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Ilkka Niiniluoto [120]Ilkka Maunu Niiniluoto [1]
  1. Ilkka Niiniluoto (1999). Critical Scientific Realism. Oxford University Press.
    This book comes to the rescue of scientific realism, showing that reports of its death have been greatly exaggerated. Philosophical realism holds that the aim of a particular discourse is to make true statements about its subject matter. Ilkka Niiniluoto surveys different kinds of realism in various areas of philosophy and then sets out his own critical realist philosophy of science.
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  2.  6
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (1989). Truthlikeness. Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (1):297-300.
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  3.  64
    Ilkka Niiniluoto, Scientific Progress. Synthese.
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  4.  40
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (2011). Revising Beliefs Towards the Truth. Erkenntnis 75 (2):165-181.
    Belief revision (BR) and truthlikeness (TL) emerged independently as two research programmes in formal methodology in the 1970s. A natural way of connecting BR and TL is to ask under what conditions the revision of a belief system by new input information leads the system towards the truth. It turns out that, for the AGM model of belief revision, the only safe case is the expansion of true beliefs by true input, but this is not very interesting or realistic as (...)
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  5. Ilkka Niiniluoto (2002). Critical Scientific Realism. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Ilkka Niiniluoto comes to the rescue of realism in the philosophy of science. Philosophical realism holds that the aim of a particular discourse is to make true statements about its subject-matter. Niiniluoto surveys different kinds of realism in various areas of philosophy, then sets out his own critical realist philosophy of science, characterizing scientific progress in terms of increasing truthlikeness, and defends this theory against its rivals.
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  6. Ilkka Niiniluoto (1998). Verisimilitude: The Third Period. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):1-29.
    The modern history of verisimilitude can be divided into three periods. The first began in 1960, when Karl Popper proposed his qualitative definition of what it is for one theory to be more truthlike than another theory, and lasted until 1974, when David Miller and Pavel Trich published their refutation of Popper's definition. The second period started immediately with the attempt to explicate truthlikeness by means of relations of similarity or resemblance between states of affairs (or their linguistic representations); the (...)
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  7. Ilkka Niiniluoto (1999). Defending Abduction. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):451.
    Charles S. Peirce argued that, besides deduction and induction, there is a third mode of inference which he called " hypothesis " or " abduction." He characterized abduction as reasoning " from effect to cause," and as " the operation of adopting an explanatory hypothesis." Peirce ' s ideas about abduction, which are related also to historically earlier accounts of heuristic reasoning, have been seen as providing a logic of scientific discovery. Alternatively, abduction is interpreted as giving reasons for pursuing (...)
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  8.  22
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (2014). Scientific Progress as Increasing Verisimilitude. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46:73-77.
    According to the foundationalist picture, shared by many rationalists and positivist empiricists, science makes cognitive progress by accumulating justified truths. Fallibilists, who point out that complete certainty cannot be achieved in empirical science, can still argue that even successions of false theories may progress toward the truth. This proposal was supported by Karl Popper with his notion of truthlikeness or verisimilitude. Popper’s own technical definition failed, but the idea that scientific progress means increasing truthlikeness can be expressed by defining (...)
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  9. Ilkka Niiniluoto (1988). Is Science Progressive? Noûs 22 (2):316-321.
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  10. Ilkka Niiniluoto (1997). Reference Invariance and Truthlikeness. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):546-554.
    A holistic account of the meaning of theoretical terms leads scientific realism into serious troubles. Alternative methods of reference fixing are needed by a realist who wishes to show how reference invariance is possible in spite of meaning variance. This paper argues that the similarity theory of truthlikeness and approximate truth, developed by logicians since the mid 1970s, helps to make precise the idea of charitable theoretical reference. Comparisons to the recent proposals by Kitcher and Psillos are given. This argument (...)
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  11.  10
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (forthcoming). Optimistic Realism About Scientific Progress. Synthese:1-19.
