Search results for 'Incompatibilism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Sofar Incompatibilism (2007). And the so-Far Consequence Argument Stephen Hetherington University of New South Wales. Grazer Philosophische Studien 73:163-178.score: 30.0
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  2. Benjamin Vilhauer (2008). Incompatibilism and Ontological Priority in Kant's Theory of Free Will. In Pablo Muchnik (ed.), Incompatibilism and Ontological Priority in Kant's Theory of Free Will.score: 21.0
    This paper concerns the role of the transcendental distinction between agents qua phenomena and qua noumena in Kant's theory of free will. It argues (1) that Kant's incompatibilism can be accommodated if one accepts the "ontological" interpretation of this distinction (i.e. the view that agents qua noumena are ontologically prior to agents qua phenomena), and (2) that Kant's incompatibilism cannot be accommodated by the "two-aspect" interpretation, whose defining feature is the rejection of the ontological priority of agents qua (...)
     
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  3. Derk Pereboom (2005). Defending Hard Incompatibilism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):228-247.score: 18.0
    In _Living Without Free Will_, I develop and argue for a view according to which our being morally responsible would be ruled out if determinism were true, and also if indeterminism were true and the causes of our actions were exclusively events.1 Absent agent causation, indeterministic causal histories are as threatening to moral responsibility as deterministic histories are, and a generalization argument from manipulation cases shows that deterministic histories indeed undermine moral responsibility. Agent causation has not been ruled out as (...)
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  4. Robert H. Kane (1989). Two Kinds of Incompatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (December):219-54.score: 18.0
    The present essay is about this problem of the intelligibility of incompatibilist freedom. I do not think Kant, Nagel and Strawson are right in thinking that incompatibilist theories cannot be made intelligible to theoretical reason, nor are those many others right who think that incompatibilist accounts of freedom must be essentially mysterious or terminally obscure. I doubt if I can say enough in one short paper to convince anyone of these claims who is not already persuaded. But I hope to (...)
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  5. Ted Honderich, After Compatibilism and Incompatibilism.score: 18.0
    A determinism of decisions and actions, despite our experience of deciding and acting and also an interpretation of Quantum Theory, is a reasonable assumption. The doctrines of Compatibilism and Incompatibilism are both false, and demonstrably so. Whole structures of culture and social life refute them, and establish the alternative of Attitudinism. The real problem of determinism has seemed to be that of accomodating ourselves to the frustration of certain attitudes, at bottom certain desires. This project of Affirmation can run (...)
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  6. Seth Shabo (2010). Uncompromising Source Incompatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):349-383.score: 18.0
    ...I defend the uncompromising position against both Kane’s compromise source position and the traditional, “leeway” view. In sections 1 and 2, I take up Kane’s argument that uncompromising source incompatibilists go too far in their rejection of avoidability. In seeing where this argument goes wrong, we will also see why the compromise position is untenable…With the field thus narrowed, I turn to the leeway camp. Here the source incompatibilist’s task is to show that the ultimacy rationale for incompatibilism holds (...)
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  7. Tomis Kapitan (2002). A Master Argument for Incompatibilism? In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. 127--157.score: 18.0
    The past 25 years have witnessed a vigorous discussion of an argument directed against the compatibilist approach to free will and responsibility. This reasoning, variously called the “consequence argument,” the “incompatibility argument,” and the “unavoidability argument,” may be expressed informally as follows: If determinism is true then whatever happens is a consequence of past events and laws over which we have no control and which we are unable to prevent. But whatever is a consequence of what’s beyond our control is (...)
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  8. Seth Shabo (2011). What Must a Proof of Incompatibilism Prove? Philosophical Studies 154 (3):361-371.score: 18.0
    Peter van Inwagen has developed two highly influential strategies for establishing incompatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility. These have come to be known as ‘the Direct Argument’ and ‘the Indirect Argument,’ respectively. In recent years, the two arguments have attracted closely related criticisms. In each case, it is claimed, the argument does not provide a fully general defense of the incompatibilist’s conclusion. While the critics are right to notice these arguments’ limitations, they have not made it clear what (...)
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  9. Seth Shabo (2010). The Fate of the Direct Argument and the Case for Incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 150 (3):405-424.score: 18.0
    In this paper, I distinguish causal from logical versions of the direct argument for incompatibilism. I argue that, contrary to appearances, causal versions are better equipped to withstand an important recent challenge to the direct-argument strategy. The challenge involves arguing that support for the argument’s pivotal inference principle falls short just when it is needed most, namely when a deterministic series runs through an agent’s unimpaired deliberations. I then argue that, while there are limits to what causal versions can (...)
