Search results for 'Imagining' (try it on Scholar)

804 found
Order:
  1. Robert Hopkins (forthcoming). Imagining the Past: On the Nature of Episodic Memory. In Fiona MacPherson Fabian Dorsch (ed.), Memory and Imagination. OUP
    What kind of mental state is episodic memory? I defend the claim that it is, in key part, imagining the past, where the imagining in question is experiential imagining. To remember a past episode is to experientially imagine how things were, in a way controlled by one’s past experience of that episode. Call this the Inclusion View. I motive this view by appeal both to patterns of compatibilities and incompatibilities between various states, and to phenomenology. The bulk (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  2.  36
    Fabian Dorsch (2012). The Unity of Imagining. Ontos.
    Please send me an email (fabian.dorsch@unifr.ch) if you wish to receive a copy of the book. — 'In this highly ambitious, wide ranging, immensely impressive and ground-breaking work Fabian Dorsch surveys just about every account of the imagination that has ever been proposed. He identifies five central types of imagining that any unifying theory must accommodate and sets himself the task of determining whether any theory of what imagining consists in covers these five paradigms. Focussing on what he (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  3.  21
    Martin Ruivenkamp & Arie Rip (2011). Entanglement of Imaging and Imagining of Nanotechnology. NanoEthics 5 (2):185-193.
    Images, ranging from visualizations of the nanoscale to future visions, abound within and beyond the world of nanotechnology. Rather than the contrast between imaging , i.e. creating images that are understood as offering a view on what is out there, and imagining , i.e. creating images offering impressions of how the nanoscale could look like and images presenting visions of worlds that might be realized, it is the entanglement between imaging and imagining which is the key to understanding (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4.  4
    Robert F. Mullen (2010). Holy Stigmata, Anorexia and Self-Mutilation: Parallels in Pain and Imagining. Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 9 (25):91-110.
    This paper explores the comparative dynamics of self-mutilation among young, contemporary, female self-cutters, and the holy stigmatics of the Middle Ages. It addresses the types of personalities that engage in self-mutilation and how some manipulate their self-inflicted pain into a method for healing and empowerment. The similarities between teenage cutters and female stigmatics are striking in their mutual psychoanalytical need for self-alteration as a means of escaping their own disassociative identities; and offers evidence of how their mutual bricolage of pain, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  80
    Paul Noordhof (2002). Imagining Objects and Imagining Experiences. Mind and Language 17 (4):426-455.
    A number of philosophers have argued in favour of the Dependency Thesis: if a subject sensorily imagines an F then he or she sensorily imagines from the inside perceptually experiencing an F in the imaginary world. They claim that it explains certain important features of imaginative experience, in brief: the fact that it is perspectival, the fact that it does not involve presentation of sensory qualities and the fact that mental images can serve a number of different imaginings. I argue (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  6.  77
    Edward S. Casey (1976). Imagining: A Phenomenological Study. Indiana University Press.
  7. Alan R. White (1987). Visualizing and Imagining Seeing. Analysis 47 (October):221-224.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  50
    Natika Newton (1989). Visualizing is Imagining Seeing: A Reply to White. Analysis 49 (March):77-81.
  9.  38
    Edward S. Casey (1977). Imagining and Remembering. Review of Metaphysics 31 (December):187-209.
  10.  51
    Alan R. White (1989). Imaginary Imagining. Analysis 49 (March):81-83.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  14
    M. J. Baker (1954). Perceiving, Imagining, and Being Mistaken. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 14 (June):520-535.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  27
    Geoff Moore (2008). Re-Imagining the Morality of Management. Business Ethics Quarterly 18 (4):483-511.
