Search results for 'Inconsistency' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Walter Carnielli & Rodrigues Abilio, On the Philosophical Motivations for the Logics of Formal Consistency and Inconsistency.score: 24.0
    We present a philosophical motivation for the logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs), a family of paraconsistent logics whose distinctive feature is that of having resources for expressing the notion of consistency (and inconsistency as well) within the object language. We shall defend the view according to which logics of formal inconsistency are theories of logical consequence of normative and epistemic character. This approach not only allows us to make inferences in the presence of contradictions, but offers a (...)
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  2. Derek Baker & Jack Woods (forthcoming). How Expressivists Can and Should Explain Inconsistency. Ethics.score: 24.0
    Mark Schroeder has argued that all reasonable forms of inconsistency of attitude consist of having the same attitude type towards a pair of inconsistent contents (A-type inconsistency). We suggest that he is mistaken in this, offering a number of intuitive examples of pairs of distinct attitudes types with consistent contents which are intuitively inconsistent (B-type inconsistency). We further argue that, despite the virtues of Schroeder's elegant A-type expressivist semantics, B-type inconsistency is in many ways the more (...)
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  3. Mathieu Beirlaen, Christian Straßer & Joke Meheus (2013). An Inconsistency-Adaptive Deontic Logic for Normative Conflicts. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):285-315.score: 24.0
    We present the inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic DP r , a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts such as O A ∧ O ∼A, O A ∧ P ∼A or even O A ∧ ∼O A. On the other hand, DP r still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (SDL). DP r interprets a given premise set ‘as (...)
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  4. Bryson Brown (1992). Rational Inconsistency and Reasoning. Informal Logic 14 (1).score: 24.0
    Nicholas Rescher has argued we must tolerate inconsistency because of our cognitive limitations. He has also produced, together with R. Brandom, a serious attempt at exploring the logic of inconsistency. Inconsistency tolerance calls for a systematic rewriting of our logical doctrines: it requires a paraconsistent logic. However, having given up all aggregation of premises, Rescher's proposal for a paraconsistenl logic fails to account for the reductive reasoning Rescher appeals to in his account of inconsistency tolerance. A (...)
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  5. Peter Vickers (forthcoming). Theory Flexibility and Inconsistency in Science. Synthese:1-16.score: 24.0
    For several decades now philosophers have discussed apparent examples of internally inconsistent scientific theories. However, there is still much controversy over how exactly we should conceive of scientific theories in the first place. Here I argue for a new approach, whereby all of the truly important questions about inconsistency in science can be asked and answered without disagreements about theories and theory-content getting in the way. Three examples commonly described as ‘internally inconsistent theories’ are analysed in the light of (...)
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  6. Walter Carnielli & Abilio Rodrigues, On Philosophical Motivations for Paraconsistency: An Ontology-Free Interpretation of the Logics of Formal Inconsistency.score: 24.0
    In this paper we present a philosophical motivation for the logics of formal inconsistency, a family of paraconsistent logics whose distinctive feature is that of having resources for expressing the notion of consistency within the object language in such a way that consistency may be logically independent of non- contradiction. We defend the view according to which logics of formal inconsistency may be interpreted as theories of logical consequence of an epistemological character. We also argue that in order (...)
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  7. Robert C. Pinto (1995). Inconsistency, Rationality and Relativism. Informal Logic 17 (2).score: 24.0
    In section I, I argue that the principal reason why inconsistency is a fault is that it involves having at least one false belief. In section 2, I argue that inconsistency need not be a serious epistemic fault. The argument in section 2 is based on the notion that what matters epistemically is always in the final analysis an item's effect on attaining the goal of truth. In section 3 I describe two cases in which it is best (...)
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  8. Juha Saatsi (forthcoming). Inconsistency and Scientific Realism. Synthese 191:2941-2955.score: 24.0
    I erect a framework within the semantic view of theories for explaining the empirical success of internally inconsistent models and theories, with scientific realism in mind. The framework is an instance of the ‘content-driven’ approach to inconsistency, advocated by both Norton (Philos Sci 54:327–350, 1987) and Smith (Stud Hist Philos Sci 19:429–445, 1988a, In: Fine A, Leplin J (eds) PSA1988, 1988b), whose ideas my analysis aims to clarify and substantiate.