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  10. Joseph Keim Campbell (2006). Farewell to Direct Source Incompatibilism. Acta Analytica 21 (4):36 - 49.score: 18.0
    Traditional theorists about free will and moral responsibility endorse the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP): an agent is morally responsible for an action that she performs only if she can do or could have done otherwise. According to source theorists, PAP is false and an agent is morally responsible for her action only if she is the source of that action. Source incompatibilists accept the source theory but also endorse INC: if determinism is true, then no one is morally responsible (...)
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  11. Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias (2014). Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.score: 18.0
    The debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists depends in large part on what ordinary people mean by ‘free will’, a matter on which previous experimental philosophy studies have yielded conflicting results. In Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, and Turner (2005, 2006), most participants judged that agents in deterministic scenarios could have free will and be morally responsible. Nichols and Knobe (2007), though, suggest that these apparent compatibilist responses are performance errors produced by using concrete scenarios, and that their abstract scenarios reveal the folk (...)
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  12. Ishtiyaque Haji (2008). Reflections on the Incompatibilist's Direct Argument. Erkenntnis 68 (1):1 - 19.score: 18.0
    The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility is so christened because this argument allegedly circumvents any appeal to the principle of alternate possibilities – a person is morally responsible for doing something only if he could have avoided doing it – to secure incompatibilism. In this paper, I first summarize Peter van Inwagen’s version of the Direct Argument. I then comment on David Widerker’s recent responses to the argument. Finally, I cast doubt on the argument (...)
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  13. Charles Hermes & Joe Campbell (2012). More Trouble for Direct Source Incompatibilism: Reply to Yang. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 27 (3):335-344.score: 18.0
    Direct source incompatibilism (DSI) is the conjunction of two claims: SI-F: there are genuine Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs); SI-D: there is a sound version of the direct argument (DA). Eric Yang ( 2012 ) responds to a recent criticism of DSI (Campbell 2006 ). We show that Yang misses the mark. One can accept Yang’s criticisms and get the same result: there is a deep tension between FSCs and DA, between SI-F and SI-D. Thus, DSI is untenable. In this essay, (...)
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  14. Eric Yang (2012). Defending Direct Source Incompatibilism. Acta Analytica 27 (3):325-333.score: 18.0
    Joseph Keim Campbell has attempted to say “farewell” to a particular version of source incompatibilism, viz. direct source incompatibilism, arguing that direct source incompatibilism is committed to two theses that are in tension, thereby threatening the coherence of the position. He states that direct source incompatibilism is committed to the following claims: SI-F: there are genuine Frankfurt-style counterexamples. SI-D: there is a sound version of the Direct Argument. Campbell argues that both of these theses cannot be (...)
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  15. Danilo šuster (2004). Incompatibilism and the Logic of Transfer. Acta Analytica 19 (33):45-54.score: 18.0
    Modal arguments for incompatibility of freedom and determinism are typically based on the “transfer principle” for inability to act otherwise (Beta). The principle of agglomerativity (closure under conjunction introduction) is derivable from Beta. The most convincing counterexample to Beta is based on the denial of Agglomeration. The defender of the modal argument has two ways to block counterexamples to Beta: (i) use a notion of inability to act otherwise which is immune to the counterexample to agglomerativity; (ii) replace Beta with (...)
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  16. Katarzyna Paprzycka (2002). Flickers of Freedom and Frankfurt-Style Cases in the Light of the New Incompatibilism of the Stit Theory. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:553-565.score: 18.0
    Frankfurt-style examples aim to undermine the principle that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise, which in turn requires the availability of alternate possibilities.1 They are thus considered a reason for refuting incompatibilism. One lesson drawn from Frankfurt-style examples is exemplified by the compatibilist account of Fischer and Ravizza.2 They accept the impact of Frankfurt-style cases and hold that the incompatibilist requirement of regulative control, which involves the agent’s ability to perform the action and her ability to perform (...)
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  17. Tina Talsma (2013). Source Incompatibilism and the Foreknowledge Dilemma. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):209-219.score: 18.0
    The problem that divine foreknowledge poses for free will is one that is notoriously difficult to solve. If God believes in advance how an agent will act, this fact about the past eradicates all alternatives for the actor, given the infallibility of God’s beliefs. And if we assume, with many theists, that free will requires alternatives possibilities, then it looks as if God’s omniscience is incompatible with our free will. One solution to this problem, introduced and defended by David Hunt, (...)