    Scientific realists use the “no miracle argument” to show that the empirical and pragmatic success of science is an indicator of the ability of scientific theories to give true or truthlike representations of unobservable reality. While antirealists define scientific progress in terms of empirical success or practical problem-solving, realists characterize progress by using some truth-related criteria. This paper defends the definition of scientific progress as increasing truthlikeness or verisimilitude. Antirealists have tried to rebut realism with the “pessimistic metainduction”, but critical (...)
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  12. Ilkka Niiniluoto (1982). On Explicating Verisimilitude: A Reply to Oddie. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33 (3):290-296.
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  13. Ilkka Niiniluoto (1973). Theoretical Concepts and Hypothetico-Inductive Inference. Boston,D. Reidel Pub. Co..
  14.  67
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (1980). Scientific Progress. Synthese 45 (3):427 - 462.
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  15.  6
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (1981). L. J. Cohen Versus Bayesianism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):349-349.
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  16. Jaakko Hintikka, Ilkka Niiniluoto & Esa Saarinen (1982). Essays on Mathematical and Philosophical Logic. Studia Logica 41 (4):432-433.
     
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  17.  23
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (2010). Theory Change, Truthlikeness, and Belief Revision. In M. Dorato M. Suàrez (ed.), Epsa Epistemology and Methodology of Science. Springer 189--199.
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  18. Ilkka Niiniluoto (1991). Goldstick and O'Neill on "Truer Than". Philosophy of Science 58 (3):491-495.
    In a recent article, Goldstick and O'Neill propose a definition for the comparative "truer than" relation between rival propositions. This definition is studied here in a context where the concept of "convexity" is well defined for propositions. It turns out that the Goldstick-O'Neill definition gives a reasonable but very restricted sufficient condition for the "truer than" relation, but fails as a necessary condition.
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  19.  33
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (2007). Idealization, Counterfactuals, and Truthlikeness. In Jerzy Brzeziński, Andrzej Klawiter, Theo A. F. Kuipers, Krzysztof Łastowski, Katarzyna Paprzycka & Piotr Przybysz (eds.), The Courage of Doing Philosophy: Essays Dedicated to Leszek Nowak. Rodopi 103--122.
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  20.  38
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (1981). Analogy and Inductive Logic. Erkenntnis 16 (1):1 - 34.
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  21.  69
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (1994). Hintikka and Whewell on Aristotelian Induction. Grazer Philosophische Studien 49:49-61.
    According to the standard interpretation, Aristotle has two accounts of induction (epagoge): intuitive induction (which is not an inference) and complete induction (which is not a kind of non-demonstrative inference). Hintikka has challenged the usual interpretation of Aristotle's "official account" in Analytica Priora II, 23. In this paper, Hintikka's view is compared with a similar, but in some respects perhaps even more plausible, interpretation that William Whewell gave already in 1850. Both Hintikka and Whewell argue convincingly that Aristotelean induction is (...)
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  22.  39
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (1978). Truthlikeness: Comments on Recent Discussion. Synthese 38 (2):281 - 329.
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  23.  10
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (2011). The Development of the Hintikka Program. In Dov M. Gabbay, John Woods & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Handbook of the History of Logic. Elsevier 311-356.
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  24. Ilkka Niiniluoto (2005). Abduction and Truthlikeness. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):255-275.
    This paper studies the interplay between two notions which are important for the project of defending scientific realism: abduction and truthlikeness. The main focus is the generalization of abduction to cases where the conclusion states that the best theory is truthlike or approximately true. After reconstructing the recent proposals of Theo Kuipers within the framework of monadic predicate logic, I apply my own notion of truthlikeness. It turns out that a theory with higher truthlikeness does not always have greater empirical (...)
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  25.  2
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (2013). On the Philosophy of Applied Social Sciences. In Hanne Andersen, Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao González, Thomas Uebel & Gregory Wheeler (eds.), New Challenges to Philosophy of Science. Springer Verlag 265--274.
  26.  59
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (1983). Novel Facts and Bayesianism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (4):375-379.
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  27.  35
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (2002). 10 Truthlikeness and Economic Theories. In Uskali Mäki (ed.), Fact and Fiction in Economics: Models, Realism and Social Construction. Cambridge University Press 214.