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  9. Hans Lycke (2010). Inconsistency-Adaptive Modal Logics. On How to Cope with Modal Inconsistency. Logic and Logical Philosophy 19 (1-2):31-61.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I will characterize a new class of inconsistency-adaptive logics, namely inconsistency-adaptive modal logics. These logics cope with inconsistencies in a modal context. More specifically, when faced with inconsistencies, inconsistency-adaptive modal logics avoid explosion, but still allow the derivation of sufficient consequences to adequately explicate the part of human reasoning they are intended for.
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  10. Nicholas Rescher (1987). How Serious a Fallacy is Inconsistency? Argumentation 1 (3):303-316.score: 24.0
    Consistency is often pictured as an indispensable requisite for rationality. The paper argues that this is overly rigoristic. Inconsistency can be treated as a matter of isolable singularities rather than an all-destructive disaster. The paper, supports and illustrates a perspective on which consistency can be seen as a desideratum rather than a totaly non-negotiable demand. The argumentation of the paper casts consistency in the role of a cognitive ideal rather than a sine qua non condition of rational process.
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  11. Sergei P. Odintsov & Stanislav O. Speranski (2012). On Algorithmic Properties of Propositional Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics. Logic and Logical Philosophy 21 (3):209-228.score: 24.0
    The present paper is devoted to computational aspects of propositional inconsistency-adaptive logics. In particular, we prove (relativized versions of) some principal results on computational complexity of derivability in such logics, namely in cases of CLuN r and CLuN m , i.e., CLuN supplied with the reliability strategy and the minimal abnormality strategy, respectively.
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  12. Lisa Bortolotti (2003). Inconsistency and Interpretation. Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):109-123.score: 22.0
    In this paper my purpose is to examine whether the case of inconsistent believers can offer a reason to object to theories of belief ascription that rely on a rationality constraint. I shall first illustrate how the possibility of inconsistent believers might be a challenge for the rationality constraint and then assess Davidson's influential reply to that challenge.
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  13. Jody Azzouni (2013). Inconsistency in Natural Languages. Synthese 190 (15):3175-3184.score: 22.0
    An argument for Trivialism, the view that natural languages are logically inconsistent, is provided that does not rely on contentious empirical assumptions about natural language terms such as “and” or “or.” Further, the view is defended against an important objection recently mounted against it by Thomas Hofweber.
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  14. Robert W. Batterman (2014). The Inconsistency of Physics (with a Capital “P”). Synthese 191 (13):2973-2992.score: 22.0
    This paper discusses a conception of physics as a collection of theories that, from a logical point of view, is inconsistent. It is argued that this logical conception of the relations between physical theories is too crude. Mathematical subtleties allow for a much more nuanced and sophisticated understanding of the relations between different physical theories.
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  15. Mathias Frisch (2014). Models and Scientific Representations Or: Who is Afraid of Inconsistency? Synthese 191 (13):3027-3040.score: 22.0
    I argue that if we make explicit the role of the user of scientific representations not only in the application but also in the construction of a model or representation, then inconsistent modeling assumptions do not pose an insurmountable obstacle to our representational practices.
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  16. Jan Albert van Laar (2007). Pragmatic Inconsistency and Credibility. Argumentation 21 (3):317-334.score: 22.0
    A critic may attack an arguer personally by pointing out that the arguer’s position is pragmatically inconsistent: the arguer does not practice what he preaches. A number of authors hold that such attacks can be part of a good argumentative discussion. However, there is a difficulty in accepting this kind of contribution as potentially legitimate, for the reason that there is nothing wrong for a protagonist to have an inconsistent position, in the sense of committing himself to mutually inconsistent propositions. (...)
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  17. Duncan Pritchard & Jesper Kallestrup (2004). An Argument for the Inconsistency of Content Externalism and Epistemic Internalism. Philosophia 31 (3-4):345-354.score: 21.0
    Whereas a number of recent articles have focussed upon whether the thesis of content externalism is compatible with a certain sort of knowledge that is gained via first-person authority,1 far less attention has been given to the relationship that this thesis bears to the possession of knowledge in general and, in particular, its relation to internalist and externalist epistemologies. Nevertheless, although very few actual arguments have been presented to this end, there does seem to be a shared suspicion that content (...)