    In this paper the problematic nature of the morality of management, in particular related to business organisations operating under Anglo-American capitalism, is explored. MacIntyre’s critique of managers in After Virtue (1985) serves as the starting point but this critique is itself subjected to analysis leading to a more balanced and contemporary view of the morality of management than MacIntyre provides. Paradoxically perhaps, MacIntyre’s own virtues-goods-practice-institution schema is shown to provide a way of re-imagining business organisations and management and thereby (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  13.  75
    Shaun Nichols (2004). Imagining and Believing: The Promise of a Single Code. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62 (2):129-39.
    Recent cognitive accounts of the imagination propose that imagining and believing are in the same “code”. According to the single code hypothesis, cognitive mechanisms that can take input from both imagining and from believing will process imagination-based inputs (“pretense representations”) and isomorphic beliefs in much the same way. In this paper, I argue that the single code hypothesis provides a unified and independently motivated explanation for a wide range of puzzles surrounding fiction.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  14. Shaun Nichols (2006). Just the Imagination: Why Imagining Doesn't Behave Like Believing. Mind and Language 21 (4):459–474.
    According to recent accounts of the imagination, mental mechanisms that can take input from both imagining and from believing will process imagination-based inputs (pretense representations) and isomorphic beliefs in much the same way. That is, such a mechanism should produce similar outputs whether its input is the belief that p or the pretense representation that p. Unfortunately, there seem to be clear counterexamples to this hypothesis, for in many cases, imagining that p and believing that p have quite (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  15. Peter Kung (2010). Imagining as a Guide to Possibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):620-663.
    I lay out the framework for my theory of sensory imagination in “Imagining as a guide to possibility.” Sensory imagining involves mental imagery , and crucially, in describing the content of imagining, I distinguish between qualitative content and assigned content. Qualitative content derives from the mental image itself; for visual imaginings, it is what is “pictured.” For example, visually imagine the Philadelphia Eagles defeating the Pittsburgh Steelers to win their first Super Bowl. You picture the greenness of (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  16. John Sutton (2012). Memory Before the Game: Switching Perspectives in Imagining and Remembering Sport and Movement. Journal of Mental Imagery 36 (1/2):85-95.
    This paper addresses relations between memory and imagery in expert sport in relation to visual or visuospatial perspective. Imagining, remembering, and moving potentially interact via related forms of episodic simulation, whether future- or past-directed. Sometimes I see myself engaged in action: many experts report switching between such external visual perspectives and an internal, 'own-eyes', or field perspective on their past or possible performance. Perspective in retrieval and in imagery may be flexible and multiple. I raise a range of (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  17.  15
    Gananath Obeyesekere (2002). Imagining Karma: Ethical Transformation in Amerindian, Buddhist, and Greek Rebirth. University of California Press.
    With Imagining Karma, Gananath Obeyesekere embarks on the very first comparison of rebirth concepts across a wide range of cultures. Exploring in rich detail the beliefs of small-scale societies of West Africa, Melanesia, traditional Siberia, Canada, and the northwest coast of North America, Obeyesekere compares their ideas with those of the ancient and modern Indic civilizations and with the Greek rebirth theories of Pythagoras, Empedocles, Pindar, and Plato. His groundbreaking and authoritative discussion decenters the popular notion that India was (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  18.  50
    Kathleen Stock (2013). Imagining and Fiction: Some Issues. Philosophy Compass 8 (10):887-896.
    In this paper, I survey in some depth three issues arising from the connection between imagination and fiction: (i) whether fiction can be defined as such in terms of its prescribing imagining; (ii) whether imagining in response to fiction is de se, or de re, or both; (iii) the phenomenon of ‘imaginative resistance’ and various explanations for it. Along the way I survey, more briefly, several other prominent issues in this area too.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  19. Stacie Friend (2011). The Great Beetle Debate: A Study in Imagining with Names. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):183-211.
    Statements about fictional characters, such as “Gregor Samsa has been changed into a beetle,” pose the problem of how we can say something true (or false) using empty names. I propose an original solution to this problem that construes such utterances as reports of the “prescriptions to imagine” generated by works of fiction. In particular, I argue that we should construe these utterances as specifying, not what we are supposed to imagine—the propositional object of the imagining—but how we are (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  20.  31
    Kathleen Stock (2011). Fictive Utterance and Imagining. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):145-161.
