. Moreover, from the classical physics viewpoint, it is very interesting to find and to solve the Hamilton-Jacobi equations for the relativistic particle equations.
Humans communicate emotion vocally by modulating acoustic cues such as pitch, intensity and voice quality. Research has documented how the relative presence or absence of such cues alters the likelihood of perceiving an emotion, but the neural underpinnings of acoustic cue-dependent emotion perception remain obscure. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging in 20 subjects we examined a reciprocal circuit consisting of superior temporal cortex, amygdala and inferior frontal gyrus that may underlie affective prosodic comprehension. Results showed that increased saliency of emotion-specific (...) acoustic cues was associated with increased activation in superior temporal cortex (planum temporale (PT), posterior superior temporal gyrus (pSTG), and posterior superior middle gyrus (pMTG)) and amygdala, whereas decreased saliency of acoustic cues was associated with increased inferior frontal activity and temporo-frontal connectivity. These results suggest that sensory-integrative processing is facilitated when the acoustic signal is rich in affective information, yielding increased activation in temporal cortex and amygdala. Conversely, when the acoustic signal is ambiguous, greater evaluative processes are recruited, increasing activation in inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and IFG STG connectivity. Auditory regions may thus integrate acoustic information with amygdala input to form emotion-specific representations, which are evaluated within inferior frontal regions. (shrink)
Contemporary discussions of the relationship between negligence liability and the provision of services by both public and private organizations frequently suggest the emergence of a ‘compensation culture’. Despite empirical evidence that compensation culture claims are somewhat inflated, an anxiety persists that risks of tortious liability may still undermine the implementation of public policy. Concerns about the potential negative effects of liability on public administration frame the problem in various ways. First, there is an anxiety that public authorities may overreact to (...) liability risks by becoming excessively risk averse. Secondly, there is a fear that compensation claiming will divert financial resources away from service delivery and towards the payment of insurance premiums and compensation awards. Thirdly, there is the fear that insurance companies will, as ‘risk bullies’, curtail public service activities. And, finally, there is the suggestion that risk management, including legal risk management, is becoming the dominant mode of government decision-making to the exclusion of professional judgement. This article addresses these concerns through a set of empirical case studies about the management of liability risks associated with road maintenance services. Although our findings suggest that public authorities respond to liability risks in a variety of ways, we found only limited evidence of the above concerns. In general terms, it was a case of public authorities being risk aware and responsive as opposed to risk averse. (shrink)
Under the post-metaphysical sky “old” humanistic-oriented education is possible solely at the cost of its transformation into its negative, into a power that is determined to diminish human potentials for self-exaltation. Nothing less than total metamorphosis is needed to rescue the core of humanistic genesis: the quest for edifying Life and resistance to the call for “home-returning” into the total harmony that is promised to us within nothingness.
In this review essay, Mark Brenneman and Frank Margonis address three recent book-length contributions to the ongoing discussion around cosmopolitanism and educational thought: Mark Olssen's Liberalism, Neoliberalism, Social Democracy: Thin Communitarian Perspectives on Political Philosophy and Education, Sharon Todd's Toward an Imperfect Education: Facing Humanity, Rethinking Cosmopolitanism, and Ilan Gur-Ze’ev's Beyond the Modern-Postmodern Struggle in Education: Toward Counter-Education and Enduring Improvisation. Brenneman and Margonis argue that these contributions exhibit a marked disenchantment with Enlightenment conceptions of human possibilities as these (...) inform concrete recommendations in the field of the philosophy of education. All three books call for a rethinking of modernist categories in educational thought, a call that is supported by the authors' respective distrust and ultimate disenchantment with the residual presence of ideas of human perfectibility harbored in the philosophical categories that animate discussions in multicultural, liberal, neoliberal, and postmodern educational discussion. Brenneman and Margonis argue that each of these books theorizes from its own respective regionally specific circumstances, and they therefore prove valuable to philosophers of education who struggle toward their own local responses to human difference and the pedagogical possibilities of educational relations. (shrink)
Abstract The issue of producing and controlling the memories of the Holocaust is evaluated in this paper as a valid universal example of the struggle over self?identity and the recognition of ?the other? as a moral subject. The normal realisation of morality is presented as part of the denial of the other's identity, knowledge and value. The dialectics of the memories of the Holocaust and the possibility of a non?violent moral education is examined by questioning its treatment of the suffering (...) of ?others? in the Israeli arena. The author concedes that practising the Holocaust, denying the Holocaust and refusing to recognise the genocides/holocausts of other peoples do differ, but maintains that they are to be evaluated as moral stages of one and the same level. The Israeli refusal to acknowledge the genocides/holocausts of other peoples is analysed as a testcase for the possibility of a humanist?orientated moral education today. (shrink)
This paper characterizes a present institutionalizedunwillingness of both the Israeli and Palestinian educationalsystems to acknowledge each other's suffering because of the presenceof what the author terms `the otherness of the other.' This isdone largely through hegemonic control of memory of genocidesendured by both and through limiting constructions of the self.Coming to terms with `each other' paves the way for ahumanistic-oriented counter-education, one based in mutualacknowledgment and open dialogue.
The sensation-perception distinction did not appear before the seventeenth century, but since then various formulations of it have gained wide acceptance. This is not an historical accident and the article suggests an explanation for its appearance. Section 1 describes a basic assumption underlying the sensation-perception distinction, to wit, the postulation of a pure sensory stage--viz. sensation--devoid of active influence of the agent's cognitive, emotional, and evaluative frameworks. These frameworks are passive in that stage. I call this postulation the passivity assumption. (...) Section 2 suggests three major reasons for the emergence of this assumption in the seventeenth century: the mental-physical gap, the causal theory of perception, and epistemological considerations regarding the status of the sensory given. In the last section a critical discussion is presented. The passivity assumption is found to have serious empirical and theoretical flaws. (shrink)
Aristotle in Physics I,1 says some strange-sounding things about how we come to know wholes and parts, universals and particulars. In explicating these, Simplicius distinguishes an initial rough cognition of a thing as a whole, an intermediate “cognition according to the definition and through the elements,” and a final cognition of how the thing's many elements are united: only this last is πιστήμη. Simplicius refers to the Theaetetus for the point about what is needed for πιστήμη and the ways that (...) cognition according to the definition and through the elements falls short. By unpacking this reference I try to reconstruct Simplicius' reading of “Socrates' Dream,” its place in the Theaetetus ' larger argument, and its harmony with other Platonic and Aristotelian texts. But this reconstruction depends on undoing some catastrophic emendations in Diels's text of Simplicius. Diels's emendations arise from his assumptions about definitions and elements, in Socrates' Dream and elsewhere, and rethinking the Simplicius passage may help us rethink those assumptions. (shrink)