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  18. Andrew Cling (1989). Eliminative Materialism and Self-Referential Inconsistency. Philosophical Studies 56 (May):53-75.score: 21.0
  19. Mehmet M. Erginel (2011). Inconsistency and Ambiguity in Republic IX. Classical Quarterly 61 (02):493-520.score: 21.0
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  20. Isabelle Brocas (2011). Dynamic Inconsistency and Choice. Theory and Decision 71 (3):343-364.score: 21.0
    In this paper, we analyze an intra-personal game where a decision-maker is summarized by a succession of selves. Selves may (or may not) have conflicting interests, and earlier selves may have imperfect knowledge of the preferences of future selves. At date 1, self-1 chooses a menu, at date 2, the preferences of self-2 realize and self-2 chooses an item from the menu. We show that equilibrium choice is consistent with either a preference for flexibility, a preference for betweenness or a (...)
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  21. James G. Raftery (2013). Inconsistency Lemmas in Algebraic Logic. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 59 (6):393-406.score: 21.0
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  22. Margaret Morrison (2011). One Phenomenon, Many Models: Inconsistency and Complementarity. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42 (2):342-351.score: 20.0
    The paper examines philosophical issues that arise in contexts where one has many different models for treating the same system. I show why in some cases this appears relatively unproblematic (models of turbulence) while others represent genuine difficulties when attempting to interpret the information that models provide (nuclear models). What the examples show is that while complementary models needn’t be a hindrance to knowledge acquisition, the kind of inconsistency present in nuclear cases is, since it is indicative of a (...)
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  23. Jonathan Harrison (1995). Ethical Egoism, Utilitarianism and the Fallacy of Pragmatic Inconsistency. Argumentation 9 (4):595-609.score: 20.0
    In this paper I shall consider the difficulty for Ethical Egoism, Act Utilitarianism and later what I shall call Cumulative Effect Utilitarianism, that they both commit the fallacy of pragmatic inconsistency. I shall distinguish various forms of the fallacy of pragmatic inconsistency; in particular I shall distinguish between the fallacy of direct and indirect pragmatic inconsistency, and shall argue that though both Ethical Egoism and Act Utilitarianism probably commit both, Cumulative Effect Utilitarianism does not.
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  24. Newton C. A. Da Costa & Décio Krause (2014). Physics, Inconsistency, and Quasi-Truth. Synthese 191 (13):3041-3055.score: 20.0
    In this work, the first of a series, we study the nature of informal inconsistency in physics, focusing mainly on the foundations of quantum theory, and appealing to the concept of quasi-truth. We defend a pluralistic view of the philosophy of science, grounded on the existence of inconsistencies and on quasi-truth. Here, we treat only the ‘classical aspects’ of the subject, leaving for a forthcoming paper the ‘non-classical’ part.
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  25. Andrew Bacon (2013). Curry's Paradox and Omega Inconsistency. Studia Logica 101 (1):1-9.score: 18.0
    In recent years there has been a revitalised interest in non-classical solutions to the semantic paradoxes. In this paper I show that a number of logics are susceptible to a strengthened version of Curry's paradox. This can be adapted to provide a proof theoretic analysis of the omega-inconsistency in Lukasiewicz's continuum valued logic, allowing us to better evaluate which logics are suitable for a naïve truth theory. On this basis I identify two natural subsystems of Lukasiewicz logic which individually, (...)
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  26. Gunnar Björnsson (2001). Why Emotivists Love Inconsistency. Philosophical Studies 104 (1):81 - 108.score: 18.0
    Emotivists hold that moral opinions are wishes and desires, and that the function of moral language is to “express” such states. But if moral opinions were but wishes or desires, why would we see certain opinions as inconsistent with, or following from other opinions? And why should our reasoning include complex opinions such as the opinion that a person ought to be blamed only if he has done something wrong? Indeed, why would we think that anything is conditional on his (...)
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  27. Jody Azzouni (2007). The Inconsistency of Natural Languages: How We Live with It. Inquiry 50 (6):590 – 605.score: 18.0
    I revisit my earlier arguments for the (trivial) inconsistency of natural languages, and take up the objection that no such argument can be established on the basis of surface usage. I respond with the evidential centrality of surface usage: the ways it can and can't be undercut by linguistic science. Then some important ramifications of having an inconsistent natural language are explored: (1) the temptation to engage in illegitimate reductio reasoning, (2) the breakdown of the knowledge idiom (because its (...)