    A popular approach to defining fictive utterance says that, necessarily, it is intended to produce imagining. I shall argue that this is not falsified by the fact that some fictive utterances are intended to be believed, or are non-accidentally true. That this is so becomes apparent given a proper understanding of the relation of what one imagines to one's belief set. In light of this understanding, I shall then argue that being intended to produce imagining is sufficient for (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  21.  5
    Peter Langland-Hassan (forthcoming). Imagining Experiences. Noûs.
    It is often held that in imagining experiences we exploit a special imagistic way of representing mentality—one that enables us to think about mental states in terms of what it is like to have them. According to some, when this way of thinking about the mind is paired with more objective means, an explanatory gap between the phenomenal and physical features of mental states arises. This paper advances a view along those lines, but with a twist. What many take (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  19
    Andreea Smaranda Aldea (2013). Husserl's Struggle with Mental Images: Imaging and Imagining Reconsidered. [REVIEW] Continental Philosophy Review 46 (3):371-394.
    Husserl’s extensive analyses of image consciousness (Bildbewusstsein) and of the imagination (Phantasie) offer insightful and detailed structural explications. However, despite this careful work, Husserl’s discussions fail to overcome the need to rely on a most problematic concept: mental images. The epistemological conundrums triggered by the conceptual framework of mental images are well known—we have only to remember the questions regarding knowledge acquisition that plagued British empiricism. Beyond these problems, however, a plethora of important questions arise from claiming that mental images (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  23. Stacie Friend (2011). Fictive Utterance and Imagining II. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):163-180.
    The currently standard approach to fiction is to define it in terms of imagination. I have argued elsewhere (Friend 2008) that no conception of imagining is sufficient to distinguish a response appropriate to fiction as opposed to non-fiction. In her contribution Kathleen Stock seeks to refute this objection by providing a more sophisticated account of the kind of propositional imagining prescribed by so-called ‘fictive utterances’. I argue that although Stock's proposal improves on other theories, it too fails to (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  24.  16
    Bence Nanay (2009). Imagining, Recognizing and Discriminating. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):699-717.
    According to the Ability Hypothesis, knowing what it is like to have experience E is just having the ability to imagine or recognize or remember having experience E. I examine various versions of the Ability Hypothesis and point out that they all face serious objections. Then I propose a new version that is not vulnerable to these objections: knowing what it is like to experience E is having the ability todiscriminate imagining or having experience E from imagining or (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  25. Clare J. Rathbone, Martin A. Conway & Chris J. A. Moulin (2011). Remembering and Imagining: The Role of the Self. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1175-1182.
    This study investigated whether temporal clustering of autobiographical memories around periods of self-development would also occur when imagining future events associated with the self. Participants completed an AM task and future thinking task. In both tasks, memories and future events were cued using participant-generated identity statements . Participants then dated their memories and future events, and finally gave an age at which each identity statement was judged to emerge. Dates of memories and future events were recoded as temporal distance (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  26.  5
    Brandon Cooke (2014). Ethics and Fictive Imagining. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 72 (3):317-327.
    Sometimes it is wrong to imagine or take pleasure in imagining certain things, and likewise it is sometimes wrong to prompt these things. Some argue that certain fictive imaginings—imaginings of fictional states of affairs—are intrinsically wrong or that taking pleasure in certain fictive imaginings is wrong and so prompting either would also be wrong. These claims sometimes also serve as premises in arguments linking the ethical properties of a fiction to its artistic value. However, even if we grant that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  27. Steven L. Reynolds (1989). Imagining Oneself to Be Another. Noûs 23 (5):615-633.
