Search results for 'Inconsistency' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  4
    Eric Barnes, Neither Truth Nor Empirical Adequacy Explain, Matti Eklund, Deep Inconsistency, Barbara Montero, Harold Langsam, Self-Knowledge Externalism, Christine McKinnon Desire-Frustration, Moral Sympathy & Josh Parsons (2002). INDEX for Volume 80, 2002. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):545-548.
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  2. Sergei P. Odintsov & Stanislav O. Speranski (2012). On Algorithmic Properties of Propositional Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics. Logic and Logical Philosophy 21 (3):209-228.
    The present paper is devoted to computational aspects of propositional inconsistency-adaptive logics. In particular, we prove (relativized versions of) some principal results on computational complexity of derivability in such logics, namely in cases of CLuN r and CLuN m , i.e., CLuN supplied with the reliability strategy and the minimal abnormality strategy, respectively.
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  3. Derek Baker & Jack Woods (2015). How Expressivists Can and Should Explain Inconsistency. Ethics 125 (2):391-424.
    Mark Schroeder has argued that all reasonable forms of inconsistency of attitude consist of having the same attitude type towards a pair of inconsistent contents (A-type inconsistency). We suggest that he is mistaken in this, offering a number of intuitive examples of pairs of distinct attitudes types with consistent contents which are intuitively inconsistent (B-type inconsistency). We further argue that, despite the virtues of Schroeder's elegant A-type expressivist semantics, B-type inconsistency is in many ways the more (...)
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  4. Hans Lycke (2010). Inconsistency-Adaptive Modal Logics. On How to Cope with Modal Inconsistency. Logic and Logical Philosophy 19 (1-2):31-61.
    In this paper, I will characterize a new class of inconsistency-adaptive logics, namely inconsistency-adaptive modal logics. These logics cope with inconsistencies in a modal context. More specifically, when faced with inconsistencies, inconsistency-adaptive modal logics avoid explosion, but still allow the derivation of sufficient consequences to adequately explicate the part of human reasoning they are intended for.
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  5. Walter Carnielli & Rodrigues Abilio, On the Philosophical Motivations for the Logics of Formal Consistency and Inconsistency.
    We present a philosophical motivation for the logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs), a family of paraconsistent logics whose distinctive feature is that of having resources for expressing the notion of consistency (and inconsistency as well) within the object language. We shall defend the view according to which logics of formal inconsistency are theories of logical consequence of normative and epistemic character. This approach not only allows us to make inferences in the presence of contradictions, but offers a (...)
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  6.  29
    Juha Saatsi (2014). Inconsistency and Scientific Realism. Synthese 191 (13):2941-2955.
    I erect a framework within the semantic view of theories for explaining the empirical success of internally inconsistent models and theories, with scientific realism in mind. The framework is an instance of the ‘content-driven’ approach to inconsistency, advocated by both Norton (Philos Sci 54:327–350, 1987) and Smith (Stud Hist Philos Sci 19:429–445, 1988a, In: Fine A, Leplin J (eds) PSA1988, 1988b), whose ideas my analysis aims to clarify and substantiate.
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  7.  23
    Peter Vickers (2014). Theory Flexibility and Inconsistency in Science. Synthese 191 (13):2891-2906.
    For several decades now philosophers have discussed apparent examples of internally inconsistent scientific theories. However, there is still much controversy over how exactly we should conceive of scientific theories in the first place. Here I argue for a new approach, whereby all of the truly important questions about inconsistency in science can be asked and answered without disagreements about theories and theory-content getting in the way. Three examples commonly described as ‘internally inconsistent theories’ are analysed in the light of (...)
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  8.  30
    Walter Carnielli & Abilio Rodrigues, On Philosophical Motivations for Paraconsistency: An Ontology-Free Interpretation of the Logics of Formal Inconsistency.
    In this paper we present a philosophical motivation for the logics of formal inconsistency, a family of paraconsistent logics whose distinctive feature is that of having resources for expressing the notion of consistency within the object language in such a way that consistency may be logically independent of non- contradiction. We defend the view according to which logics of formal inconsistency may be interpreted as theories of logical consequence of an epistemological character. We also argue that in order (...)
