Modernity and the other: a story of inequality -- Locating the other in the political debates of early modernity -- Thinking and rethinking the equality of the other: Vitoria, Sepúlveda and the true barbarians -- Las Casas and the other: the tension between equality and cultural othercide -- From the civilizing mission to irreconcilable alterity: the changing perception of the Indians in the French Enlightenment -- The other side of modernity: legitimizing the transition from cultural othercide to physical othercide (...) -- Looking to the future. (shrink)
In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...) of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM – whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article took up the first two questions. Part II will take up the second two questions. Question 3 deals with the question as to whether DSM-V should assume a conservative or assertive posture in making changes from DSM-IV. That question in turn breaks down into discussion of diagnoses that depend on, and aim toward, empirical, scientific validation, and diagnoses that are more value-laden and less amenable to scientific validation. Question 4 takes up the role of pragmatic consideration in a psychiatric nosology, whether the purely empirical considerations need to be tempered by considerations of practical consequence. As in Part 1 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances. (shrink)
In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...) of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM - whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article took up the first two questions. Part II will take up the second two questions. Question 3 deals with the question as to whether DSM-V should assume a conservative or assertive posture in making changes from DSM-IV. That question in turn breaks down into discussion of diagnoses that depend on, and aim toward, empirical, scientific validation, and diagnoses that are more value-laden and less amenable to scientific validation. Question 4 takes up the role of pragmatic consideration in a psychiatric nosology, whether the purely empirical considerations need to be tempered by considerations of practical consequence. As in Part 1 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances. (shrink)
In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...) of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM - whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part 1 of this article took up the first two questions. Part 2 took up the second two questions. Part 3 now deals with Questions 5 & 6. Question 5 confronts the issue of utility, whether the manual design of DSM-III and IV favors clinicians or researchers, and what that means for DSM-5. Our final question, Question 6, takes up a concluding issue, whether the acknowledged problems with the earlier DSMs warrants a significant overhaul of DSM-5 and future manuals. As in Parts 1 & 2 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances. (shrink)
In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...) of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM - whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article will take up the first two questions. With the first question, invited commentators express a range of opinion regarding the nature of psychiatric disorders, loosely divided into a realist position that the diagnostic categories represent real diseases that we can accurately name and know with our perceptual abilities, a middle, nominalist position that psychiatric disorders do exist in the real world but that our diagnostic categories are constructs that may or may not accurately represent the disorders out there, and finally a purely constructivist position that the diagnostic categories are simply constructs with no evidence of psychiatric disorders in the real world. The second question again offers a range of opinion as to how we should define a mental or psychiatric disorder, including the possibility that we should not try to formulate a definition. The general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances. (shrink)
In the conclusion to this multi-part article I first review the discussions carried out around the six essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis – the position taken by Allen Frances on each question, the commentaries on the respective question along with Frances’ responses to the commentaries, and my own view of the multiple discussions. In this review I emphasize that the core question is the first – what is the nature of psychiatric illness – and that in some (...) manner all further questions follow from the first. Following this review I attempt to move the discussion forward, addressing the first question from the perspectives of natural kind analysis and complexity analysis. This reflection leads toward a view of psychiatric disorders – and future nosologies – as far more complex and uncertain than we have imagined. (shrink)
We present a compositional semantics for first-order logic with imperfect information that is equivalent to Sevenster and Sandu’s equilibrium semantics (under which the truth value of a sentence in a finite model is equal to the minimax value of its semantic game). Our semantics is a generalization of an earlier semantics developed by the first author that was based on behavioral strategies, rather than mixed strategies.