    Imagining that I am Napoleon is not (normally) imagining an impossibility. It is (or at least may be) just adopting a first person way of imagining Napoleon. The images and bits of narrative using 'I' are intended to refer to Napoleon and his surroundings, in something like the way that a salt shaker can stand for a regiment of troops when the general says "This is the third regiment' while explaining his plans at the breakfast table.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  28.  3
    Janet R. White (2016). Imagining and Making the World: Reconsidering Architecture and Utopia Ed. By Nathaniel Coleman. Utopian Studies 27 (1):116-120.
    The cover image of Nathaniel Coleman’s Imagining and Making the World is a photo by Coleman of Carlo Scarpa’s Castelvecchio Museum renovation in Verona. It shows the skillful layering of elements from different eras assembled by Scarpa and the bridge that connects the upper floors of two buildings from different periods. Such skillful connecting of disparate things is rare. Yet this is what Coleman and his contributors have set out to do: connect architecture and utopia.Coleman himself seems to question (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  33
    Adam Morton (2010). Imagining Evil. Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 5 (1):26-33.
    It is in a way easier to imagine evil actions than we often suppose, but what it is thus relatively easy to do is not what we want to understand about evil. To argue for this conclusion I distinguish between imagining why someone did something and imagining how they could have done it, and I try to grasp partial understanding, in part by distinguishing different imaginative perspectives we can have on an act. When we do this we see (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Tim Mulgan (2011). Ethics for a Broken World: Imagining Philosophy After Catastrophe. Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    Preface : imagining a broken world -- Philosophy in the age of affluence -- pt. I. Rights -- Nozick on rights -- Self-ownership -- The Lockean proviso -- Nozick in a broken world -- Nationalism -- pt. II. Utilitarianism -- Act utilitarianism -- Rule utilitarianism -- Well-being and value -- Mill on liberty -- Utilitarianism and future people -- Utilitarianism in a broken world -- pt. III. The social contract -- Hobbes and Locke -- Rawls -- Rawls and the (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  31.  11
    Charles G. Manning & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Imagination Inflation: Imagining a Childhood Event Inflates Confidence That It Occurred.
    Counterfactual imaginings are known to have far reaching implications. In the present experiment, we ask if imagining events from one's past can affect memory for childhood events. We draw on the social psychology literature showing that imagining a future event increases the subjective likelihood that the event will occur. The concepts of cognitive availability and the source monitoring framework provide reasons to expect that imagination may inflate confidence that a childhood event occurred. However, people routinely produce myriad counterfactual (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  32.  68
    Fabian Dorsch (2011). Emotional Imagining and Our Responses to Fiction. Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofía 46:153-176.
    The aim of this article is to present the disagreement between Moran and Walton on the nature of our affective responses to fiction and to defend a view on the issue which is opposed to Moran’s account and improves on Walton’s. Moran takes imagination-based affective responses to be instances of genuine emotion and treats them as episodes with an emotional attitude towards their contents. I argue against the existence of such attitudes, and that the affective element of such responses should (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  37
    Markus Kneer (2008). Imagining Being Napoleon. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:97-102.
    If I want to imagine myself to be someone else, say, Napoleon, a problem arises concerning the protagonist of the imagined scenario: One has to attribute two conflicting personal identities to this protagonist, my own (the imaginer’s) and Napoleon’s (the target subject) – hence, a metaphysical impossibility arises. The metaphysically impossible is generally deemed inconceivable and hence unimaginable – however, we generally take ourselves capable of imagining being someone else. Williams (1966), who first raised the issue, proposes a way (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  86
    Bence Nanay (2009). Imagining, Recognizing and Discriminating: Reconsidering the Ability Hypothesis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):699-717.