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  9.  5
    Nicholas Rescher (1987). How Serious a Fallacy is Inconsistency? Argumentation 1 (3):303-316.
    Consistency is often pictured as an indispensable requisite for rationality. The paper argues that this is overly rigoristic. Inconsistency can be treated as a matter of isolable singularities rather than an all-destructive disaster. The paper, supports and illustrates a perspective on which consistency can be seen as a desideratum rather than a totaly non-negotiable demand. The argumentation of the paper casts consistency in the role of a cognitive ideal rather than a sine qua non condition of rational process.
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  10.  31
    Mathieu Beirlaen, Christian Straßer & Joke Meheus (2013). An Inconsistency-Adaptive Deontic Logic for Normative Conflicts. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):285-315.
    We present the inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic DP r , a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts such as O A ∧ O ∼A, O A ∧ P ∼A or even O A ∧ ∼O A. On the other hand, DP r still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (SDL). DP r interprets a given premise set ‘as (...)
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  11.  9
    Bryson Brown (1992). Rational Inconsistency and Reasoning. Informal Logic 14 (1).
    Nicholas Rescher has argued we must tolerate inconsistency because of our cognitive limitations. He has also produced, together with R. Brandom, a serious attempt at exploring the logic of inconsistency. Inconsistency tolerance calls for a systematic rewriting of our logical doctrines: it requires a paraconsistent logic. However, having given up all aggregation of premises, Rescher's proposal for a paraconsistenl logic fails to account for the reductive reasoning Rescher appeals to in his account of inconsistency tolerance. A (...)
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  12.  8
    Robert C. Pinto (1995). Inconsistency, Rationality and Relativism. Informal Logic 17 (2).
    In section I, I argue that the principal reason why inconsistency is a fault is that it involves having at least one false belief. In section 2, I argue that inconsistency need not be a serious epistemic fault. The argument in section 2 is based on the notion that what matters epistemically is always in the final analysis an item's effect on attaining the goal of truth. In section 3 I describe two cases in which it is best (...)
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  13. Marcelo E. Coniglio, Francesc Esteva & Lluís Godo (2014). Logics of Formal Inconsistency Arising From Systems of Fuzzy Logic. Logic Journal of the IGPL 22 (6):880-904.
    This article proposes the meeting of fuzzy logic with paraconsistency in a very precise and foundational way. Specifically, in this article we introduce expansions of the fuzzy logic MTL by means of primitive operators for consistency and inconsistency in the style of the so-called Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs). The main novelty of the present approach is the definition of postulates for this type of operators over MTL-algebras, leading to the definition and axiomatization of a family of logics, (...)
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  14. Duncan Pritchard & Jesper Kallestrup (2004). An Argument for the Inconsistency of Content Externalism and Epistemic Internalism. Philosophia 31 (3-4):345-354.
    Whereas a number of recent articles have focussed upon whether the thesis of content externalism is compatible with a certain sort of knowledge that is gained via first-person authority,1 far less attention has been given to the relationship that this thesis bears to the possession of knowledge in general and, in particular, its relation to internalist and externalist epistemologies. Nevertheless, although very few actual arguments have been presented to this end, there does seem to be a shared suspicion that content (...)
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  15. Joke Meheus (2002). Inconsistency in Science. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
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  16.  6
    Robert Brandom & N. Rescher (1979). The Logic of Inconsistency: A Study in Nonstandard Possible-World Semantics and Ontology. American Philosophical Quarterly, Library of Philosophy 5 (1):233-236.
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  17.  3
    James G. Raftery (2013). Inconsistency Lemmas in Algebraic Logic. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 59 (6):393-406.
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  18.  88
    Lisa Bortolotti (2003). Inconsistency and Interpretation. Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):109-123.
    In this paper my purpose is to examine whether the case of inconsistent believers can offer a reason to object to theories of belief ascription that rely on a rationality constraint. I shall first illustrate how the possibility of inconsistent believers might be a challenge for the rationality constraint and then assess Davidson's influential reply to that challenge.
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  19.  17
    Mehmet M. Erginel (2011). Inconsistency and Ambiguity in Republic IX. Classical Quarterly 61 (02):493-520.