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  18. Boris Rähme (2013). Common Sense, Strict Incompatibilism, and Free Will. Philosophical Inquiries 1 (1):107-124.score: 18.0
    Peter van Inwagen and Colin McGinn hold that there are strong arguments for strict incompatibilism, i.e. for the claim that the free will thesis (F) is inconsistent not just with determinism but with the negation of determinism as well. Interestingly, both authors deny that these arguments are apt to justify the claim that (F) is false. I argue that van Inwagen and McGinn are right in taking the fact that epistemic commitment to (F) is deeply rooted in common sense (...)
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  19. David Vander Laan (2001). A Regress Argument for Restrictive Incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 103 (2):201 - 215.score: 18.0
    Plausibly, no agent ever performs an action without some desire to perform that action. If so, a regress argument shows that, given incompatibilism, we are only rarely free. The argument sidesteps recent objections to this thesis.
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  20. D. Vander-Laan (2001). A Regress Argument for Restrictive Incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 103 (2):201-215.score: 18.0
    Plausibly, no agent ever performs an action without some desire to perform that action. If so, a regress argument shows that, given incompatibilism, we are only rarely free. The argument sidesteps recent objections to this thesis.
     
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  21. Derk Pereboom (2002). Living Without Free Will: The Case for Hard Incompatibilism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. 477-488.score: 15.0
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  22. Penelope Mackie (2003). Fatalism, Incompatibilism, and the Power to Do Otherwise. Noûs 37 (4):672-689.score: 15.0
  23. Gideon Rosen (2002). The Case for Incompatibilism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):699-706.score: 15.0
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  24. Alfred R. Mele (2005). A Critique of Pereboom's 'Four-Case Argument' for Incompatibilism. Analysis 65 (285):75-80.score: 15.0
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  25. Michael Otsuka (1998). Incompatibilism and the Avoidability of Blame. Ethics 108 (4):685-701.score: 15.0
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  26. Erik Carlson (2003). On a New Argument for Incompatibilism. Philosophia 31 (1-2):159-164.score: 15.0
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  27. Eleonore Stump (2000). The Direct Argument for Incompatibilism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):459-466.score: 15.0
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  28. Michael S. McKenna (2005). Reasons Reactivity and Incompatibilist Intuitions. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):131-143.score: 15.0
  29. Kadri Vihvelin (1988). The Modal Argument for Incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 53 (March):227-44.score: 15.0
  30. Carl Ginet (1983). In Defense of Incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 44 (November):391-400.score: 15.0
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  31. Robert Heinaman (1986). Incompatibilism Without the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (September):266-76.score: 15.0
  32. David Widerker (1987). On an Argument for Incompatibilism. Analysis 47 (January):37-41.score: 15.0
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  33. Erik Carlson (2000). Incompatibilism and the Transfer of Power Necessity. Noûs 34 (2):277-290.score: 15.0
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  34. Sanford C. Goldberg (2000). Externalism and Authoritative Knowledge of Content: A New Incompatibilist Strategy. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 100 (1):51-79.score: 15.0
    A typical strategy of those who seek to show that externalism is compatible with authoritative knowledge of content is to show that externalism does nothing to undermine the claim that all thinkers can at any time form correct and justi?ed self-ascriptive judgements concerning their occurrent thoughts. In reaction, most incompat- ibilists have assumed the burden of denying that externalism is compatible with this claim about self-ascription. Here I suggest another way to attack the compatibilist strategy. I aim to show that (...)
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  35. Michael S. McKenna (2001). Source Incompatibilism, Ultimacy, and the Transfer of Non-Responsibility. American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):37-51.score: 15.0
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  36. Michael Kremer (2004). How Not to Argue for Incompatibilism. Erkenntnis 60 (1):1-26.score: 15.0
    Ted A. Warfield has recently employed modal logic to argue that compatibilism in the free-will/determinism debate entails the rejection of intuitively valid inferences. I show that Warfield's argument fails. A parallel argument leads to the false conclusion that the mere possibility of determinism, together with the necessary existence of any contingent propositions, entails the rejection of intuitively valid inferences. The error in both arguments involves a crucial equivocation, which can be revealed by replacing modal operators with explicit quantifiers over possible (...)