  28.  93
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (1979). Degrees of Truthlikeness: From Singular Sentences to Generalisations. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (4):371-376.
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  29.  80
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (1978). Dretske on Laws of Nature. Philosophy of Science 45 (3):431-439.
  30.  91
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (2007). Abduction and Scientific Realism. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 12:137-142.
    Many scientific realists think that the best reasons for scientific theories are abductive, i.e., must appeal to what is also called inference to the best explanation (IBE), while some anti-realists have argued that the use of abduction in defending realism is question-begging, circular, or incoherent. This paper studies the idea that abductive inference can be reformulated by taking its conclusion to concern the truthlikeness of a hypothetical theory on the basis of its success in explanation and prediction. The strength of (...)
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  31.  26
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (2004). Tarski's Definition and Truth-Makers. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 126 (1-3):57-76.
    A hallmark of correspondence theories of truth is the principle that sentences are made true by some truth-makers. A well-known objection to treating Tarski’s definition of truth as a correspondence theory has been put forward by Donald Davidson. He argued that Tarski’s approach does not relate sentences to any entities (like facts) to which true sentences might correspond. From the historical viewpoint, it is interesting to observe that Tarski’s philosophical teacher Tadeusz Kotarbinski advocated an ontological doctrine of reism which accepted (...)
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  32.  79
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (1991). Realism, Relativism, and Constructivism. Synthese 89 (1):135 - 162.
    This paper gives a critical evaluation of the philosophical presuppositions and implications of two current schools in the sociology of knowledge: the Strong Programme of Bloor and Barnes; and the Constructivism of Latour and Knorr-Cetina. Bloor's arguments for his externalist symmetry thesis (i.e., scientific beliefs must always be explained by social factors) are found to be incoherent or inconclusive. At best, they suggest a Weak Programme of the sociology of science: when theoretical preferences in a scientific community, SC, are first (...)
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  33.  5
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (2004). Truth-Seeking by Abduction. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 11:57-82.
    In a seminar with the title “Deduction and Induction in the Sciences”, it is intriguing to ask the following questions: Is there a third type of inference besides deduction and induction? Does this third type of inference play a significant role within scientific inquiry? A positive answer to both of these questions was advocated by Charles S. Peirce throughout his career, even though his opinions changed in important ways during the fifty years between 1865 and 1914. Peirce called the third (...)
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  34. Ilkka Niiniluoto & Raimo Tuomela (eds.) (1979). The Logic and Epistemology of Scientific Change. North-Holland Pub. Co..
  35.  53
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (1993). The Aim and Structure of Applied Research. Erkenntnis 38 (1):1 - 21.
    The distinction between basic and applied research is notoriously vague, despite its frequent use in science studies and in science policy. In most cases it is based on such pragmatic factors as the knowledge and intentions of the investigator or the type of research institute. Sometimes the validity of the distinction is denied altogether. This paper suggests that there are two ways of distinguishing systematically between basic and applied research: (i) in terms of the utilities that define the aims of (...)
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  36. Jan Woleński, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Hans Sluga, Anita Burdman Feferman, Solomon Feferman & Richard Creath (1999). Alfred Tarski and the Vienna Circle: Austro-Polish Connections in Logical Empiricism. Springer Netherlands.
     
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  37.  83
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (1994). Truthlikeness Misapplied: A Reply to Ernest W. Adams. Synthese 101 (2):291 - 300.
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  38.  13
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (1982). What Shall We Do with Verisimilitude? Philosophy of Science 49 (2):181-197.
    Popper distinguishes the problems of theoretical and pragmatic preference between rival theories, but he claims that there is a common non-inductive solution to both of them, viz. the "best-tested theory", or the theory with the highest degree of corroboration. He further suggests that the degrees of corroboration serve as indicators of verisimilitude. One may therefore raise the question whether the recent theory of verisimilitude gives a general non-inductive solution to the problem of theoretical preference. This paper argues that this is (...)