    Plato’s view on pleasure in the Republic emerges in the course of developing the third proof of his central thesis that the just man is happier than the unjust. Plato presents it as the “greatest and most decisive” proof of his central thesis, so one might expect to find an abundance of scholarly work on it. Paradoxically, however, this argument has received little attention from scholars, and what has been written on it has generally been harshly critical. I believe that (...)
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  20.  56
    Jody Azzouni (2013). Inconsistency in Natural Languages. Synthese 190 (15):3175-3184.
    An argument for Trivialism, the view that natural languages are logically inconsistent, is provided that does not rely on contentious empirical assumptions about natural language terms such as “and” or “or.” Further, the view is defended against an important objection recently mounted against it by Thomas Hofweber.
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  21.  18
    Robert W. Batterman (2014). The Inconsistency of Physics. Synthese 191 (13):2973-2992.
    This paper discusses a conception of physics as a collection of theories that, from a logical point of view, is inconsistent. It is argued that this logical conception of the relations between physical theories is too crude. Mathematical subtleties allow for a much more nuanced and sophisticated understanding of the relations between different physical theories.
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  22.  45
    Andrew Cling (1989). Eliminative Materialism and Self-Referential Inconsistency. Philosophical Studies 56 (May):53-75.
  23.  18
    Mathias Frisch (2014). Models and Scientific Representations Or: Who is Afraid of Inconsistency? Synthese 191 (13):3027-3040.
    I argue that if we make explicit the role of the user of scientific representations not only in the application but also in the construction of a model or representation, then inconsistent modeling assumptions do not pose an insurmountable obstacle to our representational practices.
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  24.  7
    Jan Albert van Laar (2007). Pragmatic Inconsistency and Credibility. Argumentation 21 (3):317-334.
    A critic may attack an arguer personally by pointing out that the arguer’s position is pragmatically inconsistent: the arguer does not practice what he preaches. A number of authors hold that such attacks can be part of a good argumentative discussion. However, there is a difficulty in accepting this kind of contribution as potentially legitimate, for the reason that there is nothing wrong for a protagonist to have an inconsistent position, in the sense of committing himself to mutually inconsistent propositions. (...)
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  25.  13
    Isabelle Brocas (2011). Dynamic Inconsistency and Choice. Theory and Decision 71 (3):343-364.
    In this paper, we analyze an intra-personal game where a decision-maker is summarized by a succession of selves. Selves may (or may not) have conflicting interests, and earlier selves may have imperfect knowledge of the preferences of future selves. At date 1, self-1 chooses a menu, at date 2, the preferences of self-2 realize and self-2 chooses an item from the menu. We show that equilibrium choice is consistent with either a preference for flexibility, a preference for betweenness or a (...)
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  26.  10
    Lisa Bortolotti (2003). Inconsistency and Interpretation. Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):109-123.
    Abstract In this paper I discuss one apparent counterexample to the rationality constraint on belief ascription. The fact that there are inconsistent believers does not seem compatible with the idea that only rational creatures can be ascribed beliefs. I consider Davidson's explanation of the possibility of inconsistent believers and claim that it involves a reformulation of the rationality constraint in terms of the believers' subscription to norms of rationality. I shall argue that Davidson's strategy is partially successful, but that the (...)
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  27.  60
    Terence Rajivan Edward, An Inconsistency in the (Supposed) Prohibitions of Philosophy.
    In different papers, David Liggins and Chris Daly tell philosophers what they should not do. There is no sign of them withdrawing any of these prohibitions, but I show that they fail to be consistent when asserting them. The inconsistency concerns when a philosopher should defer to the empirical findings of science.
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  28.  42
    Peter Vickers (2008). Frisch, Muller, and Belot on an Inconsistency in Classical Electrodynamics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):767-792.
    This paper follows up a debate as to whether classical electrodynamics is inconsistent. Mathias Frisch makes the claim in Inconsistency, Asymmetry and Non-Locality ([2005]), but this has been quickly countered by F. A. Muller ([2007]) and Gordon Belot ([2007]). Here I argue that both Muller and Belot fail to connect with the background assumptions that support Frisch's claim. Responding to Belot I explicate Frisch's position in more detail, before providing my own criticisms. Correcting Frisch's position, I find that I (...)