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  37. Dana K. Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless (2002). Warfield's New Argument for Incompatibilism. Analysis 62 (2):104-107.score: 15.0
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  38. James W. Lamb (1977). On a Proof of Incompatibilism. Philosophical Review 86 (January):20-35.score: 15.0
  39. John Martin Fischer (2000). Problems with Actual-Sequence Incompatibilism. Journal of Ethics 4 (4):323-328.score: 15.0
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  40. Ralph D. Ellis (1991). Ethical Consequences of Recent Work on Incompatibilism. Philosophical Inquiry 13 (3-4):22-42.score: 15.0
     
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  41. J. M. Ficsher (1983). Incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 43 (January):127-37.score: 15.0
     
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  42. Ted Honderich (2002). Determinism as True, Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as False, and the Real Alternative. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.score: 15.0
     
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  43. Ariel Yadin (2004). Assuming Determinism, Free Will Can Only Be an Illusion: An Argument for Incompatibilism. Iyyun 53 (July):275-286.score: 15.0
     
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  44. Eddy Nahmias, Stephen G. Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner (2006). Is Incompatibilism Intuitive? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28 - 53.score: 12.0
    Incompatibilists believe free will is impossible if determinism is true, and they often claim that this view is supported by ordinary intuitions. We challenge the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive to most laypersons and discuss the significance of this challenge to the free will debate. After explaining why incompatibilists should want their view to accord with pretheoretical intuitions, we suggest that determining whether incompatibilism is in fact intuitive calls for empirical testing. We then present the results of our (...)
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  45. Andrew M. Bailey (2012). Incompatibilism and the Past. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):351-376.score: 12.0
    There is a new objection to the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism. I argue that the objection is more wide-ranging than originally thought. In particular: if it tells against the Consequence Argument, it tells against other arguments for incompatibilism too. I survey a few ways of dealing with this objection and show the costs of each. I then present an argument for incompatibilism that is immune to the objection and that enjoys other advantages.
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  46. Simon Shengjian Xie (2009). What is Kant: A Compatibilist or an Incompatibilist? A New Interpretation of Kant's Solution to the Free Will Problem. Kant-Studien 100 (1):53-76.score: 12.0
    There are generally two controversial issues over Kant's solution to the free will problem. One is over whether he is a compatibilist or an incompatibilist and the other is over whether his solution is a success. In this paper, I will argue, regarding the first controversy, that “compatibilist” and “incompatibilist” are not the right terms to describe Kant for his unique views on freedom and determinism; but that of the two, incompatibilist is the more accurate description. Regarding the second controversy, (...)
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  47. Kadri Vihvelin, Arguments for Incompatibilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 12.0
    Determinism is a claim about the laws of nature: very roughly, it is the claim that everything that happens is determined by antecedent conditions together with the natural laws. Incompatibilism is a philosophical thesis about the relevance of determinism to free will: that the truth of determinism rules out the existence of free will. The incompatibilist believes that if determinism turned out to be true, it would also be true that we don't have, and have never had, free will. (...)
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  48. Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely (2009). Do Judgments About Freedom and Responsibility Depend on Who You Are? Personality Differences in Intuitions About Compatibilism and Incompatibilism. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):342-350.score: 12.0
    Recently, there has been an increased interest in folk intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility from both philosophers and psychologists. We aim to extend our understanding of folk intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility using an individual differences approach. Building off previous research suggesting that there are systematic differences in folks’ philosophically relevant intuitions, we present new data indicating that the personality trait extraversion predicts, to a significant extent, those who have compatibilist versus incompatibilist intuitions. We argue that identifying groups (...)
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  49. Michael McKenna (2010). Whose Argumentative Burden, Which Incompatibilist Arguments?—Getting the Dialectic Right. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):429-443.score: 12.0
    Kadri Vihvelin has recently argued that between compatibilists and incompatibilists, the incompatibilists have a greater dialectical burden than compatibilists. According to her, both must show that free will is possible, but beyond this the incompatibilists must also show that no deterministic worlds are free will worlds. Thus, according to Vihvelin, so long as it is established that free will is possible, all the compatibilist must do is show that the incompatibilists' arguments are ineffective. I resist Vihvelin's assessment of the dialectical (...)
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  50. Derk Pereboom (2003). Source Incompatibilism and Alternative Possibilities. In Michael S. McKenna & David Widerker (eds.), Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. 184--199.score: 12.0
    The claim that moral responsibility for an action requires that the agent could have done otherwise is surely attractive. Moreover, it seems reasonable to contend that a requirement of this sort is not merely a necessary condition of little consequence, but that it plays a decisive role in explaining an agent's moral responsibility for an action. For if an agent is to be blameworthy for an action, it seems crucial that she could have done something to avoid this blameworthiness. If (...)
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