    According to the Ability Hypothesis, knowing what it is like to have experience E is just having the ability to imagine or recognize or remember having experience E. I examine various versions of the Ability Hypothesis and point out that they all face serious objections. Then I propose a new version that is not vulnerable to these objections: knowing what it is like to experience E is having the ability todiscriminate imagining or having experience E (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  35
    P. Joyce (2003). Imagining Experiences Correctly. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):361-370.
    According to Mellor, we know what an experience is like if we can imagine it correctly, and we will do so if we recognise the experience as it is imagined. This paper identifies a constraint on adequate accounts of how we ordinarily imagine experiences correctly: the capacities to imagine and to recognise the experience must be jointly operative at the point of forming an intention to imagine the experience. The paper develops an account of imagining experiences correctly that meets (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  36.  42
    James Harold (2007). Imagining Evil (Or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Sopranos). The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 12:7-14.
    In this paper, I explore a set of moral questions about the portrayal of evil characters in fiction: might the portrayal of evil in fiction ever be morally wrong? If so, under what circumstances and for what reasons? What kinds of portrayals are morally wrong and what kinds are not? I argue that whether or not imagining evil is morally wrong depends on the formal and structural properties of the work.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Robert Grant (2003). Imagining the Real: Essays on Politics, Ideology and Literature. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Throughout its ten related essays, Imagining the Real contrasts our abstract imaginings about the human world with the imaginative insights provided by art and experience. It questions, variously, the relevance of game theory and sociobiology to politics the supposed intrinsic values of liberal freedom, cultural change, and democratic action and the claims of Marxism, deconstruction and "Theory" generally to be non-ideological. More positively, it reinterprets fiction as a specific invitation to imagine, and celebrates Shakespeare, L.H. Myers and Beckett as (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  38.  6
    Ken Wilder (2015). Vermeer: Interruptions, Exclusions, and ‘Imagining Seeing’. Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics 52 (1):38-59.
    This article proposes an essential interrelatedness of Vermeer’s strategies of inclusion and exclusion of an implied beholder. I will argue that such strategies mutually reinforce each other, to the extent that the plausibility of one is arguably dependent upon the possibility of the other. This is evidenced by Vermeer’s subtle manipulations of pictorial space, and the article traces a decisive shift in his familiar use of barriers from those aimed at an external presence to those oriented towards an internal beholder. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39.  62
    Matthew Nudds (2000). Modes of Perceiving and Imagining. Acta Analytica 15 (24):139-150.
    We enjoy modes of sensory imagining corresponding to our five modes of perception - seeing, touching, hearing, smelling and tasting. An account of what constitutes these different modes of perseption needs also to explain what constitutes the corresponding modes of sensory perception. In this paper I argue that we can explain what distinguishes the different modes of sensory imagination in terms of their characteristic experiences without supposing that we must distinguish the senses in terms of the kinds of experience (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  35
    Elizabeth Loftus, Imagination Inflation: Imagining a Childhood Event Inflates Confidence That It Occurred.
    Counterfactual imaginings are known to have far reaching implications. In the present experiment, we ask if imagining events from one's past can affect memory for childhood events. We draw on the social psychology literature showing that imagining a future event increases the subjective likelihood that the event will occur. The concepts of cognitive availability and the source monitoring framework provide reasons to expect that imagination may inflate confidence that a childhood event occurred. However, people routinely produce myriad counterfactual (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  5
    Annis Flew (1953). Images, Supposing, and Imagining. Philosophy 28 (106):246 - 254.
    In this paper I shall do three things. Firstly , I shall distinguish between three senses of “imagine”: one in which the word is used to report the occurrence of mental imagery; a second in which “imagined” is used as substantially equivalent to “thought”; and a third in which “imagine” is used as substantially equivalent to “suppose.” Secondly , I shall discuss Hume's thesis about imagination: both because, although this is set out as a plausible generalization about psychology, it nevertheless (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  42.  7
    Brett Smith (2008). Imagining Being Disabled Through Playing Sport: The Body and Alterity as Limits to Imagining Others' Lives. Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 2 (2):142 – 157.