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  29. Andrew Bacon (2013). Curry's Paradox and Omega Inconsistency. Studia Logica 101 (1):1-9.
    In recent years there has been a revitalised interest in non-classical solutions to the semantic paradoxes. In this paper I show that a number of logics are susceptible to a strengthened version of Curry's paradox. This can be adapted to provide a proof theoretic analysis of the omega-inconsistency in Lukasiewicz's continuum valued logic, allowing us to better evaluate which logics are suitable for a naïve truth theory. On this basis I identify two natural subsystems of Lukasiewicz logic which individually, (...)
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  30.  86
    Thomas Pölzler (2014). Absurdism as Self-Help: Resolving an Essential Inconsistency in Camus’ Early Philosophy. Journal of Camus Studies 2014:91-102.
    Camus’ early philosophy has been subject to various kinds of criticism. In this paper I address a problem that has not been noticed so far, namely that it appears to be essentially inconsistent. On the one hand, Camus explicitly denies the existence of moral values, and construes his central notion of the absurd in a way that presupposes this denial. On the other hand, he is also committed to the existence of certain values. Both in his literary and philosophical works (...)
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  31.  16
    Joel David Hamkins, Greg Kirmayer & Norman Lewis Perlmutter (2012). Generalizations of the Kunen Inconsistency. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163 (12):1872-1890.
    We present several generalizations of the well-known Kunen inconsistency that there is no nontrivial elementary embedding from the set-theoretic universe V to itself. For example, there is no elementary embedding from the universe V to a set-forcing extension V[G], or conversely from V[G] to V, or more generally from one set-forcing ground model of the universe to another, or between any two models that are eventually stationary correct, or from V to HOD, or conversely from HOD to V, or (...)
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  32.  56
    Jeffrey Ketland (2005). Yablo's Paradox and Ω-Inconsistency. Synthese 145 (3):295-302.
    It is argued that Yablo’s Paradox is not strictly paradoxical, but rather ‘ω-paradoxical’. Under a natural formalization, the list of Yablo sentences may be constructed using a diagonalization argument and can be shown to be ω-inconsistent, but nonetheless consistent. The derivation of an inconsistency requires a uniform fixed-point construction. Moreover, the truth-theoretic disquotational principle required is also uniform, rather than the local disquotational T-scheme. The theory with the local disquotation T-scheme applied to individual sentences from the Yablo list is (...)
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  33.  71
    Newton C. A. Da Costa & Décio Krause (2014). Physics, Inconsistency, and Quasi-Truth. Synthese 191 (13):3041-3055.
    In this work, the first of a series, we study the nature of informal inconsistency in physics, focusing mainly on the foundations of quantum theory, and appealing to the concept of quasi-truth. We defend a pluralistic view of the philosophy of science, grounded on the existence of inconsistencies and on quasi-truth. Here, we treat only the ‘classical aspects’ of the subject, leaving for a forthcoming paper the ‘non-classical’ part.
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  34.  54
    Jody Azzouni (2007). The Inconsistency of Natural Languages: How We Live with It. Inquiry 50 (6):590 – 605.
    I revisit my earlier arguments for the (trivial) inconsistency of natural languages, and take up the objection that no such argument can be established on the basis of surface usage. I respond with the evidential centrality of surface usage: the ways it can and can't be undercut by linguistic science. Then some important ramifications of having an inconsistent natural language are explored: (1) the temptation to engage in illegitimate reductio reasoning, (2) the breakdown of the knowledge idiom (because its (...)
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  35.  81
    Margaret Morrison (2011). One Phenomenon, Many Models: Inconsistency and Complementarity. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42 (2):342-351.
    The paper examines philosophical issues that arise in contexts where one has many different models for treating the same system. I show why in some cases this appears relatively unproblematic (models of turbulence) while others represent genuine difficulties when attempting to interpret the information that models provide (nuclear models). What the examples show is that while complementary models needn’t be a hindrance to knowledge acquisition, the kind of inconsistency present in nuclear cases is, since it is indicative of a (...)