A stalwart view in the philosophy of science holds that, even when broadly construed so as to include theoretical auxiliaries, theories cannot make direct contactwith observations. This view owes much to Bogen and Woodward’s (1988) influential distinction between data and phenomena. According to them, data are typically the kind of things that are observable or measurable like "bubble chamber photographs, patterns of discharge in electronic particle detectors and records of reaction times and error rates in various psychological (...) experiments" (p. 306). Phenomena are physical processes that are typically unobservable. Examples of the latter category include "weak neutral currents, the decay of the proton, and chunking and recency effects in human memory" (ibid.). Theories, in Bogen and Woodward’s view, are utilised to systematically explain, infer and predict phenomena, not data (pp. 305-306). The relationship between theories and data is rather indirect. Data count as evidence for phenomena and the latter in turn count as evidence for theories. This view is becoming increasingly influential (e.g. Prajit K. Basu (2003), Stathis Psillos (2004) and Mauricio Suárez (2005)). In this paper I argue contrary to this view that in various significant and well-known cases theories do make direct contactwith the help of suitable auxiliaries. (shrink)
Partly in reply to D. Cannon’s critique of my analytical reconstruction of Polanyi’s post-critical theory of knowledge, I argue that there are good reasons for not appropriating Polanyi’s programme of self-identication and the confessional rhetoric which may be derived from it. Arguing that “post-critical”should not be identified with an uncritical dogmatism, I then go on to suggest that the theory of tacit knowing had best be elaborated further by drawingon the work of J. Searle and M. Johnson. Finally, I (...) make use of E. Meek’s account of the notion of “contactwith reality”to highlight the Polanyian criteria of truth. (shrink)
O descobrimento do Novo Mundo é um dos fatores fundamentais de ruptura com a tradição, na inauguração do pensamento moderno. A descoberta de povos no novo continente com culturas radicalmente diferentes da europeia leva a um questionamento cético sobre a universalidade da natureza humana, o que denominamos "argumento antropológico". Montaigne é o mais importante pensador deste contexto a discutir esta questão nos Ensaios. Examinamos aqui alguns dos aspectos centrais de sua reflexão a este respeito. The Discovery of the New World (...) is one of the central causes of the breakdown with tradition that opens the way to modern thought. The firstcontact of the Europeanswith the native peoples of the New World shows radically different cultures giving rise to doubts about the universality of human nature, what might be called an "anthropological argument" in a skeptic sense. Michel de Montaigne is the major philosopher in this context to discuss these issues in his Essays and I shall examine some of the more relevant aspects of this discussion. (shrink)
The Meditations, one of the key texts of Western philosophy, is the most widely studied of all Descartes' writings. This authoritative translation by John Cottingham, taken from the much acclaimed three-volume Cambridge edition of the Philosophical Writings of Descartes, is based upon the best available texts and presents Descartes' central metaphysical writings in clear, readable modern English. As well as the complete text of the Meditations, the reader will find a thematic abridgement of the Objections and Replies (which were originally (...) published with the Meditations) containing Descartes' replies to his critics. These extracts, specially selected for the present volume, indicate the main philosophical difficulties which occurred to Descartes' contemporaries and show how Descartes developed and clarified his arguments in response. This edition contains a new comprehensive introduction to Descartes' philosophy by John Cottingham and the classic introductory essay on the Meditations by Bernard Williams. (shrink)
We consider the decision problem for cases of first-order temporal logic with function symbols and without equality. The monadic monodic fragment with flexible functions can be decided with EXPSPACE-complete complexity. A single rigid function is sufficient to make the logic not recursively enumerable. However, the monadic monodic fragment with rigid functions, where no two distinct terms have variables bound by the same quantifier, is decidable and EXPSPACE-complete.