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  28. George Bealer (1978). An Inconsistency in Functionalism. Synthese 38 (July):333-372.score: 18.0
    This paper demonstrates that there is an inconsistency in functionalism in psychology and philosophy of mind. Analogous inconsistencies can be expected in functionalisms in biology and social theory. (edited).
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  29. Matti Eklund, The Inconsistency View on Vagueness.score: 18.0
    I elaborate and defend the inconsistency view on vagueness I have earlier argued for in my (2002) and (forthcoming). In rough outline, the view is that the sorites paradox arises because tolerance principles, despite their inconsistency, are meaning-constitutive for vague expressions. Toward the end of the paper I discuss other inconsistency views on vagueness that have been proposed, and compare them to the view I favor.
     
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  30. Patricia Marino (2011). Ambivalence, Valuational Inconsistency, and the Divided Self. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):41-71.score: 18.0
    Is there anything irrational, or self-undermining, about having "inconsistent" attitudes of caring or valuing? In this paper, I argue that, contra suggestions of Harry Frankfurt and Charles Taylor, the answer is "No." Here I focus on "valuations," which are endorsed desires or attitudes. The proper characterization of what I call "valuational inconsistency" I claim, involves not logical form (valuing A and not-A), but rather the co-possibility of what is valued; valuations are inconsistent when there is no possible world in (...)
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  31. Jeffrey Ketland (2005). Yablo's Paradox and Ω-Inconsistency. Synthese 145 (3):295 - 302.score: 18.0
    It is argued that Yablo’s Paradox is not strictly paradoxical, but rather ‘ω-paradoxical’. Under a natural formalization, the list of Yablo sentences may be constructed using a diagonalization argument and can be shown to be ω-inconsistent, but nonetheless consistent. The derivation of an inconsistency requires a uniform fixed-point construction. Moreover, the truth-theoretic disquotational principle required is also uniform, rather than the local disquotational T-scheme. The theory with the local disquotation T-scheme applied to individual sentences from the Yablo list is (...)
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  32. Matt Weiner (2009). The (Mostly Harmless) Inconsistency of Knowledge Ascriptions. Philosophers' Imprint 9 (1):1-25.score: 18.0
    I argue for an alternative to invariantist, contextualist, and relativist semantics for ‘know’. This is that our use of ‘know’ is inconsistent; it is governed by several mutually inconsistent inference principles. Yet this inconsistency does not prevent us from assigning an effective content to most individual knowledge ascriptions, and it leads to trouble only in exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, we have no reason to abandon our inconsistent knowledge-talk.
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  33. Roger F. Gibson (1984). On an Inconsistency in Thomson's Abortion Argument. Philosophical Studies 46 (1):131 - 139.score: 18.0
    I argue that thompson's analysis of the argument proscribing abortion except to save the woman's life is inconsistent, For it commits thompson to the following set of statements: (1) all fetuses have a right not to be killed unjustly; (2) no fetus can be aborted/killed unjustly unless it possesses a right to a woman's body; (3) some fetuses do not possess a right to a woman's body. I suggest two alternative ways to deal with this inconsistency.
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  34. Kevin Knight (2002). Measuring Inconsistency. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (1):77-98.score: 18.0
    I provide a method of measuring the inconsistency of a set of sentences from 1-consistency, corresponding to complete consistency, to 0-consistency, corresponding to the explicit presence of a contradiction. Using this notion to analyze the lottery paradox, one can see that the set of sentences capturing the paradox has a high degree of consistency (assuming, of course, a sufficiently large lottery). The measure of consistency, however, is not limited to paradoxes. I also provide results for general sets of sentences.
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  35. Neil Campbell (2012). Reply to Nagasawa on the Inconsistency Objection to the Knowledge Argument. Erkenntnis 76 (1):137-145.score: 18.0
    Yujin Nagasawa has recently defended Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument from the “inconsistency objection.” The objection claims that the premises of the knowledge argument are inconsistent with qualia epiphenomenalism. Nagasawa defends Jackson by showing that the objection mistakenly assumes a causal theory of phenomenal knowledge. I argue that although this defense might succeed against two versions of the inconsistency objection, mine is unaffected by Nagasawa’s argument, in which case the inconsistency in the knowledge argument remains.