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  36.  9
    Yoshihiro Maruyama (forthcoming). Prior’s Tonk, Notions of Logic, and Levels of Inconsistency: Vindicating the Pluralistic Unity of Science in the Light of Categorical Logical Positivism. Synthese:1-13.
    There are still on-going debates on what exactly is wrong with Prior’s pathological “tonk.” In this article I argue, on the basis of categorical inferentialism, that two notions of inconsistency ought to be distinguished in an appropriate account of tonk; logic with tonk is inconsistent as the theory of propositions, and it is due to the fallacy of equivocation; in contrast to this diagnosis of the Prior’s tonk problem, nothing is actually wrong with tonk if logic is viewed as (...)
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  37.  67
    Patricia Marino (2011). Ambivalence, Valuational Inconsistency, and the Divided Self. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):41-71.
    Is there anything irrational, or self-undermining, about having "inconsistent" attitudes of caring or valuing? In this paper, I argue that, contra suggestions of Harry Frankfurt and Charles Taylor, the answer is "No." Here I focus on "valuations," which are endorsed desires or attitudes. The proper characterization of what I call "valuational inconsistency" I claim, involves not logical form (valuing A and not-A), but rather the co-possibility of what is valued; valuations are inconsistent when there is no possible world in (...)
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  38.  8
    Walter A. Carnielli, João Marcos & Sandra De Amo (2000). Formal Inconsistency and Evolutionary Databases. Logic and Logical Philosophy 8 (2):115-152.
    This paper introduces new logical systems which axiomatize a formal representation of inconsistency (here taken to be equivalent to contradictoriness) in classical logic. We start from an intuitive semantical account of inconsistent data, fixing some basic requirements, and provide two distinct sound and complete axiomatics for such semantics, LFI1 and LFI2, as well as their first-order extensions, LFI1* and LFI2*, depending on which additional requirements are considered. These formal systems are examples of what we dub Logics of Formal (...) (LFI) and form part of a much larger family of similar logics. We also show that there are translations from classical and paraconsistent first-order logics into LFI1* and LFI2*, and back. Hence, despite their status as subsystems of classical logic, LFI1* and LFI2* can codify any classical or paraconsistent reasoning. (shrink)
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  39.  44
    Matt Weiner (2009). The (Mostly Harmless) Inconsistency of Knowledge Ascriptions. Philosophers' Imprint 9 (1):1-25.
    I argue for an alternative to invariantist, contextualist, and relativist semantics for ‘know’. This is that our use of ‘know’ is inconsistent; it is governed by several mutually inconsistent inference principles. Yet this inconsistency does not prevent us from assigning an effective content to most individual knowledge ascriptions, and it leads to trouble only in exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, we have no reason to abandon our inconsistent knowledge-talk.
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  40.  75
    Gunnar Björnsson (2001). Why Emotivists Love Inconsistency. Philosophical Studies 104 (1):81 - 108.
    Emotivists hold that moral opinions are wishes and desires, and that the function of moral language is to “express” such states. But if moral opinions were but wishes or desires, why would we see certain opinions as inconsistent with, or following from other opinions? And why should our reasoning include complex opinions such as the opinion that a person ought to be blamed only if he has done something wrong? Indeed, why would we think that anything is conditional on his (...)
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  41.  41
    John Norton (1987). The Logical Inconsistency of the Old Quantum Theory of Black Body Radiation. Philosophy of Science 54 (3):327-350.
    The old quantum theory of black body radiation was manifestly logically inconsistent. It required the energies of electric resonators to be both quantized and continuous. To show that this manifest inconsistency was inessential to the theory's recovery of the Planck distribution law, I extract a subtheory free of this manifest inconsistency but from which Planck's law still follows.
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  42.  34
    Neil Campbell (2012). Reply to Nagasawa on the Inconsistency Objection to the Knowledge Argument. Erkenntnis 76 (1):137-145.