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  39.  28
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (2008). Unification and Abductive Confirmation. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 43:151-156.
    According to the traditional requirement, formulated already by William Whewell in his account of the “consilience of inductions” in 1840, an explanatory scientific theory should be independently testable by new kinds of phenomena. A good theory should have unifying power in the sense that it explains and predicts several mutually independent phenomena. This paper studies the prospects of Bayesianism to motivate this kind of unification criterion for abductive confirmation.
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  40.  73
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (2001). From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism: On Some Relations Between Confirmation, Empirical Progress, and Truth Approximation. Theo A. F. Kuipers. [REVIEW] Mind 110 (439):774-777.
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  41.  40
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (1986). Truthlikeness and Bayesian Estimation. Synthese 67 (2):321 - 346.
  42.  17
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (1981). Statistical Explanation Reconsidered. Synthese 48 (3):437 - 472.
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  43.  6
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (1984). The Significance of Verisimilitude. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:591 - 613.
    The concept of verisimilitude is an indispensable tool for the fallibilist and realist epistemology. Part of the argument for this thesis consists in the important applications of this notion within the history and philosophy of science. But perhaps the harder part is to convince a sceptical reader of the existence of this concept. A general programme for defining and estimating degrees of truthlikeness for various kinds of scientific statements is outlined in some detail. Ten years after Miller's and Tichy's refutation (...)
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  44. Ilkka Niiniluoto (1990). Theories, Approximations, and Idealizations. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 16:9-57.
     
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  45.  35
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (2007). Structural Rules for Abduction. Theoria 22 (3):325-329.
    Atocha Aliseda’s Abductive Reasoning (2006) gives a structural characterization of the “forward” explana-tory reasoning from a theory to observational data. This paper asks whether there are any interesting structural rules for the “backward” abductive reasoning from observations to explanatory theories. Ignoring statistical cases, a partial explication of abduction is converse deductive explanation: h is abducible from e iff h deductively explains e. This relation of abducibility trivially satisfies Converse Entailment (if h entails e, then h is abducible from e ), (...)
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  46. Monika Asztalos, John Emery Murdoch, Ilkka Niiniluoto & International Society for the Study of Medieval Philosophy (1990). Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy. Yliopistopaino.
     
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  47.  2
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (2007). Evaluation of Theories. In Theo A. F. Kuipers (ed.), General Philosophy of Science. North Holland 175--217.
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  48.  15
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (1972). Inductive Systematization: Definition and a Critical Survey. Synthese 25 (1-2):25 - 81.
    In 1958, to refute the argument known as the theoretician's dilemma, Hempel suggested that theoretical terms might be logically indispensable for inductive systematization of observational statements. This thesis, in some form or another, has later been supported by Scheffler, Lehrer, and Tuomela, and opposed by Bohnert, Hooker, Stegmüller, and Cornman. In this paper, a critical survey of this discussion is given. Several different putative definitions of the crucial notion inductive systematization achieved by a theory are discussed by reference to the (...)
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  49.  17
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (2014). Values in Design Sciences. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46:11-15.
    Following Herbert Simon’s idea of “the sciences of the artificial”, one may contrast descriptive sciences and design sciences: the former are concerned with “how things are”, the latter tell us “how things ought to be in order to attain goals, and to function”. Typical results of design sciences are thus expressions about means—ends relations or technical norms in G. H. von Wright’s sense. Theorizing and modeling are important methods of giving a value-free epistemic justification for such technical norms. The values (...)
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  50.  4
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (1999). Theories of Truth: Vienna, Berlin, and Warsaw. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 6:17-26.
    Neo-Kantian philosophers sometimes divided the history of philosophy in three periods: philosophy before Kant, Kant, and philosophy after Kant. The admirers of Alfred Tarski are prone, with good justification, to propose a similar division of theories of truth. But even in our post-Tarskian period, the nature and significance of Tarski’s theory of truth is still a matter of controversy.1 Therefore, to understand better Tarski’s achievement and some of our present puzzles, it is instructive to go back to the pre-Tarskian problem (...)
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