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  36. Jill North (2007). Review of Mathias Frisch, Inconsistency, Asymmetry, and Non-Locality: A Philosophical Investigation of Classical Electrodynamics. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 74:555-558.score: 18.0
    This book is a stimulating and engaging discussion of philosophical issues in the foundations of classical electromagnetism. In the rst half, Frisch argues against the standard conception of the theory as consistent and local. The second half is devoted to the puzzle of the arrow of radiation: the fact that waves behave asymmetrically in time, though the laws governing their evolution are temporally symmetric. The book is worthwhile for anyone interested in understanding the physical theory of electromagnetism, as well for (...)
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  37. Peter Vickers (2008). Frisch, Muller, and Belot on an Inconsistency in Classical Electrodynamics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):767-792.score: 18.0
    This paper follows up a debate as to whether classical electrodynamics is inconsistent. Mathias Frisch makes the claim in Inconsistency, Asymmetry and Non-Locality ([2005]), but this has been quickly countered by F. A. Muller ([2007]) and Gordon Belot ([2007]). Here I argue that both Muller and Belot fail to connect with the background assumptions that support Frisch's claim. Responding to Belot I explicate Frisch's position in more detail, before providing my own criticisms. Correcting Frisch's position, I find that I (...)
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  38. Bradley Armour-Garb (2007). Consistent Inconsistency Theories. Inquiry 50 (6):639 – 654.score: 18.0
    In this paper I critically evaluate a number of current "consistent inconsistency theories" and then briefly motivate a rival position. The rival position challenges a consistent inconsistency theory, by sharing many of its basic commitments without suffering the problems that such a theory appears to face.
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  39. Charles B. Cross (2003). Nonmonotonic Inconsistency. Artificial Intelligence 149 (2):161-178.score: 18.0
    Nonmonotonic consequence is the subject of a vast literature, but the idea of a nonmonotonic counterpart of logical inconsistency—the idea of a defeasible property representing internal conflict of an inductive or evidential nature—has been entirely neglected. After considering and dismissing two possible analyses relating nonmonotonic consequence and a nonmonotonic counterpart of logical inconsistency, this paper offers a set of postulates for nonmonotonic inconsistency, an analysis of nonmonotonic inconsistency in terms of nonmonotonic consequence, and a series of (...)
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  40. Ben Eggleston (2003). Does Participation Matter? An Inconsistency in Parfit's Moral Mathematics. Utilitas 15 (01):92-.score: 18.0
    Consequentialists typically think that the moral quality of one's conduct depends on the difference one makes. But consequentialists may also think that even if one is not making a difference, the moral quality of one's conduct can still be affected by whether one is participating (even if only ineffectually, or redundantly) in an endeavour that does make a difference. Derek Parfit discusses this issue participation in the chapter of Reasons and Persons that he devotes to what he calls . In (...)
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  41. Richard Routley (1984). I. On the Alleged Inconsistency, Moral Insensitivity and Fanaticism of Pacifism. Inquiry 27 (1-4):117 – 136.score: 18.0
    All the standard and some esoteric objections to pacifism are refuted, either directly or (as with the charge of impracticality) in outline. Familiar arguments to the inconsistency and irresponsibility of pacifism are shown to turn upon illegitimately construing pacifist activities such as resisting, preventing, and defending as involving violence. Several arguments against pacifism from violence as a lesser evil turn out to be fallacious; some involve the erroneous assumption that violence is the only evil, but some lead into what (...)
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  42. Hin-Chung E. Hung (1987). Incommensurability and Inconsistency of Languages. Erkenntnis 27 (3):323 - 352.score: 18.0
    Incommensurable theories are said to be both incompatible and incomparable. This is paradoxical, because, being incompatible, these theories must have the same subject-matter, yet incomparability implies that their subject-matter is different. This paper's proposed resolution of the paradox makes use of the distinction between internal subject-matter and external subject-matter for languages (frameworks) as outlined by W. Sellars. Incommensurability arises when two languages share the same external subject-matter but differ in internal subject-matter. When they share the same external subject-matter, they can (...)
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  43. Erik Carlson (2003). Dynamic Inconsistency and Performable Plans. Philosophical Studies 113 (2):181 - 200.score: 18.0
    An agent may abandon an initiated action plan, although he doesnot acquire new information or encounter unforeseen obstacles.Such dynamic inconsistency can be to the agent'';s guaranteeddisadvantage, and there is a debate on how it should rationallybe avoided. The main contenders are the sophisticated andthe resolute approaches. I argue that this debate is misconceived,since both approaches rely on false assumptions about theperformability of action plans. The debate can be reformulated,so as to avoid these mistaken assumptions. I try to show that (...)