We present Property Theory with Curry Typing (PTCT), an intensional first-order logic for natural language semantics. PTCT permits fine-grained specifications of meaning. It also supports polymorphic types and separation types.1 We develop an intensional number theory within PTCT in order to represent proportional generalized quantifiers like most. We use the type system and our treatment of generalized quantifiers in natural language to construct a type-theoretic approach to pronominal anaphora that avoids some of the difficulties that undermine previous type-theoretic (...) analyses of this phenomenon. (shrink)
After their voyage through the United States, Alexis de Tocqueville and Gustave de Beaumont each wrote about the nature of race relations there. The author offers two theses regarding the nature of U.S. racism and its relation to U.S. democracy as revealed in Tocqueville's and Beaumont's texts. First, these works illustrate how European Americans, in subordinating Indians and blacks, produce not a politically and socially egalitarian democracy situated amid an otherwise racist society and culture but, rather, a social (...) state internally structured by inegalitarian relations with non-Europeans. Second, in Tocqueville's and Beaumont's portraits there operate (1) a critical narrative of European Americans' fraternalized relations withIndians, marked by sibling-rivalry-like democratic envy, and (2) a critical narrative of European Americans' relations of absolute differentiation with blacks, marked by desire to secure inalienable status. Both strategies are, nonetheless, rooted in European American anxiety over democracy's flux. (shrink)
In this article, I provide a close analysis of the resolutions to God as first known in Bonaventure’s Itinerarium mentis in Deum and the Collationes in Hexaemeron. Hardly any methodological reflection has been given to the fact that there are two accounts of God as first known in each of these works. Myanalysis shows that there exists a structural similarity between the Itinerarium and the Hexaemeron with regard to their treatment of Deus primum cognitum. In both texts, (...) Bonaventure’s doctrine on God as first known exhibits a dynamic character, which I relate to the fact that both texts present a spiritual discourse dealing with the gradual transformation of the soul, in which the resolutions are embedded. Each of the two resolutions is part of a different stage of the development ofknowledge that corresponds to this transformation. (shrink)
The paper presents Property Theory with Curry Typing (PTCT) where the language of terms and well-formed formulæ are joined by a language of types. In addition to supporting fine-grained intensionality, the basic theory is essentially first-order, so that implementations using the theory can apply standard first-order theorem proving techniques. Some extensions to the type theory are discussed, type polymorphism, and enriching the system with sufficient number theory to account for quantifiers of proportion, such as “most.”.
The aim of this paper is to introduce a formal system STW of self-referential truth, which extends the classical first-order theory of pure combinators with a truth predicate and certain approximation axioms. STW naturally embodies the mechanisms of general predicate application/abstraction on a par with function application/abstraction; in addition, it allows non-trivial constructions, inspired by generalized recursion theory. As a consequence, STW provides a smooth inner model for Myhill's systems with levels of implication.
For first order languages with no individual constants, empty structures and truth values (for sentences) in them are defined. The first order theories of the empty structures and of all structures (the empty ones included) are axiomatized with modus ponens as the only rule of inference. Compactness is proved and decidability is discussed. Furthermore, some well known theorems of model theory are reconsidered under this new situation. Finally, a word is said on other approaches to the (...) whole problem. (shrink)
We prove that the two-variable fragment of first-order intuitionistic logic is undecidable, even without constants and equality. We also show that the two-variable fragment of a quantified modal logic L with expanding first-order domains is undecidable whenever there is a Kripke frame for L with a point having infinitely many successors (such are, in particular, the first-order extensions of practically all standard modal logics like K, K4, GL, S4, S5, K4.1, S4.2, GL.3, etc.). For many (...) quantified modal logics, including those in the standard nomenclature above, even the monadic two-variable fragments turn out to be undecidable. (shrink)
We provide a simple translation of the satisfiability problem for regular grammar logics with converse into GF2, which is the intersection of the guarded fragment and the 2-variable fragment of first-order logic. The translation is theoretically interesting because it translates modal logics with certain frame conditions into first-order logic, without explicitly expressing the frame conditions. It is practically relevant because it makes it possible to use a decision procedure for the guarded fragment in order to decide (...) regular grammar logics with converse. The class of regular grammar logics includes numerous logics from various application domains. A consequence of the translation is that the general satisfiability problem for every regular grammar logics with converse is in EXPTIME. This extends a previous result of the first author for grammar logics without converse. Other logics that can be translated into GF2 include nominal tense logics and intuitionistic logic. In our view, the results in this paper show that the natural first-order fragment corresponding to regular grammar logics is simply GF2 without extra machinery such as fixed-point operators. (shrink)
J. D. Monk has shown that for first order languages with finitely many variables there is no finite set of schema which axiomatizes the universally valid formulas. There are such finite sets of schema which axiomatize the formulas valid in all structures of some fixed finite size.