    Yujin Nagasawa has recently defended Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument from the “inconsistency objection.” The objection claims that the premises of the knowledge argument are inconsistent with qualia epiphenomenalism. Nagasawa defends Jackson by showing that the objection mistakenly assumes a causal theory of phenomenal knowledge. I argue that although this defense might succeed against two versions of the inconsistency objection, mine is unaffected by Nagasawa’s argument, in which case the inconsistency in the knowledge argument remains.
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  43.  3
    Michaelis Michael (2013). Facing Inconsistency: Theories and Our Relations to Them. Episteme 10 (4):351-367.
    Classical logic is explosive in the face of contradiction, yet we find ourselves using inconsistent theories. Mark Colyvan, one of the prominent advocates of the indispensability argument for realism about mathematical objects, suggests that such use can be garnered to develop an argument for commitment to inconsistent objects and, because of that, a paraconsistent underlying logic. I argue to the contrary that it is open to a classical logician to make distinctions, also needed by the paraconsistent logician, which allow a (...)
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  44. George Bealer (1978). An Inconsistency in Functionalism. Synthese 38 (July):333-372.
    This paper demonstrates that there is an inconsistency in functionalism in psychology and philosophy of mind. Analogous inconsistencies can be expected in functionalisms in biology and social theory. (edited).
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  45.  12
    Joel Smith (1988). Inconsistency and Scientific Reasoning. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 19 (4):429-445.
    This is a philosophical and historical investigation of the role of inconsistent representations of the same scientific phenomenon. The logical difficulties associated with the simultaneous application of inconsistent models are discussed. Internally inconsistent scientific proposals are characterized as structures whose application is necessarily tied to the confirming evidence that each of its components enjoys and to a vision of the general form of the theory that will resolve the inconsistency. Einstein's derivation of the black body radiation law is used (...)
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  46.  2
    Diderik Batens (2001). Towards the Unification of Inconsistency Handling Mechanisms. Logic and Logical Philosophy 8:5-31.
    It is shown that the consequence relations defined from theRescher-Manor Mechanism are all inconsistency-adaptive logics combined with a specific interpretation schema for the premises. Each of the adaptive logics isobtained by applying a suitable adaptive strategy to the paraconsistent logicCLuN.This result provides all those consequence relations with a proof theory and with a static semantics.
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  47.  31
    Kevin Knight (2002). Measuring Inconsistency. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (1):77-98.
    I provide a method of measuring the inconsistency of a set of sentences from 1-consistency, corresponding to complete consistency, to 0-consistency, corresponding to the explicit presence of a contradiction. Using this notion to analyze the lottery paradox, one can see that the set of sentences capturing the paradox has a high degree of consistency (assuming, of course, a sufficiently large lottery). The measure of consistency, however, is not limited to paradoxes. I also provide results for general sets of sentences.
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  48.  13
    Erik J. Olsson (2003). Avoiding Epistemic Hell: Levi on Pragmatism and Inconsistency. Synthese 135 (1):119 - 140.
    Isaac Levi has claimed that our reliance on the testimony of others, and on the testimony of the senses, commonly produces inconsistency in our set of full beliefs. This happens if what is reported is inconsistent with what we believe to be the case. Drawing on a conception of the role of beliefs in inquiry going back to Dewey, Levi has maintained that the inconsistent belief corpus is a state of ``epistemic hell'': it is useless as a basis for (...)
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  49.  23
    Bradley Armour-Garb (2007). Consistent Inconsistency Theories. Inquiry 50 (6):639 – 654.
    In this paper I critically evaluate a number of current "consistent inconsistency theories" and then briefly motivate a rival position. The rival position challenges a consistent inconsistency theory, by sharing many of its basic commitments without suffering the problems that such a theory appears to face.
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  50.  6
    Michael Schippers & Mark Siebel (2015). Inconsistency as a Touchstone for Coherence Measures. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 30 (1):11-41.
    The debate on probabilistic measures of coherence has focused on evaluating sets of consistent propositions. In this paper we draw attention to the largely neglected question of whether such measures concur with intuitions on test cases with inconsistent propositions and whether they satisfy general adequacy constraints on coherence and inconsistency. While it turns out that, for the vast majority of proposals in their original shape, this question must be answered in the negative, we show that it is possible to (...)
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