    Qualitative research methods in sport often advocate that to understand others, obtain significant knowledge and do ethically admirable research we should empathise with our participants by imagining being them. In philosophy, it is likewise often assumed that we can overcome differences between people through moral imagination: putting ourselves in the place of others, we can share their points of view, merge with them, and enter into their embodied worlds. Drawing partly on the view that imagination is embodied and the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  3
    Jennifer Church (2007). Three Steps to Rational Imagining? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):456-456.
    Ruth Byrne presents a three-step argument to the conclusion that counterfactual imagining is rational. Insofar as this argument is valid, the conclusion is weaker than it seems. More importantly, it does not represent the central contributions of this book – contributions that, if anything, point instead to what is irrational about counterfactual imagining.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  3
    Gordon H. Bell (1979). Imagining and Moral Education. Journal of Moral Education 8 (2):99-109.
    Abstract Some relations obtaining between what it is to imagine and what it is to become educated are explored. An analysis is proposed which describes the concept of the imagination as being reducible to certain logically distinct forms and modes of imagining. This analysis is related to contemporary accounts of the educated person. A sketch of some implications for moral education is presented together with an examination of philosophies that oppose the development of imagination in children.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Anna Christina Ribeiro, Imagining From the Inside.
    The cinematic technique of point-of-view shots is meant to give spectators a film character’s point-ofview. In ‘Imagining from the Inside’, Murray Smith claims that point-of-view shots allow viewers to ‘imagine seeing as the character does’ and this imagining in turn promotes imagining the character ‘from the inside’, thereby fostering empathy with the character. I argue, against Smith, that the cinematic technique of point-of-view shots does not prompt viewers to ‘imagine seeing as the character does’ for two reasons: (...)
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  2
    G. Reddiford (1981). Moral Imagining and Children. Journal of Moral Education 10 (2):75-84.
    Abstract The use of ?imagination? that I discuss is ?freedom of description? and I take moral imagining to be the putting to one side of one's own descriptions of the world in order to understand a situation in the terms of another person. This imagining is a necessary condition of acting from a moral point of view, though it does not have to characterize the earliest stages of moral development. A critical attention to moral principles makes extensive demands (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Kathleen Knight Abowitz (2016). Imagining Democratic Futures for Public Universities: Educational Leadership Against Fatalism's Temptations. Educational Theory 66 (1-2):181-197.
    At current rates, almost all U.S. public universities could reach a point of zero state subsidy within the next fifty years. What is a public university without public funding? In this essay, Kathleen Knight Abowitz considers the future of public universities, drawing upon the analysis provided in John Dewey's Democracy and Education. Knight Abowitz conducts an initial institutional analysis through two broad prisms: that of the political landscape that authorizes universities as public institutions, and that of the present political–economic context (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Chiara Bottici & Benoît Challand (2013). Imagining Europe: Myth, Memory, and Identity. Cambridge University Press.
    In Imagining Europe, Chiara Bottici and Benoît Challand explore the formation of modern European identity. Europe has not always been there, although we have been imagining it for quite some time. Even after the birth of a polity called the European Union, the meaning of Europe remained a very much contested topic. What is Europe? What are its boundaries? Is there a specific European identity or is the EU just the name for a group of institutions? This book (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Stephen Eric Bronner (2002). Imagining the Possible: Radical Politics for Conservative Times. Routledge.
    Jean-Paul Sartre originally made the term engagement a part of the existentialist vocabulary following WWII. It imples the responsibility of intervening in social or political conflicts in the hope of fostering freedom. Imagining the Possible opens different windows upon this particular engagement.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Edward S. Casey (2000). Imagining, Second Edition: A Phenomenological Study. Indiana University Press.
    Imagining A Phenomenological Study Second Edition Edward S. Casey A classic firsthand account of the lived character of imaginative experience. "This scrupulous, lucid study is destined to become a touchstone for all future writings on imagination." —Library Journal "Casey’s work is doubly valuable—for its major substantive contribution to our understanding of a significant mental activity, as well as for its exemplary presentation of the method of phenomenological analysis." —Contemporary Psychology "... an important addition to phenomenological philosophy and to the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 804