The aim of this paper is to give a new proof for the decidability and finite model property of first-order logic with two variables (without function symbols), using a combinatorial theorem due to Herwig. The results are proved in the framework of polyadic equality set algebras of dimension two (Pse 2 ). The new proof also shows the known results that the universal theory of Pse 2 is decidable and that every finite Pse 2 can be represented on (...) a finite base. Since the class Cs 2 of cylindric set algebras of dimension 2 forms a reduct of Pse 2 , these results extend to Cs 2 as well. (shrink)
In his annual essay on the philosophy in France for the year 1912, André Lalande (1913, 366-7) made the following observation: M. Perrin, professor of physics at the Sorbonne, has described in Les Atomes, with his usual lucidity and vigor, the recent experiments (in which he has taken so considerable a part) which prove conclusively that the atoms are physical realities and not symbolical conceptions as people have for a long time been fond of calling them. By giving precise (...) and concordant measures for their weights and dimensions, it is proved that bodies actually exist which, though invisible, are analogous at all points to those which we see and touch. An old philosophical question thus receives a positive solution. This brief and matter-of-factly announcement expressed a rather widely shared sentiment on the European continent that Jean Perrin’s experimental work had clinched the issue of the reality of atoms. Indeed, it is now obvious that between roughly 1908 and 1912, there was a massive shift in the scientific community in favour of the atomic hypothesis. As is also obvious that Perrin’s experimental work on the causes of Brownian motion played a major role in this shift. When Perrin received the Nobel Prize for physics in 1926, it was noted in the presentation speech by Professor C W Oseen that he “put a definite end to the long struggle regarding the real existence of molecules”. Peter Achinstein has offered one of the most systematic expositions and reconstructions of Perrin’s argument, aiming a) to show how his own theory of evidence best accounts for the significance of Perrin’s results; and b) how Perrin has offered a local and experimental argument for scientific realism. After some detailed presentation of Perrin’s argument, I will offer my own reconstruction of it and will show why it is superior to Achinstein’s. Finally, I will try to draw some lessons for scientific realism. (shrink)
This is the first part of a two-part article in which we defend the thesis of Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature (HS). According to this thesis, two possible worlds cannot differ on what is a law of nature unless they also differ on the Humean base. The Humean base is easy to characterize intuitively, but there is no consensus on how, precisely, it should be defined. Here in Part I, we present and motivate a characterization of the Humean (...) base that, we argue, enables HS to capture what is really stake in the debate, without taking on extraneous commitments. (shrink)
In Part I, we presented and motivated a new formulation of Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature (HS). Here in Part II, we present an epistemological argument in defense of HS, thus formulated. Our contention is that one can combine a modest realism about laws of nature with a proper recognition of the importance of empirical testability in the epistemology of science only if one accepts HS.
This is the first part of a two-part article in which we defend the thesis of Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature (HS). According to this thesis, two possible worlds cannot differ on what is a law of nature unless they also differ on the Humean base. The Humean base is easily to characterize intuitively, but there is no consensus on how, precisely, it should be defined. Here in Part I, we present and motivate a characterization of the Humean (...) base that, we argue, enables HS to capture what is really stake in the debate, without taking on extraneous commitments. (shrink)
On the basis of a reinterpretation of the International Sexuality Description Project (ISDP) data, we suggest that findings are consistent with the view that human reproductive behaviour is largely under social control. Behaviours associated with a high Sociosexual Orientation Index (SOI) may be part of a progressive change in reproductive behaviour initiated by the dispersal of kin that occurs as societies modernize.