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  44. Bart Jacobs (1989). The Inconsistency of Higher Order Extensions of Martin-Löf's Type Theory. Journal of Philosophical Logic 18 (4):399 - 422.score: 18.0
    Martin-Löf's constructive type theory forms the basis of this paper. His central notions of category and set, and their relations with Russell's type theories, are discussed. It is shown that addition of an axiom - treating the category of propositions as a set and thereby enabling higher order quantification - leads to inconsistency. This theorem is a variant of Girard's paradox, which is a translation into type theory of Mirimanoff's paradox (concerning the set of all well-founded sets). The occurrence (...)
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  45. Otis Dudley Duncan (1986). Probability, Disposition, and the Inconsistency of Attitudes and Behavior. Synthese 68 (1):65 - 98.score: 18.0
    Inconsistency of attitudes and behavior is due to the probabilistic connection between responses or actions and the (not directly observable) dispositions on which they depend. Latent variable models provide criteria for recognizing when attitude and behavior depend on the same disposition. Statistical tests of such models and techniques of parameter estimation are described. The viewpoint proposed here and illustrated with empirical examples contrasts with the prevalent reliance on correlational models and methods.
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  46. Charles B. Cross (2004). A Correction to “Nonmonotonic Inconsistency” [Artificial Intelligence 149 (2003) 161–178]. Artificial Intelligence 160 (1-2):191-192.score: 18.0
    This note corrects an error in the statement and proof of Propositions 9 and 10 of [C. Cross, Nonmonotonic inconsistency, Artificial Intelligence 149 (2) (2003) 161–178]. Both results turn out to depend on the postulate of Consistency Preservation.
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  47. Joel Smith (1988). Inconsistency and Scientific Reasoning. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 19 (4):429-445.score: 18.0
    This is a philosophical and historical investigation of the role of inconsistent representations of the same scientific phenomenon. The logical difficulties associated with the simultaneous application of inconsistent models are discussed. Internally inconsistent scientific proposals are characterized as structures whose application is necessarily tied to the confirming evidence that each of its components enjoys and to a vision of the general form of the theory that will resolve the inconsistency. Einstein's derivation of the black body radiation law is used (...)
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  48. Joachim Aufderheide (2013). An Inconsistency in the Philebus? British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (5):817 - 837.score: 18.0
    Plato's Philebus contains an intricate difficulty. Plato seems to hold both (a) that all pleasures are processes of becoming, a crucial premise in the argument that no pleasure is good (53c?55c) and (b) that some pleasures contribute in their own right to the goodness of the best life (64c?67b). Since it seems also plausible that only things which are good can contribute to the goodness of the best life in their own right, Plato's view seems to be inconsistent. Interpreters usually (...)
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  49. E. L. Angell, C. J. Jackson, R. E. Ashcroft, A. Bryman, K. Windridge & M. Dixon-Woods (2007). Is 'Inconsistency' in Research Ethics Committee Decision-Making Really a Problem? An Empirical Investigation and Reflection. Clinical Ethics 2 (2):92-99.score: 18.0
    Research Ethics Committees (RECs) are frequently a focus of complaints from researchers, but evidence about the operation and decisions of RECs tends to be anecdotal. We conducted a systematic study to identify and compare the ethical issues raised in 54 letters to researchers about the same 18 applications submitted to three RECs over one year. The most common type of ethical trouble identified in REC letters related to informed consent, followed by scientific design and conduct, care and protection of research (...)
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  50. Bernard Gert (1992). A Sex Caused Inconsistency in Dsm-III-R: The Definition of Mental Disorder and the Definition of Paraphilias. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17 (2):155-171.score: 18.0
    The DSM-III-R definition of mental disorder is inconsistent with the DSM-III-R definition of paraphilias. The former requires the suffering or increased risk of suffering some harm while the latter allows that deviance, by itself, is sufficient to classify a behavioral syndrome as a paraphilia. This inconsistency is particularly clear when examining the DSM-III-R account of a specific paraphilia, Transvestic Fetishism. The author defends the DSM-III-R definition of mental disorder and argues that the DSM-III-R definition of paraphilias should be changed. (...)
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