This is the first part of a two-part article in which we defend the thesis of Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature (HS). According to this thesis, two possible worlds cannot differ on what is a law of nature unless they also differ on the Humean base. The Humean base is easy to characterize intuitively, but there is no consensus on how, precisely, it should be defined. Here in Part I, we present and motivate a characteriza- tion of the (...) Humean base that, we argue, enables HS to capture what is really stake in the debate, without taking on extraneous commitments. (shrink)
This paper seeks to demonstrate the structural difference in communication of schizophrenia and autism. For a normal adult, spontaneous communication is nothing but the transmission of phantasía (thought) by means of perceptual objects or language. This transmission is first observed in a make-believe play of child. Husserl named this function “perceptual phantasía,” and this function presupposes as its basis the “internalized affection of contact” (which functions empirically in eye contact, body contact, or voice calling me). Regarding (...) autism, because of the innate lack of affection of contact, intersubjective perceptual phantasía does not occur spontaneously. Consequently, autistics do not engage in make-believe play but in stereotyped and solipsistic play. Without the formation of perceptual phantasía, there is no differentiation between phantasía and perception. For this reason, people with Asperger's syndrome consider conversation not an immediate communication of thought but a logical transmission of concepts. Schizophrenia is characterized by a distortion in the internalized affection of contact, resulting in a disturbance of perceptual phantasía, and this later is covered by various symptoms—for example, delusion as a pathological kind of communication of thought. This delusion is based on the pathological internalized affection of contact represented by a terrifying Other. (shrink)
We de ne an executable process interpretation for dynamic rst order logic and show that it is a faithful approximation of a dynamic interpre tation procedure for rst order formulas familiar from natural language semantics extended with constructs for bounded choice and bounded it eration This new interpretation of extended dynamic FOL is inspired by an executable interpretation for standard FOL proposed by Apt and Bezem The relation to the Apt Bezem style execution process and the advantages of taking (...) dynamic FOL rather than standard FOL as one s point of reference are discussed at some length Our results relate computational interpretation of FOL to a research tra dition from natural language semantics We discuss some example pro grams in Dynamo a simple language for dynamic logic programming based on the executable process interpretation for dynamic FOL.. (shrink)
This article briefly reviews concerns related to the “cultural colonialism” of applying Western biomedical models of research ethics to non-Western groups. The feasibility of alternate ethical models is discussed and found wanting. In practical terms, many academic researchers in the United States are funded by federal agencies and are required to adhere to Title 45, Part 46 of the Code of Federal Regulations , legislation that is clearly grounded in the Western biomedical research tradition. Consequently, the question is not whether (...) this system of ethics should be applied but rather how it can be applied most sensitively, appropriately, and wisely. The remainder of this article discusses of how the authors have attempted to do so in each stage of their own research with Hispanic immigrants to the United States. (shrink)
Via the formulas-as-types embedding certain extensions of Heyting Arithmetic can be represented in intuitionistic type theories. In this paper we discuss the embedding of ω-sorted Heyting Arithmetic HA ω into a type theory WL, that can be described as Troelstra's system ML 1 0 with so-called weak Σ-elimination rules. By syntactical means it is proved that a formula is derivable in HA ω if and only if its corresponding type in WL is inhabited. Analogous results are proved for Diller's (...) so-called restricted system and for a type theory based on predicate logic instead of arithmetic. (shrink)
In this paper the modal operator "x is provable in Peano Arithmetic" is incorporated into first-order theories. A provability extension of a theory is defined. Presburger Arithmetic of addition, Skolem Arithmetic of multiplication, and some first order theories of partial consistency statements are shown to remain decidable after natural provability extensions. It is also shown that natural provability extensions of a decidable theory may be undecidable.
Internal sets and the Boolean algebras of the collection of the internal sets are of central importance in non-standard analysis. Boolean algebras are the algebraization of propositional logic while the logic applied in non-standard analysis (in non-standard stochastics) is the first order or the higher order logic (type theory). We present here a first order logic algebraization for the collection of internal sets rather than the Boolean one. Further, we define an unusual probability on this algebraization.
A BSTRACT. We present Property Theory withCurry Typing (PTCT), an intensional first-order logic for natural language semantics. PTCT permits fine-grained specifications of meaning. It also supports polymorphic types and separation types.1 We develop an intensional number theory within PTCT in order to represent proportional generalized quantifiers like most. We use the type system and our treatment of generalized quantifiers in natural language to construct a typetheoretic approach to pronominal anaphora that avoids some of the difficulties that (...) undermine previous type-theoretic analyses of this phenomenon. (shrink)
We present Property Theory withCurry Typing (PTCT), an intensional first-order logic for natural language semantics. PTCT permits fine-grained specifications of meaning. It also supports polymorphic types and separation types.1 We develop an intensional number theory within PTCT in order to represent proportional generalized quantifiers like most. We use the type system and our treatment of generalized quantifiers in natural language to construct a type-theoretic approach to pronominal anaphora that avoids some of the difficulties that undermine previous (...) type-theoretic analyses of this phenomenon. (shrink)
This classic essay on the responsibilities of a doctor was first published in New York in 1769. It remains a perfect gift for a young doctor just starting out or for one who is older and wiser. This classic will be an inspiration to any who read its timeless message.
This article reports on an empirical investigation of long-term use of a groupware system in a spatially and massively distributed network of educators. It is a case study based investigation aimed at understanding the impacts of collaboration technology in supporting social interaction. The paradigm of social constructivism and the perspective of structuration are proposed as frameworks for understanding the impacts of technology on mediating social interaction. Utilizing these perspectives in an empirical investigation, the case study findings demonstrate how collaboration technology (...) can serve as a change agent in transforming the culture and structure of social interaction. This is enacted in two ways: through the various meanings which people construct when interacting with technology and in benefiting from the structural properties of a system through its technical affordances. (shrink)
First, this article provides a survey of the kind of relationship that existed between Kepler and the Jesuits. Afterwards, it is pondered upon the likelihood of their having been in direct contactwith each other while Kepler lived in Prague. The second part of the article is devoted to an investigation into the correspondence between Kepler and Paul Guldin as an example. Thus, the paper describes the key issues of those letters and concludes from this Guldin's attitude (...) to Kepler and the resulting commitment to Kepler's affairs. Finally, the article examines whether the assumption that Kepler and Guldin later discontinued their correspondence intensionally is verifiable and plausible. (shrink)
          The production of a number of vaccines involves the use of cell-lines originally derived from fetuses directly aborted in the 1960s and 1970s. Such cell-lines, indeed sometimes the very same ones, are important to on-going research, including at Catholic institutions. The cells currently used are removed by a number of decades and by a significant number of cellular generations from the original cells. Moreover, the original cells extracted from the bodies (...) of the aborted fetuses were transformed to produce the cell lines, since otherwise they would be incapable of the kind of culturing that is required.           It is generally acknowledged by ethicists, including many Catholic ones generally considered to be orthodox, and by the U.S. bishops, that the use of the cell-lines in connection with the production of vaccines is morally permissible. It does not appear that there is a relevant qualitative difference between the use of the cell-lines in vaccines and in research. One might argue that there is certainty of benefit from a vaccine while the benefits of research are uncertain. However, in any given case of the administration of a vaccine to an individual, it is far from certain that such administration will be of benefit to that individual. After all, the individual might never come in contactwith someone infected with the disease in question, particularly if the disease is now uncommon in the individual’s locale. Yet, it is morally certain that some of the administrations of the vaccine will be beneficial. This is parallel to the fact that while any one research project might not be beneficial, the history of biomedical research makes it extremely probable, indeed morally certain, that some project involving the use of such cell-lines will be beneficial. There may, of course, be quantitative difference between the cases—the probabilities and benefits may not be equal—but the difference does not seem to be a qualitative one. Therefore, if one accepts the use of the cell-lines in vaccines, one should accept the use in research in at least some conceivable and perhaps actual circumstances.           The main argument I am interested in in favor of the use of the cell-lines proceeds by first granting that the initial abortion and extraction of cells from the deceased fetus was morally gravely illicit. However, the connection between the currently used derived cells and the abortion and original derivation is sufficiently remote that the use becomes licit. Not all fruit of a poisoned tree is poisoned: it can be morally.... (shrink)
Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives et Imagerie Ce´re´brale (LENA), Hoˆpital de La Salpeˆtrie`re, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS).
The recent development of a field known as experimental philosophy—in particular, its subfield devoted to moral decision making—invites us to reflect on what it means to experiment in ethics and how it is that philosophers determine the good. Furthermore, as this new discipline uses the methods of experimental psychology to examine our intuitions about such things as praise, blame, and moral responsibility, we ought to consider the relationship between ethics and our psychological makeup. To this end, it will be beneficial (...) to consider the American pragmatists' interpretations of these issues. Ethics, for these thinkers, was both a psychological and an experimental enterprise, one in which all of our psychological .. (shrink)
A modern translation of J. G. Fichte's best known philosophical work (including his two explanatory Introductions), which contributed to the development of 19th Century German Idealism from Kant's critical philosophy.
Semi-urban ecotones exist on the periphery and in the midst of many human population centers. This article addresses the need for and nature of an ethos appropriate to inter-species contact in such zones. It first examines the historical and contemporary intellectual resources available for developing this kind of ethic, then surveys the range of possible relationships between humans and other animals, and finally investigates the morality of multi-species neighborhoods as a promising model. Discussion of these themes has the (...) effect, in conclusion, of dismantling notorious dualisms traditionally associated with the geographic imagination (city/wild, human/animal, nature/culture). (shrink)
